“The transfer is not reversible. Rather, it becomes known later that the title was always in the defrauded party and never transferred.

At this piont the owner gains the knowledge that he is entitled to recover his property.”

This sounds pretty reasonable. The only thing I don’t like about it is that there is uncertainty as to who is the actual title holder. How does the seller know when he can spend the money he got from the buyer? How does the buyer know when he can modify or trade away what he bought from the seller? A whole series of “illegitimate” transactions could take place before it was eventually discovered that the original title transfer had never even occurred.

This uncertainty could be avoided by designating a single point in time for the title to change hands. This point would be chosen by the parties to the exchange. If none was specified, it would be assumed that the title transfer occurred at the point of exchange. However, the title transfer could be set far enough in the future to allow for proper investigation of the exchanged items. Before the time of transfer had been reached, the seller could not spend the buyer’s money and the buyer could not damage, give away, or sell the seller’s merchandise.

“I am inclined to think that the act of title transfer should serve to certify that all necessary conditions for transfer have been met.”

But this is the point: the title transfer has not occurred. You are confusing the physical transfer of possession with title. If I hand you a flashlight to loan it to you for 5 minutes, there is no act of title transfer. Why? Because I don’t intend this, and you know it. Conversely, I can give you title to the flashlight even while still holding it. Physical possession and ownership are different things.

If I transfer $5 to you *if you are not defrauding me* as to the nature of apples you are selling me, then the title transfer *does not happen* if the condition is not fulfilled. That is the point.

” I favor this approach because I think it is preferable that the title be transferred at a specific point in time and that the transfer not be reversible.”

The transfer is not reversible. Rather, it becomes known later that the title was always in the defrauded party and never transferred.

At this piont the owner gains the knowledge that he is entitled to recover his property.

I am inclined to think that the act of title transfer should serve to certify that all necessary conditions for transfer have been met. I favor this approach because I think it is preferable that the title be transferred at a specific point in time and that the transfer not be reversible. It makes things much clearer cut and less muddy. Otherwise, there is a period of time where there is uncertainty regarding whether the title has actually been transferred, or whether the transfer will ultimately be reversed, against the wishes of the current title holder. This uncertainty should be avoided if at all possible.

If not otherwise specified, the title should transfer at the point of sale and be irreversible except through the voluntary action of the new title holder. If it is necessary to have a period of evaluation after purchase, delayed title transfer can allow for this. In this case, the title would transfer at a specified time in the future, unless certain actions were taken to prevent this from occurring (i.e. The buyer would have 30 days to evaluate his purchase, after which the title to his money would automatically and irreversibly transfer to the seller).

The benefits of this approach are that it specifies the time of title transfer, makes it final, and allows us to dispense with the word “fraud”, instead relying on good old theft (e.g. If the seller refused to return the buyer’s money within a previously stipulated evaluation period, the seller would be guilty of theft, because the title to the buyer’s money had not yet transferred to him.)

No you misunderstood. It is not that I cant “do anything” but I cant use force for the sake of punishment. I can only resort to violence to get restitution for my loss. Murder cases are the hardest since you cant bring back the lost one, killing the murderer would have nothing to the with my loss. And restitution for murder would indeed very high in my opinion. A life time of slavery of the murderer perhaps.

He is actually trespassing, because I assume the terms of his invitation to the property doesn’t cover the taping. The taping itself is not a crime but trespassing to have an access to the loo is a crime.

Apparently, ktibuk and Brainpolice, if you came home and found a family member dead then by your reasoning nothing could be done – the crime has been committed and is over, period. If you could find out who the perpetrator was you couldn’t do anything as you aren’t being physically threatened.

An act of violence is either aggression (initiatory) or self defense (reactionary). There is no third way.

If anyone is going to claim that the violence he resorts to is self defense (reactionary) he has to establish a link between his violent action and the aggression that was initiated against him.

If the claimed “self defense” is “punishment” there is no link between the initial aggression and the violence because punishment is the act of imposing some unpleasant situation without restitution of the initial aggression.

Violence for restitution on the other hand is directly linked with the initial aggression and that is why it is justifiable.

You don’t get to use violence as self defense at the time the attack just because the aggressor gave you an excuse. You use it to minimize your loses.

Perhaps Ayn Rand’s distinction can be helpful here: between “metaphysical givens” and “the man-made”, including laws, ideas, traditions, etc., as well as artifacts.

An act of violence is either aggression (initiatory) or self defense (reactionary). There is no third way.

If anyone is going to claim that the violence he resorts to is self defense (reactionary) he has to establish a link between his violent action and the aggression that was initiated against him.

If the claimed “self defense” is “punishment” there is no link between the initial aggression and the violence because punishment is the act of imposing some unpleasant situation without restitution of the initial aggression.

Violence for restitution on the other hand is directly linked with the initial aggression and that is why it is justifiable.

You don’t get to use violence as self defense at the time the attack just because the aggressor gave you an excuse. You use it to minimize your loses.

Even if for arguments sake we bring scarcity, which is an economics concept, into a ethics discussion, one must logically assume that even an idea is scarce “BEFORE” the copying. What makes an idea non scarce is the act of copying.

And, for arguments sake, since non scarcity of ideas is what makes an idea non property, an idea that has never been copied must be a property of producer.

So scarcity is not relevant to the fact that copying without consent is aggression or not because it precedes any dissolution of property (I know weird concept but this IP socialism is weird too)

“But the NAP prohibits aggression–the initiation of violence. It does not prohibit all force or violence.”

I never argued that it does. I’m not advocating pacifism, just a tigher view of the NAP. My point is that “punishment” (as an arbitrary ex-post-facto use of force) is an initiation of violence, not self-defense.

But saying it’s initiation as opposed to self-defense is question-begging, b/c it implicitly assumes that anything that is not self-defense is initiatory.

This needs an argument. And it is wrong, since IMO force — whether retaliatory, restitutive, or defensive — that is in response to initiated force, is … well, in response to the aggression, not initiated itself.

“And proportional violence applied to the aggressor by the victim is not initiatory–it’s in response to initiated violence; this is why people distinguish defensive force from aggression; but defensive force is just one type of responsive force. It is responsive force in general that is the opposite of aggression.”

If you punch me in the face one day, and a few days later then I punch you in the face, all I’ve done is created escalation.

Maybe, and if so, it’s unwise to retaliate; but this does not mean it’s aggression or initiatory.

Me punching you in the face serves no constructive purpose.

Even if tha’ts right, that does not mean it’s initiatory.

The violence has only been doubled.

So? Libertarians are not against violence, but aggression. Defense is violent, but fine, for example.

At best, all you could argue is that I have been restituted with “psychological utility points”.

Did you not read my post? I am saying restitution is not the standard. I never pretend it’s “restitution.” It’s just an action the victim has a right to take, if he wants to, for his own reasons.

So – what is the PURPOSE of punishment then?

I laid them out in my post–a victim might want to use responsive force for any number of purposes or reasons–revenge, satisfaction, “closure,” incapacitation, deterrence, rehabilitation, restitutive bargaining, compelling action, etc. If people had no reason to want to punish, we would have nothing to puzzle about. It is quite obvious people do want to punish, or use responsive force, sometimes. The question is: may they?

This seems to only reinforce my claim that retribution is punishment for its own sake.

The more general category is responsive force, or perhaps retaliation. It’s not always for retribution.

“So what? The purpose or reason that motivates a victim to exercise her right to punish is irrelevant.”

If you can’t see the psychological problem with vengeance, that’s your problem.

I do see that there are psychological problems with it. I tend to *prefer* as well as predict that a restitutive-dominant system would emerge. What has this to do with whether a victim has a right to punish?

Anyways, I deny that anyone has a right to punish.

Yes, I was wondering what your reasoning for this assertion is.

But keep in mind that part of this is semantics over how we define punishment. I’m primarily refering to violent punishment, ranging from torture to death. I fail to see how this (ex-post-facto violence against offenders) can be part of a libertarian concept of justice.

Because the victim has a right to do it, and justice is giving someone their due–what they are entitled to do. They have a right to, since the aggressor has no grounds to complain about violence, since by committing an act of aggression they have irrevocably committed themselves to upholding this rule as legitimate, so that any objection to it being acted on against them is contradictory.

“I dont’t agree. While proportionality in retribution is not an exact science, at least the goal is clear: to impose like damage or violent harm on the aggressor.”

That’s punishment for punishment’s sake. I don’t see any rational reason for it, beyond the emotion of a victim (which isn’t rational).

Who cares if you see a rational reason for it? The question is not whether you approve of someone’s reaons in exercising their rights, but whether they have this right.

To be clear, I don’t necessarily entirely oppose victim empowerment/enforcement. But I think there is a danger of it greatly exceeding the nature of the crime because of the subjectivity of the victim’s emotions.

That’s why loose-cannon, self-help measures would be frowned upon and people would have communal, institutional reason to use reliable institutions of justice to make these determinations. But just b/c this is done does not mean punishment is ruled out.

But the same is true of 3rd party enforcement as well, it too can greatly exceed the nature of the crime and do little more than appease the emotions of victims and spectators.

So what, again? I do thin this is one reason that a punitive system would be more expensive and thus tend to be outcompeted by a restitution based system, but that doesn’t mean it violates an aggressor’s rights to violently punish him.

The reason why I say that the “traditional” notion of punishment is essentially mobocracy is because the only function it really serves is to appease the emotions for revenge of victims and spectators.

You seem to think that it’s uncontroversial that if “mere revenge” is a motive for some victim exercising her right to punish, that this means there is no right to punish. This is an incorrect assumption.

Does “imposing like harm on an offender” actually negate the crime or help the victim in any way (other than appeasing their emotions)?

But nothing undoes the harm, so this is an empty critique.
ktibuk:

“then one has to understand fraud as some kind of misrepresentation that vitiates the consent needed for a title transfer to be effective”

Exactly.

That is why “consent” is the basis for judging if aggression took place or not, and “copying without the consent of the owner” is aggression.

this does not follow at all. Fraud means that if A and B have a transaction, and A defrauds B about the nature of what A is giving to B in exchange for B transferring some title to A, then the title from B to A does not happen and A is in effect a trespasser if he then uses or takes the property. But all this presupposes a view of property in scarce resource to which B has title.

All this implies for your “copying without the consent of the owner is aggression” notion is that if B loans or rents or partially sells to A some owned scarce resource on certain conditions, such that B does not give A permission to copy it, then A is committing a type of trespass against B if he nevertheless does copy it.

But this does not imply that the pattern of information he copied was property. And it does not imply that a third party C or fourth party D who learns of the information without committing trespass against B’s owned scarce resource, is committing any kind of trespass or aggression against B.

Exactly.

That is why “consent” is the basis for judging if aggression took place or not, and “copying without the consent of the owner” is aggression.

“My point is that “punishment” (as an arbitrary ex-post-facto use of force) is an initiation of violence, not self-defense.”

Using violence as self defense, rests on the assumption of a “what if” situation about the use of violence.

What if at the point of aggression the victim could have actually used force to defend himself. Would this be ok?

Yes it would.

The fact that a crime actually took place means the victim couldn’t defend himself.

But after the fact, using violence as punishment has no rational basis.

The only way violence can be used after the fact is restitution, since again if the victim could actually use force to defend himself he wouldn’t have lost anything.

Maybe some discomfort of having to deal with aggression but that can be dealt with restitution larger than the loss.

I never argued that it does. I’m not advocating pacifism, just a tigher view of the NAP. My point is that “punishment” (as an arbitrary ex-post-facto use of force) is an initiation of violence, not self-defense.

“And proportional violence applied to the aggressor by the victim is not initiatory–it’s in response to initiated violence; this is why people distinguish defensive force from aggression; but defensive force is just one type of responsive force. It is responsive force in general that is the opposite of aggression.”

If you punch me in the face one day, and a few days later then I punch you in the face, all I’ve done is created escalation. Me punching you in the face serves no constructive purpose. The violence has only been doubled. At best, all you could argue is that I have been restituted with “psychological utility points”. So – what is the PURPOSE of punishment then? This seems to only reinforce my claim that retribution is punishment for its own sake.

“So what? The purpose or reason that motivates a victim to exercise her right to punish is irrelevant.”

If you can’t see the psychological problem with vengeance, that’s your problem. Anyways, I deny that anyone has a right to punish. But keep in mind that part of this is semantics over how we define punishment. I’m primarily refering to violent punishment, ranging from torture to death. I fail to see how this (ex-post-facto violence against offenders) can be part of a libertarian concept of justice.

“I dont’t agree. While proportionality in retribution is not an exact science, at least the goal is clear: to impose like damage or violent harm on the aggressor.”

That’s punishment for punishment’s sake. I don’t see any rational reason for it, beyond the emotion of a victim (which isn’t rational).

“Well, I dont agree. And anyway it doesn’t stop me. But I think Rand hated the idea of messiness, with not having a “final” decision (even if wrong). Bizarre.”

I should modify my statement: she couldnt embrace market anarchy because she felt a need for a monopoly on retribution/retaliation. However, I think my original statement stands in that this follows from her general thrist for it. That comment of mine was sidetracking though.

The very concept of punishment (and I’m defining punishment as the inflicting of physical harm against an offender for reasons other than self-defense) is a violation of the NAP, since it’s ex-post-facto violence.

But the NAP prohibits aggression–the initiation of violence. It does not prohibit all force or violence. And proportional violence applied to the aggressor by the victim is not initiatory–it’s in response to initiated violence; this is why people distinguish defensive force from aggression; but defensive force is just one type of responsive force. It is responsive force in general that is the opposite of aggression.

“Punishment”, at least as traditionally concieved, is little more than revenge.

So what? The purpose or reason that motivates a victim to exercise her right to punish is irrelevant.

Furthermore, the theory of retribution is even more nonsensical, since it favors punishment for punishment’s sake, not for any rational reason.

No; it says this: here we have a victim who (for some reason) wants to punish her offender. Is it justified, or not? If he aggressed against her, it’s not against her rights–or, to put it another way, he has no grounds to object, and if he doesn’t, neither do outsiders.

That being said, I think Kinsella’s estoppel approach contitutes a half-decent proportionality concept, similar to Rothbard’s proportionality concept.

Thanks.

As for the vageness of restitution, the exact same vagueness exists for retribution. Arguably, retribution is even more vague.

I dont’t agree. While proportionality in retribution is not an exact science, at least the goal is clear: to impose like damage or violent harm on the aggressor. There are gray areas, but the idea is clear enough and provides some guidance; and we can easily identify excessive punishment, or punishemnt that is not as severe as could be justified.

By contrast, the idea of restitution if it means “make the victim whole” is also coherent and has some standard; but unfortunately, except for simple cases of restoration of stolen property, it’s unattainable and unrealistic. So if you abandon the idea of “making the victim whole” (which is completely impossible), then what is restitution? What is it, other than some sum of money? Obviously you don’t mean “just any sum of money”; yet you don’t mean “enough to make the victim whole.” So what is the standard? I think there is no standard. I think restitution has to refer to an award of damages that can be thought of as the ransom to escape proportional punishment. That amount is not arbitrary, unlike the vague, free-floating concept “restitution”.

“The main reason why Ayn Rand couldn’t jump the fence towards market anarchism is because she couldn’t give up her love for retribution and “retaliation”. ”

Well, I dont agree. And anyway it doesn’t stop me. But I think Rand hated the idea of messiness, with not having a “final” decision (even if wrong). Bizarre.