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Source link: http://archive.mises.org/9220/mondustrial-policy/

Mondustrial Policy

January 11, 2009 by

John Taylor, once consider a possible Greenspan successor, has blasted the Fed for running what he he calls Mondustrial Policy, which amounts to picking winners and losers in the marketplace via monetary policy. Taylor is not an Austrian but at least he is aware that too much pumping is bad news.


Bruce Koerber January 11, 2009 at 9:38 pm

Instead we got Bernanke!

The prepping by Bernanke during the end of the Greenspan tenure made it clear and obvious that if selected he would make the Federal Reserve the mainline for the dope-loving unConstitutional coup. His lust for power and lack of ethics made him the perfect candidate and so if John Taylor was ‘qualified’ it mattered not.

The unConstitutional coup had their man! And now he is injecting the dope continually and he is increasing the dosage since it potency is being watered down. Loopy from the dope these economic terrorists look worldwide with crazed eyes for places to pillage to support their drug habit.

MC Shalom January 12, 2009 at 5:45 am

Ben S. Bernanke Exposed

“The debate about the ultimate causes of the prolonged Japanese slump has been heated. There are questions, for example, about whether the Japanese economic model, constrained as it is by the inherent conservatism of a society that places so much value on consensus, is well-equipped to deal with the increasing pace of technological, social, and economic change we see in the world today.

The problems of the Japanese banking system, for example, can be interpreted as arising in part from the collision of a traditional, relationship-based financial system with the forces of globalization, deregulation, and technological innovation (Hoshi and Kashyap, forthcoming). Indeed, it seems fairly safe to say that, in the long run, Japan’s economic success will depend largely on whether the country can achieve a structural transformation that increases its economic flexibility and openness to change, without sacrificing its traditional strengths.

In the short-to-medium run, however, macroeconomic policy has played, and will continue to play, a major role in Japan’s macroeconomic (mis) fortunes. My focus in this essay will be on monetary policy in particular. Although it is not essential to the arguments I want to make—-which concern what monetary policy should do now, not what it has done in the past—-I tend to agree with the conventional wisdom that attributes much of Japan’s current dilemma to exceptionally poor monetary policy-making over the past fifteen years (see Bernanke and Gertler, 1999, for a formal econometric analysis).

Among the more important monetary-policy mistakes were 1) the failure to tighten policy during 1987-89, despite evidence of growing inflationary pressures, a failure that contributed to the development of the “bubble economy”; 2) the apparent attempt to “prick” the stock market bubble in 1989-91, which helped to induce an asset-price crash; and 3) the failure to ease adequately during the 1991-94 period, as asset prices, the banking system, and the economy declined precipitously

Bernanke and Gertler (1999) argue that if the Japanese monetary policy after 1985 had focused on stabilizing aggregate demand and inflation, rather than being distracted by the exchange rate or asset prices, the results would have been much better. Bank of Japan officials would not necessarily deny that monetary policy has some culpability for the current situation. But they would also argue that now, at least, the Bank of Japan is doing all it can to promote economic recovery.

For example, in his vigorous defense of current Bank of Japan (BOJ) policies, Okina (1999, p. 1) applauds the “BOJ’s historically unprecedented accommodative monetary policy”. He refers, of course, to the fact that the BOJ has for some time now pursued a policy of setting the call rate, its instrument rate, virtually at zero, its practical floor. Having pushed monetary ease to 2 Posen (1998) discusses the somewhat spotty record of Japanese fiscal policy; see especially his Chapter 2.its seeming limit, what more could the BOJ do? Isn’t Japan stuck in what Keynes called a “liquidity trap”?

I will argue here that, to the contrary, there is much that the Bank of Japan, in cooperation with other government agencies, could do to help promote economic recovery in Japan. Most of my arguments will not be new to the policy board and staff of the BOJ, which of course has discussed these questions extensively. However, their responses, when not confused or inconsistent, have generally relied on various technical or legal objections—- objections which, I will argue, could be overcome if the will to do so existed.

My objective here is not to score academic debating points. Rather it is to try in a straightforward way to make the case that, far from being powerless, the Bank of Japan could achieve a great deal if it were willing to abandon its excessive caution and its defensive response to criticism.”

Prof. Benjamin Shalom Bernanke
Japanese Monetary Policy: A Case of Self-Induced Paralysis?
For presentation at the ASSA meetings, Boston MA, January 9, 2000.

So Mister Chairman Ben S. Bernanke is not fit to deal with the present situation he does not even readily understand.
Moreover, he advocates illegality.
There is no pilot in this plane! We are going to crash!

If short-term risk free interest rates are at 0.00% doesn’t that mean that credit is worthless?

A Credit Free, Free Market Economy will correct all of those dysfunctions.

The alternative would be to wait till, on the long run, most of our productive assets get physically destroyed either by war or by rust.
It will be either awfully deadly or dramatically long.

In This Age of Turbulence People Want an Exit Strategy Out of Credit,
An Adventure in a New World Economic Order.

We Need Hence Abolish Interest Bearing Credit and Cancel All Interest Bearing Debt.

A Specific Application of Employment, Interest and Money
[Intended to my Fellows Economists].

Exit Strategy Out of Credit

Press release of my open letter to Chairman Ben S. Bernanke:

Chairman Ben S. Bernanke, Quantitative Easing Can’t Work!

Yours Sincerely,

Shalom P. Hamou AKA ‘MC Shalom’
Chief Economist – Master Conductor
1776 – Annuit CÅ“ptis.

Joe January 12, 2009 at 6:42 am

You know, there is part of me that actually wonders if Keynesians in general actually think that the Zimbabwean Central Bank and Mugabe Government are economic geniuses? They must because they are following the policies.

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