The Lockean (and Rothbardian) theory of initial acquisition of property involves the necessity of mixing one’s labor with an object in the external environment. Once labor has been applied to a thing, it can legitimately become one’s private property. The immediate question that arises is, how much labor is necessary in order to make a thing one’s own? Suppose I pick up a stone thinking of throwing it an my foe; is the stone thereby mine? But isn’t the stone unchanged? With what have I mixed my labor? Or suppose that I bend down and blow some air gently with my mouth over the stone without so much as touching it. Haven’t I exerted myself? Can I now claim the stone as mine by natural right? In another scenario imagine that Robinson Crusoe has decided to use the island he discovered as an amusement park, e.g., by placing some dinosaurs in it. Doesn’t it seem reasonable that he be able to claim the whole island as his own even before he populates it with raptors (otherwise, how can he be certain that he will not be thwarted in his endeavors for potential competitors in the meantime?)? Not according to Rothbard:
Suppose that Crusoe had landed not on a small island but on a new and virgin continent, and that, standing on the shore, he had claimed “ownership” of the entire new continent by virtue of his own prior discovery. This assertion would be sheer empty vainglory, so long as no one else came upon the continent. For the natural fact is that his true property – his actual control over material goods – would extend only so far as his actual labor brought them into production. (Ethics of Liberty, 34)
But what is true of a continent should be true of a smaller island, as well. And in yet another example, what if I want to abandon ownership of the stone by placing it back in the state of nature? Can I do that? The labor theory of property (LTP) would seem to say no. As Rothbard writes,
it would be empty and meaningless for Crusoe to trumpet that he does not “really” own some or all of what he has produced…, for in fact the use and therefore the ownership has already been his. Crusoe, in natural fact, owns his own self and the extension of his self into the material world, neither more nor less. (34)
A second problem is, how does an addition of labor to a thing make the entire result of capital good of (n-1)th order = labor + time + capital good of nth order one’s own as opposed to just the results of his labor? In order to own the capital good of (n-1)th order one must also have previously come to own the capital good of nth order, for example, a good that one simply found in nature. But how does he come to own that original good? Isn’t that precisely what we are trying to figure out? The LTP is of no help, for it assumes what it sets out to demonstrate. And it is beside the point that labor infused into a good is inseparable from that good. The question of justification of ownership remains. Further, say I labor on a good that belongs to someone else, and, what’s more, I invest into it much more energy than its owner had put into it. What reason is there, according to the LTP, for not considering me as the rightful owner of the good?
Given these difficulties, it seems to me that the theory of ownership should be to an extent modified. It is not the labor per se that causes a thing to become owned, but rather the thing’s participation in a plan of action devised by a person. If I simply decide to use an unowned object for a particular end, it immediately become my own. In other words, if there is a connection between a material thing and my immaterial designs for it, then that connection alone is sufficient to make the object mine. Thus, picking up the stone in order to defend myself causes the stone to become mine, because it is now part of a plan that I came up with to further my well-being. Blowing air over the stone does not, but not because the amount of labor exerted is too small, but because this action is meaningless and has no purpose. The use of the stone does not enter into my actions. Yes, Crusoe can claim the whole island as his, as long as he really intends to convert all of it into an amusement park. It becomes his the moment his plan forms in his mind with the natural proviso that the plan is at least at first glance realizable. Of course, if Friday also has plans for the island, it devolves to whoever first formally establishes his ownership of the island, for such a notice is essential to orderly claims of property rights in any actual society. And just as Crusoe can formally come to own the island, so he can, upon learning of the uselessness of a property to him, also formally divest himself of or abandon it. All he has to do is notify everyone of his no longer having an interest in it.
Thus, legal ownership should follow upon praxeological control. He comes to own a hitherto unowned thing who intends to use it for an end, even before he mixes any labor with it and regardless of the amount of the actual labor he imparts into it. In other words, the necessity of using labor with capital goods is due to the law that all production requires more than one input to factor in it. And it is true that working on a thing often constitutes good evidence of using it for a purpose, whereas Crusoe’s harboring a plan in his head is hidden from whoever may challenge him for the claim to a property. But it must be realized that this epistemological utility of labor is irrelevant to who ought to own any given thing.
Notice that the second problem of the LTP mentioned above is also solved, for any original good can become private property once it is incorporated into a plan of human action. One is able to get something for nothing (that is, for free) by appropriating nature-given resources under the right circumstances, exactly as our intuition demands. The concept of ownership is useful here, because it is rare that the same object can be used for several different purposes by different people at the same time. But does not our theory allow Crusoe to claim ownership of an entire continent, as long as he comes up with a plan to exploit it? I believe so, yet there is no absurdity in this. It is precisely the fact that one cannot usually have such enormous ambitions that causes continents to become owned by different people one little patch of land after another. Further, consider the following situation: in the not-so-distant future a big corporation sends a ship to Mars with the hope of “terraforming” a large part of it and thereby making it habitable by human beings (rather like in the movie Total Recall). Would it not be a perfectly just thing for the company to come to own the entire land it intends to transform from hostile to human life to supportive of it? Would it not be reasonable for it to be able to charge independent colonists who wanted to move to Mars money for the land even before it is developed, despite the fact that the amount of the land in its possession is huge? Yes, I think, on both questions. The LTP, on the other hand, would not allow the land to become owned until it is actually terraformed which might cause the company to become involved into futile disputes with competitors.
Now suppose a person has “claimed” a parcel of land by putting up a fence around it, yet he does not intend to use it for anything. According to our theory of property, that person does not actually own the land. But even if his property rights are formally recognized, this is not a problem. For now anyone can buy the land from its “owner” for no more than a penny, for even a penny would be of more use to its “owner” than the land itself. Thus, again, the imparting of a final cause to a thing is crucial for any genuine ownership of it. Unless the final cause is present, the property is worthless and may even be an economic bad.
Again, this is an outline of a theory of initial appropriation, not a theory of property transfers. If I already own a thing and give to another person the right to use it for his own purposes (e.g., renting an apartment), he does not by virtue of his controlling the object come to own it and thereby deprive me from owning it. Only when all the proper rights in the bundle of rights are transferred does ownership change hands. In other words, ownership persists even if the original plan of action that caused the object to become owned is no longer viable, as long as it still figures in some plan or another.
If the arguments above are correct, then this “praxeological” theory of property is superior to the LTP and should be used instead of it.
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“So “ownership” is defined as “rightful control”.
But this presupposes that “rights” be defined first.
And then what about the Rothbardian project of deriving morality from the axiom of self-ownership?”
Here is an essay by Kinsella that I think explains the entire concept well:
http://mises.org/daily/2291
Interesting. But it has some problems.
“Given these difficulties, it seems to me that the theory of ownership should be to an extent modified. It is not the labor per se that causes a thing to become owned, but rather the thing’s participation in a plan of action devised by a person.”
Okay, he’s onto something–in criticizing labor as the source of ownership. He is not clear about exactly why, though, but still. I’ve critized the idea that “labor” or “creation” is the source of ownership in a few places– Thoughts on Intellectual Property, Scarcity, Labor-ownership, Metaphors, and Lockean Homesteading; Against Intellectual Property for example.
“If I simply decide to use an unowned object for a particular end, it immediately become my own. In other words, if there is a connection between a material thing and my immaterial designs for it, then that connection alone is sufficient to make the object mine.”
Almost. What he seems to be missing is that the connection has to be intersubjectively ascertainable–i.e,. visible; i.e., it has to be a type of embordering, the establishing-of-a-border. See my Defending Argumentation Ethics, esp. the section “Objective Links: First Use, Verbal Claims, and the Prior-Later Distinction,” and the links in this piece to various writings by Hans-Hermann Hoppe on this issue.
“Thus, picking up the stone in order to defend myself causes the stone to become mine, because it is now part of a plan that I came up with to further my well-being. Blowing air over the stone does not, but not because the amount of labor exerted is too small, but because this action is meaningless and has no purpose. The use of the stone does not enter into my actions. Yes, Crusoe can claim the whole island as his, as long as he really intends to convert all of it into an amusement park. It becomes his the moment his plan forms in his mind with the natural proviso that the plan is at least at first glance realizable.”
Not quite. Merely being part of a plan in one’s mind is not enough. Ownership is the assignment of the exclusive right to control to a scarce resource. The purpose is to permit conflict-free usage of resources. This is one reason why ownership by decree is not sufficient–any number of people could claim something by decree, and there is no objective way to decide as between these claimants. The same is true of people forming plans in their minds. More is needed: some embordering action.
“Of course, if Friday also has plans for the island, it devolves to whoever first formally establishes his ownership of the island, for such a notice is essential to orderly claims of property rights in any actual society.”
I think he’s getting it backwards here. He’s thinking that notice is just the way that you formally establish your internal claim. I think that’s not right. It is instead the notice that is itself the claiming.
“Thus, legal ownership should follow upon praxeological control.”
Yes, but not because one has a claim as soon as you think of a way to use something, and then make this formal with some kind of notice. All you need to to is emborder–use, mix labor with, imprint one’s personality on–the thing. That necessarily is including it in some plan, and notifying at the same time. Further, by this author’s definition, you could (a) think of a way to use something, then (b) “formally notify” people *without even using the thing*. But this would not be even praxeological control. I could post on my blog tomorrow, “I have thought of a great way to use Mars–I hereby claim it, be on notice.” By his framework, this is enough, even though it is NOT “praxeological control.”
“And it is true that working on a thing often constitutes good evidence of using it for a purpose, whereas Crusoe’s harboring a plan in his head is hidden from whoever may challenge him for the claim to a property. But it must be realized that this epistemological utility of labor is irrelevant to who ought to own any given thing.”
I disagree. Working the thing is the homesteading. Not the “mental planning.”
“Now suppose a person has “claimed” a parcel of land by putting up a fence around it, yet he does not intend to use it for anything. According to our theory of property, that person does not actually own the land. But even if his property rights are formally recognized, this is not a problem. For now anyone can buy the land from its “owner” for no more than a penny, for even a penny would be of more use to its “owner” than the land itself.”
I think this is incredibly naive. If the land is worth $1 million to the buyer, I won’t sell it to him for just a penny, even if it has no “mental plan” value for me!
Well said. I am agree with you.
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Anthony: “So “ownership” is defined as “rightful control”. But this presupposes that “rights” be defined first. And then what about the Rothbardian project of deriving morality from the axiom of self-ownership?”
Me: Well, not exactly. Let’s not confuse rights with what is right. On the one hand, it is right to respect rights because one has an obligation to do so. But on the other, rights are a form of moral claim (to the aforementioned obligation) and they do not exhaust what is right to do.
Also, I reject the notion that self-ownership is an axiom. It is true, but it is not an axiom.
1. Why does establishing a border over a piece of land cause you to come to own that piece of land?
2. What if several people try to emborder the same territory at the same time? How are their claims to be adjudicated?
3. The North American continent is naturally embordered by oceans. Can’t I claim that I own the entire continent by wetting my hand in their waters?
4. Suppose that instead of making an arrowhead, I find a stone already shaped like an arrowhead (or even a whole arrow lost by someone) in nature. Can’t I appropriate it rightfully even without laboring on it? There is really no connection between the form or even the former of a thing and who should own it. But there is a definite connection between the purpose of a thing and claims of ownership of it. Even going beyond initial appropriation, on the free market ownership of a resource will gravitate toward whoever can use it most profitably. Or must I continuously clutch the arrowhead in my hand, thereby “establishing a border” over the item, the “fence” being the palm and fingers of my hand? If I were to let go of the arrowhead, would it cease to be mine?
5. If embordering a land is how property rights are established, then go on and do that. What’s the big deal?
1. Whoever propounds the decree first is the owner. Suppose you find a seemingly unowned lot full of junk. Ah, you say, a great place for me and my friends to play ball. You clean the place out, mixing your labor with it, and boom, it’s yours. Now suppose instead the lot was in pristine condition. Can you appropriate it without mixing any labor with it? Why not?
2. Ownership is a conceptual category. It takes general recognition of the validity of a procedure of claiming ownership for any such procedure to work. Property is about the meaning that people attach to the connection between you and the object you own. Putting up a fence around something will work to establish ownership only if people believe that it is a valid means to it. And they may or may not.
3. If embordering means simply specifying the limits of your property for all to see, then sure, it is necessary to do it. But that can fall under my formalities for establishing ownership.
Why would you want to do something like that?
Congratulations, you now own Mars. And no, this is not a reductio; I’ll be happy if someone can make use of Mars. Again, the purpose has to be real and attainable. I allow that you may indeed have to demonstrate your intentions by working on the land. Now you may object as follows: suppose the use to which I want to put Mars is extracting rent from the colonists who must henceforth treat me as ruler of Mars. But that’s not really a use of the planet or resources on it as such. I see no reason why my theory is inconsistent with a court’s declaring your “rulership” illegitimate.
Why is working the thing homesteading, unless merely as evidence of previous planning?
We have a recent example of a rush to homestead domain names during the beginning of the Internet. Someone who registered microsoft.com before Microsoft did could earn millions trying to sell the domain name back to Microsoft. Such people were called “cybersquatters.” Yet the whole thing was apparently resolved even without lawsuits.
Michael Clem wrote:
“Water IS scarce, economically speaking, in that it is finite. The fact that water is relatively more abundant than petroluem doesn’t change its scarcity.”
If it were scarce as you say (economically speaking) would not a scarcity rent attach to it?
Have you never paid a water bill?
I thought water’s scarcity was common knowledge?
scineram wrote:
“Have you never paid a water bill?’
BG reponds:
Water delivered to your house is a service that involves labor.
Anthony wrote:
“I thought water’s scarcity was common knowledge?”
BG responds:
It is finite but not necessarily scarce. If it were scarce (in an economic sense) it would have an economic rent attached to it. There are plenty of natural springs in my state were one can freely access the water.
Dmitry:
B/c it establishes a natural and objective connection with the land. It’s a proxy for or type of “use” of the land. The first-use of the land gives you a connection to the land that gives you a better claim than any latecomer. Any latecomer would have to claim a right to it based on his use of it too, but since this use is later, and since he has to admit the prior-later distinction’s relevance (after all he does not want yet a later latecomer to take it from him), he admits his claim is inferior to the first user’s claim.
Property rights apply to scarce (rivalrous) resources–those that have precisely the characteristic that use by one person excludes another’s use. Therefore embordering, as a sign or manifestation of possession/use, cannot conflict. For the same reason that you and I cannot both use a given resource in the same way at the same time (if we could, it would not be a rivalrous/scarce resource, and not subject to ownership rights).
See the discussion of Rothbard’s “relevant technological unit” in the comments to this thread. The connection is first use–using something transforms it, makes the extent of use visible (establishes borders or boundaries). Use is naturally limited in scope. You don’t own the entire (virgin) continent by stepping on it, since you are not using it all.
Sure, as long as you reduce it to your control (possession) in some way that makes your control of it manifest (intersubjectively ascertainable).
Sure. Coase is okay in small doses. But only in small doses.
It depends; abandonment is possible. Ownerhsip is distinct from mere possession, and there is an intentional aspect to it. So when the intention to not own is clear, it’s abandoned. But once you appropriate it, it’s now yours, even without continual possession; to maintain the opposite would be to obliterate the distinction between possession and ownership, it would be to collapse the two. But anyone disputing or claiming the right to control a resource (ownership) is presupposing a distinction.
I go into abandonment in my A Theory of Contracts: Binding Promises, Title Transfer. Also, I think, in my How We Come To Own Ourselves piece; as well as one or two others on “inalienability.”
I think you need to establish intersubjectively ascertainable borders somehow. The entire purpose of property rights is to permit conflict-free use of a resource; unless the borders are objecively visible this cannot be done b/c non-owners can’t know what borders not to violate.
I think of it as a relationship.
Maybe, but have you ever noticed, even animals like dogs know the difference between mine and yours.
I didn’t konw it was “about” anything. What is it, a novel?
Sure, and rights are only “useful” if and to the extent people by and large voluntarily abide by them. This seems to be but a truism.
I think it is, unwittingly.
THen your view is starting to collapse into mine.
Because any number of people can have mental plans about things, just as any number can verbally decree that they own it. The institution of property works because people respect the natural borders that people do and have established already, by natural use of the relevant technological unit. You want to reverse this, in a sense–you want people to decree, mentally, borders, and have others respect it (for some reason), and *therefore* “real” or “proprety” borders arise. The way it works in my view is that property boundaries correspond to natural, or real, boundaries related to actual use of the thing; people recognize this natural border and that makes it property.
As to why it’s working it that matters, and not “thinking about it” (incorporating it into one’s plans, mentally, internally)–look, any time there is a dispute, it’s about contesting *uses* of the thing. So naturally, if these people want to settle the dispute peacefully, following some kind of general rule that can be regarded as just, and to allow for peaceful, conflict-free use of resources, the only rule is to try to find a “tie breaker”, a way of deciding who gets it; and this rule cannot be arbitrary, meaning no verbal decrees, in fact it has to be some kind of demonstrable, natural connection between the superior claimant and the land–in fact, a connection related to the thing claimed: the thing claimed is the right to use it; so of course, the ocnnection will be related to *use of* it. This is exactly why first use is the best connection to the thing. But first use is the use, not the mental planning.
You don’t just start to move dirt into random piles on the land you want to own; you must have a goal in mind, some plan which you think will profit you. In the example of a lot, you write that “you need to establish intersubjectively ascertainable borders somehow.” Nothing could be simpler, just put up a big official-looking sign near the lot which says: “This lot now belongs to me and my ball-playing buddies.” Shouldn’t that be enough? Whence laboring on the lot?
In other words, there is a difference between embordering and using. You can emborder with a fence yet not use; or you can use yet not emborder, e.g., in such a way that it is not clear to other people that you have mixed labor with the land. Another example of the latter, besides the lot, might be a private park. It looks wild, but in fact you may have spent a considerable amount of money making the park desirable to customers. So, in your view, which is essential: embordering, using, or both?
Why not then combine our theories and say that a mental plan is essential, and, moreover, if you can somehow prove that you had this plan without working on the land, prior to anybody else’s conceiving a rival plan, then the land is yours. For example, in the case of terraforming Mars you might go on TV and announce your plans and tell everybody to get out of your way while you are working on the entire planet. But I agree that in some cases actual work on the land may be required as evidence of previous planning. Still, using in itself has no value: if you develop the land and find out that you will suffer losses, then it may be in your interest to abandon it, despite the fact that your labor may appear to have given ownership to you. So, you would have to post another big official-looking sign which says: “This land is now unowned.” This again indicates that mixing labor is just a way of letting people know of your intentions and valuations, not some magical rite which necessarily confers ownership.
Mises, too: Human Action, p. 683ff, starting with “Private property is a human device.”
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