Comments on: F.A. Hayek and the Concept of Coercion

By: Anthony

Anthony — Tue, 28 Aug 2007 06:36:10 +0000

Fine, but my remarks were aimed at positive and negative rights, which are part and parcel of certain ethical theories.

By: TGGP

TGGP — Tue, 28 Aug 2007 06:00:15 +0000

I do not find any ethical theories plausible (emotivism is different because it is meta-ethics). What is relevant is inherently subjective.

By: Anthony

Anthony — Tue, 28 Aug 2007 04:57:10 +0000

Using that logic I can turn all rights into a statement of power. Of course, that isn’t what a right is; all a right is is simply a statement to the effect that I am permitted (or even entitled) to do something for which I may not be admonished. They are not self-enforcing. A legal system based off negative rights would prohibit all violations of such rights, whereas one built off positive rights would enforce performance to provide for their beneficiaries. BTW, for your first example to work, it would have to be phrased as an “ought”, and I cannot see what the punishment for deviation would be; the person issuing the prohibition becoming a CEO themselves?

The universalization test merely stipulates why a criminal may not coherently object to punishment. It is a filter, of sorts, that ethical theories are built on to.

By: TLWP Sam

TLWP Sam — Tue, 28 Aug 2007 04:25:46 +0000

Universality test? If one can’t do it then neither can anyone else? If someone said “well I can’t be a CEO therefore no one can be allowed to be a CEO” wouldn’t they get beat up for being a commie? But then on the hand, the golden rule ‘do unto others as they do unto you’ can be translated how you like. A lot of blokes might think it’s fun to have a barfight and be consistent in that they’re willing to throw punches yet not in any way complain when they receive a punch. Similarly, differences in outcomes for different people presumably rest on premise that ‘pursuit of happiness doesn’t guarantee attainment of happiness’. This can also mean people can be free to be slave owners but not complain if they turn out to be a slave. Perhaps slavery would still exist if it didn’t have racial overtones. If blacks were allowed to attain their freedom (in the way that Roman slaves could) and in time, perhaps, have white slaves then maybe people wouldn’t feel so bad and presume weaklings of all colours and races deserve what they get. Even in Bible the Hebrews although probably didn’t like being slaves to the Egyptians they’d probably didn’t despise it either because they enslaved surrounding tribes when they made it to the promised land. It many ways it’s all relative and keeps going back to my assertion that such freedoms therefore amount to the private ability to personally avoid enslavement. This I believe to be a statement of power (I mean it as in ‘the ability to do’) than of philosophy/ideology (sounds nice but alone is probably wishful thinking).

By: Anthony

Anthony — Tue, 28 Aug 2007 00:15:38 +0000

Then give me a plausible basis for an ethic that says it is alright for one moral agent to do x, and not for another to do so, even though they differ in no relevant respect. I cannot understand opposition to universalization – it is the cornerstone of almost all modern ethical theorizing.

By: TGGP

TGGP — Mon, 27 Aug 2007 16:56:25 +0000

Why must we play by the same rules? Or why may not the rules distinguish between different agents? How is anything in ethics other than arbitrary?

By: Anthony

Anthony — Mon, 27 Aug 2007 12:20:03 +0000

All the universalization test implies is that moral agents must play by the same rules. Justifying x rule for myself but for nobody else, when there is no relevant differentiating factor, is arbitrary and morally unjustifable.

By: TGGP

TGGP — Mon, 27 Aug 2007 08:15:09 +0000

What is so important about the universalization test that it necessitates one to exceed some standard? One would have to know that in order to be able to answer your question.

By: Anthony

Anthony — Mon, 27 Aug 2007 04:09:22 +0000

Ethical theories are constrained by the laws of logic. In what respect does one moral agent differ from another that is relevant enough to circumvent the universalization test?

By: TGGP

TGGP — Mon, 27 Aug 2007 03:16:58 +0000

Who says we have to accept the universalization test? Ethics makes distinctions between people (and species, though only Singer-style utilitarians usually mention that) all the time, but people still usually claim it follows from some universal rule.

By: Anthony

Anthony — Sun, 26 Aug 2007 23:48:20 +0000

Wouldn’t that require a breach of the universalization test in ethics?

By: TGGP

TGGP — Sun, 26 Aug 2007 18:32:48 +0000

Anthony, not being able to coherently object and object at all are two different things, since we could disagree on whether an objection is coherent, while agreeing he is exclaiming “I object!”. One way to coherently object would be to say that he has rights that others do not.

By: NiccolÃ²

NiccolÃ² — Sun, 26 Aug 2007 13:35:44 +0000

“Bah humbag. A basis for any civil society does rely to some extent on ‘positive’ rights. That is to say there are some rights that place a certain burden of duty onto others. Heck, the Ten Commandments is a document of duties not rights. Either that or everyone personal ‘negative’ rights depend solely on their own ability to defend themselves. ‘Tis interesting to note the way Minimalist Libertarians have to occasionally to defend themselves against the accusation that they’re not anarchist. :\”

*cough* bullocks *cough*

By: Anthony

Anthony — Sun, 26 Aug 2007 06:03:29 +0000

Because he cannot at once violate rights and maintain he has rights. So he cannot coherently object to punishment.

By: TGGP

TGGP — Sun, 26 Aug 2007 05:28:54 +0000

What do you mean he can’t object? I can object to the sky being green and the grass being blue, even though it is in fact the reverse.

By: Anthony

Anthony — Sun, 26 Aug 2007 00:12:37 +0000

Umm, where on earth did you get such an idea? First of all, nothing in negative rights precludes contracting with others to defend those rights (in fact that is commonly seen as the source of government’s legitimacy, leaving aside inconsistencies in the argument.) Secondly, as Kinsella has noted in his estoppel approach, a rights-violator cannot object to being punished for whatever rights he has violated. So negative rights face no problems in that regard.

By: TLWP Sam

TLWP Sam — Sat, 25 Aug 2007 16:28:25 +0000

Well either that or your ideals of ‘no force and fraud’ are solely a criteria for knowing when to defend yourself. After all, strictly speaking what with ‘negative rights’ and all, it would mean that wanting ‘no force and fraud’ places no duty on anyone else not to use ‘force and fraud’ if they so desired.

By: Anthony

Anthony — Sat, 25 Aug 2007 05:30:04 +0000

should read: even though I value the Church as an institution.

By: Anthony

Anthony — Sat, 25 Aug 2007 05:29:30 +0000

So the basis of a sound society is partly based on the ability to enslave others into providing what we want? Then count me out. Negative rights are perfectly compatible with cooperation, unlike their positive counterparts. I am not even sure why you would bring up the Ten Commandments, given that many of us are not Christians (even though I value the Church’s value as an institution.)

And as for your note, I am a market anarchist. So far from being an accusation, it is an accurate claim. Minarchists can answer that as they see fit.

By: TLWP Sam

TLWP Sam — Sat, 25 Aug 2007 05:12:59 +0000

Bah humbag. A basis for any civil society does rely to some extent on ‘positive’ rights. That is to say there are some rights that place a certain burden of duty onto others. Heck, the Ten Commandments is a document of duties not rights. Either that or everyone personal ‘negative’ rights depend solely on their own ability to defend themselves. ‘Tis interesting to note the way Minimalist Libertarians have to occasionally to defend themselves against the accusation that they’re not anarchist. :\