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	<title>Comments on: Thoughts on the Latecomer and Homesteading Ideas; or, why the very idea of &#8220;ownership&#8221; implies that only libertarian principles are justifiable</title>
	<atom:link href="http://archive.mises.org/6992/thoughts-on-the-latecomer-and-homesteading-ideas-or-why-the-very-idea-of-ownership-implies-that-only-libertarian-principles-are-justifiable/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://archive.mises.org/6992/thoughts-on-the-latecomer-and-homesteading-ideas-or-why-the-very-idea-of-ownership-implies-that-only-libertarian-principles-are-justifiable/</link>
	<description>Proceeding Ever More Boldly Against Evil</description>
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		<title>By: BjÃ¶rn Lundahl</title>
		<link>http://archive.mises.org/6992/thoughts-on-the-latecomer-and-homesteading-ideas-or-why-the-very-idea-of-ownership-implies-that-only-libertarian-principles-are-justifiable/comment-page-3/#comment-125768</link>
		<dc:creator>BjÃ¶rn Lundahl</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 31 Aug 2007 16:18:28 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.mises.org/archives/006992.asp#comment-125768</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Really, I should explain in a more detailed manner what I meant with my sincere feelings about above mentioned books:

I feel that the conclusions made in the book Human Action are quite correct. My feelings about the truthfulness of the conclusions made in the book Man, Economy, and State are quite high too. Does anyone share those feelings as well?
]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Really, I should explain in a more detailed manner what I meant with my sincere feelings about above mentioned books:</p>
<p>I feel that the conclusions made in the book Human Action are quite correct. My feelings about the truthfulness of the conclusions made in the book Man, Economy, and State are quite high too. Does anyone share those feelings as well?</p>
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	<item>
		<title>By: BjÃ¶rn Lundahl</title>
		<link>http://archive.mises.org/6992/thoughts-on-the-latecomer-and-homesteading-ideas-or-why-the-very-idea-of-ownership-implies-that-only-libertarian-principles-are-justifiable/comment-page-3/#comment-125765</link>
		<dc:creator>BjÃ¶rn Lundahl</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 31 Aug 2007 15:27:19 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.mises.org/archives/006992.asp#comment-125765</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[I feel that the book Human Action is quite correct. My feelings about the truthfulness of the book Man, Economy, and State are quite high too. Does anyone share those feelings as well?  

]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I feel that the book Human Action is quite correct. My feelings about the truthfulness of the book Man, Economy, and State are quite high too. Does anyone share those feelings as well?  </p>
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		<title>By: Anthony</title>
		<link>http://archive.mises.org/6992/thoughts-on-the-latecomer-and-homesteading-ideas-or-why-the-very-idea-of-ownership-implies-that-only-libertarian-principles-are-justifiable/comment-page-3/#comment-125761</link>
		<dc:creator>Anthony</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 31 Aug 2007 13:23:33 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.mises.org/archives/006992.asp#comment-125761</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[&quot;I don&#039;t know about you, but I am an American which means I do not encounter them either. They serve as extreme examples. However, I do live under the rule of American politicians, who might be said to be a tastier flavor of dirt.&quot;

And I suppose you think justice must come out of the barrel of a gun? Again, I aim at convincing people of the veracity of my position; the more who come to agree with me, the more potential revolutionaires out there when things do come to justice out of the barrel of a gun.
&quot;How is it inherent in argumentation itself if people argue without it?&quot;

Argue without what spefically?

&quot; &quot;Might makes right. Finders keepers, losers weepers, nana-nana boo-boo you poopie-pants.&quot; That is clearly proposing an ethical theory and arguing in a childish way.&quot;

Sure, with no justification behind it. Anyone serious about reaching the truthfulness of an ethic will aim at justifying it.

]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>&#8220;I don&#8217;t know about you, but I am an American which means I do not encounter them either. They serve as extreme examples. However, I do live under the rule of American politicians, who might be said to be a tastier flavor of dirt.&#8221;</p>
<p>And I suppose you think justice must come out of the barrel of a gun? Again, I aim at convincing people of the veracity of my position; the more who come to agree with me, the more potential revolutionaires out there when things do come to justice out of the barrel of a gun.<br />
&#8220;How is it inherent in argumentation itself if people argue without it?&#8221;</p>
<p>Argue without what spefically?</p>
<p>&#8221; &#8220;Might makes right. Finders keepers, losers weepers, nana-nana boo-boo you poopie-pants.&#8221; That is clearly proposing an ethical theory and arguing in a childish way.&#8221;</p>
<p>Sure, with no justification behind it. Anyone serious about reaching the truthfulness of an ethic will aim at justifying it.</p>
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		<title>By: TGGP</title>
		<link>http://archive.mises.org/6992/thoughts-on-the-latecomer-and-homesteading-ideas-or-why-the-very-idea-of-ownership-implies-that-only-libertarian-principles-are-justifiable/comment-page-3/#comment-125755</link>
		<dc:creator>TGGP</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 31 Aug 2007 10:17:58 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.mises.org/archives/006992.asp#comment-125755</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[&lt;i&gt;And given that they are not persons I either encounter on a regular basis or aim to convert any time soon, they are irrelevant to me for the time being.&lt;/i&gt;
I don&#039;t know about you, but I am an American which means I do not encounter them either. They serve as extreme examples. However, I do live under the rule of American politicians, who might be said to be a tastier flavor of dirt.

&lt;i&gt;From what I can tell you seem to be thinking that if one can show that the motivations of the individual involved in argumentation are contrary to what it states that they are, then AE does not hold. However, AE is solely based on the presuppositions inherent in argumentation itself and the demonstrated preferences involved.&lt;/i&gt;
How is it inherent in argumentation itself if people argue without it?

&lt;i&gt;For any ethical theory to be proposed, argumentation in the sense used in AE must be engaged in.&lt;/i&gt;
&quot;Might makes right. Finders keepers, losers weepers, nana-nana boo-boo you poopie-pants.&quot; That is clearly proposing an ethical theory and arguing in a childish way.

&lt;i&gt;And no amount of reason can persuade you otherwise. I understand this now.&lt;/i&gt;
I already explained what could change my mind.

&lt;i&gt;Because when you say you &quot;believeâ€ something is true, it means as much to you as to say you &quot;believeâ€ apples taste better than oranges. It&#039;s subjective and arbitrary - not based on reasons which justify it.&lt;/i&gt;
No, it is a meta-normative belief, not a normative one.

&lt;i&gt;This is why you do not think that people who value the truth should necessarily agree with you.&lt;/i&gt;
The post &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.overcomingbias.com/2007/01/two_cheers_for_.html&quot;&gt;Two Cheers for Ignoring Plain Facts&lt;/a&gt; greatly angered me from the title alone, but I must concede there are situations in which I would prefer for people not to believe the truth because of the consequences of their belief. I think if Hitler had more accurate beliefs about the probability of military success, he might have been more cautious and stayed in power. I cannot answer for your perspective because I am not and can never be you.

&lt;i&gt;To observe that there is such a thing as justice requires first observing that there is such a thing as reason&lt;/i&gt;
I don&#039;t intend on denying reason here!

&lt;i&gt;and that the two are implied in each other and in the act of argumentation geared to the determining of truth.&lt;/i&gt;
I do not concede that part.

&lt;i&gt;Given that I require a logical justification for an ethical truth&lt;/i&gt;
But I am not arguing for an ethical truth but a meta-ethical one!

&lt;i&gt;And I see that you perhaps unintentionally demonstrate what you mean by that in the course of our discourse. However all this confirms to me is that we have not been engaged in argumentation.&lt;/i&gt;
What have I said that was a logical fallacy? I bet if there was a poll of random web users in which they read our posts up until now and were asked if we were engaged in argumentation, a huge majority would say we were.

Mr. Lundahl, if you hadn&#039;t posted substantive comments before your most recent one, I would have assumed your were a spam-bot!]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><i>And given that they are not persons I either encounter on a regular basis or aim to convert any time soon, they are irrelevant to me for the time being.</i><br />
I don&#8217;t know about you, but I am an American which means I do not encounter them either. They serve as extreme examples. However, I do live under the rule of American politicians, who might be said to be a tastier flavor of dirt.</p>
<p><i>From what I can tell you seem to be thinking that if one can show that the motivations of the individual involved in argumentation are contrary to what it states that they are, then AE does not hold. However, AE is solely based on the presuppositions inherent in argumentation itself and the demonstrated preferences involved.</i><br />
How is it inherent in argumentation itself if people argue without it?</p>
<p><i>For any ethical theory to be proposed, argumentation in the sense used in AE must be engaged in.</i><br />
&#8220;Might makes right. Finders keepers, losers weepers, nana-nana boo-boo you poopie-pants.&#8221; That is clearly proposing an ethical theory and arguing in a childish way.</p>
<p><i>And no amount of reason can persuade you otherwise. I understand this now.</i><br />
I already explained what could change my mind.</p>
<p><i>Because when you say you &#8220;believeâ€ something is true, it means as much to you as to say you &#8220;believeâ€ apples taste better than oranges. It&#8217;s subjective and arbitrary &#8211; not based on reasons which justify it.</i><br />
No, it is a meta-normative belief, not a normative one.</p>
<p><i>This is why you do not think that people who value the truth should necessarily agree with you.</i><br />
The post <a href="http://www.overcomingbias.com/2007/01/two_cheers_for_.html">Two Cheers for Ignoring Plain Facts</a> greatly angered me from the title alone, but I must concede there are situations in which I would prefer for people not to believe the truth because of the consequences of their belief. I think if Hitler had more accurate beliefs about the probability of military success, he might have been more cautious and stayed in power. I cannot answer for your perspective because I am not and can never be you.</p>
<p><i>To observe that there is such a thing as justice requires first observing that there is such a thing as reason</i><br />
I don&#8217;t intend on denying reason here!</p>
<p><i>and that the two are implied in each other and in the act of argumentation geared to the determining of truth.</i><br />
I do not concede that part.</p>
<p><i>Given that I require a logical justification for an ethical truth</i><br />
But I am not arguing for an ethical truth but a meta-ethical one!</p>
<p><i>And I see that you perhaps unintentionally demonstrate what you mean by that in the course of our discourse. However all this confirms to me is that we have not been engaged in argumentation.</i><br />
What have I said that was a logical fallacy? I bet if there was a poll of random web users in which they read our posts up until now and were asked if we were engaged in argumentation, a huge majority would say we were.</p>
<p>Mr. Lundahl, if you hadn&#8217;t posted substantive comments before your most recent one, I would have assumed your were a spam-bot!</p>
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		<title>By: BjÃ¶rn Lundahl</title>
		<link>http://archive.mises.org/6992/thoughts-on-the-latecomer-and-homesteading-ideas-or-why-the-very-idea-of-ownership-implies-that-only-libertarian-principles-are-justifiable/comment-page-3/#comment-125749</link>
		<dc:creator>BjÃ¶rn Lundahl</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 31 Aug 2007 09:21:13 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.mises.org/archives/006992.asp#comment-125749</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[GÃ¶teborg We Love You:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LOsme0cTgcw

]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>GÃ¶teborg We Love You:</p>
<p><a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LOsme0cTgcw" rel="nofollow">http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LOsme0cTgcw</a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>By: Paul Edwards</title>
		<link>http://archive.mises.org/6992/thoughts-on-the-latecomer-and-homesteading-ideas-or-why-the-very-idea-of-ownership-implies-that-only-libertarian-principles-are-justifiable/comment-page-3/#comment-125745</link>
		<dc:creator>Paul Edwards</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 31 Aug 2007 08:12:14 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.mises.org/archives/006992.asp#comment-125745</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[&quot;My meta-ethical belief that ethical beliefs have no truthâ€¦â€

And no amount of reason can persuade you otherwise. I understand this now.

&quot;So even though I believe that belief of mine is true, it is not then objectively the case that you ought to believe it, and subjectively I would not be too concerned if you didn&#039;t.â€

Because when you say you &quot;believeâ€ something is true, it means as much to you as to say you &quot;believeâ€ apples taste better than oranges. It&#039;s subjective and arbitrary - not based on reasons which justify it. This is why you do not think that people who value the truth should necessarily agree with you. Because you do not think it ultimately is the truth â€“ just your belief - and you don&#039;t think you can justify your believe with reason. Again, I get it.

&quot;I don&#039;t think there are any justifications,â€ Yes, I now recognize this is what you believe. This is why it is futile for me to attempt to present you with one. The criminal has his own beliefs as well. Perhaps he also doesn&#039;t think there are any justifications.

&quot;It is a meta-ethical position, and can be correct or incorrect.â€ I know, I know. LOL!

&quot;I can&#039;t speak for you guys, but I know I&#039;ve been entertained.â€ This I believe. And this is a fine thing. It just doesn&#039;t get you any closer to the truth.

&quot;At any rate, I am looking to observe something so that I can say &quot;Ah, there is such a thing as justice!&quot;. Imaginary things in your head will not cut the mustard.â€

To observe that there is such a thing as justice requires first observing that there is such a thing as reason and that the two are implied in each other and in the act of argumentation geared to the determining of truth. Why did I just say that? â€“ another impossible justification.

&quot;â€¦but since you display a reluctance to engage in conversation hereâ€

Finally, this conversation gets entertaining.

&quot;I would certainly put the likelihood that you will accept my position at less than 0.5.â€

Given that I require a logical justification for an ethical truth, and your contention that such a justification is utterly impossible, I would put the likelihood at considerably less than that.

&quot;That sounds a bit overdramatic.â€ That is entertaining as well. I don&#039;t call our discussions a psychological battle to dramatize, but rather to distinguish it from logical argumentation: which I claim must presuppose the pursuit of truth via the cooperative application of reason. Something you persistently contend is not necessary. And I see that you perhaps unintentionally demonstrate what you mean by that in the course of our discourse. However all this confirms to me is that we have not been engaged in argumentation.
]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>&#8220;My meta-ethical belief that ethical beliefs have no truthâ€¦â€</p>
<p>And no amount of reason can persuade you otherwise. I understand this now.</p>
<p>&#8220;So even though I believe that belief of mine is true, it is not then objectively the case that you ought to believe it, and subjectively I would not be too concerned if you didn&#8217;t.â€</p>
<p>Because when you say you &#8220;believeâ€ something is true, it means as much to you as to say you &#8220;believeâ€ apples taste better than oranges. It&#8217;s subjective and arbitrary &#8211; not based on reasons which justify it. This is why you do not think that people who value the truth should necessarily agree with you. Because you do not think it ultimately is the truth â€“ just your belief &#8211; and you don&#8217;t think you can justify your believe with reason. Again, I get it.</p>
<p>&#8220;I don&#8217;t think there are any justifications,â€ Yes, I now recognize this is what you believe. This is why it is futile for me to attempt to present you with one. The criminal has his own beliefs as well. Perhaps he also doesn&#8217;t think there are any justifications.</p>
<p>&#8220;It is a meta-ethical position, and can be correct or incorrect.â€ I know, I know. LOL!</p>
<p>&#8220;I can&#8217;t speak for you guys, but I know I&#8217;ve been entertained.â€ This I believe. And this is a fine thing. It just doesn&#8217;t get you any closer to the truth.</p>
<p>&#8220;At any rate, I am looking to observe something so that I can say &#8220;Ah, there is such a thing as justice!&#8221;. Imaginary things in your head will not cut the mustard.â€</p>
<p>To observe that there is such a thing as justice requires first observing that there is such a thing as reason and that the two are implied in each other and in the act of argumentation geared to the determining of truth. Why did I just say that? â€“ another impossible justification.</p>
<p>&#8220;â€¦but since you display a reluctance to engage in conversation hereâ€</p>
<p>Finally, this conversation gets entertaining.</p>
<p>&#8220;I would certainly put the likelihood that you will accept my position at less than 0.5.â€</p>
<p>Given that I require a logical justification for an ethical truth, and your contention that such a justification is utterly impossible, I would put the likelihood at considerably less than that.</p>
<p>&#8220;That sounds a bit overdramatic.â€ That is entertaining as well. I don&#8217;t call our discussions a psychological battle to dramatize, but rather to distinguish it from logical argumentation: which I claim must presuppose the pursuit of truth via the cooperative application of reason. Something you persistently contend is not necessary. And I see that you perhaps unintentionally demonstrate what you mean by that in the course of our discourse. However all this confirms to me is that we have not been engaged in argumentation.</p>
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		<title>By: Anthony</title>
		<link>http://archive.mises.org/6992/thoughts-on-the-latecomer-and-homesteading-ideas-or-why-the-very-idea-of-ownership-implies-that-only-libertarian-principles-are-justifiable/comment-page-3/#comment-125722</link>
		<dc:creator>Anthony</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 31 Aug 2007 03:58:38 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.mises.org/archives/006992.asp#comment-125722</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[&quot;Intellectual inquiry doesn&#039;t seem to have made a dent on the Mugabes and Castros of the world.&quot;

And given that they are not persons I either encounter on a regular basis or aim to convert any time soon, they are irrelevant to me for the time being.

&quot;How is that different from what I said?&quot;

From what I can tell you seem to be thinking that if one can show that the motivations of the individual involved in argumentation are contrary to what it states that they are, then AE does not hold. However, AE is solely based on the presuppositions inherent in argumentation itself and the demonstrated preferences involved. If you mean that you can show that the presuppositions it claims exist in argumentation in fact do not, then that is an entirely different matter.

&quot;If they aren&#039;t actually talking about arguing in the common sense of the term, perhaps it&#039;s not really all that relevant.&quot;

For any ethical theory to be proposed, argumentation in the sense used in AE must be engaged in. So it is relevant for such purposes.
]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>&#8220;Intellectual inquiry doesn&#8217;t seem to have made a dent on the Mugabes and Castros of the world.&#8221;</p>
<p>And given that they are not persons I either encounter on a regular basis or aim to convert any time soon, they are irrelevant to me for the time being.</p>
<p>&#8220;How is that different from what I said?&#8221;</p>
<p>From what I can tell you seem to be thinking that if one can show that the motivations of the individual involved in argumentation are contrary to what it states that they are, then AE does not hold. However, AE is solely based on the presuppositions inherent in argumentation itself and the demonstrated preferences involved. If you mean that you can show that the presuppositions it claims exist in argumentation in fact do not, then that is an entirely different matter.</p>
<p>&#8220;If they aren&#8217;t actually talking about arguing in the common sense of the term, perhaps it&#8217;s not really all that relevant.&#8221;</p>
<p>For any ethical theory to be proposed, argumentation in the sense used in AE must be engaged in. So it is relevant for such purposes.</p>
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		<title>By: TGGP</title>
		<link>http://archive.mises.org/6992/thoughts-on-the-latecomer-and-homesteading-ideas-or-why-the-very-idea-of-ownership-implies-that-only-libertarian-principles-are-justifiable/comment-page-3/#comment-125719</link>
		<dc:creator>TGGP</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 31 Aug 2007 03:40:38 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.mises.org/archives/006992.asp#comment-125719</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[&lt;i&gt;If force in self-defence against their hate preaching is necessary, then so be it. Otherwise I prefer the field of intellectual inquiry.&lt;/i&gt;
Intellectual inquiry doesn&#039;t seem to have made a dent on the Mugabes and Castros of the world.

&lt;i&gt;Are you a market anarchist, minarchist, something else perhaps, or what?&lt;/i&gt;
Like Randall Holcombe, I do not think anarchy can be sustained and would like a minimal state to fill the power vacuum.

&lt;i&gt;You&#039;d have to show that the action of argumentation does not presuppose certain things logically.&lt;/i&gt;
How is that different from what I said?

&lt;i&gt;Well AE provides a definition of the term to go with it, so it is not really ambiguous at all. Terms are used in certain differing ways all the time.&lt;/i&gt;
If they aren&#039;t actually talking about arguing in the common sense of the term, perhaps it&#039;s not really all that relevant.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><i>If force in self-defence against their hate preaching is necessary, then so be it. Otherwise I prefer the field of intellectual inquiry.</i><br />
Intellectual inquiry doesn&#8217;t seem to have made a dent on the Mugabes and Castros of the world.</p>
<p><i>Are you a market anarchist, minarchist, something else perhaps, or what?</i><br />
Like Randall Holcombe, I do not think anarchy can be sustained and would like a minimal state to fill the power vacuum.</p>
<p><i>You&#8217;d have to show that the action of argumentation does not presuppose certain things logically.</i><br />
How is that different from what I said?</p>
<p><i>Well AE provides a definition of the term to go with it, so it is not really ambiguous at all. Terms are used in certain differing ways all the time.</i><br />
If they aren&#8217;t actually talking about arguing in the common sense of the term, perhaps it&#8217;s not really all that relevant.</p>
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		<title>By: Anthony</title>
		<link>http://archive.mises.org/6992/thoughts-on-the-latecomer-and-homesteading-ideas-or-why-the-very-idea-of-ownership-implies-that-only-libertarian-principles-are-justifiable/comment-page-3/#comment-125675</link>
		<dc:creator>Anthony</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 30 Aug 2007 15:09:26 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.mises.org/archives/006992.asp#comment-125675</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[TGGP: &quot;None of the examples I gave (Bell, Moldbug, Patri Friedman) were of proselytizers.&quot;

My bad then.

&quot;Leonard Reed said communism was a problem to argued away, not shot or blown up. I think some communists cannot be argued with and must be shot or blown up. If you can convince any communists by arguing, go for it, but I don&#039;t think much of your chances.&quot;

If force in self-defence against their hate preaching is necessary, then so be it. Otherwise I prefer the field of intellectual inquiry. Are you a market anarchist, minarchist, something else perhaps, or what?

&quot;If I can show that person is 1 arguing and 2 not presupposing the libertarian ethic then that would show that the ethic is not a necessary presupposition of argument.&quot;

You&#039;d have to show that the action of argumentation does not presuppose certain things logically.

&quot;The common definition of &quot;arguing&quot; includes the childish type. If you want to refer to something else it is up to you to use a different term!&quot;

Well AE provides a definition of the term to go with it, so it is not really ambiguous at all. Terms are used in certain differing ways all the time.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>TGGP: &#8220;None of the examples I gave (Bell, Moldbug, Patri Friedman) were of proselytizers.&#8221;</p>
<p>My bad then.</p>
<p>&#8220;Leonard Reed said communism was a problem to argued away, not shot or blown up. I think some communists cannot be argued with and must be shot or blown up. If you can convince any communists by arguing, go for it, but I don&#8217;t think much of your chances.&#8221;</p>
<p>If force in self-defence against their hate preaching is necessary, then so be it. Otherwise I prefer the field of intellectual inquiry. Are you a market anarchist, minarchist, something else perhaps, or what?</p>
<p>&#8220;If I can show that person is 1 arguing and 2 not presupposing the libertarian ethic then that would show that the ethic is not a necessary presupposition of argument.&#8221;</p>
<p>You&#8217;d have to show that the action of argumentation does not presuppose certain things logically.</p>
<p>&#8220;The common definition of &#8220;arguing&#8221; includes the childish type. If you want to refer to something else it is up to you to use a different term!&#8221;</p>
<p>Well AE provides a definition of the term to go with it, so it is not really ambiguous at all. Terms are used in certain differing ways all the time.</p>
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		<title>By: TGGP</title>
		<link>http://archive.mises.org/6992/thoughts-on-the-latecomer-and-homesteading-ideas-or-why-the-very-idea-of-ownership-implies-that-only-libertarian-principles-are-justifiable/comment-page-3/#comment-125672</link>
		<dc:creator>TGGP</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 30 Aug 2007 13:51:03 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.mises.org/archives/006992.asp#comment-125672</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[&lt;i&gt;Yes, nihilists/subjectivists should logically prove their relativistic points of views which they naturally cannot.&lt;/i&gt;
It is my belief that normative statements are unfalsifiable and thus have no truth value. This meta-ethical statement is in principle falsifiable: in order to falsify it, falsify a normative statement.

&lt;i&gt;&lt;i&gt;So we really are logically, because of justice, forced to brush aside their &quot;opinions.â€&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
Logic does not seem to have applied many pounds of force on you as you continue to converse with me! Also, I like how you put scare-quotes around &quot;opinion&quot; (those aren&#039;t scare-quotes, remember the use-mention distinction) as if somebody else was claiming I had an opinion but you are not willing to concur! You might like this blog: http://quotation-marks.blogspot.com/

&lt;i&gt;A while ago when I thought of the subjectivist point of view I also thought of exactly the same example. Subjectivists do not really act in accordance with their beliefs. As Mises said &quot;We may say that action is the manifestation of a man&#039;s will.â€&lt;/i&gt;
I already explained why I would get out of the way of the truck if I were in a simulation, and I have never stated that I actually believe I am in a simulation (Robin Hanson suggests there is a 5% probability and I am willing to defer to his expertise).

&lt;i&gt;This is also a correct statement, very childish &quot;argumentsâ€ indeed.&lt;/i&gt;
Now &lt;b&gt;this&lt;/b&gt; is a proper use of quotation marks! The issue was whether what the child was doing constitutes argument and by your use of quotation marks you indicate it does not.

&lt;i&gt;Why bother to answer childish statements in return for another one? A waste of energy I would say. He does a terrible job in &quot;defendingâ€ the nihilist/moral relativist/subjectivist points of view.&lt;/i&gt;
So you have slipped from discussing the hypothetical child to me? Where have I said &quot;am not/are too&quot; or used any logical fallacies? You disagree with my premise, that normative statements do not have truth value, and now you say it is useless to argue with me. Wasn&#039;t it your position that false beliefs need to be met with true arguments?

&lt;i&gt;Actually in reality he does a good job in defending the opposite point of view as it seems that no real argument exist for subjectivism regarding ethical principles.&lt;/i&gt;
Above I point out how to argue against emotivism: falsify a normative statement. You will not be able to do that if you start by assuming another normative statement, because its truth has not yet been established. Either it is elephants all the way down or you will have to derive a normative from a positive somewhere.

&lt;i&gt;I think this sums up what we you doing here. You do not think it is possible to, much less are you inclined to, demonstrate that there is any truth to your argument regarding ethics.&lt;/i&gt;
My meta-ethical belief that ethical beliefs have no truth value is itself a positive belief and does have truth value. If I stated you ought to believe the truth, that would be a normative statement. So even though I believe that belief of mine is true, it is not then objectively the case that you ought to believe it, and subjectively I would not be too concerned if you didn&#039;t.

&lt;i&gt;In this field, you are content to describe your position, which to you is hardly a justification&lt;/i&gt;
I don&#039;t think there are any justifications, and it  would be odd (though not impossible) to demonstrate the validity of statement X without understanding what statement X actually says.

&lt;i&gt;Naturally, according to this view, any justification showing your ethical position is incorrect is impossible as well, as reason and logic are both outside the domain of such considerations.&lt;/i&gt;
It is a meta-ethical position, and can be correct or incorrect.

&lt;i&gt;Therefore, what we have been doing here has been to play a game void of purpose aside from perhaps the entertainment value we derive from it.&lt;/i&gt;
I can&#039;t speak for you guys, but I know I&#039;ve been entertained.

&lt;i&gt;Fair enough. I cannot convince you of the rational foundation of justice because reason is not relevant to you on this question.&lt;/i&gt;
Whatever happened to the primacy of existence over consciousness? Or was that someone else? At any rate, I am looking to observe something so that I can say &quot;Ah, there is such a thing as justice!&quot;. Imaginary things in your head will not cut the mustard.

&lt;i&gt;And likewise, you do not attempt to, and indeed cannot even hope to convince me of the validity of your position, and for the very same reason.&lt;/i&gt;
Oh, I wouldn&#039;t assign a probability of 0 to that, but since you display a reluctance to engage in conversation here I would certainly put the likelihood that you will accept my position at less than 0.5.

&lt;i&gt;I think this discussion has been a battle of psychology&lt;/i&gt;
That sounds a bit overdramatic.

&lt;i&gt;with one participant refusing to do what the other insists is necessary for a logical argumentation: to acknowledge and admit the necessary element of logic and reason to the discussion.&lt;/i&gt;
I don&#039;t have any beef with logic and reason though I hold Bayesian rationality above all those (they can be considered special cases of Bayes), I just think it is a non-standard use of the term &quot;argument&quot; to refer only to logical argumentation. Otherwise arguments would consist of at most one arguer.

&lt;i&gt;We were referring to the formulation of libertarian ethics vs. libertarian strategy (i.e. proselytization.)&lt;/i&gt;
None of the examples I gave (Bell, Moldbug, Patri Friedman) were of proselytizers. I don&#039;t think certain thugs can&#039;t be successfully proselytized into accepting libertarianism. Bell wants to set up a market for anonymously killing rights-violators which will deter people from violating our rights. Patri Friedman wants to dramatically decrease exit costs and allow us to get away from governments we want no part in. Mencius Moldbug (who perhaps advocates proselytizing to government, but not convincing them to give up their power!) wants to formalize the State into a joint-stock corporation that will avoid idiotic and destructive actions in favor of those which provide value to its customers (the tax-payers) because this in turn will maximize revenue for the shareholders (those who currently but informally hold power).

&lt;i&gt;My point was simply that in order to combat contrary ethics, a well-formulated libertarian ethic is needed.&lt;/i&gt;
Leonard Reed said communism was a problem to argued away, not shot or blown up. I think some communists cannot be argued with and must be shot or blown up. If you can convince any communists by arguing, go for it, but I don&#039;t think much of your chances.

&lt;i&gt;For the last time, argumentation ethics is not about what people want; it is about what is presupposed in the action of argumentation.&lt;/i&gt;
If I can show that person is 1 arguing and 2 not presupposing the libertarian ethic then that would show that the ethic is not a necessary presupposition of argument.

&lt;i&gt;There exist childish arguments, but these are not what the term subsumes. If you don&#039;t like the term argumentation, imagine some other word to take its place.&lt;/i&gt;
The common definition of &quot;arguing&quot; includes the childish type. If you want to refer to something else it is up to &lt;b&gt;you&lt;/b&gt; to use a different term!]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><i>Yes, nihilists/subjectivists should logically prove their relativistic points of views which they naturally cannot.</i><br />
It is my belief that normative statements are unfalsifiable and thus have no truth value. This meta-ethical statement is in principle falsifiable: in order to falsify it, falsify a normative statement.</p>
<p><i></i><i>So we really are logically, because of justice, forced to brush aside their &#8220;opinions.â€</i><br />
Logic does not seem to have applied many pounds of force on you as you continue to converse with me! Also, I like how you put scare-quotes around &#8220;opinion&#8221; (those aren&#8217;t scare-quotes, remember the use-mention distinction) as if somebody else was claiming I had an opinion but you are not willing to concur! You might like this blog: <a href="http://quotation-marks.blogspot.com/" rel="nofollow">http://quotation-marks.blogspot.com/</a></p>
<p><i>A while ago when I thought of the subjectivist point of view I also thought of exactly the same example. Subjectivists do not really act in accordance with their beliefs. As Mises said &#8220;We may say that action is the manifestation of a man&#8217;s will.â€</i><br />
I already explained why I would get out of the way of the truck if I were in a simulation, and I have never stated that I actually believe I am in a simulation (Robin Hanson suggests there is a 5% probability and I am willing to defer to his expertise).</p>
<p><i>This is also a correct statement, very childish &#8220;argumentsâ€ indeed.</i><br />
Now <b>this</b> is a proper use of quotation marks! The issue was whether what the child was doing constitutes argument and by your use of quotation marks you indicate it does not.</p>
<p><i>Why bother to answer childish statements in return for another one? A waste of energy I would say. He does a terrible job in &#8220;defendingâ€ the nihilist/moral relativist/subjectivist points of view.</i><br />
So you have slipped from discussing the hypothetical child to me? Where have I said &#8220;am not/are too&#8221; or used any logical fallacies? You disagree with my premise, that normative statements do not have truth value, and now you say it is useless to argue with me. Wasn&#8217;t it your position that false beliefs need to be met with true arguments?</p>
<p><i>Actually in reality he does a good job in defending the opposite point of view as it seems that no real argument exist for subjectivism regarding ethical principles.</i><br />
Above I point out how to argue against emotivism: falsify a normative statement. You will not be able to do that if you start by assuming another normative statement, because its truth has not yet been established. Either it is elephants all the way down or you will have to derive a normative from a positive somewhere.</p>
<p><i>I think this sums up what we you doing here. You do not think it is possible to, much less are you inclined to, demonstrate that there is any truth to your argument regarding ethics.</i><br />
My meta-ethical belief that ethical beliefs have no truth value is itself a positive belief and does have truth value. If I stated you ought to believe the truth, that would be a normative statement. So even though I believe that belief of mine is true, it is not then objectively the case that you ought to believe it, and subjectively I would not be too concerned if you didn&#8217;t.</p>
<p><i>In this field, you are content to describe your position, which to you is hardly a justification</i><br />
I don&#8217;t think there are any justifications, and it  would be odd (though not impossible) to demonstrate the validity of statement X without understanding what statement X actually says.</p>
<p><i>Naturally, according to this view, any justification showing your ethical position is incorrect is impossible as well, as reason and logic are both outside the domain of such considerations.</i><br />
It is a meta-ethical position, and can be correct or incorrect.</p>
<p><i>Therefore, what we have been doing here has been to play a game void of purpose aside from perhaps the entertainment value we derive from it.</i><br />
I can&#8217;t speak for you guys, but I know I&#8217;ve been entertained.</p>
<p><i>Fair enough. I cannot convince you of the rational foundation of justice because reason is not relevant to you on this question.</i><br />
Whatever happened to the primacy of existence over consciousness? Or was that someone else? At any rate, I am looking to observe something so that I can say &#8220;Ah, there is such a thing as justice!&#8221;. Imaginary things in your head will not cut the mustard.</p>
<p><i>And likewise, you do not attempt to, and indeed cannot even hope to convince me of the validity of your position, and for the very same reason.</i><br />
Oh, I wouldn&#8217;t assign a probability of 0 to that, but since you display a reluctance to engage in conversation here I would certainly put the likelihood that you will accept my position at less than 0.5.</p>
<p><i>I think this discussion has been a battle of psychology</i><br />
That sounds a bit overdramatic.</p>
<p><i>with one participant refusing to do what the other insists is necessary for a logical argumentation: to acknowledge and admit the necessary element of logic and reason to the discussion.</i><br />
I don&#8217;t have any beef with logic and reason though I hold Bayesian rationality above all those (they can be considered special cases of Bayes), I just think it is a non-standard use of the term &#8220;argument&#8221; to refer only to logical argumentation. Otherwise arguments would consist of at most one arguer.</p>
<p><i>We were referring to the formulation of libertarian ethics vs. libertarian strategy (i.e. proselytization.)</i><br />
None of the examples I gave (Bell, Moldbug, Patri Friedman) were of proselytizers. I don&#8217;t think certain thugs can&#8217;t be successfully proselytized into accepting libertarianism. Bell wants to set up a market for anonymously killing rights-violators which will deter people from violating our rights. Patri Friedman wants to dramatically decrease exit costs and allow us to get away from governments we want no part in. Mencius Moldbug (who perhaps advocates proselytizing to government, but not convincing them to give up their power!) wants to formalize the State into a joint-stock corporation that will avoid idiotic and destructive actions in favor of those which provide value to its customers (the tax-payers) because this in turn will maximize revenue for the shareholders (those who currently but informally hold power).</p>
<p><i>My point was simply that in order to combat contrary ethics, a well-formulated libertarian ethic is needed.</i><br />
Leonard Reed said communism was a problem to argued away, not shot or blown up. I think some communists cannot be argued with and must be shot or blown up. If you can convince any communists by arguing, go for it, but I don&#8217;t think much of your chances.</p>
<p><i>For the last time, argumentation ethics is not about what people want; it is about what is presupposed in the action of argumentation.</i><br />
If I can show that person is 1 arguing and 2 not presupposing the libertarian ethic then that would show that the ethic is not a necessary presupposition of argument.</p>
<p><i>There exist childish arguments, but these are not what the term subsumes. If you don&#8217;t like the term argumentation, imagine some other word to take its place.</i><br />
The common definition of &#8220;arguing&#8221; includes the childish type. If you want to refer to something else it is up to <b>you</b> to use a different term!</p>
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		<title>By: Anthony</title>
		<link>http://archive.mises.org/6992/thoughts-on-the-latecomer-and-homesteading-ideas-or-why-the-very-idea-of-ownership-implies-that-only-libertarian-principles-are-justifiable/comment-page-3/#comment-125655</link>
		<dc:creator>Anthony</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 30 Aug 2007 07:26:10 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.mises.org/archives/006992.asp#comment-125655</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[TGGP: &quot;Incorrect arguments do not proceed from truth and reason, so are they not true arguments then?&quot;

Incorrect arguments do not reach truth or reason - but they attempt to.

&quot;The fact that someone who desires to bash you over the head is purposefully arguing over the internet shows that they are in fact interested in argumentation!&quot;

For the last time, argumentation ethics is not about what people want; it is about what is presupposed in the action of argumentation. Argumentation is specifically defined for the purposes of AE. All ethical justifications take the form of argumentation, that is they seek to reach some truth. There exist childish arguments, but these are not what the term subsumes. If you don&#039;t like the term argumentation, imagine some other word to take its place.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>TGGP: &#8220;Incorrect arguments do not proceed from truth and reason, so are they not true arguments then?&#8221;</p>
<p>Incorrect arguments do not reach truth or reason &#8211; but they attempt to.</p>
<p>&#8220;The fact that someone who desires to bash you over the head is purposefully arguing over the internet shows that they are in fact interested in argumentation!&#8221;</p>
<p>For the last time, argumentation ethics is not about what people want; it is about what is presupposed in the action of argumentation. Argumentation is specifically defined for the purposes of AE. All ethical justifications take the form of argumentation, that is they seek to reach some truth. There exist childish arguments, but these are not what the term subsumes. If you don&#8217;t like the term argumentation, imagine some other word to take its place.</p>
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		<title>By: Anthony</title>
		<link>http://archive.mises.org/6992/thoughts-on-the-latecomer-and-homesteading-ideas-or-why-the-very-idea-of-ownership-implies-that-only-libertarian-principles-are-justifiable/comment-page-3/#comment-125654</link>
		<dc:creator>Anthony</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 30 Aug 2007 07:17:17 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.mises.org/archives/006992.asp#comment-125654</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[TWLP Sam: &quot;But then I realised that Mark, Anthony. BjÃ¶rn, etc were simply talking about living their own lives without personal contradiction and not talking about trying to the world. Much clearer now. :P&quot;

Umm, no. Sorry. We were referring to the formulation of libertarian ethics vs. libertarian strategy (i.e. proselytization.) My point was simply that in order to combat contrary ethics, a well-formulated libertarian ethic is needed. TGGP disagrees (TT doesn&#039;t - he just seems to think our emphasis is misplaced.) Clearer now?]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>TWLP Sam: &#8220;But then I realised that Mark, Anthony. BjÃ¶rn, etc were simply talking about living their own lives without personal contradiction and not talking about trying to the world. Much clearer now. <img src='http://archive.mises.org/wp-includes/images/smilies/icon_razz.gif' alt=':P' class='wp-smiley' /> &#8221;</p>
<p>Umm, no. Sorry. We were referring to the formulation of libertarian ethics vs. libertarian strategy (i.e. proselytization.) My point was simply that in order to combat contrary ethics, a well-formulated libertarian ethic is needed. TGGP disagrees (TT doesn&#8217;t &#8211; he just seems to think our emphasis is misplaced.) Clearer now?</p>
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		<title>By: Paul Edwards</title>
		<link>http://archive.mises.org/6992/thoughts-on-the-latecomer-and-homesteading-ideas-or-why-the-very-idea-of-ownership-implies-that-only-libertarian-principles-are-justifiable/comment-page-3/#comment-125653</link>
		<dc:creator>Paul Edwards</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 30 Aug 2007 07:12:58 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.mises.org/archives/006992.asp#comment-125653</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[TGGP:

&quot;I have not said that anyone ought to take my position. I am simply explaining what it is I believe.&quot;

I think this sums up what we you doing here. You do not think it is possible to, much less are you inclined to, demonstrate that there is any truth to your argument regarding ethics. In this field, you are content to describe your position, which to you is hardly a justification; as such a thing is necessarily beyond reach. Naturally, according to this view, any justification showing your ethical position is incorrect is impossible as well, as reason and logic are both outside the domain of such considerations.

Therefore, what we have been doing here has been to play a game void of purpose aside from perhaps the entertainment value we derive from it. 

Fair enough. I cannot convince you of the rational foundation of justice because reason is not relevant to you on this question. And likewise, you do not attempt to, and indeed cannot even hope to convince me of the validity of your position, and for the very same reason.

I think this discussion has been a battle of psychology, with one participant refusing to do what the other insists is necessary for a logical argumentation: to acknowledge and admit the necessary element of logic and reason to the discussion. ]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>TGGP:</p>
<p>&#8220;I have not said that anyone ought to take my position. I am simply explaining what it is I believe.&#8221;</p>
<p>I think this sums up what we you doing here. You do not think it is possible to, much less are you inclined to, demonstrate that there is any truth to your argument regarding ethics. In this field, you are content to describe your position, which to you is hardly a justification; as such a thing is necessarily beyond reach. Naturally, according to this view, any justification showing your ethical position is incorrect is impossible as well, as reason and logic are both outside the domain of such considerations.</p>
<p>Therefore, what we have been doing here has been to play a game void of purpose aside from perhaps the entertainment value we derive from it. </p>
<p>Fair enough. I cannot convince you of the rational foundation of justice because reason is not relevant to you on this question. And likewise, you do not attempt to, and indeed cannot even hope to convince me of the validity of your position, and for the very same reason.</p>
<p>I think this discussion has been a battle of psychology, with one participant refusing to do what the other insists is necessary for a logical argumentation: to acknowledge and admit the necessary element of logic and reason to the discussion. </p>
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		<title>By: BjÃ¶rn Lundahl</title>
		<link>http://archive.mises.org/6992/thoughts-on-the-latecomer-and-homesteading-ideas-or-why-the-very-idea-of-ownership-implies-that-only-libertarian-principles-are-justifiable/comment-page-3/#comment-125652</link>
		<dc:creator>BjÃ¶rn Lundahl</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 30 Aug 2007 07:08:09 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.mises.org/archives/006992.asp#comment-125652</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Anthony &quot;Exactly the same thoughts were passing through my mind yesterday. It seems a little too easy for these moral nihilists/subjectivists to brush aside ethical theory. I wonder what philosophers have to say about it - that will be my next topic of inquiry.â€

Yes, nihilists/subjectivists should logically prove their relativistic points of views which they naturally cannot. So we really are logically, because of justice, forced to brush aside their &quot;opinions.â€

Ktibuk &quot;&quot;this might be a simulation&quot; and not get away when a car is coming at him on the street.â€

A while ago when I thought of the subjectivist point of view I also thought of exactly the same example. Subjectivists do not really act in accordance with their beliefs. As Mises said &quot;We may say that action is the manifestation of a man&#039;s will.â€
 
Peter &quot;If you persist in the use of fallacies/logical errors after having them pointed out, you&#039;re not really arguing, except in the childish sense (&quot;are too!&quot;, &quot;am not!&quot;, &quot;are too!&quot;, &quot;am not!&quot;), are you?! That&#039;s all anyone is saying.â€

This is also a correct statement, very childish &quot;argumentsâ€ indeed. Why bother to answer childish statements in return for another one? A waste of energy I would say. He does a terrible job in &quot;defendingâ€ the nihilist/moral relativist/subjectivist points of view. Actually in reality he does a good job in defending the opposite point of view as it seems that no real argument exist for subjectivism regarding ethical principles.  
]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Anthony &#8220;Exactly the same thoughts were passing through my mind yesterday. It seems a little too easy for these moral nihilists/subjectivists to brush aside ethical theory. I wonder what philosophers have to say about it &#8211; that will be my next topic of inquiry.â€</p>
<p>Yes, nihilists/subjectivists should logically prove their relativistic points of views which they naturally cannot. So we really are logically, because of justice, forced to brush aside their &#8220;opinions.â€</p>
<p>Ktibuk &#8220;&#8221;this might be a simulation&#8221; and not get away when a car is coming at him on the street.â€</p>
<p>A while ago when I thought of the subjectivist point of view I also thought of exactly the same example. Subjectivists do not really act in accordance with their beliefs. As Mises said &#8220;We may say that action is the manifestation of a man&#8217;s will.â€</p>
<p>Peter &#8220;If you persist in the use of fallacies/logical errors after having them pointed out, you&#8217;re not really arguing, except in the childish sense (&#8220;are too!&#8221;, &#8220;am not!&#8221;, &#8220;are too!&#8221;, &#8220;am not!&#8221;), are you?! That&#8217;s all anyone is saying.â€</p>
<p>This is also a correct statement, very childish &#8220;argumentsâ€ indeed. Why bother to answer childish statements in return for another one? A waste of energy I would say. He does a terrible job in &#8220;defendingâ€ the nihilist/moral relativist/subjectivist points of view. Actually in reality he does a good job in defending the opposite point of view as it seems that no real argument exist for subjectivism regarding ethical principles.  </p>
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		<title>By: TGGP</title>
		<link>http://archive.mises.org/6992/thoughts-on-the-latecomer-and-homesteading-ideas-or-why-the-very-idea-of-ownership-implies-that-only-libertarian-principles-are-justifiable/comment-page-3/#comment-125644</link>
		<dc:creator>TGGP</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 30 Aug 2007 05:15:07 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.mises.org/archives/006992.asp#comment-125644</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[&lt;i&gt;But presuming I value the truth, is it not true that I ought to agree with the above, if it is indeed the truth?&lt;/i&gt;
Presuming you value rape and murder, is it not true that you ought to agree with those who support rapists and murderers? It begs the question of whether you ought to support your beliefs and whether you ought to believe in something like truth.

&lt;i&gt;Your comments were both an attempt at a justification of your position, and an attempt to show its validity, by the way.&lt;/i&gt;
I have not said that anyone ought to take my position. I am simply explaining what it is I believe.

&lt;i&gt;Is this &quot;objective senseâ€ as you put it, to mean that you have an objective view, or only a subjective opinion not based in reason, which disapproves of Hitler?&lt;/i&gt;
Yes, I only subjectively dislike Hitler and his actions. I also disagree with Hitler on certain positive issues (will war and massacre bring Germany back to prominence and save it from Bolshevism? history showed that was not the case). If given the opportunity I might attempt to argue with Hitler using such positive points of disagreement, but in his final days he expressed a willingness to destroy Germany as it had failed to achieve his aims, so perhaps that would not work.

&lt;i&gt;Are you conceding that there is nothing superior to your view that his actions were wrong, compared to his view that his actions were right?&lt;/i&gt;
Yes, there is no way to resolve the issue.

&lt;i&gt;Would you two simply agree with each other that you have different values, neither superior to the other?&lt;/i&gt;
I don&#039;t know what Hitler would do, but I would recognize that we have very different values. Mencius Moldbug discussed those values &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;ct=res&amp;cd=1&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Funqualified-reservations.blogspot.com%2F2007%2F05%2Funderstanding-racial-idealism.html&amp;ei=XebWRreNGaSSiwHsjLmmDQ&amp;usg=AFQjCNFfZHSi_z-_sxGuMqItBBwk4vcPNA&amp;sig2=Ic7FbQObUtxe-FXeLjpogw&quot;&gt;here&lt;/a&gt;.

&lt;i&gt;Yes it does. In order to satisfactorily justify anything, one logically must argue correctly, logically, factually, and truthfully. This is a logical necessity. A true justification does not succeed by force, fraud, deceit or plain brute ignorance. A true justification must necessarily be made via correct arguments.&lt;/i&gt;
The mathematician Kurt Godel proved that there are infinitely many truths that cannot be proved. A great book on this is &quot;Godel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid&quot; by Douglas Hofstadter.

&lt;i&gt;true argumentation&lt;/i&gt;
I hope we&#039;re not getting in No True Scotsman territory here.

&lt;i&gt;It must proceed with reason and truth.&lt;/i&gt;
Incorrect arguments do not proceed from truth and reason, so are they not true arguments then?

&lt;i&gt;What you might believe is irrelevant.&lt;/i&gt;
Presuppositions are beliefs, and since you said I must presuppose something, my beliefs are relevant.

&lt;i&gt;All this means is that you are uninterested or incapable of argumentation and justification.&lt;/i&gt;
The fact that someone who desires to bash you over  the head is purposefully arguing over the internet shows that they are in fact interested in argumentation!

&lt;i&gt;and to do this, they must â€“ logically - in advance, agree to norms of civilized behavior. They must logically agree to the libertarian ethic to even attempt to justify their propositions.&lt;/i&gt;
The master may elect not to do this before arguing with is slave.

&lt;i&gt;And they cannot justify any ethic that is a contradiction to these norms.&lt;/i&gt;
If, hypothetically, the libertarian ethic is objectively false, perhaps one could justify something contrary to it.

&lt;i&gt;I also thought one day that it was a little peculiar that generally societies forbade physical violence and theft.&lt;/i&gt;
No they don&#039;t, they have instances where it is ok and instances where it is not. Except perhaps odd groups like the Amish or Jains.

&lt;i&gt;If all principles are purely subjectively undertaken, why do societies generally forbid physical violence and theft&lt;/i&gt;
If taste is subjective, why do all societies believe bread tastes better than mud? If they encountered a species that believed mud is tastier than bread and could converse, could they prove bread is in fact more delicious?

&lt;i&gt;Rightly or wrongly societies are ultimately guided by some moral principles whether we like it or not.&lt;/i&gt;
Societies are ultimately guided by people, and people are prone to self-serving post-facto rationalizations.

&lt;i&gt;In our societies laws must be enacted to keep the peace.&lt;/i&gt;
And I thought this place was full of anarchists!

&lt;i&gt;Obviously the principle of democracy and utilitarianism couldn&#039;t logically be defended as true and just.&lt;/i&gt;
I believe in neither, but I don&#039;t see where you showed it was obvious.

&lt;i&gt;Later I realized that the truthfulness of some ethical principles do not rest upon if all people support them or not.&lt;/i&gt;
Hooray, you&#039;ve discovered that argumentum ad populum is a fallacy.

&lt;i&gt;What supports them is whether they can be derived from an axiom and by this procedure be logically defended.&lt;/i&gt;
How is any ethical axion shown to be true?

&lt;i&gt;The superficial belief in moral relativism is the very cause of the high crime rates we have in our societies.&lt;/i&gt;
You haven&#039;t even proved a correlation, let alone causation. Also, I think you need to read &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/pinker07/pinker07_index.html&quot;&gt;some Steven Pinker&lt;/a&gt;.

&lt;i&gt;No they can&#039;t.&lt;/i&gt;
0 is false, 1 is true conventionally. Even if they distinguished them incorrectly they would still be distinguishing them. Our brains are ultimately not that different from computers and operate according to the same laws of physics.

&lt;i&gt;If there was no disagreement, there&#039;d be no need for argument in the first place&lt;/i&gt;
But people will still argue, perhaps believing incorrectly that there is disagreement. I plug &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.overcomingbias.com/2007/07/making-beliefs-.html&quot;&gt;this&lt;/a&gt; from Eliezer Yudkowsky again.

&lt;i&gt;and if the argument is resolvable (not merely a matter of opinion)&lt;/i&gt;
I believe all normative arguments are of the latter type.

&lt;i&gt;If you persist in the use of fallacies/logical errors after having them pointed out, you&#039;re not really arguing, except in the childish sense (&quot;are too!&quot;, &quot;am not!&quot;, &quot;are too!&quot;, &quot;am not!&quot;), are you?!&lt;/i&gt;
Arguing in the childish sense is still arguing, and a person who was incorrect at first might also incorrectly argue against those who claim they made incorrect claims.

TLWP Sam, you are right on the first part. However, I don&#039;t see why ethical philosophy is necessary to live your life without contradictions.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><i>But presuming I value the truth, is it not true that I ought to agree with the above, if it is indeed the truth?</i><br />
Presuming you value rape and murder, is it not true that you ought to agree with those who support rapists and murderers? It begs the question of whether you ought to support your beliefs and whether you ought to believe in something like truth.</p>
<p><i>Your comments were both an attempt at a justification of your position, and an attempt to show its validity, by the way.</i><br />
I have not said that anyone ought to take my position. I am simply explaining what it is I believe.</p>
<p><i>Is this &#8220;objective senseâ€ as you put it, to mean that you have an objective view, or only a subjective opinion not based in reason, which disapproves of Hitler?</i><br />
Yes, I only subjectively dislike Hitler and his actions. I also disagree with Hitler on certain positive issues (will war and massacre bring Germany back to prominence and save it from Bolshevism? history showed that was not the case). If given the opportunity I might attempt to argue with Hitler using such positive points of disagreement, but in his final days he expressed a willingness to destroy Germany as it had failed to achieve his aims, so perhaps that would not work.</p>
<p><i>Are you conceding that there is nothing superior to your view that his actions were wrong, compared to his view that his actions were right?</i><br />
Yes, there is no way to resolve the issue.</p>
<p><i>Would you two simply agree with each other that you have different values, neither superior to the other?</i><br />
I don&#8217;t know what Hitler would do, but I would recognize that we have very different values. Mencius Moldbug discussed those values <a href="http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&#038;ct=res&#038;cd=1&#038;url=http%3A%2F%2Funqualified-reservations.blogspot.com%2F2007%2F05%2Funderstanding-racial-idealism.html&#038;ei=XebWRreNGaSSiwHsjLmmDQ&#038;usg=AFQjCNFfZHSi_z-_sxGuMqItBBwk4vcPNA&#038;sig2=Ic7FbQObUtxe-FXeLjpogw">here</a>.</p>
<p><i>Yes it does. In order to satisfactorily justify anything, one logically must argue correctly, logically, factually, and truthfully. This is a logical necessity. A true justification does not succeed by force, fraud, deceit or plain brute ignorance. A true justification must necessarily be made via correct arguments.</i><br />
The mathematician Kurt Godel proved that there are infinitely many truths that cannot be proved. A great book on this is &#8220;Godel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid&#8221; by Douglas Hofstadter.</p>
<p><i>true argumentation</i><br />
I hope we&#8217;re not getting in No True Scotsman territory here.</p>
<p><i>It must proceed with reason and truth.</i><br />
Incorrect arguments do not proceed from truth and reason, so are they not true arguments then?</p>
<p><i>What you might believe is irrelevant.</i><br />
Presuppositions are beliefs, and since you said I must presuppose something, my beliefs are relevant.</p>
<p><i>All this means is that you are uninterested or incapable of argumentation and justification.</i><br />
The fact that someone who desires to bash you over  the head is purposefully arguing over the internet shows that they are in fact interested in argumentation!</p>
<p><i>and to do this, they must â€“ logically &#8211; in advance, agree to norms of civilized behavior. They must logically agree to the libertarian ethic to even attempt to justify their propositions.</i><br />
The master may elect not to do this before arguing with is slave.</p>
<p><i>And they cannot justify any ethic that is a contradiction to these norms.</i><br />
If, hypothetically, the libertarian ethic is objectively false, perhaps one could justify something contrary to it.</p>
<p><i>I also thought one day that it was a little peculiar that generally societies forbade physical violence and theft.</i><br />
No they don&#8217;t, they have instances where it is ok and instances where it is not. Except perhaps odd groups like the Amish or Jains.</p>
<p><i>If all principles are purely subjectively undertaken, why do societies generally forbid physical violence and theft</i><br />
If taste is subjective, why do all societies believe bread tastes better than mud? If they encountered a species that believed mud is tastier than bread and could converse, could they prove bread is in fact more delicious?</p>
<p><i>Rightly or wrongly societies are ultimately guided by some moral principles whether we like it or not.</i><br />
Societies are ultimately guided by people, and people are prone to self-serving post-facto rationalizations.</p>
<p><i>In our societies laws must be enacted to keep the peace.</i><br />
And I thought this place was full of anarchists!</p>
<p><i>Obviously the principle of democracy and utilitarianism couldn&#8217;t logically be defended as true and just.</i><br />
I believe in neither, but I don&#8217;t see where you showed it was obvious.</p>
<p><i>Later I realized that the truthfulness of some ethical principles do not rest upon if all people support them or not.</i><br />
Hooray, you&#8217;ve discovered that argumentum ad populum is a fallacy.</p>
<p><i>What supports them is whether they can be derived from an axiom and by this procedure be logically defended.</i><br />
How is any ethical axion shown to be true?</p>
<p><i>The superficial belief in moral relativism is the very cause of the high crime rates we have in our societies.</i><br />
You haven&#8217;t even proved a correlation, let alone causation. Also, I think you need to read <a href="http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/pinker07/pinker07_index.html">some Steven Pinker</a>.</p>
<p><i>No they can&#8217;t.</i><br />
0 is false, 1 is true conventionally. Even if they distinguished them incorrectly they would still be distinguishing them. Our brains are ultimately not that different from computers and operate according to the same laws of physics.</p>
<p><i>If there was no disagreement, there&#8217;d be no need for argument in the first place</i><br />
But people will still argue, perhaps believing incorrectly that there is disagreement. I plug <a href="http://www.overcomingbias.com/2007/07/making-beliefs-.html">this</a> from Eliezer Yudkowsky again.</p>
<p><i>and if the argument is resolvable (not merely a matter of opinion)</i><br />
I believe all normative arguments are of the latter type.</p>
<p><i>If you persist in the use of fallacies/logical errors after having them pointed out, you&#8217;re not really arguing, except in the childish sense (&#8220;are too!&#8221;, &#8220;am not!&#8221;, &#8220;are too!&#8221;, &#8220;am not!&#8221;), are you?!</i><br />
Arguing in the childish sense is still arguing, and a person who was incorrect at first might also incorrectly argue against those who claim they made incorrect claims.</p>
<p>TLWP Sam, you are right on the first part. However, I don&#8217;t see why ethical philosophy is necessary to live your life without contradictions.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: TGGP</title>
		<link>http://archive.mises.org/6992/thoughts-on-the-latecomer-and-homesteading-ideas-or-why-the-very-idea-of-ownership-implies-that-only-libertarian-principles-are-justifiable/comment-page-3/#comment-125643</link>
		<dc:creator>TGGP</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 30 Aug 2007 05:14:39 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.mises.org/archives/006992.asp#comment-125643</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[&lt;i&gt;But presuming I value the truth, is it not true that I ought to agree with the above, if it is indeed the truth?&lt;/i&gt;
Presuming you value rape and murder, is it not true that you ought to agree with those who support rapists and murderers? It begs the question of whether you ought to support your beliefs and whether you ought to believe in something like truth.

&lt;i&gt;Your comments were both an attempt at a justification of your position, and an attempt to show its validity, by the way.&lt;/i&gt;
I have not said that anyone ought to take my position. I am simply explaining what it is I believe.

&lt;i&gt;Is this &quot;objective senseâ€ as you put it, to mean that you have an objective view, or only a subjective opinion not based in reason, which disapproves of Hitler?&lt;/i&gt;
Yes, I only subjectively dislike Hitler and his actions. I also disagree with Hitler on certain positive issues (will war and massacre bring Germany back to prominence and save it from Bolshevism? history showed that was not the case). If given the opportunity I might attempt to argue with Hitler using such positive points of disagreement, but in his final days he expressed a willingness to destroy Germany as it had failed to achieve his aims, so perhaps that would not work.

&lt;i&gt;Are you conceding that there is nothing superior to your view that his actions were wrong, compared to his view that his actions were right?&lt;/i&gt;
Yes, there is no way to resolve the issue.

&lt;i&gt;Would you two simply agree with each other that you have different values, neither superior to the other?&lt;/i&gt;
I don&#039;t know what Hitler would do, but I would recognize that we have very different values. Mencius Moldbug discussed those values &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;ct=res&amp;cd=1&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Funqualified-reservations.blogspot.com%2F2007%2F05%2Funderstanding-racial-idealism.html&amp;ei=XebWRreNGaSSiwHsjLmmDQ&amp;usg=AFQjCNFfZHSi_z-_sxGuMqItBBwk4vcPNA&amp;sig2=Ic7FbQObUtxe-FXeLjpogw&quot;&gt;here&lt;/a&gt;.

&lt;i&gt;Yes it does. In order to satisfactorily justify anything, one logically must argue correctly, logically, factually, and truthfully. This is a logical necessity. A true justification does not succeed by force, fraud, deceit or plain brute ignorance. A true justification must necessarily be made via correct arguments.&lt;/i&gt;
The mathematician Kurt Godel proved that there are infinitely many truths that cannot be proved. A great book on this is &quot;Godel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid&quot; by Douglas Hofstadter.

&lt;i&gt;true argumentation&lt;/i&gt;
I hope we&#039;re not getting in No True Scotsman territory here.

&lt;i&gt;It must proceed with reason and truth.&lt;/i&gt;
Incorrect arguments do not proceed from truth and reason, so are they not true arguments then?

&lt;i&gt;What you might believe is irrelevant.&lt;/i&gt;
Presuppositions are beliefs, and since you said I must presuppose something, my beliefs are relevant.

&lt;i&gt;All this means is that you are uninterested or incapable of argumentation and justification.&lt;/i&gt;
The fact that someone who desires to bash you over  the head is purposefully arguing over the internet shows that they are in fact interested in argumentation!

&lt;i&gt;and to do this, they must â€“ logically - in advance, agree to norms of civilized behavior. They must logically agree to the libertarian ethic to even attempt to justify their propositions.&lt;/i&gt;
The master may elect not to do this before arguing with is slave.

&lt;i&gt;And they cannot justify any ethic that is a contradiction to these norms.&lt;/i&gt;
If, hypothetically, the libertarian ethic is objectively false, perhaps one could justify something contrary to it.

&lt;i&gt;I also thought one day that it was a little peculiar that generally societies forbade physical violence and theft.&lt;/i&gt;
No they don&#039;t, they have instances where it is ok and instances where it is not. Except perhaps odd groups like the Amish or Jains.

&lt;i&gt;If all principles are purely subjectively undertaken, why do societies generally forbid physical violence and theft&lt;/i&gt;
If taste is subjective, why do all societies believe bread tastes better than mud? If they encountered a species that believed mud is tastier than bread and could converse, could they prove bread is in fact more delicious?

&lt;i&gt;Rightly or wrongly societies are ultimately guided by some moral principles whether we like it or not.&lt;/i&gt;
Societies are ultimately guided by people, and people are prone to self-serving post-facto rationalizations.

&lt;i&gt;In our societies laws must be enacted to keep the peace.&lt;/i&gt;
And I thought this place was full of anarchists!

&lt;i&gt;Obviously the principle of democracy and utilitarianism couldn&#039;t logically be defended as true and just.&lt;/i&gt;
I believe in neither, but I don&#039;t see where you showed it was obvious.

&lt;i&gt;Later I realized that the truthfulness of some ethical principles do not rest upon if all people support them or not.&lt;/i&gt;
Hooray, you&#039;ve discovered that argumentum ad populum is a fallacy.

&lt;i&gt;What supports them is whether they can be derived from an axiom and by this procedure be logically defended.&lt;/i&gt;
How is any ethical axion shown to be true?

&lt;i&gt;The superficial belief in moral relativism is the very cause of the high crime rates we have in our societies.&lt;/i&gt;
You haven&#039;t even proved a correlation, let alone causation. Also, I think you need to read &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/pinker07/pinker07_index.html&quot;&gt;some Steven Pinker&lt;/a&gt;.

&lt;i&gt;No they can&#039;t.&lt;/i&gt;
0 is false, 1 is true conventionally. Even if they distinguished them incorrectly they would still be distinguishing them. Our brains are ultimately not that different from computers and operate according to the same laws of physics.

&lt;i&gt;If there was no disagreement, there&#039;d be no need for argument in the first place&lt;/i&gt;
But people will still argue, perhaps believing incorrectly that there is disagreement. I plug &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.overcomingbias.com/2007/07/making-beliefs-.html&quot;&gt;this&lt;/a&gt; from Eliezer Yudkowsky again.

&lt;i&gt;and if the argument is resolvable (not merely a matter of opinion)&lt;/i&gt;
I believe all normative arguments are of the latter type.

&lt;i&gt;If you persist in the use of fallacies/logical errors after having them pointed out, you&#039;re not really arguing, except in the childish sense (&quot;are too!&quot;, &quot;am not!&quot;, &quot;are too!&quot;, &quot;am not!&quot;), are you?!&lt;/i&gt;
Arguing in the childish sense is still arguing, and a person who was incorrect at first might also incorrectly argue against those who claim they made incorrect claims.

TLWP Sam, you are right on the first part. However, I don&#039;t see why ethical philosophy is necessary to live your life without contradictions.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><i>But presuming I value the truth, is it not true that I ought to agree with the above, if it is indeed the truth?</i><br />
Presuming you value rape and murder, is it not true that you ought to agree with those who support rapists and murderers? It begs the question of whether you ought to support your beliefs and whether you ought to believe in something like truth.</p>
<p><i>Your comments were both an attempt at a justification of your position, and an attempt to show its validity, by the way.</i><br />
I have not said that anyone ought to take my position. I am simply explaining what it is I believe.</p>
<p><i>Is this &#8220;objective senseâ€ as you put it, to mean that you have an objective view, or only a subjective opinion not based in reason, which disapproves of Hitler?</i><br />
Yes, I only subjectively dislike Hitler and his actions. I also disagree with Hitler on certain positive issues (will war and massacre bring Germany back to prominence and save it from Bolshevism? history showed that was not the case). If given the opportunity I might attempt to argue with Hitler using such positive points of disagreement, but in his final days he expressed a willingness to destroy Germany as it had failed to achieve his aims, so perhaps that would not work.</p>
<p><i>Are you conceding that there is nothing superior to your view that his actions were wrong, compared to his view that his actions were right?</i><br />
Yes, there is no way to resolve the issue.</p>
<p><i>Would you two simply agree with each other that you have different values, neither superior to the other?</i><br />
I don&#8217;t know what Hitler would do, but I would recognize that we have very different values. Mencius Moldbug discussed those values <a href="http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&#038;ct=res&#038;cd=1&#038;url=http%3A%2F%2Funqualified-reservations.blogspot.com%2F2007%2F05%2Funderstanding-racial-idealism.html&#038;ei=XebWRreNGaSSiwHsjLmmDQ&#038;usg=AFQjCNFfZHSi_z-_sxGuMqItBBwk4vcPNA&#038;sig2=Ic7FbQObUtxe-FXeLjpogw">here</a>.</p>
<p><i>Yes it does. In order to satisfactorily justify anything, one logically must argue correctly, logically, factually, and truthfully. This is a logical necessity. A true justification does not succeed by force, fraud, deceit or plain brute ignorance. A true justification must necessarily be made via correct arguments.</i><br />
The mathematician Kurt Godel proved that there are infinitely many truths that cannot be proved. A great book on this is &#8220;Godel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid&#8221; by Douglas Hofstadter.</p>
<p><i>true argumentation</i><br />
I hope we&#8217;re not getting in No True Scotsman territory here.</p>
<p><i>It must proceed with reason and truth.</i><br />
Incorrect arguments do not proceed from truth and reason, so are they not true arguments then?</p>
<p><i>What you might believe is irrelevant.</i><br />
Presuppositions are beliefs, and since you said I must presuppose something, my beliefs are relevant.</p>
<p><i>All this means is that you are uninterested or incapable of argumentation and justification.</i><br />
The fact that someone who desires to bash you over  the head is purposefully arguing over the internet shows that they are in fact interested in argumentation!</p>
<p><i>and to do this, they must â€“ logically &#8211; in advance, agree to norms of civilized behavior. They must logically agree to the libertarian ethic to even attempt to justify their propositions.</i><br />
The master may elect not to do this before arguing with is slave.</p>
<p><i>And they cannot justify any ethic that is a contradiction to these norms.</i><br />
If, hypothetically, the libertarian ethic is objectively false, perhaps one could justify something contrary to it.</p>
<p><i>I also thought one day that it was a little peculiar that generally societies forbade physical violence and theft.</i><br />
No they don&#8217;t, they have instances where it is ok and instances where it is not. Except perhaps odd groups like the Amish or Jains.</p>
<p><i>If all principles are purely subjectively undertaken, why do societies generally forbid physical violence and theft</i><br />
If taste is subjective, why do all societies believe bread tastes better than mud? If they encountered a species that believed mud is tastier than bread and could converse, could they prove bread is in fact more delicious?</p>
<p><i>Rightly or wrongly societies are ultimately guided by some moral principles whether we like it or not.</i><br />
Societies are ultimately guided by people, and people are prone to self-serving post-facto rationalizations.</p>
<p><i>In our societies laws must be enacted to keep the peace.</i><br />
And I thought this place was full of anarchists!</p>
<p><i>Obviously the principle of democracy and utilitarianism couldn&#8217;t logically be defended as true and just.</i><br />
I believe in neither, but I don&#8217;t see where you showed it was obvious.</p>
<p><i>Later I realized that the truthfulness of some ethical principles do not rest upon if all people support them or not.</i><br />
Hooray, you&#8217;ve discovered that argumentum ad populum is a fallacy.</p>
<p><i>What supports them is whether they can be derived from an axiom and by this procedure be logically defended.</i><br />
How is any ethical axion shown to be true?</p>
<p><i>The superficial belief in moral relativism is the very cause of the high crime rates we have in our societies.</i><br />
You haven&#8217;t even proved a correlation, let alone causation. Also, I think you need to read <a href="http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/pinker07/pinker07_index.html">some Steven Pinker</a>.</p>
<p><i>No they can&#8217;t.</i><br />
0 is false, 1 is true conventionally. Even if they distinguished them incorrectly they would still be distinguishing them. Our brains are ultimately not that different from computers and operate according to the same laws of physics.</p>
<p><i>If there was no disagreement, there&#8217;d be no need for argument in the first place</i><br />
But people will still argue, perhaps believing incorrectly that there is disagreement. I plug <a href="http://www.overcomingbias.com/2007/07/making-beliefs-.html">this</a> from Eliezer Yudkowsky again.</p>
<p><i>and if the argument is resolvable (not merely a matter of opinion)</i><br />
I believe all normative arguments are of the latter type.</p>
<p><i>If you persist in the use of fallacies/logical errors after having them pointed out, you&#8217;re not really arguing, except in the childish sense (&#8220;are too!&#8221;, &#8220;am not!&#8221;, &#8220;are too!&#8221;, &#8220;am not!&#8221;), are you?!</i><br />
Arguing in the childish sense is still arguing, and a person who was incorrect at first might also incorrectly argue against those who claim they made incorrect claims.</p>
<p>TLWP Sam, you are right on the first part. However, I don&#8217;t see why ethical philosophy is necessary to live your life without contradictions.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: TLWP Sam</title>
		<link>http://archive.mises.org/6992/thoughts-on-the-latecomer-and-homesteading-ideas-or-why-the-very-idea-of-ownership-implies-that-only-libertarian-principles-are-justifiable/comment-page-2/#comment-125634</link>
		<dc:creator>TLWP Sam</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 30 Aug 2007 04:01:23 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.mises.org/archives/006992.asp#comment-125634</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Oh, I think I get it now.  I think what TGGP and possibly TokyoTom (and heck I was thinking of asking it) is that talk of being nice isn&#039;t good enough to make the world a better place.  Or some seem to imply that some could get ahead by using force and fraud but it wouldn&#039;t last long so it&#039;s better not to use it.  But that baloney because the whole of history and present proves otherwise, plenty of people have done quite nicely with force and fraud.  Or that the world is far from Libertopia is another proof that people don&#039;t play nicely.

But then I realised that Mark, Anthony. BjÃ¶rn, etc were simply talking about living their own lives without personal contradiction and not talking about trying to the world.  Much clearer now.  :P]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Oh, I think I get it now.  I think what TGGP and possibly TokyoTom (and heck I was thinking of asking it) is that talk of being nice isn&#8217;t good enough to make the world a better place.  Or some seem to imply that some could get ahead by using force and fraud but it wouldn&#8217;t last long so it&#8217;s better not to use it.  But that baloney because the whole of history and present proves otherwise, plenty of people have done quite nicely with force and fraud.  Or that the world is far from Libertopia is another proof that people don&#8217;t play nicely.</p>
<p>But then I realised that Mark, Anthony. BjÃ¶rn, etc were simply talking about living their own lives without personal contradiction and not talking about trying to the world.  Much clearer now.  <img src='http://archive.mises.org/wp-includes/images/smilies/icon_razz.gif' alt=':P' class='wp-smiley' /> </p>
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		<title>By: Peter</title>
		<link>http://archive.mises.org/6992/thoughts-on-the-latecomer-and-homesteading-ideas-or-why-the-very-idea-of-ownership-implies-that-only-libertarian-principles-are-justifiable/comment-page-2/#comment-125618</link>
		<dc:creator>Peter</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 29 Aug 2007 21:31:35 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.mises.org/archives/006992.asp#comment-125618</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[&lt;i&gt;Computers can distinguish between true and false.&lt;/i&gt;

No they can&#039;t.

&lt;i&gt;as others stated that using fallacies or incorrect logic did not constitute arguing&lt;/i&gt;

If, when you involve yourself in &quot;argument&quot; using fallacies or incorrect logic, your opponent points out the problem, you can recognize that you were making an error and correct it, that&#039;s a legitimate argument.  If there was no disagreement, there&#039;d be no need for argument in the first place; and if the argument is resolvable (not merely a matter of opinion), there must obviously have been some fallacy in at least one of the participants&#039; initial positions.  If you persist in the use of fallacies/logical errors after having them pointed out, you&#039;re not really arguing, except in the childish sense (&quot;are too!&quot;, &quot;am not!&quot;, &quot;are too!&quot;, &quot;am not!&quot;), are you?!  That&#039;s all anyone is saying.
]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><i>Computers can distinguish between true and false.</i></p>
<p>No they can&#8217;t.</p>
<p><i>as others stated that using fallacies or incorrect logic did not constitute arguing</i></p>
<p>If, when you involve yourself in &#8220;argument&#8221; using fallacies or incorrect logic, your opponent points out the problem, you can recognize that you were making an error and correct it, that&#8217;s a legitimate argument.  If there was no disagreement, there&#8217;d be no need for argument in the first place; and if the argument is resolvable (not merely a matter of opinion), there must obviously have been some fallacy in at least one of the participants&#8217; initial positions.  If you persist in the use of fallacies/logical errors after having them pointed out, you&#8217;re not really arguing, except in the childish sense (&#8220;are too!&#8221;, &#8220;am not!&#8221;, &#8220;are too!&#8221;, &#8220;am not!&#8221;), are you?!  That&#8217;s all anyone is saying.</p>
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		<title>By: BjÃ¶rn Lundahl</title>
		<link>http://archive.mises.org/6992/thoughts-on-the-latecomer-and-homesteading-ideas-or-why-the-very-idea-of-ownership-implies-that-only-libertarian-principles-are-justifiable/comment-page-2/#comment-125614</link>
		<dc:creator>BjÃ¶rn Lundahl</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 29 Aug 2007 20:08:10 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.mises.org/archives/006992.asp#comment-125614</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Very long time ago I was a moral relativist. I thought that it was very obvious that not any ethical principle is objectively or axiomatically true. This because people do obviously have different opinions. So how could I tell which opinion is truer and more correct than the other guys opinion? It seemed to be like telling that the colour red is objectively more beautiful and correct colour than blue! It didn&#039;t sound very plausible. Generally nearly all people also seemed to support the idea of moral relativism. Rothbard was the man that started my rethinking. I also thought one day that it was a little peculiar that generally societies forbade physical violence and theft. If all principles are purely subjectively undertaken, why do societies generally forbid physical violence and theft (with exceptions of course) and this has also been going on for thousands of years? Rightly or wrongly societies are ultimately guided by some moral principles whether we like it or not. In our societies laws must be enacted to keep the peace.  Obviously the principle of democracy and utilitarianism couldn&#039;t logically be defended as true and just. 

Later I realized that the truthfulness of some ethical principles do not rest upon if all people support them or not. What supports them is whether they can be derived from an axiom and by this procedure be logically defended. 

Rothbard gave me the glints why the principle of none violence and theft are ethically true and just. Further investigation and analyzing supported this.

My conclusion was that the principle of none violence and theft which regulates the relations between people are objectively true borders of justice but within those spheres that is the lives of the individuals, are only guided and subjectively undertaken and are also only a matter of individual tastes.  

The superficial belief in moral relativism is the very cause of the high crime rates we have in our societies. 
]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Very long time ago I was a moral relativist. I thought that it was very obvious that not any ethical principle is objectively or axiomatically true. This because people do obviously have different opinions. So how could I tell which opinion is truer and more correct than the other guys opinion? It seemed to be like telling that the colour red is objectively more beautiful and correct colour than blue! It didn&#8217;t sound very plausible. Generally nearly all people also seemed to support the idea of moral relativism. Rothbard was the man that started my rethinking. I also thought one day that it was a little peculiar that generally societies forbade physical violence and theft. If all principles are purely subjectively undertaken, why do societies generally forbid physical violence and theft (with exceptions of course) and this has also been going on for thousands of years? Rightly or wrongly societies are ultimately guided by some moral principles whether we like it or not. In our societies laws must be enacted to keep the peace.  Obviously the principle of democracy and utilitarianism couldn&#8217;t logically be defended as true and just. </p>
<p>Later I realized that the truthfulness of some ethical principles do not rest upon if all people support them or not. What supports them is whether they can be derived from an axiom and by this procedure be logically defended. </p>
<p>Rothbard gave me the glints why the principle of none violence and theft are ethically true and just. Further investigation and analyzing supported this.</p>
<p>My conclusion was that the principle of none violence and theft which regulates the relations between people are objectively true borders of justice but within those spheres that is the lives of the individuals, are only guided and subjectively undertaken and are also only a matter of individual tastes.  </p>
<p>The superficial belief in moral relativism is the very cause of the high crime rates we have in our societies. </p>
]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>By: Paul Edwards</title>
		<link>http://archive.mises.org/6992/thoughts-on-the-latecomer-and-homesteading-ideas-or-why-the-very-idea-of-ownership-implies-that-only-libertarian-principles-are-justifiable/comment-page-2/#comment-125611</link>
		<dc:creator>Paul Edwards</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 29 Aug 2007 18:35:24 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.mises.org/archives/006992.asp#comment-125611</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[T: Well, it turns out you were wrong to assume so.

P: If you say so.

T: Validity is correctness, or truth. The truth is what is rather than what ought. 

P: But presuming I value the truth, is it not true that I ought to agree with the above, if it is indeed the truth? 

T: What is is demonstrated all the time and if one person&#039;s judgement is not trusted a machine can analyze it objectively. Worthiness entails value judgements, which are subjective rather than objective.

P: Your comments were both an attempt at a justification of your position, and an attempt to show its validity, by the way.

T: &quot;In an objective sense, yes. I happen to disapprove of such things, but my opinion does not count for much.â€

P: What your opinion counts for in the grand scheme of things in this world, is not actually the issue; it is whether or not your professed view is logically consistent with how you present that view. Is this &quot;objective senseâ€ as you put it, to mean that you have an objective view, or only a subjective opinion not based in reason, which disapproves of Hitler? Are you conceding that there is nothing superior to your view that his actions were wrong, compared to his view that his actions were right? Would you two simply agree with each other that you have different values, neither superior to the other? I guess you have already answered in the affirmative to this. Not everyone has such courage of their convictions. My hat is off to you.

T: It presupposes that correct things are argued, 

P: Yes it does. In order to satisfactorily justify anything, one logically must argue correctly, logically, factually, and truthfully. This is a logical necessity. A true justification does not succeed by force, fraud, deceit or plain brute ignorance. A true justification must necessarily be made via correct arguments.

T: when it might the case that the set of things that may be argued are all false (I am not saying this is the case, only that they do not consider this). 

P: Pardon the repetition, but, if a true justification is to be given, argumentation must proceed with truth and reason. Again this is not something that requires psychological &quot;buy-inâ€ by the participants of argumentation. It is something that simply stands as a logical requirement of true argumentation. One cannot logically argue that one cannot argue â€“ although he can certainly physically attempt to do so. And one cannot logically present a successful justification based on force and fraud. It must proceed with reason and truth. Both of these are fundamental necessary truths.

T: Furthermore, it is not true that one must presuppose anything in order to argue. I can believe 

P: What you might believe is irrelevant. You might be insane, or perhaps a criminal who is not interested in truth or justice. You might be a compulsive liar, or simply intent on demonstrating your cleverness by misleading another. This is all quite beside the point. What is relevant is the logical presupposition of argumentation. And that is peaceful cooperative logical reasoned discourse directed towards arriving at truthful propositions.

T: I am in the right to bash you over the head for disagreeing with me, but have merely elected not to do so at the present 

P: All this means is that you are uninterested or incapable of argumentation and justification. In this case, you are the ethical equivalent of the wolf or cougar, fit to be dispensed with according to the violent threat that you pose to civilized humans. The question of justification is only pertinent to those interested in it and willing and capable of respecting civilized laws of justice.

T: (or perhaps I am incapable of doing so, such as with arguments over a distance on the internet). The &quot;master arguing with a slave&quot; was the best example I can remember there.

P: So to recap, this argument that some people are uninterested in justice is merely a tangential irrelevant observation turned sideways and made to look relevant to the discussion. What is relevant is that among those who are interested in justification of their behavior must do their justifying through argumentation, and to do this, they must â€“ logically - in advance, agree to norms of civilized behavior. They must logically agree to the libertarian ethic to even attempt to justify their propositions. And they cannot justify any ethic that is a contradiction to these norms.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>T: Well, it turns out you were wrong to assume so.</p>
<p>P: If you say so.</p>
<p>T: Validity is correctness, or truth. The truth is what is rather than what ought. </p>
<p>P: But presuming I value the truth, is it not true that I ought to agree with the above, if it is indeed the truth? </p>
<p>T: What is is demonstrated all the time and if one person&#8217;s judgement is not trusted a machine can analyze it objectively. Worthiness entails value judgements, which are subjective rather than objective.</p>
<p>P: Your comments were both an attempt at a justification of your position, and an attempt to show its validity, by the way.</p>
<p>T: &#8220;In an objective sense, yes. I happen to disapprove of such things, but my opinion does not count for much.â€</p>
<p>P: What your opinion counts for in the grand scheme of things in this world, is not actually the issue; it is whether or not your professed view is logically consistent with how you present that view. Is this &#8220;objective senseâ€ as you put it, to mean that you have an objective view, or only a subjective opinion not based in reason, which disapproves of Hitler? Are you conceding that there is nothing superior to your view that his actions were wrong, compared to his view that his actions were right? Would you two simply agree with each other that you have different values, neither superior to the other? I guess you have already answered in the affirmative to this. Not everyone has such courage of their convictions. My hat is off to you.</p>
<p>T: It presupposes that correct things are argued, </p>
<p>P: Yes it does. In order to satisfactorily justify anything, one logically must argue correctly, logically, factually, and truthfully. This is a logical necessity. A true justification does not succeed by force, fraud, deceit or plain brute ignorance. A true justification must necessarily be made via correct arguments.</p>
<p>T: when it might the case that the set of things that may be argued are all false (I am not saying this is the case, only that they do not consider this). </p>
<p>P: Pardon the repetition, but, if a true justification is to be given, argumentation must proceed with truth and reason. Again this is not something that requires psychological &#8220;buy-inâ€ by the participants of argumentation. It is something that simply stands as a logical requirement of true argumentation. One cannot logically argue that one cannot argue â€“ although he can certainly physically attempt to do so. And one cannot logically present a successful justification based on force and fraud. It must proceed with reason and truth. Both of these are fundamental necessary truths.</p>
<p>T: Furthermore, it is not true that one must presuppose anything in order to argue. I can believe </p>
<p>P: What you might believe is irrelevant. You might be insane, or perhaps a criminal who is not interested in truth or justice. You might be a compulsive liar, or simply intent on demonstrating your cleverness by misleading another. This is all quite beside the point. What is relevant is the logical presupposition of argumentation. And that is peaceful cooperative logical reasoned discourse directed towards arriving at truthful propositions.</p>
<p>T: I am in the right to bash you over the head for disagreeing with me, but have merely elected not to do so at the present </p>
<p>P: All this means is that you are uninterested or incapable of argumentation and justification. In this case, you are the ethical equivalent of the wolf or cougar, fit to be dispensed with according to the violent threat that you pose to civilized humans. The question of justification is only pertinent to those interested in it and willing and capable of respecting civilized laws of justice.</p>
<p>T: (or perhaps I am incapable of doing so, such as with arguments over a distance on the internet). The &#8220;master arguing with a slave&#8221; was the best example I can remember there.</p>
<p>P: So to recap, this argument that some people are uninterested in justice is merely a tangential irrelevant observation turned sideways and made to look relevant to the discussion. What is relevant is that among those who are interested in justification of their behavior must do their justifying through argumentation, and to do this, they must â€“ logically &#8211; in advance, agree to norms of civilized behavior. They must logically agree to the libertarian ethic to even attempt to justify their propositions. And they cannot justify any ethic that is a contradiction to these norms.</p>
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