Ordinary speech (and we’ll leave aside whether it’s correct or incorrect) equates “rational” with other descriptors (“judicious,” “logical,” and, especially, “sane”), when, at its core definition relates it to the concept, “based on reason.” Mises points out (and we may easily observe, ourselves) that the wider, more commonplace usages introduce opportunity for error. Indeed, the process of learning itself is enormously complicated by these frequent (mis)usages, to the point where even educated speakers frquently refer to actions by others of which they disapprove (or even do not understand) as “irrational.”

The matter might seem merely an opportunity for pedantic quibbling. But, when it is reflected that the very-frequent propagandistic technique of “demonizing” other parties or peoples frequently consists in convincing as many as possible that such others hold beliefs utterly unamenable to reason, that they are, in fact, irrational, insane, beyond productive argument or negotiation, the damage-potential of such inapt language can be seen more clearly.

This is not a problem restricted to uneducated ignoramuses. They don’t come much smarter (and educated) than some of the commentors over at Gene Expression (gnxp.com) but very much the same confusion arises repeatedly, no matter how often a narrower, more accurate use of language is suggested (and argued for).

I’m changing the subject somewhat, if I may. Does praxeology have anything to say about someone who is delusional and, say, drinks a glass of bleach believing it is delicious orange juice, other than the observation that this individual nevertheless acts in his own ‘self-interest’?

Mises iterates many times sentences such as the two sentences I stated above defining action as both rational and self-interested in order to describe the universally true implications of action. That’s consistent with all valid economic science.

Excuse me, I just realized now what I think you meant with this statement, and I didn’t take it into account while writing my previous post. But so this doesn’t get too confusing, I’ll wait until you comment on my previous post before my commenting further.

Your (valid) reasoning which you applied to the phrase ‘rational action’ equally applies to the phrase ‘self-interested action’, does it not? Isn’t this latter phrase equally redundant since it implies the existence of non self-interested action?

That’s different from what you said in your first comment, though, which is perfectly valid.

Actually, the answer I was looking for is addressed by Mises this very excerpt–I overlooked it.

“The term ‘rational action’ is therefore pleonastic and must be rejected as such.”

“It’s not redundant, but self-referential.”

I think Mises is clear that a phrase such as “acting in one’s best interest,” while self-referential, is nevertheless indeed redundant–a ‘pleonasm’ in his words.

I don’t know that redundant is the right word for it though. Action implies a purpose. A purpose must be driven by some subjective value. I don’t know – in order for the statement to be false, it might contradict itself, thereby it must be true?

If I discern all the value I may get from some action, and then take only actions that give me negative value, then “negative” valued actions are more valued than “positive” valued actions. That is, we always mean to take the action that we take – and only in retrospect may we discern whether we acted in our best interest.

“It seemed like a good idea at the time.”

Does anyone know where this was from? It was possibly Mises, or Hoppe (or perhanps another author).

Thanks.