1. Skip to navigation
  2. Skip to content
  3. Skip to sidebar
Source link: http://archive.mises.org/5950/anarchy-degradation-and-extremism/

Anarchy, degradation, and extremism!

November 28, 2006 by

The Journal of Libertarian Studies continues to bring you exciting cutting-edge scholarship in libertarian theory. Here’s what you’ll find in issue 20.3:

  • One of the most popular contemporary arguments for the state comes from game theorists, who tend to model interaction without the state as a coordination problem which can be solved only by centrally imposed governmental force. But in “Fallacies in the Theories of the Emergence of the State,” Bertrand Lemennicier argues that such game-theoretic arguments routinely disregard the variety of ways in which, once the participants of a coordination problem recognize the payoff structure of the situation they are in, they have a clear incentive to take advantage of a number of available means of altering that situation. Lemennicier’s analysis makes the case for a far more optimistic view of the prospects for successful cooperation in the absence of the state.
  • The common assumption that the state is necessary for national defense has been criticized by free-market anarchists, who often point to the possibility of market provision of military protection. But, notes Carl Watner, these anarchist critics have too often neglected the possibility of modes of protection that are not only nonstate but also nonmilitary and nonviolent. In “Without Firing a Shot: Societal Defense and Voluntaryist Resistance,” Watner draws on libertarian theory, civilian defense theory, and historical examples to argue that nonviolent mass disobedience can be far more effective in resisting an invader than is generally recognized, inasmuch as such resistance exploits the fact that governmental power depends crucially on the acquiescence of those it subjugates.
  • Barry D. Simpson sets out to show how the work of nineteenth-century educational theorist Robert Lewis Dabney anticipates and complements, in certain respects, contemporary libertarian economist Hans-Hermann Hoppe’s critique of democracy. In “The Cultural Degradation of Universal Education: The Educational Views of Robert Lewis Dabney,” Simpson explains Dabney’s arguments that state-mandated universal education tends, not to bring the least educated up to the level of the best educated, but rather the reverse; that by awakening aspirations without providing the means of satisfying them, it tends to an increase in crime and incivility; and that insofar as it is administered by the state, education will inevitably have its content dictated by the power struggles of special interests rather than by the desires of parents or the needs of children.
  • Some nine years ago Walter Block and the late Milton Friedman exchanged a number of letters debating the roles of moderation and gradualism versus radical extremism in making the case for liberty, with Friedman, often a free-market extremist in the eyes of the economic profession generally, playing the moderate relative to Block’s more radical libertarianism. A few months ago Dr. Friedman graciously granted permission for this exchange to be published in the JLS; as this issue went to press, we could not have known that its publication would coincide with Friedman’s death, but the unexpected timing gives the journal a fitting opportunity to pay tribute to a great champion of liberty. “Fanatical, Not Reasonable: A Short Correspondence Between Walter Block and Milton Friedman” may thus be said to represent both, excitingly, Friedman’s first publication in the JLS, and, sadly, his last publication during his lifetime.
  • David Conway has argued that classical liberals should defend nationalism against the claims of supranational entities like the European Union on the one hand, and against the decentralist arguments of secessionists and anarchists on the other. J. C. Lester, in a review of Conway’s book In Defence of the Realm: The Place of Nations in Classical Liberalism, takes issue with Conway’s position from an anarcho-libertarian perspective, discussing issues ranging from immigration and cultural group rights to 9/11 and the Israel-Palestine conflict.
  • Jacob T. Levy has maintained that the primary case for multiculturalist legislation lies in its potential to block the oppression of some cultures by others. In a review of Levy’s book The Multiculturalism of Fear, Marcus Verhaegh worries that Levy’s approach manifests an uneasy tension between suspicion of particularist identities on the one hand and suspicion of attempts to suppress such identities on the other; Verhaegh suggests that a more positive appreciation for particularist identities can be reconciled with the kind of protection from oppression that Levy seeks by embracing a more decentralist, libertarian vision.
  • Andrew P. Napolitano represents a perhaps surprising combination: former Superior Court judge, chief legal analyst for Fox News, and natural-law libertarian theorist. William L. Anderson reviews Napolitano’s book Constitutional Chaos: What Happens When the Government Breaks Its Own Laws, which details the myriad ways in which the U.S. government routinely abuses its power in defiance of the limited-government strictures embodied in the Constitution.

Subscribe now and receive a PDF of the current issue immediately!

{ 64 comments }

Daniel December 5, 2006 at 7:38 pm

Forgive my relative ignorance. I have other priorities that are higher than my desire to learn about anarchist and libertarian theories, and time is a scarce resource for me as it is for everyone else. I do not have time to keep up with my current commitments, let alone read books, however much I might enjoy them.

Bjorn, in this theoretical anarchist society in which all are governed by the libertarian law in the absence of a state…

Who enforces that law? Whomever happens to be handy and have superior force to overwhelm the violators? Or would there be some people who are charged with that task? And what is to be done when the enforcers inevitably break the law they are entrusted with enforcing? (I say inevitably not to impune all such enforces, but because in the whole of any human society there will be some.) How can such a law be enforced without effectively violating said law, or at least acting through an exception. What happens when someone mistakenly takes a person enforcing the law to be violating it and tries to enforce it upon the first enforcer, perhaps because the violator decieves the newcomer into ‘rescuing’ him? Or in turn, what happens when a person ‘enforces’ the law against someone who had not actually violated it as a means to coerce illegitimately through deceit.
Ultimately it would seem that some arbiter is necessary to settle such disputes as would arise from whatever form of enforcement is in place. However, arbiters are human and may be corrupt or biased, or falsely accused of corruption or bias. Thus one side may refuse a particular arbiter, seeing him as untrustworthy, while the other side may refuse a particular arbiter because they fear the trustworthiness of that arbiter will lead to their own punishment, and hide thier reasons in lies. If, ultimately, there is some arbiter who cannot be refused, are they not a de facto state? And if there is no arbiter who cannot be refused, how can someone be held accountable?

It seems as though the best one could hope for as a stable state would be a State which sees its role as only that of enforcing a few simple rules and whose individual enforcers believe in libertarian principles above their own power, and on that basis are willing to fight if necessary to keep one another in check. I’m guessing you could count me as a ‘minarchist’, but only if I am correctly guessing the meaning of that term.

I hope that you will debate my humble inquiries without accusations of non sequitorism, despite the fact that they pertain to anarchy and the question of the necessity of a state in the role of defense, rather than online translations.

Irrelevantly yours,
Daniel

Björn Lundahl December 6, 2006 at 4:35 am

The power of ideas:

I have just found, on the internet, a proposition that Hans-Hermann Hoppe has made:

“States, as powerful and invincible as they might seem, ultimately owe their existence to ideas and, since ideas can in principle change instantaneously, states can be brought down and crumble practically overnight.”

http://www.freelythinking.com/quotes.htm

Björn Lundahl
Göteborg, Sweden

Björn Lundahl December 6, 2006 at 3:18 pm

Daniel

Hi, the main point is that if people supports libertarian ethics as they today supports the state there will be real law and order. The laws will be powerful and the aggressors weak because they belong to a small minority.

States are inherently aggressive since states do not bear the costs themselves of the aggressions they always make. That is, for instance, one reason for all the wars which states causes. Individuals in a society are not allowed to aggress against each other and if they do and get caught they will have to, at least, bear some of the cost themselves. In a libertarian society they would have to fully bear the costs for the crimes which they have made.

For a New Liberty, by Murray Rothbard:

“Every consumer, every buyer of police protection, would wish above all for protection that is efficient and quiet, with no conflicts or disturbances. Every police agency would be fully aware of this vital fact. To assume that police would continually clash and battle with each other is absurd, for it ignores the devastating effect that this chaotic “anarchy” would have on the business of all the police companies. To put it bluntly, such wars and conflicts would be bad—very bad—for business. Therefore, on the free market, the police agencies would all see to it that there would be no clashes between them, and that all conflicts of opinion would be ironed out in private courts, decided by private judges or arbitrators”.

http://mises.org/rothbard/newliberty11.asp

Hans-Hermann Hoppe has argued that insurance companies, would play a prominent role as providers of security and protection in a natural order (a pure free market).

Democracy, The God That Failed, by Hans-Hermann Hoppe:

“Furthermore, the relationship between insurer and client is contractual. The rules of the game are mutually accepted and fixed. An insurer cannot “legislate,” or unilaterally change the terms of the contract. In particular, if an insurer wants to attract a voluntarily paying clientele, it must provide for the foreseeable contingency of conflict in its contracts, not only between its own clients but especially with clients of other insurers. The only provision satisfactorily covering the latter contingency is for an insurer to bind itself contractually to independent third-party arbitration. However, not just any arbitration will do. The conflicting insurers must agree on the arbitrator or arbitration agency, and in order to be agreeable to insurers, an arbitrator must produce a product (of legal procedure and substantive judgment) that embodies the widest possible moral consensus among insurers and clients alike. Thus, contrary to statist conditions, a natural order is characterized by stable and predictable law and increased legal harmony”.

http://www.lewrockwell.com/hoppe/hoppe4.html

Best regards Daniel!

Björn Lundahl
Göteborg, Sweden

Björn Lundahl December 8, 2006 at 6:41 am

I want to add to my post “National defence is a so called private good and not a so called public good”:

To occupy unpopulated and worthless land would be aggressions against people wanting, in the future, to visit or to make use of those areas.

Björn Lundahl

Dan Coleman December 8, 2006 at 6:54 am

Daniel,

Bjorn listed a chapter from Rothbard’s book, For a New Liberty (Chapter 11). It was this link,

http://mises.org/rothbard/newliberty11.asp

and I highly recommend that you at least read this one part of his book. It’ll probably take only a half an hour or so to read, and it answers just about every common objection to anarchism. I’m not betting on a conversion to anarchism based solely on that, but it will give you the material that you are looking for, I think.

Perhaps a libertarian should make a FAQ with the most relevant Rothbard, Mises, Hoppe, Block, Reisman, Rockwell, Bastiat, etc. quotes for those without enough time or interest to read entire books! The common questions such as “How will you protect against corruption of private judges and protection services?; If the roads are privatized. . .how will that work?; Who will take care of the poor?” would be easy to cover in a comprehensive list.

Björn Lundahl December 30, 2006 at 12:22 pm

Mark Humphrey “I don’t want to precipitate trench warfare with devoted Rothbardians, but I strongly suspect that Rothbard owed his insight about “life as the standard of moral value” to Ayn Rand. I can’t prove this, of course. Sadly, in “The Ethics of Liberty”, (published in the early Eighties) Rothbard chose to, in a sense, blacklist Rand by claiming that NO ONE, other than himself, in the libertarian movement was working to develope a system of rationally defensible ethics. (Maybe Rothbard meant “at the moment I am writing this statement”.)”

Björn That life is an axiomatic value and functions “as the standard of moral value” in an ethical system, Rothbard could, alternatively for example, have gotten this insight from Mises himself through analyzing his statement in his book, “Human Action”, page 11:

“We may say that action is the manifestation of a man’s will.”

http://mises.org/humanaction/chap1sec1.asp

I am not saying that Rothbard did get his insight from Mises; I am only saying that it was possible. Surely, many other possibilities exist which we do not know anything about.

Mark Humphrey “It has been awhile since I’ve read Hoppe, and Rothbard; but I suspect Hoppe’s reasoning goes: either we all own ourselves, or everyone owns everyone else. Since the first proposition is clearly more defensible than the latter absurd proposition, one can affirm self ownership as valid. But if this is the argument, it fails. For that argument assumes that which it sets out to prove, namely that an ethical concept, “ownership”, exists. But on this basis, ownership remains unproven, so that one could just as well assert: “no one owns anything, and anything goes.””

Björn Self-ownership is a natural fact, since a man in his very nature controls his own mind and body (natural disposition), that is, he is a natural self-owner of his own will and person (having a free will) and if this was not true, neither could he effectively control any property and, therefore, not own it. In other words; “nothing could control and own something”.

Naturally, praxeology the science of human action, by itself logically confirms the natural fact of self-ownership, since praxeology is based upon “the acting man consciously intending to improve his own satisfaction” and I quote from answers.com:

“From praxeology Mises derived the idea that every conscious action is intended to improve a person’s satisfaction. He was careful to stress that praxeology is not concerned with the individual’s definition of end satisfaction, just the way he sought that satisfaction. The way in which a person will increase his satisfaction is by removing a source of dissatisfaction. As the future is uncertain so every action is speculative.

An acting man is defined as one capable of logical thought — to be otherwise would be to make one a mere creature who simply reacts to stimuli by instinct. Similarly an acting man must have a source of dissatisfaction which he believes capable of removing, otherwise he cannot act.

Another conclusion that Mises reached was that decisions are made on an ordinal basis. That is, it is impossible to carry out more than one action at once, the conscious mind being only capable of one decision at a time — even if those decisions can be made in rapid order. Thus man will act to remove the most pressing source of dissatisfaction first and then move to the next most pressing source of dissatisfaction.

As a person satisfies his first most important goal and after that his second most important goal then his second most important goal is always less important than his first most important goal. Thus, for every further goal reached, his satisfaction, or utility, is lessened from the preceding goal. This is the rule of diminishing marginal utility.

In human society many actions will be trading activities where one person regards a possession of another person as more desirable than one of his own possessions, and the other person has a similar higher regard for his colleague’s possession than he does for his own. This subject of praxeology is known as catallactics, and is the more commonly accepted realm of economics.”

http://www.answers.com/Praxeology?gwp=11&ver=2.0.1.458&method=3
Further:

The Ethics of Liberty, page 45:

Footnote:

“[1]Professor George Mavrodes, of the department of philosophy of the University of Michigan, objects that there is another logical alternative: namely, “that no one owns anybody, either himself or anyone else, nor any share of anybody.” However, since ownership signifies range of control, this would mean that no one would be able to do anything, and the human race would quickly vanish.”

http://mises.org/rothbard/ethics/eight.asp

Or in my own words from the essay “Normative principles”:

“Why must anybody own anything?

In accordance with our objective test to find out if something is a condition for something else, we grasp a state of things where the following principle is none existent anywhere and at all:

“Everybody owns themselves and their Justly owned property rights”.

Nobody would be able to do anything, since nobody has the right to control anything. Not even themselves (see below about property rights in your own person).

This question is not only a contradiction it is also silly. You ask a question which means that you control yourselves (natural disposition), that is owning yourself (see below the excellent writing of Hans-Hermann Hoppe). The other contradiction is that if nobody would own anything, nobody would be able to hinder anyone to own anything either since they would otherwise have an invalid control (having the disposition to) of everyone else, that is having an invalid ownership to everybody else (see below about valid property rights in your own person).

Ownership itself is, therefore, an objective condition for the preservation of human life.”

http://normativeprinciples.blogspot.com/2006/12/normative-principles-pure-free-market_10.html

Björn Lundahl
Göteborg, Sweden

Peter December 30, 2006 at 7:23 pm

Daniel: ask all of your questions above of the state! What you’re doing here is the same thing others often do (cf, Roger M): insist that unless anarchy can be proved to be perfect, it can’t work, while utterly ignoring the fact that “archy” isn’t perfect either! Roger is fond of saying “unless you can solve this problem X, I can’t support you”, where problem X is an existing problem not solved by the status quo which he supports instead! That is just ridiculous.

Also, to ask “how would anarchy handle situation Y”, aside from the imprecise language imputing intent and behavior to a concept, supposes that anarchy is centrally planned :) Various people may be able to give you ideas about how Y might be handled, but these ideas need to be tested and ironed out in practice; maybe better solutions will only be apparent then. If you lived in a world in which food and clothing were provided by government, and someone suggested that they could be better produced privately, would anyone be able to answer your questions as to how that would be done? Where precisely will factories be built? Who will pay for it? Who will work there? How will they know how much of what to produce? Etc. Nobody could say. But private production of food and clothing works much better than government production of food and clothing (ask anyone who lived in a communist state!)

Sam December 30, 2006 at 10:51 pm

National defense in Libertopia provided by some sort of insurance company?! Pleeeease. Doesn’t that mean people getting paid forever waiting for an invasion? Understandable in a Big Bad Statist society but in a happy free-market Libertarian society? I don’t think so. I’d say the more reasonable alternative has been the other suggestion: allow individual to self-arm and hope an invader is either easily repelled or gets stuck in a quagmire like Iraq.

Sam December 30, 2006 at 10:59 pm

Oh, BTW, what are the are those examples of successful anarchic societies? Clans? Tribes? That Icelandic example and, um, er, well ?

Björn Lundahl January 3, 2007 at 4:38 pm

“Doesn’t that mean people getting paid forever waiting for an invasion?”

I have already answered this as I wrote; “as people in a free market would want to protect themselves (life and property) against aggression (physical violence and theft), for example, through insurers (or other protection agencies), risks against warfare would, also, be included in the insurance premium.

Warfare is only aggression or physical violence of a greater magnitude, but is still the implementation of physical violence.”

I do not believe that the insurance companies themselves want to bear the costs.

Björn Lundahl

Björn Lundahl January 3, 2007 at 4:44 pm

The idea is that if people support a libertarian ethic just as much as they used to support the state, everything will work much better than today. Protection agencies, insurers etc will cooperate peacefully. Minorities including minor “protection agencies” that violate the law will be as weak as minorities are today when they violate state laws.

If such a society would not be a success and people started to beat each other up, it would not prove that this statement was wrong, it would only prove that people did not support libertarian laws as much as they once did support the state and its laws.

To argue that this is not so etc will, also, only legitimate the state and therefore the support of the state. I think it is very wise to be careful with what we say.”

Björn Lundahl

Sam January 3, 2007 at 10:57 pm

Actually yes, Björn Lundahl, how does the proverbial insurance companies actually protect against invaders unless they have a standing army? To say ‘give everyone a gun and we now a have non-standing militia army’ isn’t really an answer as I don’t why we’d need insurance companies for that.

Björn Lundahl January 4, 2007 at 2:42 pm

Sam

“Actually yes, Björn Lundahl, how does the proverbial insurance companies actually protect against invaders unless they have a standing army? To say ‘give everyone a gun and we now a have non-standing militia army’ isn’t really an answer as I don’t why we’d need insurance companies for that.”

I do not know the most technological and economical way to counterattack state aggressions. Only the market can decide. They might use highly efficient intelligence services and high tech to locate and to wipe out those at the top. That might be an efficient way to stop an aggression. There might be other more efficient ways which we do not know anything about.

In Friedrich Hayek’s own words:

“Many of the greatest things man has achieved are not the result of consciously directed thought, and still less the product of a deliberately coordinated effort of many individuals, but of a process in which the individual plays a part which he can never fully understand.”

“It is, indeed, part of the liberal attitude to assume that, especially in the economic field, the self-regulating forces of the market will somehow bring about the required adjustments to new conditions, although no one can foretell how they will do this in a particular instance. There is perhaps no single factor contributing so much to people’s frequent reluctance to let the market work as their inability to conceive how some necessary balance, between demand and supply, between exports and imports, or the like, will be brought about without deliberate control.”

http://homepage.eircom.net/~odyssey/Politics/Liberty/Hayek.html

“Compared with the totality of knowledge which is continually utilized in the evolution of a dynamic civilization, the difference between the knowledge that the wisest and that which the most ignorant individual can deliberately employ is comparatively insignificant.”

“Human reason can neither predict nor deliberately shape its own future. Its advances consist in finding out where it has been wrong.”

“The part of our social order which can or ought to be made a conscious product of human reason is only a small part of all the forces of society.”

“Many of the greatest things man has achieved are not the result of consciously directed thought, and still less the product of a deliberately co-ordinated effort of many individuals, but of a process in which the individual plays a part which he can never fully understand.”

“We are only beginning to understand on how subtle a communication system the functioning of an advanced industrial society is based – a communications system which we call the market and which turns out to be a more efficient mechanism for digesting dispersed information than any that man has deliberately designed.”

“… the case for individual freedom rests largely on the recognition of the inevitable and universal ignorance of all of us concerning a great many of the factors on which the achievements of our ends and welfare depend.”

“…the argument for liberty is not an argument against organization, which is one of the most powerful tools human reason can employ, but an argument against all exclusive, privileged, monopolistic organization, against the use of coercion to prevent others from doing better.”

“..it is largely because civilization enables us constantly to profit from knowledge which we individually do not possess and because each individual’s use of his particular knowledge may serve to assist others unknown to him in achieving their ends that men as members of civilized society can pursue their individual ends so much more successfully than they could alone.”

http://www.adamsmith.org/index.php/main/heroes_more/hayek_quotes/

Björn Lundahl
Göteborg, Sweden

Björn Lundahl March 15, 2007 at 3:42 pm

I will post this again since I do believe that my comment regarding none existence of any property rights is here presented more clearly and logically than in my above post.

Life and self-ownership

Mark Humphrey “I don’t want to precipitate trench warfare with devoted Rothbardians, but I strongly suspect that Rothbard owed his insight about “life as the standard of moral value” to Ayn Rand. I can’t prove this, of course. Sadly, in “The Ethics of Liberty”, (published in the early Eighties) Rothbard chose to, in a sense, blacklist Rand by claiming that NO ONE, other than himself, in the libertarian movement was working to develope a system of rationally defensible ethics. (Maybe Rothbard meant “at the moment I am writing this statement”.)”

Björn That life is an axiomatic value and functions “as the standard of moral value” in an ethical system, Rothbard could, alternatively for example, have gotten this insight from Mises himself through analyzing his statement in his book, “Human Action”, page 11:

“We may say that action is the manifestation of a man’s will.”

http://mises.org/humanaction/chap1sec1.asp

I am not saying that Rothbard did get his insight from Mises; I am only saying that it was possible. Surely, many other possibilities exist which we do not know anything about.

Mark Humphrey “It has been awhile since I’ve read Hoppe, and Rothbard; but I suspect Hoppe’s reasoning goes: either we all own ourselves, or everyone owns everyone else. Since the first proposition is clearly more defensible than the latter absurd proposition, one can affirm self ownership as valid. But if this is the argument, it fails. For that argument assumes that which it sets out to prove, namely that an ethical concept, “ownership”, exists. But on this basis, ownership remains unproven, so that one could just as well assert: “no one owns anything, and anything goes.””

Björn Self-ownership is a natural fact, since a man in his very nature controls his own mind and body (natural disposition), that is, he is a natural self-owner of his own will and person (having a free will) and if this was not true, neither could he effectively control any property and, therefore, not own it. In other words; “nothing could control and own something”.

Naturally, praxeology the science of human action, by itself logically confirms the natural fact of self-ownership, since praxeology is based upon “the acting man consciously intending to improve his own satisfaction” and I quote from answers.com:

“From praxeology Mises derived the idea that every conscious action is intended to improve a person’s satisfaction. He was careful to stress that praxeology is not concerned with the individual’s definition of end satisfaction, just the way he sought that satisfaction. The way in which a person will increase his satisfaction is by removing a source of dissatisfaction. As the future is uncertain so every action is speculative.

An acting man is defined as one capable of logical thought — to be otherwise would be to make one a mere creature who simply reacts to stimuli by instinct. Similarly an acting man must have a source of dissatisfaction which he believes capable of removing, otherwise he cannot act.
Another conclusion that Mises reached was that decisions are made on an ordinal basis. That is, it is impossible to carry out more than one action at once, the conscious mind being only capable of one decision at a time — even if those decisions can be made in rapid order. Thus man will act to remove the most pressing source of dissatisfaction first and then move to the next most pressing source of dissatisfaction.

As a person satisfies his first most important goal and after that his second most important goal then his second most important goal is always less important than his first most important goal. Thus, for every further goal reached, his satisfaction, or utility, is lessened from the preceding goal. This is the rule of diminishing marginal utility.

In human society many actions will be trading activities where one person regards a possession of another person as more desirable than one of his own possessions, and the other person has a similar higher regard for his colleague’s possession than he does for his own. This subject of praxeology is known as catallactics, and is the more commonly accepted realm of economics.”

http://www.answers.com/Praxeology?gwp=11&ver=2.0.1.458&method=3

Further:

The Ethics of Liberty, page 45:

Footnote:

“[1]Professor George Mavrodes, of the department of philosophy of the University of Michigan, objects that there is another logical alternative: namely, “that no one owns anybody, either himself or anyone else, nor any share of anybody.” However, since ownership signifies range of control, this would mean that no one would be able to do anything, and the human race would quickly vanish.”

http://mises.org/rothbard/ethics/eight.asp

Or in my own words:

Why must anybody own anything?

In accordance with our objective test to find out if something is a condition for something else, we grasp a state of things where the following principle is none existent anywhere and at all:

“The existence of property rights”:

In a world without any property rights nobody would be able to do anything, since nobody has the right to control anything. Not even themselves (see below about property rights in your own person).

This question is not only a contradiction it is also silly. You ask a question which means that you control yourselves (natural disposition), that is owning yourself (see below the excellent writing of Hans-Hermann Hoppe). The other contradiction is that if nobody would own anything, nobody would be able to hinder anyone to own anything either since they would otherwise have an invalid control (having the disposition to) of everyone else, that is having an invalid ownership to everybody else (see below about valid property rights in your own person).

Ownership itself is, therefore, an objective condition for the preservation of human life.

Please read some of Hans-Hermann Hoppe´s excellent writing from the book “The Ethics and Economics of Private Property”:

http://mises.org/etexts/hoppe5.pdf

And to:

ON THE ULTIMATE JUSTIFICATION OF THE ETHICS OF PRIVATE PROPERTY:

http://www.hanshoppe.com/publications/econ-ethics-10.pdf

Björn Lundahl

Comments on this entry are closed.

Previous post:

Next post: