“or you have a vastly different concept of economics from him and the Austrians”: that is correct, that is what i am trying to say in my earlier post… the austrian perspective / analysis certainly has a place, but also has its limitations

“If it is human action which is the base of market behavior, which it seems to me to be”: this is where we differ… to me its not either / or… i guess i shld try harder to at least ‘illustrate’ the principle of reaction vs action… for instance, actions based on fear / panic belong in the irrational, or a-rational to avoid semantic quarrels… but one cld say this is still ‘action’ as contemplated by mises (i doubt it but…)… fanning / exploiting fear though, would be ‘action’ indeed, even though it may have unintended consequences at times radically opposite to the actor’s intention… but let’s jump above the human actors perhaps, without being too presumptuous … lets take oil… one could probably have predicted from the start of the industrial revolution that as fears of oil shortages develop, tensions would rise, wars would be waged etc along those centuries… the root cause being the fact that oil is finite, a mere environmental factor… v. simplistic and i apologize, but at a level, human action cld have been to move away asap from a finite source of energy, e.g. go nuclear to a much greater extent than current, with all the risks… but again here fears have ‘prevailed’ to an extent, even if the picture may change in coming years

pls do keep in mind, this is not intended as the start of an argument over nuclear vs oil etc, just an attempt to illustrate where ‘reaction’ differs from ‘action’ as an analytical premise and in some cases may be a more appropriate framework to analyse mkt behaviour on a particular timeframe… now perhaps on a shorter timeframe, praxeology yields more ‘relevant’ results, am not disputing that… as i said, my point is simply that i do not believe it is either / or between, say, praxeology and darwinism… and going a bit further from a pure methodology standpoint, i do not think it is beneficial to ‘stick’ to an either / or divide, if only for the fact that there is more to gain when more than one approach is used / is available to tackle / analyse a situation… but that’s just a view

another ‘illustration’ perhaps cld be the type of abortion / criminality relationships described by Stephen Levitt for instance (Freakonomics). or th type of relationships described by J.Diamond, i.e. ‘shaping’-type influences to which humans ‘react’ without being fully conscious of the fact that they do, in the sense, here, that whatever action they may take is in no way purposefully nor rationally related / directed towards the forces that are actually shaping (some of) the mass behaviours on a larger scale

having said that, i would agree that, whenever any such reaction-type framework has been identified as sufficiently ‘valid’ by a ‘critical mass’ of people, in those cases where the framework is contemporaneously ‘actionable’, it falls in the hands of the praxeological analysis framework… (at the risk of quickly becoming unactionable in fact, but that’s a different discussion)

thing is, the distinction is not all down to a law of ‘unintended’ consequences of course, although that is a symptom

“But if you were wondering how at least I view what Mises’s take is on Darwinian evolution and reaction, I’d say he thinks it is way outside the field of economics.”: i think Mises was more ‘reacting’ to the fact that Darwinism was too much the all and everything of his times, and that couldn’t be right either, but let’s not get too philosophical!

nice chatting with you

Perhaps it would help me to know if you understand the study of economics to be anything at all like how Mises characterizes it in Human Action:

“The subject matter of catallactics is all market phenomena with all their roots, ramifications, and consequences.”

“All that can be contended is this: Economics is mainly concerned with the analysis of the determination of money prices of goods and services exchanged on the market. In order to accomplish this task it must start from a comprehensive theory of human action. Moreover, it must study not only the market phenomena, but no less the hypothetical conduct of an isolated man and of a socialist community. Finally, it must not restrict its investigations to those modes of action which in mundane speech are called “economic” actions, but must deal also with actions which are in a loose manner of speech called “noneconomic.”

And this is how he views praxeology in relation to economics:

“The economic or catallactic problems are embedded in a more general science, and can no longer be severed from this connection. No treatment of economic problems proper can avoid starting from acts of choice; economics becomes a part, although the hitherto best elaborated part, of a more universal science, praxeology.”

“It is no longer enough to deal with the economic problems within the traditional framework. It is necessary to build the theory of catallactics upon the solid foundation of a general theory of human action, praxeology.”

If it is human action which is the base of market behavior, which it seems to me to be, then Darwinian adaptation, which has nothing to do with human action, could have nothing possibly to do with economics. Animals do not purposefully evolve and human rational purpose is a very central theme to human action, and therefore to economics.

I don’t think you’re crazy for posing the question, but rather that you’re perhaps not completely familiar with Mises and the Austrian school, which is nothing unusual, or you have a vastly different concept of economics from him and the Austrians.

But if you were wondering how at least I view what Mises’s take is on Darwinian evolution and reaction, I’d say he thinks it is way outside the field of economics.

“To the extent that action differs from reaction, reaction is irrelevant to economics and ethics. To the extent that reaction is relevant, it is subsumed by action.”

reaction as in darwinian adaptation type responses for instance has everything to do with economics… and has precious little to do with action as per mises imo… but yes perhaps i am just a bit crazy after all, you could be right!

Before the next ‘action’ or ‘apriori’ brouhaha, I would recommend that any interested parties take a look at an excellent work, IMHO, by Roderick Long:

Wittgenstein, Austrian Economics, and the Logic of Action

Cheers,

Brian

There’s a proverb out there somewhere that covers persistence, and so I thought I’d confirm it by answering you.

“PRAXEOLOGY IS ONLY HALF THE STORY, AT THE VERY BEST…”

At best. But when it comes to political economy and political philosophy, it’s the whole story.

“would Mises say that action = reaction is a valid indentity?”

Action in the manner in which we use it here is where humans interact with their physical reality, use scarce means in a purposeful way to achieve their desired ends. So if you come at it from that context, if a human reacts to something by acting, then the two are the same. On the other hand, when you bonk someone on that funny part of the knee and it kicks up, if you mean that as reaction, then that falls outside of action, and is irrelevant to the field of praxeology.

“i am asking because i do not believe it is… to keep this short, reaction belongs more to a darwinian view of the world, therefore it itself could form the basis for a SEPARATE axiom to Mises’ ‘homo agens’ postulate.”

You got me there.

“nothing wrong here, if mathematics and logic are any guide, it is possible to construct as many separate axiomatic-based theories as one wishes. and then, possible to find applications for some (perhaps all) of those theories to help acquiring an ever-better understanding of ‘the real world’.”

Praxeology isn’t based on arbitrary postulates or axioms. It is based on a priori truths about the nature of acting man with a few other matters of objective empirical fact added in. Its entire foundation is on indisputable truths, and the conclusions it reaches are also indisputable, provided they are shown to be arrived at through valid logic.

“however unless someone proves or even postulates the afore-suggested action = reaction identity, or suggests, better, proves that ‘homo reactens’ is a false premise, isn’t the whole theory of praxeology missing a big chunk of the… action?”

In the study of praxeology, economics and ethics, there’s nothing more to it than human action; that is, what your find in Mises’s “Human Action” is to a very large extent, the great foundation of economics. In other words, there’s no missing chunk.

“how about a new theory recognizing that action differs from reaction in profound ways, and having both ‘homo agens’ and ‘homo reactens’ as axioms… a yin yang type framework if you will?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yin_yang”

To the extent that action differs from reaction, reaction is irrelevant to economics and ethics. To the extent that reaction is relevant, it is subsumed by action.

“am only reposting because i don’t exactly know how this board functions / haven’t received an answer… holidays? also tried to start a blog on this but getting no answer whatsoever, been 2 weeks!? lazy administrators?”

LOL! If only I had a dime for every time someone didn’t respond to one of my crazy posts.

would Mises say that action = reaction is a valid indentity? i am asking because i do not believe it is… to keep this short, reaction belongs more to a darwinian view of the world, therefore it itself could form the basis for a SEPARATE axiom to Mises’ ‘homo agens’ postulate.

nothing wrong here, if mathematics and logic are any guide, it is possible to construct as many separate axiomatic-based theories as one wishes. and then, possible to find applications for some (perhaps all) of those theories to help acquiring an ever-better understanding of ‘the real world’.

however unless someone proves or even postulates the afore-suggested action = reaction identity, or suggests, better, proves that ‘homo reactens’ is a false premise, isn’t the whole theory of praxeology missing a big chunk of the… action?

how about a new theory recognizing that action differs from reaction in profound ways, and having both ‘homo agens’ and ‘homo reactens’ as axioms… a yin yang type framework if you will?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yin_yang

am only reposting because i don’t exactly know how this board functions / haven’t received an answer… holidays? also tried to start a blog on this but getting no answer whatsoever, been 2 weeks!? lazy administrators?

nothing wrong here, if mathematics and logic are any guide, it is possible to construct as many separate axiomatic-based theories as one wishes. and then, possible to find applications for some (perhaps all) of those theories to help acquiring an ever-better understanding of ‘the real world’.

however unless someone proves or even postulates the afore-suggested action = reaction identity, or suggests, better, proves that ‘homo reactens’ is a false premise, isn’t the whole theory of praxeology missing a big chunk of the… action?

how about a new theory recognizing that action differs from reaction in profound ways, and having both ‘homo agens’ and ‘homo reactens’ as axioms… a yin yang type framework if you will?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yin_yang

am only reposting because i don’t exactly know how this board functions / haven’t received an answer… holidays? also tried to start a blog on this but getting no answer whatsoever!? lazy administrators?

nothing wrong here, if mathematics and logic are any guide, it is possible to construct as many separate axiomatic-based theories as one wishes. and then, possible to find applications for some (perhaps all) of those theories to help acquiring an ever-better understanding of ‘the real world’.

however unless someone proves or even postulates the afore-suggested action = reaction identity, or suggests, better, proves that ‘homo reactens’ is a false premise, isn’t the whole theory of praxeology missing a big chunk of the… action?

how about a new theory recognizing that action differs from reaction in profound ways, and having both ‘homo agens’ and ‘homo reactens’ as axioms… a yin yang type framework if you will?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yin_yang

am only reposting because i don’t exactly know how this board functions / haven’t received an answer… holidays?

nothing wrong here, if mathematics and logic are any guide, it is possible to construct as many separate axiomatic-based theories as one wishes. and then, possible to find applications for some (perhaps all) of those theories to help acquiring an ever-better understanding of ‘the real world’.

however unless someone proves or even postulates the afore-suggested action = reaction identity, or suggests, better, proves that ‘homo reactens’ is a false premise, isn’t the whole theory of praxeology missing a big chunk of the… action?

how about a new theory recognizing that action differs from reaction in profound ways, and having both ‘homo agens’ and ‘homo reactens’ as axioms… a yin yang type framework if you will?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yin_yang

nothing wrong here, if mathematics and logic are any guide, it is possible to construct as many separate axiomatic-based theories as one wishes. and then, possible to find applications for some (perhaps all) of those theories to acquiring an ever-better understanding of ‘the real world’.

however unless someone proves or even postulates the afore-suggested action = reaction identity, or suggests, better, proves that ‘homo reactens’ is a false premise, isn’t the whole theory of praxeology missing a big chunk of the… action?

how about a new theory recognizing that action reaction in profound ways, and having both ‘homo agens’ and ‘homo reactens’ as axioms… a yin yang type framework if you will?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yin_yang

From my understanding the Austrian School is unique because they have a demonstrated interest not so much in equilibrium conditions but in the actions of man which tend towards acheiving equilibrium conditions.

Thus the Austrians reason towards equilibrium conditions and orthodox economics reasons from equilibrium conditions.

So correct me if I am wrong here but I think the Austrians are concerned with a dynamic process whereby humans act to meet / obtain objectives.

The orthodox economics ideology on the other hand assumes equilibrium exists out of thin air and is not the product of entreprenurial efforts.

ok maybe not – but I tried to keep things informal.

It says nothing of value, let alone anything useful. It only says that they act. The rest of the axiom (the one with means and values and blah blah) is at least debatable on the grounds that the “axiom” (platitude) does not specify frequency, and only works in combination with a terribly unnatural definition of means and values.

What is left, the “action” part, is truly worthless. You could get anyone who disagrees with you in a great variety of different ways to say, “yeah, that axiom is true.”

Ironically, those logically inclined will recall that if A implies B, and “not B” holds, then “not A” holds too. Given the many claims made by “austrian” economists which simply do not correspond to evidence, one would have to conclude that your axiom is false.

Or, and that is the by far most plausible explanation, that your “economics” is nothing but an algebra of falacies.

“None of my other points were addressed.”

Here goes then:

“If mind is a noun then it is an abstract rather than concrete one. What is the nature of an abstraction? What is the mind an abstraction of? You answer the brain. If this is true wouldn’t mind and brain be synonymous? Why are they used differently? Where can thoughts be found in bodily organs?”

I don’t really get the point of this question, but let me answer as best I can: Thoughts are a feature of the existence of the mind. Thoughts do exist regardless of the fact that I can’t point to where in our brain our minds conceive them. We cannot dispute the existence of a mind and thoughts on this basis, especially when we reveal their existence in every word we express.

“You say, “Our mind is pretty real, despite what we may perceive its physical nature to be.” What if we perceive its physical nature to be in the posession and under the control of a non-human?”

As my kid said in reference to a similar question put to her at the dinner table last night: “that’s a big ‘what if’”. LOL. But seriously, and quite simply, Benjamin, we don’t. You don’t, despite what you say, you have demonstrated that by engaging in debate about truth with me. All arguments that propose we are not in control of our minds are inconsistent and incoherent.

“You say, “If the truth of our own self ownership in our mind is unknown, nothing is known.” This has no relevance to the validity or truth of my argument.”

I guess I attacked this one previously. I thought your reply was on the weak side.

“Previously you considered the appearance of thought-controlling things a possibility (however remote and ridiculous), now you call it an impossibility. Why?”

Previously, for sake of argument, I went along with the premise to see where it would take us. The arrival of the alien that could express the thought that “humans don’t act” would render “humans act” finally disputable without contradiction (but only for the alien). That never changed the fact that “humans act” remains indisputable because there exists no such alien to put up such an argument.

“You have continued to claim that maths and praxeology are equally apodictic. Maths involves propositions that are true be definition.”

A is A is true by definition. It is analytic, tautological, and a priori true. But most maths are comprised of more than (I think) tautologies. At least that’s what most engineers will tell you (once you explain to them what a tautology is. LOL). Whether that means it is synthetic or still analytic is beyond me, but that’s not strictly important to me. “Humans act”, on the other hand, is also a priori true, but it is synthetic. It says something useful about humans and how they interact with reality.

“Praxeology does not [involve propositions that are true be definition]. If it did then human action would be called an analytic rather than synthetic proposition.”

This statement is very close to the point we are debating. I am claiming that praxeology involves (is founded on) the proposition that “humans act”. I claim everyone including you presupposes its truth (it is axiomatic), and that it is furthermore indisputable. Therefore, I am claiming that it is true _a priori_, and because of its practical application in the science of praxeology, it is a synthetic proposition.

I think we are just going to have to disagree because I sense that I am repeating myself now.

What I meant, as I explained above, is that the mind has no concrete existence as a noun. If it has no concrete existence, then it can have no structure. You (Paul) claimed that the mind has a structure, I made this argument in response. It has not been addressed.

Paul:

I said your comment was irrelevant because you were trying to make deductions from it to show that the results were not to your liking, not that they were wrong on logical grounds. You were evading my argument. And, anyway, your deductions were incorrect (but now we’re digressing): My proposition does not imply that we cannot know anything at all. What I argue is that we cannot be absolutely certain of any synthetic arguments, because of the mind-body problem. That is all.

None of my other points were addressed.

“You say, “If the truth of our own self ownership in our mind is unknown, nothing is known.” This has no relevance to the validity or truth of my argument.”

Are you serious? We are here debating about what is true and what is not or what may not be true. At the same time, you say that it is not relevant that your proposition implies we can know nothing at all.

If we take your premise and accept its implication that we really may know nothing at all, then this debate is nothing more than an intricate exercise in futility. I know neither of us believes this, however, therefore, implicitly, neither of us believes “thought-controlling things a possibility.”

So I’m not exactly saying they are not possible (although it is true I am certain they are not). I’m just saying that even you implicitly presuppose they are not. Why? Because you argue about truth, implying truth can be known, implying it is true that we control and own our own minds. It’s all about arguing consistently with our necessary implicit presuppositions.

Peter:

By those definitions, then, Humans act is an axiom.

Through-out all of my schooling, I managed to avoid learning the definitions of these terms as they arose in geometry and math and engineering, only to finally have to learn them studying economics! How strange is that?

“Of course it is.”

I have always found understatement to be funny. I hope in this case, it didn’t obscure that I didn’t doubt mind is a noun.

“However, the Austrian analysis is incomplete, because besides their own purposes humans appear to act for the benefit of their memetic symbionts and parasites – their cultures.”

I think what you are really observing is that economics is not psychology. Economics doesn’t analyze how or why we arrive at the ends we value most. It merely deals with the fact that given we chose ends, we also choose and use means to obtain them.