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Source link: http://archive.mises.org/4783/the-mantle-of-science/

The Mantle of Science

March 10, 2006 by


[Reprinted from Scientism and Values, Helmut Schoeck and James W. Wiggins, eds. (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand), 1960].

Science, wrote Murray Rothbard, means scientia, correct knowledge; it is older and wiser than the positivist-pragmatist attempt to monopolize the term. Scientism, on the other hand, is the profoundly unscientific attempt to transfer uncritically the methodology of the physical sciences to the study of human action.


Kenneth R. Gregg March 10, 2006 at 5:45 pm

“The Mantle of Science” is one of Murray’s finest essays, and one of the reasons that he truly deserves the title of intellectual. He not only frames the nature of science within its fundamental structure, but he then applies his foundations to social sciences and, continuing his examination, explains why physical science is not up to the task of explaining social phenomena.

Long after Rothbard has been forgotten for other writings, “The Mantle of Science” will justly be remembered.
Just a thought.
Just Ken

D Simon March 10, 2006 at 6:23 pm

For me, two issues jump off the page when reading this essay:
(1) I’m no physicist, but my understanding is that determinism is NOT a given with respect to fundamental particles. Has not quantum mechanics taught us that while physical matter acts according to physical laws, those laws include examples complete randomness (for example, two-neutrino decay versus zero-neutrino decay)? Hopefully some of the physicists out there can enlighten us (or at least me) on that issue.
(2) Human beings may indeed have what is described as “free will”. Certainly we make choices. But are not the choices we make, if not determined at least INFLUENCED by factors which are determined by something beyond our control (and beyond our understanding)? For example, I like chicken livers. Others despise them! I CHOOSE to eat chicken livers because I like the taste. That’s my choice. But I didn’t CHOOSE to like the taste, I just do! I had no choice with respect to the odd fact that my particular taste buds cause a chemical reaction in my brain that I recognize as “yummy”, whereas for other people the same chicken liver molecules cause their taste buds to produce a chemical reaction in their brains that they recognize as “yucky”. So where is the CHOICE in my choice to eat chicken livers? Is it not DETERMINED by the vagaries of my taste buds (which I did not choose but which were determined for me by my genetics and my development)?

Jude Chua Soo Meng March 11, 2006 at 9:11 am

Wow! this is one really fantastic essay by Rothbard. I like Rothbard when he writes like that. This is hell of a good essay. I’m working on a critique of social sciences myself. This hits it right on the spot. Bingo!

Simon, I don’t agree with your analysis. The first part seems correct, but just after the bit of chicken liver your conclusion does not follow. I think you’re right to say that we do not choose to like chicken liver, but if I go along with that inclination, that does not quite imply that my choice to go along with my inclination is indeed determined. The fact that we can resist our inclinations suggests that there is free choice with respect to our inclinations: that at least my choice is not always determined by my inclinations.

The deeper objection is that one’s intelligent choice (which resist inclinations) can in fact be the result of deterministic conditions in one’s brain. But when faced with incommensurable goods, with nothing to settle the choice but the will itself suggests again that choice is indeed free: no intelligent data (even if supposing them to be the result of deterministic mental processes) can cause one to chose one over the other. Only the will can (of itself) settle the choice. (Natural Law theorists like Finnis and Grisez argue like that). I quite like this argument, and I think it is generally successful.

Dewaine March 11, 2006 at 12:00 pm

I think you’re right to say that we do not choose to like chicken liver, but if I go along with that inclination, that does not quite imply that my choice to go along with my inclination is indeed determined.


I do not agree with your assumption that people cannot choose to like or dislike certain things, including foods. It is correct that people do not always follow their immediate inclinations, but I would make the stronger assertion that people can choose their initial inclinations.

We not only choose what we want, we choose what we like. Choices may be the outcome of envy or other social phenomena, if one chooses to be guided by such. But one of the characteristics of free human will is that man also chooses the beliefs and ideas he will live by, including the ideas and beliefs he will influenced by.

One may not choose to eat chicken liver because he is allergic to it, or for some other physical reason, but even this does not determine his liking; many people like chocolate but must not eat it or suffer physical illness if they do eat it.

Inasmuch as man is faced with rational choices (and we must assume that all choices are rational for the person doing the choosing) — which would exclude those options which are not availabe — man chooses all aspects of thoses choices, including beliefs, values, or original intent. Man also chooses what will influence his choices; only those things or ideas he chooses to value (or not value), or those these he chooses to desire (or not desire), can have any bearing on his choices.

– Dewaine

The Crawling Chaos March 11, 2006 at 12:53 pm

The problem with the debate about free will vs. determinism is that we discuss them at too high a level (‘imclination to eat chicken liver’, etc..), when the complexity of the deterministic processes (particles, subatomic forces, etc..) is far too great at that level to be able to reason about them in a deterministic way.

Consider rolling dice… is the outcome deterministic? From the initial conditions, actually it is. But it’s so complex and unknown, that it just appears random to us. Then taking the arguement one step further, someone could come along and argue that the dice exibits ‘free will’ because ‘who knows what it’ll do next’… so it’s not deterministic therefore it must be choosing. And then someone else comes along and argues, but look at this: if I roll it 60 times, each outcome occurs close to 10 times each, therefore it is deterministic, see there is a pattern. And then another comes along and argues, but look, each outcome never occurs _exactly_ 10 times each… so it’s not deterministic after all even if there are trends.

I think this is a good analogy for the level of much free will vs. determinism debate: ‘reason’, ‘inclinations’, ‘self-interest’, are all high level emergent phenomenon analogous to the outcome of dice rolling approaching (what we call) the probability as the number of trials increases (yet never actually reaching it… and even having another statistical distribution of it’s own). The ‘fundamentals’ are ignored altogether in the debate, and what we think of as the fundamentals (the things that can be used to predict outcomes), are really themselves products of the fundamental processes which are (at least probabilistically) deterministic if you assume an absence of God (or an absence of God’s interference).

This is all fairly innocuous one way or the other (since neither outcome make any difference for us at our level of perception). The real damage and the source of the furor in the debate comes because certain people attribute a lack of free will (‘determinism’) to other people, not at the level of subatomic particles, but at the level of our consciousness (at a level we can perceive). I believe this is done not as positive science (what is) but as normative science (what should be), and that these are the people who seek and/or accept ‘tyranny over the mind of man’. Which explains why the Austrian school is so pro-’free will’. But I think there are (at least) 2 completely different things that get confused in the debate.

btw, comtinuing from the second paragraph: statistics and math in economics: I think mainstream economics clearly makes mistakes in taking trends to be the fundamentals (in the sense of the physical sciences where phenomenon obey differential equation so nicely), but I think the Austrian school perhaps condems math and statistics too harshly. I think statistics has its place, if you recognize it as the observer and not the observed. I think its use is fairly limited in the areas treated by this site, but I think ‘the numbers alone’ start to become alot more useful in higher order fields (e.g. finance, insurance, etc…). btw, strangely enough the rigors of praxeology strike me as a branch of mathematics (coming from a computing/math background).

Ralph March 11, 2006 at 4:43 pm

In math, we have Godel’s incompleteness theorem. Actually two theorems, which state:
1.In any formal system adequate for number theory there exists an undecideable formula.
2.The consistency of a formal system adequate for number theory cannot be prove3d within the system.

In other words, our formal attempts to define mathematics as a complete system will remain forever inadequate. Also, we cannot prove the consistency of any system formally from within the system. It might be said that there exists a truth that cannot be proven. So, are we free? We cannot determine that from inside our own “system”.

Gregory Chaitin, I believe, has developed what he calls algorithm information theory, and he has discovered that, in any axiomatic system, there is an infinity of undecidebale propositions. So, no matter how we try to “close” or complete any formal system of sufficient complexity, “freedom” is infinite.

If we look at the biblical idea of God as omniscient, however, we are left with the idea that “salvation” cannot be dependent on free choice, since God would know in advance what choice we make.

Romans 8:7, however, may provide something similar to Godel’s theorem and algorithm information theory.
“The carnal(physical, fleshy) mind is enmity against God. It is not subject to the laws of God and neither indeed can be”.

This statement seems to provide at least two conclusions:
1.No human can make another subject to God’s laws, since no physical mind can be subject to them.
2.Any attempt to do so would result in a proliferation or “speciation” of religious ideas.

If we look at Romans 8:7 in computer terms, we may see that there is no “decision procedure” or algorithm by which we can get from “here” to “God”.

This is another aspect of Godel’s theorem. To demonstrate existence of God, we must have a system which is equal in complexity to God. Or as someone said, you can’t prove a dollar truth with a fifty cent theorem.

After stating this, however, Paul goes on to indicate that we indeed do nopt posess an algorithm to get to God. He emphasizes throughout Romans chapter 9. Chaitin, Godel, and St Paul seem consistent.

But Jesus said in Matthew 5 that he came to fulfill the law, each “jot and tittle”. If so, he must have realized that every attempt by physical minds to keep the law would result in greater speciation of ideas. Not only did he realize it, but in Matthew 10:34-38, he stated that this proliferation and “individuation” of religion was one purpose of his ministry.

So, we see a parallel between biblical concepts and mathematical concepts. Each attempt to develop a complete and consistent system of thought ends in an infinity of choice and greater complexity. Each attempt to develop a complete and consisten religious system built around God’s laws leads to greater complexity and infinite freedoms. By every system of knowledge we can develop, our freedom of choice appears infinite. But we would have to re-define our biblical conclusions concerning “God’s will”.

zombie March 11, 2006 at 5:18 pm

It is true that mainstream economics is giving ”science” a bad name.

But “austrian” economics, were it ever to transform into something that is at risk of being taken seriously by intelligent and sane people (a feat it could achieve, for instance, by not pretending any longer that you can derive a useful theory of meteorology just from “rain falls”, or some other fantastic and ridiculous claim in the same ballpark), it would give rational thought a bad name.

zombie March 11, 2006 at 5:25 pm

Inasmuch as man is faced with rational choices (and we must assume that all choices are rational for the person doing the choosing)

WTF? Where does that imperative (the ”must” part) come from? And what if we must but the assumption is just not true? (and, btw, it is not true. This is like assuming the world is flat.) Do we still must?

Roy W. Wright March 11, 2006 at 8:32 pm

…for instance, by not pretending any longer that you can derive a useful theory of meteorology just from “rain falls”, or some other fantastic and ridiculous claim in the same ballpark…

Austrian economists don’t need to pretend that useful economic theory can be derived from self-evident axioms. Such theory has already been derived.

Dewaine March 11, 2006 at 9:13 pm


You cannot make rational decisions for another person; you can only assume your understanding is more rational than another’s. An individual is the only person who can act rationally for himself.

– Dewaine

Alvin Lowi March 11, 2006 at 10:19 pm

Rothbards’ denounciation of what he calls scientism, positivism and collectivism is classical self-evident good sense. But he takes it for granted that the scientific method exists as the means for gaining knowledge of the natural world that includes autonomous humans as well as deterministic electrons. He does not attempt to define or teach the method for knowing nature. Had he done so, he would have surely pointed out that observation is the essential feature of scientific method regardless of subject matter. That observation is the court of last resort in distinguishing arbitrary opinion from reality whether in the physical, biological or social worlds. What constitutes a valid observation in any given field of inquiry? That is the central question to be answered by epistemology, which seeks to establish the criteria of knowledge in a given domain of phenomena. A classical treatment of the subject liberated from the constraints of physics can be found in Cohen and Nagel’s “An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method,” Harcourt-Brace, 1934.

Dan Mahoney March 12, 2006 at 7:51 am

Re. D Simon’s post,

One may “like” something for reasons other than
the will-independent physical sensations that
thing induces in us. Certainly, such will-
independent sensations exist, and do indeed play
an important role in whether we favor one thing
over another. However, it does not follow that
there are *no* will-dependent factors concerning
like vs. dislike. So, whether we like or dislike
something is not wholly deterministic but depends
at least in part on choice (or “free-will”, I
suppose you could say).


Frank Z March 12, 2006 at 1:22 pm

I liked Rothbards article it is closer, in my view, to truth than scientism. It basically argues for consciousness, self-determinism, the free will.

The discussion on the blog is interesting too.

I think a more definitive definition of man and consciousness is necessary to an understanding.

Mr. Simon in his “chicken liver” presentation argues he is without choice and subject to the “vagaries of his taste buds”.
In one instance that could be true, and that is under the condition that they are two things inseperable. Basically, an integral, whole entity. If you assume that true then it could only be true that choices are determined by the body and its senses through consciousness.

If the body and the consciousness are entirely seperate things then we can have the senses of the body determining certain things but that can be entirely overridden by the consciousness or vice versa.

It is our a priori determinations and choices then that make the argument. It can be assumed from his stated position that Mr. Simon has an inclination to think of a man and consciousness existing as a single indivisible unit along the lines of scientism.

If you agree that no one has yet determined that consciousness survives the body and is indeed seperate, spiritually or in whatever concept, then choice is ultimately within the realm of consciousness and it could also be a choice to allow a proxy in decisionmaking. I could assign choice to my brain and if I agreed with scientism I would. I could assign it to Baal.

But what am I saying here?

Curt Howland March 12, 2006 at 9:26 pm

Anyone who thinks they can choose to like or dislike certain foods has never tried Natou. (Japanese fermented soybean, fermented being the polite word for ROTTEN!)

Even though quantum physics does include random functionality, those random events are within observable, repeatable parameters. Human beings can and do act in completely irrational ways, going outside the limits of their prior behavior. While there are often warning signs, some individuals will “go postal” where another will not.

But that’s at the extreme. Within the “normal” boundaries, like “what shall I have for dinner”, there can be no way to know if the person will stick to their routine or try eating hot Thai curry. Or in my case, since I like hot Thai curry, there’s no way to say that I won’t do something else. Even I do not know all the time what I am going to do until I reach the decision point of doing it, and sometimes that includes not having dinner at all.

But as Frank Z so eloquently concludes, What am I saying here?

gene berman March 15, 2006 at 5:26 am


It is obvious that you’ve never read anything significant in or of Austrian economics.

The disagreement you find is entirely centered on the meanings of “rational” and “irrational.” You understand them in a different (albeit common)
sense as, respectively, “clear-thinking” and “not clear-thinking–erroneous.” To Austrians, the terms are more technical, closer to their actual meaning (as connected to reason) and, in a sense, somewhat akin to the jargon found in most areas of specialization. Neither use of the terms is
more “correct” than the other in any linguistic sense–but the Austrian use is far more helpful in identifying the source of action in the choices–the preferring and the setting aside–made by the actors themselves. Insofar as action is concerned and the market data generated by some of those actions, it matters not at all whether or not some of those actions resulted from erroneous assumptions or faulty reasoning on the part of the actors: the result, the actions taken, are every bit as “rational” as those made on the basis of correct assumptions and flawless reasoning.

Geoffrey Transom March 15, 2006 at 12:15 pm

Although I am a great fan of the departed Prof. Rothbard, he falls down when he makes the standard essay-writer’s critique of ‘model builders’.

(When I was part of a ‘think tank’ whose output centred on a highly comnplex economic model, we referred to anyone who couldn’t ‘do sums’ as an ‘essay writer’… they are usually the most strident anti-modellers [and before anyone leaps to his defence, I know full well that Rothbard was no sluggard at 'sums']).

Nobody who builds models (except the idiots) dares to suggest that the behaviour they attempt to APPROXIMATE, is deterministic.

In fact decent model builders will declare quite stridently that propensities and elasticities – and technical change parameters – are all dynamic variables. (Note here that I exclude the dolts who think that the models in Romer & Salah-i-Martin represent the higest form of the art).

To get any sort of quantitative ‘handle’ on the ramifications ofa policy proposal, you at least need to have some stab at assigning both a sign and a magnitude to these ‘quasi-parameters’. Otherwise you’re just left with hand-waving: a tax cut will stimulate growth or it will not, depending on your ideological bias, and you can weave an apparently-consistent story for each version of the outcome if all you’re doing is telling the story.

But once you are forced to write down each of your intermediate assumptions (and codify them, as in a model), you have no hand-waving ‘wiggle room’. if you say something that results in something violating a sensible state of nature (i.e., one which is consistent with the world as observed to date), the model will tell you so before your graduate seminar has gotten through disentangling the garbage you just spouted.

The functional forms of the relationships which are modelled attempt, likewise, to capture the ‘core’ features of the theory – for example consumption functions that represent preferences that ‘make sense’ (e.g., more preferred to less at given prices, transversality of preferences wherein if one prefers A for B and B for C, A is a fortiori preferred to C). But nobody pretends that Lewbel’s consumption demand system was handed down on Mount Sinai, nor that A will always be preferred to C, or that A will be preferred to C by everyone.

As one who has gone through the crucible of the modelling paradigm (and come out the other side bloodied but unbowed… I never finished my PhD), it annoys me to see otherwise sennsible men decrying modelling as if modellers are all some form of mathematical-economic fundamentalist – a Calculus Taliban.

The good modellers – folks like my mentor (Professor Peter B Dixon of Monash University in Melbourne, Australia) – are fully aware of the shortcomings of the modelling paradigm, and only ever speak in terms of directions and orders of magnitude. When ‘Dicko’ was asked about the results of a tax mix change on the Australian economy – where the ‘forecast’ outcome was GDP 1.3% higher by yr 5 – his answer was “I would be unhappy if the modelling said that the outcome was not positive, but it’s likely to be bugger-all”… or words to that effect (‘Dicko’ is a colourful character).

Finally, there is also the sense that humans get to choose (i.e., exercise their free will) but they do so subject to some very binding constraints. At the very least, that means that some model results (and ‘thought experiment’ results) are inadmissible (for example, you can’t have an economy where everybody violates a lifetime budget constraint… but you could think your way through an exercise without realising that you had done that).

Think of ‘good’ economic modellers as trying to ‘get the accounting right’ in a budget in which all variables are floating in ranges of relatively-fixed dimensions. For example, a cut in interest rates may, cet. par., generate an increase in investment activity… but the likelihood that a 0.25% cut will stimulate investment by 50%, is small enough to be assigned a probability of zero. Properly deployed, modelling is just the use of shorthand.

And one thing about which Rothbard is almost certainly wrong is the idea that ONLY humans havfe will. If you can look into the eyes of a gorilla and fail to see that they are ‘like’ us, you are guilty of forcing yourself to think that humans are special. Anthropomorphism is only misplaced when people refuse to acknowledge it: if something done by a cat looks purposive, who the hell are we to declare that it’s not?



PS excuse my spelling… I am in an internet cafe in Paris, and am using an AZERTY keyboard… it’s a cauchemar

Paul Edwards March 15, 2006 at 1:47 pm


The statement such as this,

“For example, a cut in interest rates may, cet. par., generate an increase in investment activity… but the likelihood that a 0.25% cut will stimulate investment by 50%, is small enough to be assigned a probability of zero. Properly deployed, modelling is just the use of shorthand.”

suggests there is merit in doing such calculations in the first place. However, one of the Austrian observations is that here the cart has been put before the horse. The question first to ask is: can any artificial, coercive, state imposed cut in the interest rate result in anything other than a distortion in the market, malinvestments, economic waste, and a fraudulent redistribution of and overall diminution of wealth resulting ultimately in the need for recessionary corrections and liquidations? The answer is no it can not. So why do the numbers on something we already know a priori should not be done in the first place? The problem with this math is that it is a distraction and diversion from the crucial questions that an economist must ask and answer.

mark March 16, 2006 at 7:18 am

Did Murry Rothbard present any scientific facts concerning free will?

If so I must have missed it. No mention of the Libet experiments, blind sight , or synthesia or any scientific introspections what so ever.

Translation of Murry Rothbard:

“I believe in an objective reality. Can’t you see the world is flat?”

mark March 16, 2006 at 7:19 am

Did Murry Rothbard present any scientific facts concerning free will?

If so I must have missed it. No mention of the Libet experiments, blind sight , or synthesia or any scientific introspections what so ever.

Translation of Murry Rothbard:

“I believe in an objective reality. Can’t you see the world is flat?”

David J. heinrich March 16, 2006 at 9:00 am


You seem to have entirely missed the point. We can’t determine the truth or falsehood of every claim using the scientific method, as it is only valid for the natural sciences, and not for the social sciences. Axiomatic truths — such as man has free will, the denial of which is self-contradictory — are just as true as clearly-proven as scientific facts (such as Newton’s laws).

Regarding Libet experiments, it is silly to try to reduce consciousness to various brain-states. To say that A is the same as B, A must have the same properties of B. Thus, to say that consciousness and free will can be reduced to side-effects of neural causes and correlates, we would need to be able to say that the properties of consciousness are the same as the properties of neural correlates and alleged causes. The properties of consciousness are nothing at all like the properties of the aforementioned neurochemical phenomena:

in short, the [neuronal] causes and correlates of conscious experience should not be confused with their ontology [...] the only evidence about what conscious experiences are like comes from first-person sources, which consistently suggest consciousness to be something other than or additional to neuronal activity” (Max Velmans, Understanding Consciousness, Routledge, London, 2000: 35-37

PS: Had you bothered to do the smallest bit of research and reading, you would have seen the following:

[Reprinted from Scientism and Values, Helmut Schoeck and James W. Wiggins, eds. (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand), 1960].

The wikipedia entry on Benjamin Libet says he did his experiments on consciousness in the 1970s — not the 1960s. So, it is rather silly and ignorant to criticize Rothbard for not discus1sing experiments which hadn’t even been done yet.

David J. Heinrich March 16, 2006 at 9:12 am

Another note on Libet’s experiments: he himself did not conclude that they refute the possibility of free will. One must also note that attempting to say that just because some “readiness potential” builds up before the recognition of the desire to perform a conscious action, does not mean that such is the cause of it. To assert such is just the post-hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy.

gene berman March 16, 2006 at 11:57 am

Hey, guys–all of you. Cut it out! The same ‘ol
free will vs determinism that’s been going on in college (and high-school) BS sessions since time immemorial–and that’s a long way before 55 years ago that I heard ‘em.

Just think a bit. If it’s determinism, then each is going to believe what’s predetermined–no ifs, ands, or buts. And it’s only determinism that’s forcing you to go to bat for it (and I guess you just can’t help it). But, at the same time, you’ll need to explain those who believe otherwise as being compelled to those conclusions by the same deterministic forces until finally “seeing the light” as the result of your own brilliant presentation (and what’s brilliant about whatever it is you’re compelled to like a robot?). And, if perchance the free-will variant of reality is the “correct” one, of what use is it to promote it through argument–when your own belief is that people choose of their own volition? And, how do you account for your opinion? Do you trace it back through some irrefutable logical chain until, finally, you’ve arrived at its premise (its cause, so to speak) which is, likewise, unquestionable? Just asking.

We ridicule some ancients for arguing about “how many angels can dance on the head of a pin?” These discusssions are merely an updated version.

Why don’t you grow up and try your hand(s) at something interesting for a change? Like “can we know everything?” Or, “If we can’t know everything, how can we ever even be sure that we don’t know everything already?” Or, to make it just a bit more complex, “If we can’t know everything, mustn’t it be true that there is knowledge denied us which we can’t even know exists without opening up that realm of knowledge and knowing something of it?” And, if, indeed, there is some knowledge of which we are denied any knowledge, including knowledge of its existence, won’t our condition, when “up against
the limits of knowledge,” be precisely that we already know everything? And won’t that be our tipoff that we really don’t–and there’s a whole new realm “out there” awaiting discovery?

george giles March 16, 2006 at 6:22 pm

Math and Economics do not go together at all, Murray illustrates why keenly. Math does dress economics up in a scientific facade that the mathematical illiterate (most of mankind) will fawn over and accept. The results are predictable: questionable data, followed by foregone conclusions, and always increasing funding at the expense of the public fisc.

Roy W. Wright March 16, 2006 at 11:36 pm

There is an aspect of mathematical modeling that seems to be poorly understood by Austrian economists. Math modeling is used in most sciences, but its purposes differ depending on the specific area of its application. In highly deterministic settings like physics, chemistry, and engineering, math modeling can be used very effectively to make predictions. In less deterministic settings such as mathematical biology, modeling is used to make some provisional predictions. However, it’s also used to analyze, a posteriori, the factors contributing to a given observed system behavior.

I could see how mathematical modeling might be of some limited use in economics, but not for its predictive ability.

billwald March 17, 2006 at 2:30 pm

It is a ploy of religionism to interject determinism into any discussion of scientism.

mark March 22, 2006 at 10:44 am

Life is a back ache. It’s the price we pay for our distant ancestors benifit of walking upright. Darwinian evolution works that way, marginal benifit verses cost.

Until we come to terms with Darwin all philosphical interjections are moot.

Any economic system and political system is operating in the much larger domain of Darwinian evolution.

Perhaps this is why religionism fears any discussion of scientism. Blabber all you want about a utopian ideals. At the end of the day we will all have back aches.

Paul Edwards March 22, 2006 at 1:02 pm


Have you ever heard of Stephen Jay Gould or Niles Eldredge?

No? I don’t think you’re alone. I am guessing very few have and fewer yet have heard the news: Darwin was mistaken.

Who says bad new travels fast?

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