I have a feeling Mr. Feser’s article is going to inspire quite a bit of comment as people digest what he advocates, particularly what he says from page 105 onward. An immediate negative reaction of mine is the apparent contradiction between his rejection of government defining and enforcing a moral code:

“One advantage claimed for this view [moral principles involving rights should be enforced by the state and morals involving promoting virtue and condemning vice should not] is that, though it by no means entails any kind of skepticism or relativism about morality, it does at least allow us to avoid having to settle disputes about moral issues about which there is great disagreement in modern society, and thus can facilitate social harmony. People who disagree about, say, whether homosexuality should be regarded as immoral or as a legitimate lifestyle
need not come to blows. Traditionalists are free to live in accordance with their views and to promote them within their own institutions – private associations, schools, places of business, churches, etc. – and “liberationists” can do the same within their institutions. This is one reason that libertarians hold that schools ought to be privatized and anti-discrimination laws abolished: such laws, and public education, inevitably involve the imposition of some people’s moral views on others.”

The libertarian does not absolutely rule out such things, however. Any community, of whatever size, is free to impose any restrictions
on its members that it likes, provided that all members of the community consent to the restrictions.

Cobined with his apparent endorsement of a local government (and through footnote 21, the federal government) overriding the desires of people within its jurisdiction to do just that:

“Suppose for purposes of illustration, though, that the members of a local governmental body believe that fornication, pornography,homosexuality, etc. are immoral, and that their promotion in public activities inevitably witnessed by the young will be as potentially corrupting to their moral character as would, say, a march by the KKK or Nazi party in a town where racial tensions are already high. Then it would have grounds, given the SOP [Self-Ownership Proviso, as envisoned by Erick Mack], for banning any such public activity – which would include explicit “sex ed” materials in the local
schools, a “pornography fair” at the local university, “gay pride” parades down Main Street, lewd billboard advertisements and displays
of pornographic materials on magazine racks, and so forth. These all quite obviously contribute to an atmosphere tending to undermine a child’s ability to develop character traits consistent with sexual virtue, given the extreme difficulty young people have in keeping sexual feelings under control – especially when constantly bombarded by messages insisting in effect that they not be kept under control. Along the same lines, the local government could prohibit the adoption of children by persons whose choice of sexual “lifestyle” it had reason to consider immoral, so as to prevent the moral corruption of those children. It could also prevent the formation of institutions, such as “same-sex marriage,” that it has reason to think would have a dramatic negative impact on the general public understanding of and commitment
to basic moral norms, for such a result would profoundly, if indirectly, affect the ability of children to form a sound moral sensibility.
Private vices generally recognized to be vices, and kept private, cannot justifiably be outlawed, but the public legitimization of such vices can and must be. ²¹

Although many libertarians will find such a suggestion shocking, I claim that they have no libertarian grounds for objecting to it, at least not if their libertarianism is based on the thesis of self-ownership.

All emphasis is the author’s.

Given that he does believe “the libertarian cannot rule out the possibility of such legislation a priori,” I think he’s in for a rough ride.

I find myself agreeing with much of what Feser says in his article, but also wary on the grounds Charles notes in his post. Feser’s argument, particularly in regards to subsidiarity, does seem to mesh with some of the political theory outlined by Hoppe.

I do have need for further clarification regarding Feser’s use of the Adam’s Island example, and perhaps those familiar with Mack might know: what are Adam’s additional obligations to Zelda once she has washed up on the shore’s of his island? He cannot morally exclude her from landing, but his ownership of the island would preclude her from doing anything without trespassing on Adam’s property rights claim to the island. This would then seem to deny Zelda her substantive right to life (she cannot produce or take anything from the island as this would be trespassing or stealing, but if she doesn’t she’ll presumably starve to death). What further moral obligations must Adam be held account for? Also, what are Zelda’s moral obligations to Adam?

As I see it, some of this begins down the Christian-socialist path: Adam is morally obligated to accept Zelda since she has a substantive right to life, but must he also go further and provide her some means by which to realize her substantive right to life, and how far must he go? Much of the Christian Left argues in this vein that capitalism denies substantive rights to life to the poor (i.e., the “living” wage) and offers only exploitation and “wage-slavery”. I am not sure how Mack or Feser addresses these issues of moral obligation and the boundaries of moral obligation. (I will leave aside the notion that Christians are morally obligated to assist the poor and needy without the coercion of the state).

So-called political conservatism is nothing impressive. By preventing people from acting freely, you eliminate or hamper their ability to choose the moral course of action, thus to act morally.

I have to emphatically agree with Mr. Hueter — coercion is wrong, period. If one disgrees, how can one claim to be a libertarian? (Kindly note that the question deserves a sound argument in response rather than the usual fulminations and evasions we see from these wolves in sheep’s clothing — the pseudo-libertarian.)

The tragedy of alleged libertarians reverting to a so-called ‘conservative’ outlook lies in the almost desparate set of attempts to smuggle coercion in thru shoddy argument.
To wit:
“Any community, of whatever size, is free to impose any restrictions on its members that it likes, provided that all members of the community
consent to the restrictions.”
This an example of the fallacy of
And it is absurd once the fallacy is recognized — communities do not act, and so do not impose restrictions. Restrictions may be chosen by members of the community, up to and including all members. This does not, in any way, mean that the group imposed the restrictions — the restrictions were chosen. (A side note — it would be amusing, and perhaps instructive, to see how Mr. Feser and others of his ilk, would treat the case of change of commitment. What happens when a member of the community “withdraws his consent”, ie, chooses to adopt or release a restriction on his/her own behavior?)

And immediately following in the article, we see:
“It is fully consistent with libertarianism
that, for example, a group of Puritans decide together to settle a territory and institute a religious commonwealth, or that a group of
communists set up a socialist republic. What is ruled out is Puritans or communists imposing such a system on everyone else, on a community not all of whose members consent to it.”
Can you say ‘begging the question’?
The question at hand being, of course, the rights of children.
It would have been useful to see a discussion of how the rights of individual children intersect with the rights of individual adults.
But, of course, since we are being misled by the fallacy of composition, we are directed to look at the rights of the group [groups have no rights, only individuals do] and how they might supercede the rights (yet to be determined by logic and demonstrative argument) of children.

Gentlemen, this is the tragedy of modern libertarianism. We are being co-opted by those who are comfortable with preventing anyone else’s freedom as long as their own is left undisturbed.

regards,
Shirley Knott