I make the case for Misesian utilitarianism in the following essays:
The Utilitarian Foundation of Morality
In Defense of Misesian Utilitarianism
Comments welcome.
Source link: http://archive.mises.org/18467/the-case-for-utilitarianism/
The Case for Utilitarianism
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For the sake of argument, lets assume you’re completely right about natural rights and natural law. Great.
However, Rothbard also agreed with argumentation ethics. So I’d suggest going forth and addressing Hans-Hermann Hoppe’s argument please. I’d be interested in your response, because as far as I’m aware – you’ve never addressed their existence in any depth and when called upon to do so elsewhere, have consistently decided not to engage.
“As regards the utilitarian position, the proof contains its ultimate refutation. It demonstrates that simply in order to propose the utilitarian position, exclusive rights of control over one’s body and one’s homesteaded goods already must be presupposed as valid. More specifically, as regards the consequentialist aspect of libertarianism, the proof shows its praxeological impossibility: the assignment of rights of exclusive control cannot be dependent on certain outcomes. One could never act and propose anything unless private property rights existed prior to a later outcome. A consequentialist ethic is a praxeological absurdity. Any ethic must instead be “aprioristic” or instantaneous in order to make it possible that one can act here and now and propose this or that rather than having to suspend acting until later. Nobody advocating a wait-for-the-outcome ethic would be around to say anything if he took his own advice seriously. Also, to the extent that utilitarian proponents are still around, they demonstrate through their actions that their consequentialist doctrine is and must be regarded as false. Acting and proposition-making require private property rights now and cannot wait for them to be assigned only later.” – HHH, Economics and Ethics of Private Property, pg 354.
Utilitarianism… lol!
I’ll engage if you give me something to work with. If you want to talk AE, then go ahead and start. Give me an actual proposition to respond to, instead of just gesturing at AE.
And why do I suddenly need to give you something to work with? The same obviously wasn’t necessary for you to engage Rothbard’s arguments. I’m merely suggesting you do the same with Hoppe (http://mises.org/daily/5322/Argumentation-Ethics-and-Liberty-A-Concise-Guide), or address any other of the scholarly works on the matter.
My second article was a defense of Mises’ utilitarianism. The only Rothbardian arguments I engaged were ones that directly challenged Mises’ utilitarianism. I’ve read all of Hoppe’s major works, and I don’t recall him ever challenging Mises’ position in particular.
But I’m happy to discuss Hoppe’s position, now that you’ve raised some particular concrete propositions below.
Mr. Sanchez;
This was an outstanding article and I thank you for writing it.
I often complain about the preference for Rothbard over Mises here, which usually does not involve an analysis of the point of diversion nor why posters thought Mises was wrong and Rothbard right. You do an outstanding job of making such an analysis.
When you respond to the Rothbardian view regarding his opinion that Mises was incorrectly arguing for a time preference for the long-term over the short term you said this:
An interesting question, given the greater difficulty of grasping an accurate understanding of the long run over short-run consequences of an act is, why would someone bother to seek such an understanding, and consider the possibility that there could be a conflict of interest between the two?
Although it is true that an actor must be aware of the fact that both long and short-term effects exist and may be contradictory, Rothbard seems to ask, what could be the motivation for an individual actor to forego short-term benefits in the believe that such forbearance will yield greater long-term good, and prefer one over the other?
In Rothbard’s analysis of a natural rights theory of morality over utilitarianism as he understood it, he employed the Crusoe device; man alone. If such a framework natural rights are to serve as the basis for his system of morality, it cannot be based on a misplaced understanding of the nature of humankind.
However, Kathleen Touchstone argues in Then Athena Said, the Crusoe device portrays membership in society as voluntary, and leads to the hyper-individualism that characterizes Anarcocapitalism, promoted by Rothbard and fellow ancaps here on Mises.org. She persuasively argues that the Primary Social Unit is mother and child, involves positive rights to care, and is the foundation for the primary social definition of cooperating humans. Membership is society is not voluntary because each individual universally begins life as a child, and that life is one of co-dependency and cooperation, and one in which not all rights are negative, as Rothbard holds.
I suggest that for this reason, which Rothbard failed to acknowledge, a person might have a sufficient motivation for preferring long-term over short-term benefits, and in any case would be somewhat proportional to the extent he felt himself, as a rational member of society, a participant in a cooperating group to which he has a commitment to long-term survival and prosperity. Lacking this sentiment, there would be no reason to prefer or even acknowledge long-term consequences, especially if those consequences would be measured beyond the lifetime of the actor.
I think this explains to some extent the more extreme interpretation of individual voluntarism by ancaps, which pervades this particular vision of a “free” society in which the benefits within the short –term grasp of the individual actor reigns supreme over long-term considerations, and Rothbard’s view that the gratification of the short-term benefit would be preferred over forbearance for the greater long-term benefit, even if known and well-understood.
This works well for economic issues, but for other issues who will decide what promotes cooperation? What about societies that regularly murder baby girls after they are born? Or those that murder all babies born out of wedlock? What about euthanasia?
The majority opinions in the past on cooperation have been immoral by today’s standards. At one time slavery was thought as good. We tried to eradicate all natives from east of the Mississippi. Owning land in common was thought to be absolutely necessary for social cohesion for centuries. Euthanasia was promoted by the top scientists as the only salvation for society for decades in the 20th century.
In most of the Middle East, cheating a stranger is considered being an astute businessman. You can’t cheat family members. These rules are considered necessary for social interaction.
For millennia people believed that social cooperation required a privileged nobility to rule the masses.
Then there is the problem of having rules that apply to my tribe/nation but don’t apply to those outside. That was the rule of empires up to the modern era.
“Now, what certainly would not prevent tariffs, featherbedding, and other anti-liberal privileges would be social philosophers parachuting in to inform lobbyists and workers about “violations of right reason concerning the nature of man” (natural rights arguments) or the “performative contradictions” implicit in their proposals (argumentation ethics).”
Nothing can prevent people from ignoring codes of conduct. The purpose of natural rights arguments was not to force people to follow them, but to first determine objective rules of morality through reason. Only after you have a coherent set of rules can you then worry about enforcing them. You will have a much tougher time enforcing rules if they appear irrational and incoherent.
Utilitarianism offers the best results for everyone in the long run, but the long run can sometimes be a very long way off, often outside an individual’s life span. That makes enforcing the code through reason very difficult. Most people are like Keynes and don’t care about the long run.
Almost always enforcement will boil down to force. But if the code of conduct is a human invention, then who has the right to use force to enforce them? All that anyone has the right to do is to exclude from the club those who don’t obey the club’s rules.
People throughout history have misconceived what best promotes general welfare through social cooperation. The thing to do is to eradicate those misconceptions, and replace them with sound conceptions.
“first determine objective rules of morality through reason.”
Any set of rules is just as “objective” as any other set of rules. What matters is which set of rules best serves the human purposes for which they are adopted.
“the long run can sometimes be a very long way off, often outside an individual’s life span.”
The long run interests that are served by the liberal code lie within the life spans of most individuals.
“Almost always enforcement will boil down to force.”
No, with any prevailing moral code, enforcement is for the most part effectuated by non-violent social pressure.
“But if the code of conduct is a human invention, then who has the right to use force to enforce them?”
When you speak of rights, you are speaking of a code. So what you’re asking is “what is the code for determining the enforcement of a code?” This is the infinite regress I talked about in the first essay.
Do you deny that codes of conduct are human creations?
Danny: “. The thing to do is to eradicate those misconceptions, and replace them with sound conceptions.”
But “sound” conceptions depend on your value system.
Danny: “Any set of rules is just as “objective” as any other set of rules.”
No rules are objective that are based on subjective considerations of what is best for society. As I noted, people have always had very different views of what is best.
Danny: “The long run interests that are served by the liberal code lie within the life spans of most individuals.”
For society maybe, but not necessarily for the individual doing the choosing.
Danny: “Do you deny that codes of conduct are human creations?”
That question is a lot like Blitzer’s question to Ron Paul in the latest debate. It depends. Are most codes of conduct human creations? Absolutely! Is it possible to have a code of conduct that is not human? That depends upon your theology. An atheist would say no. Theists would say yes.
Of course, then you have the problem of which theism. But that problem is no different than the problem of which goal to aim for in utilitarianism.
The utilitarian approach of Mises works fine with economic matters, but it will fail with any attempt at arriving at a moral code outside of the sphere of economics. It runs into the pseudo-rationality that Hayek attacks in “Individualism: True and False” and “Fatal Conceit”. As Hayek wrote, true reason incorporates humility about what reason can achieve.
@fundamentalist September 19, 2011 at 1:40 pm
First, you reference to “inside” and “outside” is of paramount importance, since social loyalty is by defninition a matter of defining “inside” of your own society.
Second, Daniel brought out the point of ends and means. Those points of historical fact where before time A slavery existed, for example, and after that time it did not, must have marked a seachange in the socially accepted code of conduct. That change marks a change in the ends that were desired, an/or the means to achieve those ends.
Coercion, whether by force or social pressure to conform (a lessor form of coercion than direct force), is the way people are “prevented” from ignoring codes of conduct. When the larger group holds certain values in common, they “correct” those who fail to obey.
To your concluding comment, exclusion is a powerful form of coercion. Society is by definition a group of at least two cooperationg humans. If individuals have natureal rights, then they have the right to associate with othe humans, adopt common rules of conduct, and exclude conduct which does not conform. That is in fact, at both primative and higly advanced civilizations, what actually occurs.
The referenced articles are extremely helpful and thoughtful, giving me much to think about. Thank you.
What happens when it doesn’t? Would the argument then fail? An economic argument is not the same as a moral argument. I can make the economic argument all day long, but if reality shows something else, then my argument fails. What would that say about the morality of price controls – would the moral argument also fail?
They may, but that does not mean the deontological approach is ipso facto incorrect.
Which would be a tautology as the very same argument is a man-made thing. ALL ideas are man-made, so what?
The problem is that you’re confusing ethics with economics. Certainly, people create things for a given purpose, but moral determinations are derived from deduction. Nobody “invented” the idea that not killing is a good thing; that idea is arrived at by pure deduction.
You can certainly try to test all of them. For instance, you can test a new idea on property rights by trying to break into my house – then, my two friends, Smith and Wesson, will help you reach the conclusion (before you expire, of course) that these so-called “interpersonal codes of conduct” have a very concrete reason for their existence.
“What happens when it doesn’t?”
The systemic tendency of price ceilings is always the creation of shortages. If there isn’t a shortage, it would be because of other intervening factors. The argument would still hold.
“ALL ideas are man-made, so what?”
I said the “so what” in the sentences that followed.
“Nobody “invented” the idea that not killing is a good thing; that idea is arrived at by pure deduction.”
The fact a society in which people kill each other wily nilly is a dangerous and terrible society to live in was not invented. But the code of conduct that is established in order to prevent that state of affairs was.
“You can certainly try to test all of them. For instance, you can test a new idea on property rights by trying to break into my house – then, my two friends, Smith and Wesson, will help you reach the conclusion (before you expire, of course) that these so-called “interpersonal codes of conduct” have a very concrete reason for their existence.”
Yes and that reason is a general acceptance of their usefulness. If everyone in society believed that communal ownership of houses was the path to prosperity, and private ownership of houses led to general impoverishment, your Smith and Wesson wouldn’t stand a chance against all the Smiths and Wessons supporting me in my attempt to occupy your house.
Re: Danny Sanchez,
Sure, if that were the case. Again, what if it wasn’t? How would the argument hold against an argument from morality? Let me give you an example:
Let’s say that the governent says to all “We decree that, from now on, the price for a bag of potato chips shall not be above $1,000.00 dollars! So be it!” And from then, NO bag of potato chips is ever sold above that price. However, let’s say that the price of a normal bag of potato chips still hovers around $2.50 at your favorite supermarket and you can still buy as many as you want – i.e. NO shortages.
Could there be shortages? You betcha, if the demand for bags of potato chips ever gets to the point where the $1,000 dollar cap is not enough for producers. But while that happens, what happens to the idea of price caps and shortages?
Instead, applying deontological ethics, I would say it is WRONG to impose ANY sort of price cap because that would be a violation of contractual agreements between producerand buyer and a violation of property rights, regardless of the fact that a $1,000.00 cap may NEVER achieve the shortage you use as the foundation for your argument.
That’s possible, and things may end up in bloodshed. Again, they would be welcome to try. I could ask what would happen if a bigger mob reached the same conclusions as your mob, and attacked you, and so on.
My point, David, is that you do NOT need to try out every single possible outcome to reach a conclusion regarding the most useful of human rules. These can be deduced in the same way I show above: By asking questions. Just to leave you with something to ponder, look at how evolution arrived at similar rules by a very painful and long process of trial and error, not much different than the utilitarian or consequensialist approach. We have the advantage of reason and deduction.
I just finished reading “In Defense of Misesian Utilitarianism,” and wholeheartedly agree with it. Upon discovering Austrian economics earlier this year, I soon became interested in the various ethical theories of its members. At an early stage, Rothbard had me sold on the natural rights version of ethics, and Hans Hoppe’s argumentation ethics was intriguing as well. However, I began to question where these natural rights actually come from. Rothbard claimed that it came from the very nature of man, yet I saw that this was not necessarily so . . . I understood free will to be part of the nature of man, which would allow for malevolent actors to infringe upon the allegedly natural rights of man. The turning point for me was when I found your Mises Daily article “Why Liberalism?” not too long ago, and this paper has further solidified my understanding or and adoption of Misesian utilitarianism. Thanks!
Interesting… so what are your comments on this then? Because if you’d thoroughly investigated the ‘apriori of argumentation’ before dismissing it, there should be an enlightening response.
“As regards the utilitarian position, the proof contains its ultimate refutation. It demonstrates that simply in order to propose the utilitarian position, exclusive rights of control over one’s body and one’s homesteaded goods already must be presupposed as valid. More specifically, as regards the consequentialist aspect of libertarianism, the proof shows its praxeological impossibility: the assignment of rights of exclusive control cannot be dependent on certain outcomes. One could never act and propose anything unless private property rights existed prior to a later outcome. A consequentialist ethic is a praxeological absurdity. Any ethic must instead be “aprioristic” or instantaneous in order to make it possible that one can act here and now and propose this or that rather than having to suspend acting until later. Nobody advocating a wait-for-the-outcome ethic would be around to say anything if he took his own advice seriously. Also, to the extent that utilitarian proponents are still around, they demonstrate through their actions that their consequentialist doctrine is and must be regarded as false. Acting and proposition-making require private property rights now and cannot wait for them to be assigned only later.” – HHH, Economics and Ethics of Private Property, pg 354.
“As regards the utilitarian position, the proof contains its ultimate refutation. It demonstrates that simply in order to propose the utilitarian position, exclusive rights of control over one’s body and one’s homesteaded goods already must be presupposed as valid”
The only thing that is required is effective control. That control doesn’t need to be viewed as somehow “valid.”
Imagine an Aesopic (rational) lion debating a Hoppean antelope over ethics. The antelope contends that the lion’s use of discourse presupposes libertarian property rights. “My dear fellow,” the lion responds, “the only thing implied by my not eating you is the fact that you look stringy and unappetizing.”
“Nobody advocating a wait-for-the-outcome ethic would be around to say anything if he took his own advice seriously.”
The consequences considered are not ex post particular consequences as they actually eventuate. They are the systemic, prevailing ex ante consequences that are revealed and predicted by praxeology and economics.
Danny: “The only thing that is required is effective control. That control doesn’t need to be viewed as somehow “valid.”
No, the question is whether the control is justified or not.
“My entire argument, then, claims to be an impossibility proof. But not, as the mentioned critics seem to think, a proof that means to show the impossibility of certain empirical events so that it could be refuted, by empirical evidence. Instead, it is a proof that it is impossible to propositionally justify non-libertarian principles without falling into contradictions.”
For whatever such a thing is worth (and I’ll come to this shortly), it should be clear that empirical evidence has absolutely no bearing on it. So what if there is slavery, the Gulag, taxation? The proof concerns the issue that claiming such institutions can be justified, involves a performative contradiction. It is purely intellectual in nature, like logical, mathematical, or praxeological proofs.” ~ Hoppe, http://www.hanshoppe.com/wp-content/uploads/publications/liberty_symposium.pdf , pg 8
Danny: “Imagine an Aesopic (rational) lion debating a Hoppean antelope over ethics. The antelope contends that the lion’s use of discourse presupposes libertarian property rights. “My dear fellow,” the lion responds, “the only thing implied by my not eating you is the fact that you look stringy and unappetizing.”
Leaving aside the obvious fact they have different natures..
“…He [the Lion
] has fewer difficulties recognizing the nature of my argument but then asks me in turn “So what? Why should an a priori proof of the libertarian property theory make any difference? Why not engage in aggression anyway?” Why indeed?! But then, why should the proof that 1+1=2 make any difference? One certainly can still act on the belief that 1+1=3. The obvious answer is “because a propositional justification exists for doing one thing, but not for doing another.” But why should we be reasonable, is the next come-back. Again, the answer is obvious. For one, because it would be impossible to argue against it; and further, because the proponent raising this question would already affirm the use of reason in his act of questioning it. This still might not suffice and everyone knows that it would not, for even if the libertarian ethic and argumentative reasoning must be regarded as ultimately justified, this still does not preclude that people will act on the basis of unjustified beliefs either because they don’t know, they don’t care, or they prefer not to know. I fail to see why this should be surprising or make the proof somehow defective. More than this cannot be done by propositional argument.” http://mises.org/books/economicsethics.pdf (pp. 407-08) ~ Hoppe
“No, the question is whether the control is justified or not.”
Okay, then, the only thing presupposed is effective control, not “justified control”.
I have no idea what the “impossibility proof” quote is meant to prove.
“Leaving aside the obvious fact they have different natures..”
Hoppe explicitly said his theory has nothing to do with an individual’s “nature”, which he, in differing with Rothbard, called “too diffuse” to allow the derivation of an ethic.
And you’re missing the point by posting that last quote. I’m not saying the lion recognizes the validity of the argument and then condones killing anyway. I’m saying there is no argument. The fact that an individual is using discourse, and not violence, does not necessarily imply a property code. It could be due wholly to other factors.
“Okay, then, the only thing presupposed is effective control, not “justified control”.”
- It seems to me you think all that matters is who has proximate control. That is: who is controlling the muscles. I don’t think you grasp what it really entails. You don’t care about anything but the fact that someone controls it. You do not care about hypocrisy, or performative contradictions. Would that be correct? As if it doesn’t matter?
“Hoppe explicitly said his theory has nothing to do with an individual’s “nature”, which he, in differing with Rothbard, called “too diffuse” to allow the derivation of an ethic.”
- I know. That’s why I mentioned ‘leaving it aside’, as it wasn’t directly relevant to this discussion, but I thought I’d point it out regardless.
“And you’re missing the point by posting that last quote. I’m not saying the lion recognizes the validity of the argument and then condones killing anyway. I’m saying there is no argument. The fact that an individual is using discourse, and not violence, does not necessarily imply a property code. It could be due wholly to other factors.”
- If there is no property conflict, then where is there a problem? (one not merely academic). Oh of course it could. But so what? Do those others obtain universality or not?
The above articles are decades behind considering the existence of ‘the a priori of argumentation’.
Just a quick comment, and this is not the only strawman, you say:
“So when a libertarian says something tantamount to, “X should be refrained from because it is contrary to a given code of interpersonal conduct,” that only raises the question: “Why should this code of interpersonal conduct be adopted, and not others?””
A proper libertarian wouldn’t say that. Not a Rothbardian anyway:
“For we are not, in constructing a theory of liberty and property, i.e., a “political” ethic, concerned with all personal moral principles. We are not herewith concerned whether it is moral or immoral for someone to lie, to be a good person, to develop his faculties, or be kind or mean to his neighbors. We are concerned, in this sort of discussion, solely with such “political ethical” questions as the proper role of violence, the sphere of rights, or the definitions of criminality and aggression. Whether or not it is moral or immoral for “Smith” – the fellow excluded by the owner from the plank or the lifeboat – to force someone else out of the lifeboat, or whether he should die heroically instead, is not our concern, and not the proper concern of a theory of political ethics.[5]” ~ Lifeboat scenario, TEOL – Rothbard.
Your question is outside the realm of political philosophy i.e libertarianism, which is meta-normative. You have a RIGHT to do __, whether you should/ought to follow that is a completely different question (personal ethics), it is individualized.
But of course, you’ve seen this quote tens of times before and it hasn’t changed your position, so I don’t see why it would now either.
“The natural law, then, elucidates what is best for man—what ends man should pursue…” -MNR, TEOL.
And any statement about whether someone has a RIGHT to do something can only ever be made with reference to a particular code of interpersonal conduct.
And that quote in context, not cut mid-sentence goes on to back up this:
“Libertarianism, then, is a philosophy seeking a policy.[..] In the first place, surely-again in Acton’s words-it must say that liberty is the “highest political end,” the overriding goal of libertarian philosophy. Highest political end, of course, does not mean “highest end” for man in general. Indeed, every individual has a variety of personal ends and differing hierarchies of importance for these goals on his personal scale of values. Political philosophy is that subset of ethical philosophy which deals specifically with politics, that is, the proper role of violence in human life (and hence the explication of such concepts as crime and property). Indeed, a libertarian world would beone in which every individual would at last be free to seek and pursue his own ends-to “pursue happiness,” in the felicitous Jeffersonian phrase.” – TEOL, Chp 30.
Yes, you cannot escape property rights (see Kinsella – http://mises.org/daily/3660#ref4). The difference between property norms is the specific criteria for WHO shall be deemed to justifiably control what.
Danny Sanchez: “And any statement about whether someone has a RIGHT to do something can only ever be made…”
… can only ever be made in the course of argumentation. “… any truth claim, the claim connected with any proposition that it is true, objective or valid (all terms used synonymously here), is and must be raised and settled in the course of an argumentation. Since it cannot be disputed that this is so (one cannot communicate and argue that one cannot communicate and argue), and since it must be assumed that everyone knows what it means to claim something to be true (one cannot deny this statement without claiming its negation to be true), this very fact has been aptly called “the a priori of communication and argumentation.” (EEPP, p. 314).
“…And this is to say nothing else than that a mutual recognition of each person’s exclusive control over his own body must be presupposed as long as there is argumentation (note again, that it is impossible to deny this and claim this denial to be true without implicitly having to admit its truth).” (TSC, p. 158)
Private [self-ownership & original appropriation] property is not a ‘convention’.
“proper role of violence”
How does that not entail “how one SHOULD act”?
“Yes, you cannot escape property rights (see Kinsella – http://mises.org/daily/3660#ref4). The difference between property norms is the specific criteria for WHO shall be deemed to justifiably control what.”
Indeed a property rights code is indeed a necessary DEVICE for the existence of society.
““…And this is to say nothing else than that a mutual recognition of each person’s exclusive control over his own body must be presupposed as long as there is argumentation”
No, again, only the effective control is presupposed, not any “recognition” of the validity or rightness of that control.
Sorry miss-posted earlier. Response below. Apologies for delay as well, LvMI had that down time for a long period, I forgot about this, and was just reminded by an email of a friend looking to see what I had to say on the discussion.
Congrats on the course you will be doing with David Gordon, excellent stuff.
“How does that not entail “how one SHOULD act”?”
Through self-ownership, original appropriation which makes contracting and not contracting possible etc. You have the ‘RIGHT’ to drink that entire bottle of vodka, whether you SHOULD or not is completely irrelevant to libertarianism, i.e political philosophy. (http://mises.org/Community/forums/p/14313/302672.aspx#302672) or put this way by Rothbard, TEOL – Lifeboat:
“The crucial point is that even if the contextualist libertarian may say that, given the tragic context, Smith should throw someone else out of the lifeboat to save his own life, he is still committing, at the very least, invasion of property rights, and probably also murder of the person thrown out. So that even if one says that he should try to save his life by forcibly grabbing a seat in the lifeboat, he is still, in our view, liable to prosecution as a criminal invader of property right, and perhaps as a murderer as well. After he is convicted, it would be the right of the lifeboat owner or the heir of the person tossed out to forgive Smith, to pardon him because of the unusual circumstances; but it would also be their right not to pardon and to proceed with the full force of their legal right to punish.
Once again, we are concerned in this theory with the rights of the case, not with whether or not a person chooses voluntarily to exercise his rights. In our view, the property owner or the heir of the killed would have a right to prosecute and to exact proper punishment upon the aggressor. The fallacy of the contextualists is to confuse considerations of individual, personal morality (what should Smith do?) with the question of the rights of the case. The right of property continues, then, to be absolute, even in the tragic lifeboat situation…
To sum up the application of our theory to extreme situations: if a man aggresses against another’s person or property to save his own life, he may or may not be acting morally in so doing. That is none of our particular concern in this work. Regardless of whether his action is moral or immoral, by any criterion, he is still a criminal aggressor against the property of another, and the victim is within his right to repel that aggression by force, and to prosecute the aggressor afterward for his crime.”
Danny: “Indeed a property rights code is indeed a necessary DEVICE for the existence of society.”
Device? There is only one non-contradictory property norm. “I will begin with some abstract but fundamental theoretical considerations concerning the sources of conflicts and the purpose of social norms. If there were no interpersonal conflicts, there would be no need for norms. It is the purpose of norms to help avoid otherwise unavoidable conflicts. A norm that generates conflict, rather than helps avoid it, is contrary to the purpose of norms, i.e., it is a dysfunctional norm or a perversion.” ~HHH. Private* property is not a “convention”.
Danny: “No, again, only the effective control is presupposed, not any “recognition” of the validity or rightness of that control.”
Towards the end;
“The answer to the question what makes my body “mine” lies in the obvious fact that this is not merely an assertion but that, for everyone to see, this is indeed the case. Why do we say “this is my body”? For this a twofold requirement exists. On the one hand it must be the case that the body called “mine” must indeed (in an intersubjectively ascertainable way) express or “objectify” my will. Proof of this, as far as my body is concerned, is easy enough to demonstrate: When I announce that I will now lift my arm, turn my head, relax in my chair (or whatever else) and these announcements then become true (are fulfilled), then this shows that the body which does this has been indeed appropriated by my will. If, to the contrary, my announcements showed no systematic relation to my body’s actual behavior, then the proposition “this is my body” would have to be considered as an empty, objectively unfounded assertion; and likewise this proposition would be rejected as incorrect if following my announcement not my arm would rise but always that of Müller, Meier, or Schulze (in which case one would more likely be inclined to consider Müller’s, Meier’s, or Schulze’s body “mine”). On the other hand, apart from demonstrating that my will has been “objectified” in the body called “mine,” it must be demonstrated that my appropriation has priority as compared to the possible appropriation of the same body by another person.
As far as bodies are concerned, it is also easy to prove this. We demonstrate it by showing that it is under my direct control, while every other person can objectify (express) itself in my body only indirectly, i.e., by means of their own bodies, and direct control must obviously have logical-temporal priority (precedence) as compared to any indirect control. The latter simply follows from the fact that any indirect control of a good by a person presupposes the direct control of this person regarding his own body; thus, in order for a scarce good to become justifiably appropriated, the appropriation of one’s directly controlled “own” body must already be presupposed as justified. It thus follows: If the justice of an appropriation by means of direct control must be presupposed by any further-reaching indirect appropriation, and if only I have direct control of my body, then no one except me can ever justifiably own my body (or, put differently, then property in/of my body cannot be transferred onto another person), and every attempt of an indirect control of my body by another person must, unless I have explicitly agreed to it, be regarded as unjust(ified).[7]
[7]Informal translation from Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Eigentum, Anarchie und Staat (Manuscriptum Verlag, 2005, pp. 98-100; originally published in 1985).
What is your operating definition of a “right” here?
In actual practice, people do adopt norms of all kinds. They are generally more complex and less consistent than the libertarian norm, and not nearly as effective. That doesn’t make them “self-contradictory”.
And again, I have no idea how that last quote is supposed to address my point.
A right is regarding use of something without having to ask permission and, in a social setting, that which does not violate others’ usage of what they have. Again, from Kinsella’s article; so “After all, a property right is simply the exclusive right to control a scarce resource.[4]“. What’s important is whether the right is justifiable or not.
“And again, I have no idea how that last quote is supposed to address my point.”
- You don’t understand the being engaged in a performative contradiction, demonstrates a disconnect between what they say and what they actually do/mean. Which means hypocrisy. Which means that they don’t even believe their own argument to a certain extent.
“…the appropriation of one’s directly controlled “own” body must already be presupposed as justified. It thus follows: If the justice of an appropriation by means of direct control must be presupposed by any further-reaching indirect appropriation, and if only I have direct control of my body, then no one except me can ever justifiably own my body (or, put differently, then property in/of my body cannot be transferred onto another person), and every attempt of an indirect control of my body by another person must, unless I have explicitly agreed to it, be regarded as unjust(ified).[7] ~ HHH”
“You don’t understand the being engaged in a performative contradiction, demonstrates a disconnect between what they say and what they actually do/mean. Which means hypocrisy. Which means that they don’t even believe their own argument to a certain extent.” -Conza88
So what? In the real world, there are many instances in which there are disconnects between what people say and what they actually do . . . hypocrisy abounds. Also, why doesn’t the person believe their own argument to a certain extent? I know their actions implicitly show that they don’t believe their “argument,” but is the person even conscious of having made an argument? Perhaps the person isn’t thinking in terms of broad ethical rules based on argumentation ethics . . . perhaps the person has simply calculated a certain course of action which is satisfactory to him. Of course, a system of private property rights is necessary for a free market to exist, which is the greatest engine for human prosperity that exists . . . however, I would argue that private property rights has largely arisen as an institution because people have realized its benefits, and not because it is somehow ethically justified. I know you’ll probably contend that just because there exist hypocrites in the world, with regard to argumentation ethics, is not sufficient to claim that argumentation ethics is unfounded. But neither is there sufficient grounds to establish argumentation ethics as some exogenous moral code that actually exists. Or perhaps all you are arguing is that argumentation ethics provides a moral code that is internally consistent, but which does not exist apart from reality as some sort of actual moral “force,” for lack of a better word . . . in which case our positions may be reconcilable.
Conza88: “Device? There is only one non-contradictory property norm. ‘I will begin with some abstract but fundamental theoretical considerations concerning the sources of conflicts and the purpose of social norms. If there were no interpersonal conflicts, there would be no need for norms. It is the purpose of norms to help avoid otherwise unavoidable conflicts. A norm that generates conflict, rather than helps avoid it, is contrary to the purpose of norms, i.e., it is a dysfunctional norm or a perversion.’ ~HHH. Private* property is not a ‘convention’.”
I think this paragraph demonstrates the Misesian utilitarian position . . . Hoppe says here that it is the purpose of norms to help avoid otherwise unavoidable conflicts. The norm, as considered from the Misesian utilitarian standpoint, is the moral code that must prevail in order for people whose preferences include a rising standard of living as opposed to poverty, life as opposed to death, etc. I am under the impression that Mises thought that logic/objective truth could only be applied to existential propositions, i.e. to what “is.” Many people would obviously develop preferences as to what they think the “is” should be (and so have subjective moral codes), but that doesn’t mean that there is an objective ethics outside of the actual preferences themselves. In this way, it can be seen that the highest political end is liberty from the point of view of someone whose preferences line up with the ones I mentioned above (i.e. rising living standards, longer life, etc.), and not because of any objective ethics.
“Let me start by asking what is wrong with the position taken by Mises and so many others that the choice between values is ultimately arbitrary? First, it should be noted that such a position assumes that at least the question of whether or not value judgments or normative statements can be justified is itself a cognitive problem. If this were not assumed, Mises could not even say what he evidently says and claims to be the case. His position simply could not exist as an arguable intellectual position.
At first glance this does not seem to take one very far. Indeed, it still seems to be a far cry from this insight to the actual proof that normative statements can be justified and that it is only the libertarian ethic which can be defended. This impression is wrong, however, and there is already much more won here than might be suspected. The argument shows us that any truth claim, the claim connected with any proposition that it is true, objective or valid (all terms used synonymously here), is and must be raised and settled in the course of an argumentation. Since it cannot be disputed that this is so (one cannot communicate and argue that one cannot communicate and argue), and since it must be assumed that everyone knows what it means to claim something to be true (one cannot deny this statement without claiming its negation to be true), this very fact has been aptly called “the a priori of communication and argumentation.”
Arguing never consists of just free-floating propositions claiming to be true. Rather, argumentation is always an activity, too. However, given that truth claims are raised and settled in argumentation and that argumentation, aside from whatever it is that is said in its course, is a practical affair, it follows that intersubjectively meaningful norms must exist-precisely those which make some action an argumentation-which have a special cognitive status in that they are the practical preconditions of objectivity and truth.”
The Economics and Ethics of Private Property p.314-15 ~ Hoppe
‘People develop the custom of abiding by general rules because they recognise that when both the long run and short run are taken into account, any given individual is likely to be better off, according to his own preferences, with the rules, than without them.’
Reading this as an investment banker I would agree. The sytem we have, central bank and a fiat/fractional reserve banking system is tantamount to a widely held custom and it suits investment bankers well in the short run for sure, and arguably in the long run as well.
I think your analysis is maybe a little too binary? There is a large middle ground where we can live in a society where the degrees of freedom the market has is enough to offset the drag of the state and its agents but it is clear that in this uncomfortable situation, the latter benefit unjustly.
I understand that in the long run standards of living, materially, will be higher but to argue that psychological well being is correlated with material production per person is narrow. I grant you that a man has to be fed and watered before he can be a poet but in societies far above this point, where rich and poor have similar life expectancies, it is not at all clear that the investment banker or government employee would have been better off in a classically liberal society. For instance, he might have had to work beyond 40 years of age and provided for his own retirement instead of relying on others!
I believe Danny addressed this in “In Defense of Misesian Utilitarianism.” Specifically, in the following quote:
“Furthermore, it is not true that utilitarian liberals need to convince literally everyone that a liberal society would better serve their interests. Only the majority need be convinced. Such a revolution in public opinion would necessarily engender a revolution in the prevailing morality. Against such a prevailing morality, even the most ardent statist caste-member would be unable to make any headway.
Mises concluded, using his thymological judgment, that most would prefer to avoid the long-run pitfalls if they only knew about them. When Mises says that the long-run benefits of preserving social cooperation are “incomparably greater”, he means according to nearly every acting individual’s own judgment (were they only aware of the long-run consequences), not according to some imposed external standard.
Utilitarian liberalism, does not say, “You want B, but you should really want A.” Rather, it says, “You think B will result in Y, which you want. But it will not. Instead it will result in X, which you do not want. However, if you adopt A, you will get Z, which you would like best, but did not even know was possible.”
And it says this, not with regard to particular choices considered in isolation, but with regard to the systemic consequences to be expected of general rules. Furthermore, it says this not in order to persuade each individual in every concrete choice in their daily lives, but so as to effect a revolution in public opinion concerning social expediency, which in turn will necessarily engender a revolution in the prevailing moral code.”
Even if liberalism informed by utilitarianism would not benefit some, such as government employees or investment bankers (only in the short and middle run, as you say), Danny’s point is that once an effective shift has been made in the society towards a moral code characterized by liberalism, then the featherbedders/statists/etc. could not resist the social change. Also, even if there were an objective ethics, this is no guarantee against the fact that people may break the ethical code.
Those divines who saw that nothing but revelation could provide man with perfect certainty were right. Human scientific inquiry cannot proceed beyond the limits drawn by the insufficiency of man’s senses and the narrowness of his mind. 14
13Mises, Theory and History:
14Ibid., p. 9.
The human mind in its search for knowledge resorts to philosophy or theology precisely because it aims at an explanation of problems that the natural sciences cannot answer.15
15Mises, The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science (Irvington-on-Hudson,
N.Y.: Foundation for Economic Education, [1962] 2002), p. 117.
These are from “Mises: The Last Knight of Liberalism” p 957
Indeed, but why claim that philosophy or theology can provide an ethical code that is objective with respect to existential conditions (i.e. the world we live in)? It can only speculate as to what an objective ethical code could be, but it is certain that it must conform to existential conditions. So, for instance, the Christian theologian may perhaps endorse the Misesian utilitarian position upon the basis of the following Biblical passage from Wisdom 11:21:
“Thou has ordered all things in measure, and number, and weight.”
This verse may be interpreted by the Christian theologian as showing that God’s world is sensible, logical, and can be understood based on the existential conditions of the world; all he does, in this instance, is add the concept of God to the Misesian utilitarian foundation, without altering its core in any way. This is because Misesian utilitarianism can stand on its own, without reference to divine/metaphysical factors, but it does not preclude them. It only states that it is not possible for man to come up with an objective ethical standard that is outside of the existential, short of receiving revelation, as your quote above shows. Also, I suspect most Christians would not recognize this, but faith is necessarily subjective with respect to existential conditions (i.e. they cannot objectively prove that their faith is rational with respect to existential conditions). That does not mean that the beliefs they have faith in aren’t objective, just that it is not ascertainable with respect to existential conditions alone. In short, existential information is not sufficient to prove the objectivity of their beliefs (again, short of revelation). It is for this reason that I am agnostic, though with strong hopes that Christianity is appended to Misesian utilitarianism . . . I guess you could say that I’m waiting for a revelation.
I’d like to say that I just used the Christian theologian out of a desire to come up with an example, and not out of an assumption that you are Christian.
Yours is the typical objection to natural law, but it’s based on Hume’s misunderstanding of Aristotle and Aquinas. Mises had the same problem. Everyone since Hume has had such respect for Hume that they assume his critique of natural law was right. In fact it was based on a straw man. For a correct understanding of natural law see Fezer’s “Last Superstition.”
Natural law never was based on “what is”. Essentially, it used reason to determine the purpose of something based on function and design. An obvious example would be that a hammer is better suited for driving nails than for cleaning teeth. Therefore a “good” use of a hammer would be to drive nail whereas a “bad” use of a hammer would be to clean teeth.
In introduced Mises’ statement about revelation in order to hilite a principle of epistemology. Mises hammered home the idea that the differing demands of epistemology for the natural sciences and economics required different methods. He concluded that reason was a better guide to truth in economics than is historical data.
Analyzing historical data in economics is a less certain path to truth than is reason. But as Mises pointed out, reason is less certain than revelation for some subjects. That is irrelevant if we don’t have any revelation. But if we assume that God exists, then it’s reasonable to assume that he would and has communicated with mankind some kind of revelation.
Of course, now you have the problem of sorting through the competing revelations of the world’s religions. That is another subject, but I would suggest that it is not much different and no harder than deriving morality from reason through natural law. At the same time, natural law has shown that reason and the fundamental principles of morality in all of the world’s great religions show very little divergence.
Both Mises and Hayek (in “Individualism: True and False” and “Fatal Conceit”) encourage humility about what man can achieve through reason and open the door for consideration of revelation.
> He concluded that reason was a better guide to truth in economics than is historical data.
Or, more accurately, (if my understanding is correct) historical data is worthless without the ability to use reason to draw conclusions.
That is that it is bogus to take historical data and simply present it as a conclusion to a argument, like many people do. (example: The Great Depression happened, WW2 happened, then the boom in the 1950′s happened. Therefore WW2 stopped the Great Depression and is responsible for the boom in the 1950′s)
I actually agree with how you formulated Mises’ thought in the latter half of your post, and I think if you reread my post you will see that this is so. Anyway, I just ordered Feser’s “The Last Superstition” to see whether your claim that Mises misunderstood Aristotle and Aquinas holds any water or not.
I’m glad you will read Feser’s book. Keep in mind that he is a strong proponent of Austrian econ and is very familiar with Mises, Hayek and Rothbard. He has a good web site, too. But in “Last Superstition” he doesn’t mention Mises. His beef is with Hume and others who led subsequent philosophers astray.
http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/ is his blog in case you were unaware.
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