Fortunately, language gives us the ability to assign meaning to words, and we can use them to communicate about concepts.

Oh, the audacity of someone who revels in vagueness. Pathetic.

Furthermore, I’d like to point out that again you have not confronted any of my arguments, just distract.

Do you really think I need you to tell me that the name for a thing is not the same as the thing itself?

Fortunately, language gives us the ability to assign meaning to words, and we can use them to communicate about concepts. Take that away, and all language is gibberish.

This expalins why so much of what you say is gibberish; you reduce language to a meaningless mish-mash of gobledygook and expect your “opponents” to try to sort is all out. It is a worthless endeavor.

Well, pat of my argument is that you can get almost all of the features of the current contract system using a more sound and libertarian property based TTT. The fact that you can do this with TTT is a good feature not a weakness. It’s simpler and cleaner and easier to justify.

Based on what I get from your responses, it does appear that you can arrive at the same (or very similar) outcomes with either system. We haven’t resolved the property issue yet, though. I am asking (lest you think I’m pettifogging) because I am trying to understand if you can create property interests in TTT contracts, which you can within traditional contract theory.

You said earlier that you cannot re-create IP using contracts. I’m trying to explore the why of that statement.

For example there are obligations to do, and to give, in theory; but you can only enforce the former with awards of money–so it’s like a big sham since all obligations to do (to perform) are really just title transfers. Why not just call it that?

As you mention below, there is the equitable remedies of specific performance. But the fact is that most contracts are financial arrangements in one form or another. Damages for breach are most naturally reduced to economic recovery for expectations unfulfilled because of breach. Also, remedies for breach calculate the size of the financial award based on the facts presented during trial, for example. This is why liquidated damages are rarely enforced, except in those rare cases where damages are difficult or impossible to calculate in advance.

Also, nearly all contracts involve a title transfer of something, although the concept of title transfer gets a little fuzzy when you are talking about a contract for a service for a service. It would be a stretch to call that a title transfer, wouldn’t it?

That solves immediately the debate over the efficient breach hypothesis; it separates ethical or moral aspects of promising from legal transfers of title.

How so? It seems that the efficiency of breach depends on the obligations likely for damages for breach. It is only when the damages for breach are less than the costs of fulfilling the contract that breach is efficient. I may be looking at this incorrectly, but it seems to me that under traditional contract theory, title transfer is most often the final result of most contracts.

Even in your example of a service for a fee, which in traditional terminology is a promise for a promise, in TTT terms it is simply a unilateral contract on a condition precedent. I’m not sure what advantage there is in one over the other, as it is just a terminology difference, unless I’m missing some other subtlety.

And it solves also IMO the difficult issue of specific performance and even voluntary slavery. The current account has to say there are obligations to do, then backtrack on this to avoid slavery.

What is difficult about specific performance? It only lies in those rare cases where money damages are inadequate, like in the sale or real estate or the sale of a work of art, etc. Does TTT not contemplate any form of equitable remedy?

I suppose the exception you are thinking of for slavery is the defense of illegality. What is difficult about that? If the contract is for something that is otherwise illegal, the contact is void; murder and slavery are out, just like with TTT.

Libertarians that think promises are binding then either have to support voluntary slavery and debtor’s prison, or they have to come up with contorted reasons why it does not apply the TTT avoids all this.

Well, obviously neither of these assertions is true. I think legal promises are binding and I don’t support slavery or debtor’s prison. You can’t accomplish things that are otherwise illegal just because you make what would otherwise be a binding contract. What is contorted about that?

It makes clear exactly waht is the status of a defaulting debtor: he owes nothing; he has no obligation; he is not stealing. It was simply a title transfer that failed.

I think this is the crucial issue I’m trying to raise. If a defaulting debtor owes nothing, if his other assets, for example, cannot be reached, then the TTT contract does not create a property interest in the debt payment. It eliminates the possibility of trading or securitizing the contract, because the assignee has no assurance that the promise is good. Therefore it has no value, or would have to be traded at a large discount under face value.

In traditional theory, however, a promise is enforceable, and collateral can be reached to make the obligee whole. This creates a property interest in the contract that will trade at closer to face value. Debtor prison is outlawed on public policy grounds, just like slavery, and bankruptcy stands as an option for the debtor to avoid losing essential assets in repayment, like the home.

What problem here does TTT solve?

“No. this is not rihgt. You can pre-negotiate a liquidated damages PAYMENT. You don’t need to pre-pay it as a bond. You can just arrange it. E.g., “If you sing at my kid’s party, I will give you $1000. If you fail to show up, you will pay me $7000 damages.””

OK, but doesn’t that amount to the same thing? If you contract for a certain performance in the future (payment) based on a condition precedent, when the obligation matures, the payment is in fact performance of the duty contracted for (payment in lieu of singing).

I don’t think it’s teh same–it’s not a perofrmance it’s a trasnfer of title. A performance needs the cooperation of the obligor. A title transfer does not.

Isn’t this equivalent to saying that failure to perform is a breach, which entitles the obligee to damages, which would be, in this case, payment of the liquidated damages? There is no coercion on the part of the obligee to make the obligor sing. Upon breach (non-singing), the condition is met and the obligor’s interest in the money amount is released to the obligee. If the obligor refuses to pay, the obligee has a cause of action, and the obligor would have to offer some defense or excuse, or be ordered to pay. Same result in both theories, as non-payment authorizes coercion. I don’t see an advantage here, just another way of describing the operation of law.

Think of it like this. I own a watch. You ask to see it. I hand it to you, basically loaning it to you for a few seconds, and/or until I tell you to return it. DUring that interval you have a right-to-use it, which is like ownership, but due to the contractual undersatnding between us, the full right to control will revert to me upon a condition: my demanding it back.

This appears to just be another way of describing a bailment; a conditional transfer of possession, but not ownership, (an analogy to copyrights, in some ways).

When I do, you must return it and if you refuse you are committing conversion (theft, trespass). The transfer of status–your having the right to control it; your losing this right–did not require your cooperation. It only requred a contractual title transfer arrangement set up ahead

Bailment theory does not require that the parties reach a detailed agreement in advance. It only requires that the bailor make his intentions clear. In any case, if you gave me your watch, and I refused to give it back, saying that you sold it for example, I would have to show that I gave sufficient consideration. In the absence of such a showing, you could not legally keep the watch.

The doctrine of bailment eliminates the need for parties to recreate the doctrine in an explicit and properly worded contract in advance, greatly reducing the transaction costs of such an exchange. Imagine if I asked to see your watch, and you refused until we negotiated a contract describing the bailor/bailee arrangement intended. Are you suggesting that unless this is done, I could keep your watch and you would have no recourse?

of time. Then, when the condition is fulfilled (the time ran out, or I demand it back), the full ownership reverts to me automatically.

In the bailment doctrine, the ownership does not need to revert, because the condition of transfer did not transfer ownership, only possession. That give the owner the right to demand the property at any time, under his undisturbed property rights to the watch. What is the advantage of TTT here?

This is no different in principle to a case where you own the watch and agree to transfer the title to me in 5 minutes, in excahnge for my giving you my autograph. I autograph your book, and so at that point, now the owenrship of the watch is mine automatically. This transfer does not require your cooperation any more than in the first case. IN fact in both cases if you drop dead while holding the watch, the watch still becomes my property per the previously arranged title conditions. You have no obligations at all. It is only that you acquire an obligation at the moment the title transfers: for at that moment you are now in possession of my property, and have an obligation to return it to me or not to use it without my consent etc. So any obligations that arise are soley a consequence of the current property allocation landscape, whcih itself is rearranged and determiend by contract (consent of ther owners).

This is simply a promise for a promise where performance is not simultaneous, but condition on some occurrence before the other’s obligation matures. If I sell the watch to you, the mutual duty to perform (pay money and transfer watch) arise simultaneously. If I condition my performance on some precedent condition, your duty to perform (sign) arises before mine (payment) matures. When you sign, my duty to pay matures, and your executory interest in my watch vests; same exact result.

So there is a differenc.e TTT is cleaner, based on property, libertarian, and solves many doctrinal problems or avoids complicated exceptions.

I respectfully disagree, based on my current understanding. There appears to be a distinction without a difference, save at least two important ones.

In TTT, the inalienability of will prevents formation of a property interest in an obligation, and instead substitutes a performance guarantee that must be negotiated in advance. In addition, since it does not rely on existing doctrine, TTT terms are only operational if the parties specifically negotiate them and reduce those terms to a legally enforceable agreement.

Since this significantly adds to the transaction costs of doing business, this means that it encourages inefficient economic outcomes.

For example, if I want to hire you to sing, and am willing to pay you $100 for that service, but require that you pay me $1,000 of you don’t show up, we may not reach an agreement on the performance guarantee, even though you would accept $100 for singing and I’m willing to pay you that amount. That is an inefficient outcome, and such results would seem to be more likely under TTT than tradition contract theory.

So, while it is possible to theoretically reach similar outcomes with either theory, TTT has these two major disadvantages; the inability to form enforceable property interests in promised performance, and higher transaction costs.

I am presuming that this is why you say that IP cannot be recreated between two parties by contract? One, because you cannot enforce performance of a promise except through pre-negotiated damages for non-performance between the parties, (which of course has no effect on third parties), and second, because since you deny any property rights in an original work, for example, it is not possible to transfer by contract what you don’t already own.

Is that a fair summary?

I continue to insist that this:

” But a title transfer is an actual transfer of the title–even if it’s a trasnfer set up NOW, to be effective in the future, based on a conditional event (and all future title trasnfers are uncertain and conditional since the future is uncertain–the party or the property may not exist, etc.).”

…is in fact equivalent to a condition precedent in standard contract theory.
What I’m trying to zero in on is what interest the oblige has in the obligor’s promise under TTT. If the time for performance comes, and the person or property in question doesn’t exist, is the contract is automatically void under TTT? Is this different than the impossibility defense in standard contracts?”

Well, pat of my argument is that you can get almost all of the features of the current contract system using a more sound and libertarian property based TTT. The fact that you can do this with TTT is a good feature not a weakness. It’s simpler and cleaner and easier to justify.

But the only reason it’s the same result is that the conventional system makes exceptions. For example there are obligations to do, and to give, in theory; but you can only enforce the former with awards of money–so it’s like a big sham since all obligations to do (to perform) are really just title transfers. Why not just call it that? That solves immediately the debate over the efficient breach hypothesis; it separates ethical or moral aspects of promising from legal transfers of title.

and it solves also IMO the difficult issue of specific performance and even voluntary slavery. The current account has to say there are obligations to do, then backtrack on this to avoid slavery. Libertarians that think promises are binding then either have to support voluntary slavery and debtor’s prison, or they have to come up with contorted reasons why it does not apply. the TTT avoids all this. It makes clear exactly waht is the status of a defaulting debtor: he owes nothing; he has no obligation; he is not stealing. It was simply a title transfer that failed.

“No. this is not rihgt. You can pre-negotiate a liquidated damages PAYMENT. You don’t need to pre-pay it as a bond. You can just arrange it. E.g., “If you sing at my kid’s party, I will give you $1000. If you fail to show up, you will pay me $7000 damages.””

OK, but doesn’t that amount to the same thing? If you contract for a certain performance in the future (payment) based on a condition precedent, when the obligation matures, the payment is in fact performance of the duty contracted for (payment in lieu of singing).

I don’t think it’s teh same–it’s not a perofrmance it’s a trasnfer of title. A performance needs the cooperation of the obligor. A title transfer does not.

Think of it like this. I own a watch. You ask to see it. I hand it to you, basically loaning it to you for a few seconds, and/or until I tell you to return it. DUring that interval you have a right-to-use it, which is like ownership, but due to the contractual undersatnding between us, the full right to control will revert to me upon a condition: my demanding it back. When I do, you must return it and if you refuse you are committing conversion (theft, trespass). The transfer of status–your having the right to control it; your losing this right–did not require your cooperation. It only requred a contractual title transfer arrangement set up ahead of time. Then, when the condition is fulfilled (the time ran out, or I demand it back), the full ownership reverts to me automatically.

This is no different in principle to a case where you own the watch and agree to transfer the title to me in 5 minutes, in excahnge for my giving you my autograph. I autograph your book, and so at that point, now the owenrship of the watch is mine automatically. This transfer does not require your cooperation any more than in the first case. IN fact in both cases if you drop dead while holding the watch, the watch still becomes my property per the previously arranged title conditions. You have no obligations at all. It is only that you acquire an obligation at the moment the title transfers: for at that moment you are now in possession of my property, and have an obligation to return it to me or not to use it without my consent etc. So any obligations that arise are soley a consequence of the current property allocation landscape, whcih itself is rearranged and determiend by contract (consent of ther owners).

So there is a differenc.e TTT is cleaner, based on property, libertarian, and solves many doctrinal problems or avoids complicated exceptions.

you have fallen prey to metaphors. A terrible mistake for a scientist.

instead of confronting the arguments, you ignore 95%, misrepresent 5% and then use it as a distraction. Subsequently you present yourself as a victor. Instead you’re just a pitiful clown. But I’m not here for entertainment.

Responding to your accusation and teaching you about the basics of linguistics is a waste of time, since you’d react the same way. I already explained the problem several times. Until now you ignored it, and then suddenly make fun of it. That speaks for itself. I can’t even find words anymore to describe the level of intellectual dishonesty you present.

You might be surprised to learn that I’ve read your paper as well as some others on TTT.

After all that and your explanation, I think in some large part we are talking about two systems of contract theory that arrive at similar outcomes.

For example, I continue to insist that this:

But a title transfer is an actual transfer of the title–even if it’s a trasnfer set up NOW, to be effective in the future, based on a conditional event (and all future title trasnfers are uncertain and conditional since the future is uncertain–the party or the property may not exist, etc.).

…is in fact equivalent to a condition precedent in standard contract theory.
What I’m trying to zero in on is what interest the oblige has in the obligor’s promise under TTT. If the time for performance comes, and the person or property in question doesn’t exist, is the contract is automatically void under TTT? Is this different than the impossibility defense in standard contracts?

No. this is not rihgt. You can pre-negotiate a liquidated damages PAYMENT. You don’t need to pre-pay it as a bond. You can just arrange it. E.g., “If you sing at my kid’s party, I will give you $1000. If you fail to show up, you will pay me $7000 damages.”

OK, but doesn’t that amount to the same thing? If you contract for a certain performance in the future (payment) based on a condition precedent, when the obligation matures, the payment is in fact performance of the duty contracted for (payment in lieu of singing).

If singer fails to perform the duty to sing, there is a right to action to collect the performance guarantee. How is “and if he refuses to hand it over it’s a type of theft” different than a breach of contract and a suit for breach? Both theories allow coercion at that point in time, correct?

Its may be SAFER to make the singer deposit $7k first in some escrow but this is not necessary. If the singer fails to show up then the condition to trigger the transfer of $7kis fulfilled and it is transferred. Then at that point the singer is in possession of $7k of money owned by the other guy, and if he refuses to hand it over it’s a type of theft.

Whether the “singer” buys a bond or self-funds the deposit, it is in effect a performance guarantee. Failure to perform as promised transfers the title to the money to the “other guy”.

The question is about property rights. In standard (normal?) theory, since the promise is enforceable, it can be treated as a property interest in the performance (singing and & $7k), and traded or securitized.

In TTT theory, since performance is only guaranteed by a performance bond (or deposit), only the payment for failure to perform could be traded or otherwise assigned, is that right?

The original performance is uncertain, and therefore has little value to a third party, if I understand correctly. In other words, there is no alienable property interest in the original promise to perform. Rather failure to perform might be an alienable property interest, but the likelihood of the condition occurring would be relevant to a third party; (in fact such a trade would give a financial incentive for the 3rd party to prevent performance).

Whereas in standard contract theory, no bond is required (although may be advisable in some circumstances) because the promise itself is enforceable.

It seems, therefore, that TTT does not create a property interest in the promise to perform, while standard contract theory does. Is that a valid statement?

Reasonably intelligent people can figure that out on their own without much help.

Whether you call it a sale or not is irrelevant from a legal point of view, regardless of what legal system you are using for evaluating that.

I only highlight this comment for its comedic value. Spock, are you feeling OK?

You mean we could reinvent the English language and call the concept “sale” “piano”.

By golly, I think you’re right!

merely because an act superficially looks like a sale does not mean that it actually is an exchange of a good for money. Whether you call it a sale or not is irrelevant from a legal point of view, regardless of what legal system you are using for evaluating that. I already explained that merely using a noun inside a contract does not necessarily mean that that noun represents the object of the contract. It’s a linguistic issue.

Can a contract beyond (i.e., not about or not of) your property with material consequences be valid in your system?
By the way, is it true then, that in your system, these bets (say even a winning lottery ticket) are not property?

A bet is not property. a bet is a contract. it’s a way of transferring title to property.

The penumltimate question — I don’t get. Oddly worded.

Wildberry:

This is no different that an obligation to perform on the occurance of a condition precedent.

The difference between standard contracts, and the “title transfer” theory is more to the point of the question.

In standard contract theory, a property interest in the promise is alienable, can be traded or used as a security interest, and would be enforceable agaist failure to perform. In this regard, the contract creates a property interest in the promise to perform.

In the TTT framework, my understanding is that the promise is not enforceable, because will in not alienable.

That is not my reason. That is Rothbad’s argument for inalienabiliyt. The reason a mere promise does not suffice is it is just a promise. It’s a statement of prediction about what I may do. You can rely on it or not, up to you. But a title transfer is an actual transfer of the title–even if it’s a trasnfer set up NOW, to be effective in the future, based on a conditional event (and all future title trasnfers are uncertain and conditional since the future is uncertain–the party or the property may not exist, etc.).

The only way around this is to pre-negotiate a preformance bond that establishes liquidated damages for failure to perform. Let’s ignore the issues with negotiating liquidated damages.

No. this is not rihgt. You can pre-negotiate a liquidated damages PAYMENT. You don’t need to pre-pay it as a bond. You can just arrange it. E.g., “If you sing at my kid’s party, I will give you $1000. If you fail to show up, you will pay me $7000 damages.”

Its may be SAFER to make the singer deposit $7k first in some escrow but this is not necessary. If the singer fails to show up then the condition to trigger the transfer of $7kis fulfilled and it is transferred. Then at that point the singer is in possession of $7k of money owned by the other guy, and if he refuses to hand it over it’s a type of theft.

This theory is very differnt than normal theories, and I explain why here

http://mises.org/journals/jls/17_2/17_2_2.pdf

This is no different that an obligation to perform on the occurance of a condition precedent.

The difference between standard contracts, and the “title transfer” theory is more to the point of the question.

In standard contract theory, a property interest in the promise is alienable, can be traded or used as a security interest, and would be enforceable agaist failure to perform. In this regard, the contract creates a property interest in the promise to perform.

In the TTT framework, my understanding is that the promise is not enforceable, because will in not alienable. The only way around this is to pre-negotiate a preformance bond that establishes liquidated damages for failure to perform. Let’s ignore the issues with negotiating liquidated damages.

Under TTT, there is no property interest created, or at least you would not describe the same outcome using a property interest concept. I assume you would say that you create an interest in the future transfer of title, secured by a performance bond, or something like that?

My question is, is this semantics, or is there a material difference in outcomes?

Stephan explained it better than I can. I’ll just turn the question around: if you make a bet, does it mean that the referenced phenomenon must be owned by one of the parties in order for that bet to be valid? Let’s say we bet who wins a football match. Now here are the questions:

- does the validity of that contract (bet) require that one of us has a property right in some of the aspects of the match, for example the field or the ball, or that we employ the players?

- does the opinion of the owners of the field, ball, or the players have an influence on the validity or effects of that contract (bet)?

Not only in accordance with the theory presented by Stephan, but also according to current law, the answer in both cases is no. Analogically, the same should also apply to derivatives (I’m not sure if that’s the case with current law but I’m pretty sure that’s the conclusion Stephan would draw). Financial derivatives reference already existing property (which may or may not belong to the people involved in the trade, but the point is they already belong to someone). They are not a new kind of property. They are a new way of looking at old property.

In no case do we “own” the condition, the rain. It’s jsut a trigger. Same with service contracts: a service contract is actually just a one-way title transfer: money from employer to employee IF employee does X.

I don’t think there’s anybody can make head or tails of Bitcoin. I think the reason for it is that its future development, success or demise depend on future empirical variables (which are, of course, uncertain) and cannot be praxeologically derived. That is why it’s so difficult to understand it.

unfortunately I have to put these on hold, I’m now reading about monetary theories, digital currencies and currency competition because I want to understand Bitcoin. But I’ll put the articles you referenced onto my Kindle and will come back to them eventually.