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	<title>Comments on: Supreme Court Prepares to Chop Down &#8220;Clear and Convincing&#8221; Standard for Proving Patent Invalidity</title>
	<atom:link href="http://archive.mises.org/14798/supreme-court-prepares-to-chop-down-clear-and-convincing-standard-for-proving-patent-invalidity/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://archive.mises.org/14798/supreme-court-prepares-to-chop-down-clear-and-convincing-standard-for-proving-patent-invalidity/</link>
	<description>Proceeding Ever More Boldly Against Evil</description>
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		<title>By: Jeffrey Gross</title>
		<link>http://archive.mises.org/14798/supreme-court-prepares-to-chop-down-clear-and-convincing-standard-for-proving-patent-invalidity/comment-page-1/#comment-742833</link>
		<dc:creator>Jeffrey Gross</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 06 Dec 2010 23:25:36 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.mises.org/?p=14798#comment-742833</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[I find it difficult to take seriously a post which ridicules those advocating a different view, as this one does w/ patent lawyers (&quot;hysterically,&quot; vested interests,&quot; etc.)  As if Microsoft doesn&#039;t have vested interests!  Indeed, the vested interests of MS, Intel, etc., are to be able to use others&#039; IP w/ impunity.  If the law needs to be changed, fine, but let&#039;s not kid ourselves about motivations.  As to this particular change: patent examiners examine patents, acting on behalf of the Executive.  That&#039;s all they do.  To presume that an issued patent is valid - but w/ the possibility of invalidating it later - is merely to presume that the PTO knows what it&#039;s doing on a general level.  I won&#039;t even mention the cost and time required to get a patent, since I suspect that&#039;s not on the columnist&#039;s radar screen.  But to me the mild weighting of power in favor of a patent that&#039;s made it through the system - as opposed to the many that are never declared valid and that are stillborn, so to speak - seems like little more than common sense.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I find it difficult to take seriously a post which ridicules those advocating a different view, as this one does w/ patent lawyers (&#8220;hysterically,&#8221; vested interests,&#8221; etc.)  As if Microsoft doesn&#8217;t have vested interests!  Indeed, the vested interests of MS, Intel, etc., are to be able to use others&#8217; IP w/ impunity.  If the law needs to be changed, fine, but let&#8217;s not kid ourselves about motivations.  As to this particular change: patent examiners examine patents, acting on behalf of the Executive.  That&#8217;s all they do.  To presume that an issued patent is valid &#8211; but w/ the possibility of invalidating it later &#8211; is merely to presume that the PTO knows what it&#8217;s doing on a general level.  I won&#8217;t even mention the cost and time required to get a patent, since I suspect that&#8217;s not on the columnist&#8217;s radar screen.  But to me the mild weighting of power in favor of a patent that&#8217;s made it through the system &#8211; as opposed to the many that are never declared valid and that are stillborn, so to speak &#8211; seems like little more than common sense.</p>
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		<title>By: Wildberry</title>
		<link>http://archive.mises.org/14798/supreme-court-prepares-to-chop-down-clear-and-convincing-standard-for-proving-patent-invalidity/comment-page-1/#comment-742655</link>
		<dc:creator>Wildberry</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 06 Dec 2010 16:53:48 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.mises.org/?p=14798#comment-742655</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Anthony,

Attributes of a thing are integrated into the thing itself, they are inseperable.  How can you separate something into its attributes on the one hand and the thing itself on the other?

You cannot remove &quot;roundness&quot; from a wheel, unless you change the attributes of the wheel such that it has &quot;squareness&quot; instead.  A wheel cannot have both, at least not at the same scale of description.

An attribute is a conceptualization of how a thing behaves or is situated, etc. in relation to the natural world, of which it is a part.

It is possible to alienate certain attributes from others, such as mineral rights from land.  The land and it&#039;s minerals still exist, adn can be described and distinguished from other attributes, and the context from within which it is perceived.  One may own the attribute &quot;land&quot; without owning the attribute &quot;minerals&quot; on that land.   Where is the contradiction?

What is your point?]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Anthony,</p>
<p>Attributes of a thing are integrated into the thing itself, they are inseperable.  How can you separate something into its attributes on the one hand and the thing itself on the other?</p>
<p>You cannot remove &#8220;roundness&#8221; from a wheel, unless you change the attributes of the wheel such that it has &#8220;squareness&#8221; instead.  A wheel cannot have both, at least not at the same scale of description.</p>
<p>An attribute is a conceptualization of how a thing behaves or is situated, etc. in relation to the natural world, of which it is a part.</p>
<p>It is possible to alienate certain attributes from others, such as mineral rights from land.  The land and it&#8217;s minerals still exist, adn can be described and distinguished from other attributes, and the context from within which it is perceived.  One may own the attribute &#8220;land&#8221; without owning the attribute &#8220;minerals&#8221; on that land.   Where is the contradiction?</p>
<p>What is your point?</p>
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		<title>By: Wildberry</title>
		<link>http://archive.mises.org/14798/supreme-court-prepares-to-chop-down-clear-and-convincing-standard-for-proving-patent-invalidity/comment-page-1/#comment-742512</link>
		<dc:creator>Wildberry</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 06 Dec 2010 00:43:23 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.mises.org/?p=14798#comment-742512</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Peter,
“you cannot simultaneously own objects and their attributes.”

I don’t get this.  How can you define an object without distinguishing its attributes?   How can you own an object, and not also obtain the attributes of that object?  Even if you tried to do so, like selling the mineral rights of land while keeping possession of the rest requires that I have all of the attributes of that land in the first place.  I must be missing something.  Is this symantics?

I’m familiar with set theory, if that is what you are referring to.  I think all you are saying is that subsets cannot exist outside of the superset to which they belong.  To say otherwise would be contradictory.  I agree.

Interpreting the sets in a different manner (= using different attributes) does not change the amount of their members or the existence of intersections. The intersections (= contradictions in the theory) are the problem.

Sorry I don’t get this.  

Set [book] contains [paper], [cardboard], [thread], [ink], [glue], [letters of the alphabet], [ideas].  All belong to the supersets of {all books} {all paper} {all cardboard}, etc.
The [ideas] in the set [book] are a subset of the superset {all ideas}.    Attributes can be said to distinguish a subset from the superset or subsets from one another.  The members of set [book 1] cannot also be members of [book 2] etc.  Where is the contradiction?

I really don’t see what you’re getting at.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Peter,<br />
“you cannot simultaneously own objects and their attributes.”</p>
<p>I don’t get this.  How can you define an object without distinguishing its attributes?   How can you own an object, and not also obtain the attributes of that object?  Even if you tried to do so, like selling the mineral rights of land while keeping possession of the rest requires that I have all of the attributes of that land in the first place.  I must be missing something.  Is this symantics?</p>
<p>I’m familiar with set theory, if that is what you are referring to.  I think all you are saying is that subsets cannot exist outside of the superset to which they belong.  To say otherwise would be contradictory.  I agree.</p>
<p>Interpreting the sets in a different manner (= using different attributes) does not change the amount of their members or the existence of intersections. The intersections (= contradictions in the theory) are the problem.</p>
<p>Sorry I don’t get this.  </p>
<p>Set [book] contains [paper], [cardboard], [thread], [ink], [glue], [letters of the alphabet], [ideas].  All belong to the supersets of {all books} {all paper} {all cardboard}, etc.<br />
The [ideas] in the set [book] are a subset of the superset {all ideas}.    Attributes can be said to distinguish a subset from the superset or subsets from one another.  The members of set [book 1] cannot also be members of [book 2] etc.  Where is the contradiction?</p>
<p>I really don’t see what you’re getting at.</p>
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		<title>By: Peter Surda</title>
		<link>http://archive.mises.org/14798/supreme-court-prepares-to-chop-down-clear-and-convincing-standard-for-proving-patent-invalidity/comment-page-1/#comment-742382</link>
		<dc:creator>Peter Surda</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 05 Dec 2010 12:09:37 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.mises.org/?p=14798#comment-742382</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Wildberry,

you cannot simultaneously own objects and their attributes. That is a contradiction. Merely reinterpreting the same phenomenon in a different way does not fix the problems.

Are you familiar with a set theory and what disjunct sets mean? Unless the definition of property rights is based on disjunct sets, the definition fails its purpose, because it becomes impossible to determine which actions are legitimate and which are not. IP theorists typically mistakenly assume that introducing IP increases the size of the superset including all property rights. But that&#039;s false. Physical property rights already cover everything. Introducing IP merely creates quasi-random subsets in the already existing superset. As long as these subsets are not empty, they only include elements which are already members of the superset, thereby creating a non-empty intersection. The intersection is equivalent to a contradiction in the theory explaining the phenomena.

Interpreting the sets in a different manner (= using different attributes) does not change the amount of their members or the existence of intersections. The intersections (= contradictions in the theory) are the problem.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Wildberry,</p>
<p>you cannot simultaneously own objects and their attributes. That is a contradiction. Merely reinterpreting the same phenomenon in a different way does not fix the problems.</p>
<p>Are you familiar with a set theory and what disjunct sets mean? Unless the definition of property rights is based on disjunct sets, the definition fails its purpose, because it becomes impossible to determine which actions are legitimate and which are not. IP theorists typically mistakenly assume that introducing IP increases the size of the superset including all property rights. But that&#8217;s false. Physical property rights already cover everything. Introducing IP merely creates quasi-random subsets in the already existing superset. As long as these subsets are not empty, they only include elements which are already members of the superset, thereby creating a non-empty intersection. The intersection is equivalent to a contradiction in the theory explaining the phenomena.</p>
<p>Interpreting the sets in a different manner (= using different attributes) does not change the amount of their members or the existence of intersections. The intersections (= contradictions in the theory) are the problem.</p>
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		<title>By: Peter</title>
		<link>http://archive.mises.org/14798/supreme-court-prepares-to-chop-down-clear-and-convincing-standard-for-proving-patent-invalidity/comment-page-1/#comment-742367</link>
		<dc:creator>Peter</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 05 Dec 2010 09:54:16 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.mises.org/?p=14798#comment-742367</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Do you read xkcd?  http://xkcd.com/827/]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Do you read xkcd?  <a href="http://xkcd.com/827/" rel="nofollow">http://xkcd.com/827/</a></p>
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		<title>By: Anthony</title>
		<link>http://archive.mises.org/14798/supreme-court-prepares-to-chop-down-clear-and-convincing-standard-for-proving-patent-invalidity/comment-page-1/#comment-742344</link>
		<dc:creator>Anthony</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 05 Dec 2010 05:00:17 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.mises.org/?p=14798#comment-742344</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[And you maintain that one can own &quot;attributes&quot;?]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>And you maintain that one can own &#8220;attributes&#8221;?</p>
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		<title>By: Peter Surda</title>
		<link>http://archive.mises.org/14798/supreme-court-prepares-to-chop-down-clear-and-convincing-standard-for-proving-patent-invalidity/comment-page-1/#comment-742196</link>
		<dc:creator>Peter Surda</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 04 Dec 2010 09:41:30 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.mises.org/?p=14798#comment-742196</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Andras,

you seem to be so extensively biases that you ignore elementary logic. The problem is not whether I can &quot;see beyond the physical&quot;. The problem is &lt;b&gt;you contradicting yourself&lt;/b&gt;. Do you understand what a contradiction is?]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Andras,</p>
<p>you seem to be so extensively biases that you ignore elementary logic. The problem is not whether I can &#8220;see beyond the physical&#8221;. The problem is <b>you contradicting yourself</b>. Do you understand what a contradiction is?</p>
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		<title>By: Andras</title>
		<link>http://archive.mises.org/14798/supreme-court-prepares-to-chop-down-clear-and-convincing-standard-for-proving-patent-invalidity/comment-page-1/#comment-742121</link>
		<dc:creator>Andras</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 03 Dec 2010 22:40:07 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.mises.org/?p=14798#comment-742121</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Have you considered that roundness has not enough novelty (and progressive practicality) to deserve IP? But a chemical, never seen before and able to cure an orphan disease, I think its structure is worthy of IP.
Conflict between physical and IP is not an argument against the latter.
You just can not see beyond physical. Stay at physical then. Even if you own your car you are still not antitle to do whatever you want thus your ownership is limited. Comprehend also rent, lease and other similar possibilities.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Have you considered that roundness has not enough novelty (and progressive practicality) to deserve IP? But a chemical, never seen before and able to cure an orphan disease, I think its structure is worthy of IP.<br />
Conflict between physical and IP is not an argument against the latter.<br />
You just can not see beyond physical. Stay at physical then. Even if you own your car you are still not antitle to do whatever you want thus your ownership is limited. Comprehend also rent, lease and other similar possibilities.</p>
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		<title>By: Wildberry</title>
		<link>http://archive.mises.org/14798/supreme-court-prepares-to-chop-down-clear-and-convincing-standard-for-proving-patent-invalidity/comment-page-1/#comment-742068</link>
		<dc:creator>Wildberry</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 03 Dec 2010 18:14:31 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.mises.org/?p=14798#comment-742068</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Peter,

“My point is that you cannot have a model that simultaneously uses objects and attributes as a decision criterion, since they cover the same scope. They are a different way of interpreting the same scope. If you try to use both as a decision criterion, you would end up with a contradictory requirement (= double counting).”

Let’s explore that, including your response to Andras where you use the example of a “wheel” and “roundness”.

Objects may have more than one attribute.  To distinquish them is not the same as “double counting” because the wheel has “roundness” and “hardness” “thickness” and “diameter” etc.  All of these attributes are an integral part of “wheel”.

You could define a wheel by listing these various attributes, or you could simply point to a wheel and say “There! That’s one”.  To do so is not double counting, or asserting that the wheel you point to is one wheel, and the list of attributes is another wheel, and so we have two wheels.  Objects have attributes.  Because we can see them, touch them, and otherwise conceptualize them, we can distinguish them from the background.

If we had never encountered a wheel or a table, but only had the list of attributes, and we were in a room with a wheel and a table, that list would allow us to say “this is a wheel”.  

IP is like that.  It is an object to which we assign certain attributes.  One such attribute may or may not be “property”.  An object may (and probably does) have ideas integrated into it.  Unless the wheel we are discussing was a naturally occurring object, like a mountain, it has its origin in a production process.  This process necessarily involved ideas, as well as labor, tools, and raw material.  For example, the idea of “roundness” is integrated into the process, and therefore is an attribute of the object thus produced, i.e. the wheel.

The scope of “wheel” is equal to all of the attributes we can conceptualize, plus the ones we can’t.  Just because we don’t conceptualize them, doesn’t mean they don’t exist.  One person&#039;s list of attributes may not include a “rigid matrix of crystallized  minerals originating from igneous rock”, but that would not mean that attribute doesn’t exist.  On the other hand, this attribute may not be necessary for our purpose of distinguishing a wheel from a table.  

So, the scope of attributes we select are a subset of all that exist, and sufficient to serve the intended purpose. Such a scope would be comprised of both the object itself, and the list of attributes we construct to distinguish it from other objects.  The attributes are representations of something, while the object is the thing itself, which has these attributes.  Language is required to convey attributes, while no language is required to distinguish an actual object.  One is a symbolic representation, and the other is the thing itself.  There is no contradiction here.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Peter,</p>
<p>“My point is that you cannot have a model that simultaneously uses objects and attributes as a decision criterion, since they cover the same scope. They are a different way of interpreting the same scope. If you try to use both as a decision criterion, you would end up with a contradictory requirement (= double counting).”</p>
<p>Let’s explore that, including your response to Andras where you use the example of a “wheel” and “roundness”.</p>
<p>Objects may have more than one attribute.  To distinquish them is not the same as “double counting” because the wheel has “roundness” and “hardness” “thickness” and “diameter” etc.  All of these attributes are an integral part of “wheel”.</p>
<p>You could define a wheel by listing these various attributes, or you could simply point to a wheel and say “There! That’s one”.  To do so is not double counting, or asserting that the wheel you point to is one wheel, and the list of attributes is another wheel, and so we have two wheels.  Objects have attributes.  Because we can see them, touch them, and otherwise conceptualize them, we can distinguish them from the background.</p>
<p>If we had never encountered a wheel or a table, but only had the list of attributes, and we were in a room with a wheel and a table, that list would allow us to say “this is a wheel”.  </p>
<p>IP is like that.  It is an object to which we assign certain attributes.  One such attribute may or may not be “property”.  An object may (and probably does) have ideas integrated into it.  Unless the wheel we are discussing was a naturally occurring object, like a mountain, it has its origin in a production process.  This process necessarily involved ideas, as well as labor, tools, and raw material.  For example, the idea of “roundness” is integrated into the process, and therefore is an attribute of the object thus produced, i.e. the wheel.</p>
<p>The scope of “wheel” is equal to all of the attributes we can conceptualize, plus the ones we can’t.  Just because we don’t conceptualize them, doesn’t mean they don’t exist.  One person&#8217;s list of attributes may not include a “rigid matrix of crystallized  minerals originating from igneous rock”, but that would not mean that attribute doesn’t exist.  On the other hand, this attribute may not be necessary for our purpose of distinguishing a wheel from a table.  </p>
<p>So, the scope of attributes we select are a subset of all that exist, and sufficient to serve the intended purpose. Such a scope would be comprised of both the object itself, and the list of attributes we construct to distinguish it from other objects.  The attributes are representations of something, while the object is the thing itself, which has these attributes.  Language is required to convey attributes, while no language is required to distinguish an actual object.  One is a symbolic representation, and the other is the thing itself.  There is no contradiction here.</p>
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		<title>By: Peter Surda</title>
		<link>http://archive.mises.org/14798/supreme-court-prepares-to-chop-down-clear-and-convincing-standard-for-proving-patent-invalidity/comment-page-1/#comment-741991</link>
		<dc:creator>Peter Surda</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 03 Dec 2010 09:29:18 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.mises.org/?p=14798#comment-741991</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[&lt;blockquote&gt;I said property has attributes. IF that “thing” we are generalizing (for the moment) as “IP” is in fact property, under any theory or property, THEN, it has attributes in common with other property.&lt;/blockquote&gt;
While this is correct, it misses my point. My point is that you cannot have a model that simultaneously uses objects and attributes as a decision criterion, since they cover the same scope. They are a different way of interpreting the same scope. If you try to use both as a decision criterion, you would end up with a contradictory requirement (= double counting).]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote><p>I said property has attributes. IF that “thing” we are generalizing (for the moment) as “IP” is in fact property, under any theory or property, THEN, it has attributes in common with other property.</p></blockquote>
<p>While this is correct, it misses my point. My point is that you cannot have a model that simultaneously uses objects and attributes as a decision criterion, since they cover the same scope. They are a different way of interpreting the same scope. If you try to use both as a decision criterion, you would end up with a contradictory requirement (= double counting).</p>
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		<title>By: Peter Surda</title>
		<link>http://archive.mises.org/14798/supreme-court-prepares-to-chop-down-clear-and-convincing-standard-for-proving-patent-invalidity/comment-page-1/#comment-741879</link>
		<dc:creator>Peter Surda</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 02 Dec 2010 20:10:48 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.mises.org/?p=14798#comment-741879</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Andras,

apparently you completely miss the point of my argument. IP is an attribute of physical property, rather than a separate existence. If it had a separate existence, there would be no IP debate. If you have physical property, you cannot at the same time have IP. If a person can own a wheel, another person cannot own &quot;roundness&quot;. The approaches are mutually exclusive, they interpret the same scope using different decision criteria. As long as people insist on IP, they will come into conflict with people who insist on physical property.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Andras,</p>
<p>apparently you completely miss the point of my argument. IP is an attribute of physical property, rather than a separate existence. If it had a separate existence, there would be no IP debate. If you have physical property, you cannot at the same time have IP. If a person can own a wheel, another person cannot own &#8220;roundness&#8221;. The approaches are mutually exclusive, they interpret the same scope using different decision criteria. As long as people insist on IP, they will come into conflict with people who insist on physical property.</p>
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		<title>By: Wildberry</title>
		<link>http://archive.mises.org/14798/supreme-court-prepares-to-chop-down-clear-and-convincing-standard-for-proving-patent-invalidity/comment-page-1/#comment-741858</link>
		<dc:creator>Wildberry</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 02 Dec 2010 18:49:44 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.mises.org/?p=14798#comment-741858</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Peter,
“Here’s your problem. IP does not have attributes, IP is attributes. IP is the shape, colour, sound, or in general, the meaning of things.”

Don’t get ahead of the argument.  I said property has attributes.  IF that “thing” we are generalizing (for the moment) as “IP” is in fact property, under any theory or property, THEN, it has attributes in common with other property.

What is property?  It is a word which conveys a set of rights, which are enforceable by some means.  To not enforce a right is to not have it.  It also implies that it has the attribute of being capable of ownership.  (Property; 1.c.  Something tangible or intangible to which its owner has legal title. 2. The right of ownership, title.  American Heritage Dictionary)

“What does it mean “misappropriate market value?  What is “income from trade”? Why should it flow to someone who is not a party to the trade?”

This has the meaning of simple language.  If I trade on property that that I don’t own, the income from that trade has been misappropriated from its rightful owner.  This is not unique to an IP context.  It applies equally to fencing stolen goods and to insider trading, where the only “good” is actual information, which is completely intangible. “Misappropriation” is just a legal term of art which conveys the nature of the injustice and supports a theory of retribution.

“This is a metaphorical interpretation. Ideas are not a complement to physical assets, they are another way of interpreting the same. That’s why the argument fails: it requires double-counting of reality.”

I’m really not sure what you are saying here.  
I don’t know that ideas are not a complement to ALL physical assets, with the possible exception of naturally occurring things, like land and minerals, etc.  Even there, once we create a boundary, ideas become a complement.  Certainly they are a complement (I prefer the word component) to manufactured goods.  The “how” of manufacturing is ideal, not tangible. It only becomes tangible when one actually assembles the machinery, the resources, and manifest these ideas in some tangible good.  In this way, the ideas are a “component” of the tangible good, since it would not exist, and further, could not be owned, without them.

On the other hand, tangible goods are not composed entirely of ideas.  In any case “pure” ideas are excluded in all theories of IP law.  Pure ideas are in the public domain, just like the alphabet is.

How is this a double-counting of reality?  If I count the letters in a book, and the letters in the alphabet, am I double counting?

“I’m sorry I haven’t responded to your other posts yet, I have a terrible backlog.”

No worries.  I am gratified that you are willing to continue the dialogue.  I will continue to monitor for your inputs.
Regards,]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Peter,<br />
“Here’s your problem. IP does not have attributes, IP is attributes. IP is the shape, colour, sound, or in general, the meaning of things.”</p>
<p>Don’t get ahead of the argument.  I said property has attributes.  IF that “thing” we are generalizing (for the moment) as “IP” is in fact property, under any theory or property, THEN, it has attributes in common with other property.</p>
<p>What is property?  It is a word which conveys a set of rights, which are enforceable by some means.  To not enforce a right is to not have it.  It also implies that it has the attribute of being capable of ownership.  (Property; 1.c.  Something tangible or intangible to which its owner has legal title. 2. The right of ownership, title.  American Heritage Dictionary)</p>
<p>“What does it mean “misappropriate market value?  What is “income from trade”? Why should it flow to someone who is not a party to the trade?”</p>
<p>This has the meaning of simple language.  If I trade on property that that I don’t own, the income from that trade has been misappropriated from its rightful owner.  This is not unique to an IP context.  It applies equally to fencing stolen goods and to insider trading, where the only “good” is actual information, which is completely intangible. “Misappropriation” is just a legal term of art which conveys the nature of the injustice and supports a theory of retribution.</p>
<p>“This is a metaphorical interpretation. Ideas are not a complement to physical assets, they are another way of interpreting the same. That’s why the argument fails: it requires double-counting of reality.”</p>
<p>I’m really not sure what you are saying here.<br />
I don’t know that ideas are not a complement to ALL physical assets, with the possible exception of naturally occurring things, like land and minerals, etc.  Even there, once we create a boundary, ideas become a complement.  Certainly they are a complement (I prefer the word component) to manufactured goods.  The “how” of manufacturing is ideal, not tangible. It only becomes tangible when one actually assembles the machinery, the resources, and manifest these ideas in some tangible good.  In this way, the ideas are a “component” of the tangible good, since it would not exist, and further, could not be owned, without them.</p>
<p>On the other hand, tangible goods are not composed entirely of ideas.  In any case “pure” ideas are excluded in all theories of IP law.  Pure ideas are in the public domain, just like the alphabet is.</p>
<p>How is this a double-counting of reality?  If I count the letters in a book, and the letters in the alphabet, am I double counting?</p>
<p>“I’m sorry I haven’t responded to your other posts yet, I have a terrible backlog.”</p>
<p>No worries.  I am gratified that you are willing to continue the dialogue.  I will continue to monitor for your inputs.<br />
Regards,</p>
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		<title>By: Andras</title>
		<link>http://archive.mises.org/14798/supreme-court-prepares-to-chop-down-clear-and-convincing-standard-for-proving-patent-invalidity/comment-page-1/#comment-741809</link>
		<dc:creator>Andras</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 02 Dec 2010 17:06:47 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.mises.org/?p=14798#comment-741809</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Peter,
We have no IP conflict, we wouldn&#039;t discuss it if we had. My whole point is that I try to prevent to have IP conflicts by showing them that they are wrong.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Peter,<br />
We have no IP conflict, we wouldn&#8217;t discuss it if we had. My whole point is that I try to prevent to have IP conflicts by showing them that they are wrong.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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	<item>
		<title>By: Peter Surda</title>
		<link>http://archive.mises.org/14798/supreme-court-prepares-to-chop-down-clear-and-convincing-standard-for-proving-patent-invalidity/comment-page-1/#comment-741708</link>
		<dc:creator>Peter Surda</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 02 Dec 2010 13:01:43 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.mises.org/?p=14798#comment-741708</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[&lt;blockquote&gt;All property seems to have some attributes in common. ... If IP was in fact “property”, it would also have these attributes.&lt;/blockquote&gt;
Here&#039;s your problem. IP does not &lt;b&gt;have&lt;/b&gt; attributes, IP &lt;b&gt;is&lt;/b&gt; attributes. IP is the shape, colour, sound, or in general, &lt;b&gt;the meaning&lt;/b&gt; of things.

I would argue that the dispute, which is indeed over real things, like money, is a dispute over misappropriated market value; for example an income from trade is not flowing to the person who owns the means of production, and has better title to the traded good.
What does it mean &quot;misappropriate market value&quot;? What is &quot;income from trade&quot;? Why should it flow to someone who is not a party to the trade?

&lt;blockquote&gt;This means of production is composed of several things, one of which may be a set of ideas, most of which are already in the public domain.&lt;/blockquote&gt;
This is a metaphorical interpretation. Ideas are not a complement to physical assets, they are another way of interpreting the same. That&#039;s why the argument fails: it requires double-counting of reality.

I&#039;m sorry I haven&#039;t responded to your other posts yet, I have a terrible backlog.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote><p>All property seems to have some attributes in common. &#8230; If IP was in fact “property”, it would also have these attributes.</p></blockquote>
<p>Here&#8217;s your problem. IP does not <b>have</b> attributes, IP <b>is</b> attributes. IP is the shape, colour, sound, or in general, <b>the meaning</b> of things.</p>
<p>I would argue that the dispute, which is indeed over real things, like money, is a dispute over misappropriated market value; for example an income from trade is not flowing to the person who owns the means of production, and has better title to the traded good.<br />
What does it mean &#8220;misappropriate market value&#8221;? What is &#8220;income from trade&#8221;? Why should it flow to someone who is not a party to the trade?</p>
<blockquote><p>This means of production is composed of several things, one of which may be a set of ideas, most of which are already in the public domain.</p></blockquote>
<p>This is a metaphorical interpretation. Ideas are not a complement to physical assets, they are another way of interpreting the same. That&#8217;s why the argument fails: it requires double-counting of reality.</p>
<p>I&#8217;m sorry I haven&#8217;t responded to your other posts yet, I have a terrible backlog.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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	<item>
		<title>By: Peter Surda</title>
		<link>http://archive.mises.org/14798/supreme-court-prepares-to-chop-down-clear-and-convincing-standard-for-proving-patent-invalidity/comment-page-1/#comment-741692</link>
		<dc:creator>Peter Surda</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 02 Dec 2010 11:39:49 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.mises.org/?p=14798#comment-741692</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Andras,

first of all, you demonstrate that if various groups of people have different opinion about boundaries of property rights, an attempt to enforce these rights will result in a violation of rights of at least one of them (i.e. violence). Which is exactly my point.

Your second point is conflating arbitrariness with self contradictions. Those are different issues. Arbitrariness is a question of normative scales. Self-contradiction is a logical issue. To put it into another way, no matter how much you are morally outraged, 1 plus 1 does not become 3.

Altogether, your argument boils down to: we cannot argue, so we&#039;ll fight. But by actually arguing, you contradict yourself.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Andras,</p>
<p>first of all, you demonstrate that if various groups of people have different opinion about boundaries of property rights, an attempt to enforce these rights will result in a violation of rights of at least one of them (i.e. violence). Which is exactly my point.</p>
<p>Your second point is conflating arbitrariness with self contradictions. Those are different issues. Arbitrariness is a question of normative scales. Self-contradiction is a logical issue. To put it into another way, no matter how much you are morally outraged, 1 plus 1 does not become 3.</p>
<p>Altogether, your argument boils down to: we cannot argue, so we&#8217;ll fight. But by actually arguing, you contradict yourself.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>By: Stefan Murry</title>
		<link>http://archive.mises.org/14798/supreme-court-prepares-to-chop-down-clear-and-convincing-standard-for-proving-patent-invalidity/comment-page-1/#comment-741644</link>
		<dc:creator>Stefan Murry</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 02 Dec 2010 03:43:13 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.mises.org/?p=14798#comment-741644</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Anthony,

My comment about &quot;the law of the land&quot; is aimed at Eric&#039;s first comment about the patent being &quot;stupid&quot;.  The point I am making is that under a system that rewards monopoly powers to individuals who manage to squeak &quot;inventions&quot; of dubious value through an overburdened and under-resourced bureaucracy, it would be stupid NOT to file patents on everything you could possibly think might have a prayer of getting past an examiner.  I am not defending the law by pointing out that it is, in fact, the law, but I am attacking the premise that under this system a patent such as the one that Eric thinks is &quot;stupid&quot; is actually not stuipd at all.

As to your question whether you are interpreting my argument correctly, essentially &quot;yes.&quot;  We would be mired in many more lawsuits over patent validity than we have today, and many of these would themselves have little merit (as is the case with most other types of lawsuits).  What is needed here is some recognition that merely conceiving an invention should not automatically confer &quot;ownership&quot; of that invention.  The hard work of taking that invention and making something useful (i.e. beneficial to society) out of it must be rewarded.  The threat of endless lawsuits from alleged &quot;inventors&quot; would be a strong deterrent to bringing new innovations to commercial fruition.

Contrary to your assertion, I would argue that a huge tide of lawsuits actually can harm legitimate suits, because they will they be mired in a court system that is now overwhelmed with frivolous cases.

Here are some concrete ideas to flesh out this point.  In all cases, assume that we lowered the bar for proof of patent invalidity, how might we remedy the deterrent to commercializing innovation?

How about instituting a loser-pays system for patent invalitidy suits?  If you sue and successfully prove the patent is invalid, you get damages.  If you lose, you pay damages (or at least the total cost of the suit, including both sides&#039; legal fees).

Or, shift the presumption of validity such that the first company to make commercial use of an invention is presumed to have invented it (unless another inventor makes a credible claim that the idea was misappropriated from him).  Incidentally, the idea here is that merely conceiving of the invention should not be enough to deserve monopoly rights.  Conceiving of an invention AND BRINGING IT TO MARKET is what benefits society and therefore what should be rewarded.

Just a few thoughts.  I am sure there are other ideas out there for reform.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Anthony,</p>
<p>My comment about &#8220;the law of the land&#8221; is aimed at Eric&#8217;s first comment about the patent being &#8220;stupid&#8221;.  The point I am making is that under a system that rewards monopoly powers to individuals who manage to squeak &#8220;inventions&#8221; of dubious value through an overburdened and under-resourced bureaucracy, it would be stupid NOT to file patents on everything you could possibly think might have a prayer of getting past an examiner.  I am not defending the law by pointing out that it is, in fact, the law, but I am attacking the premise that under this system a patent such as the one that Eric thinks is &#8220;stupid&#8221; is actually not stuipd at all.</p>
<p>As to your question whether you are interpreting my argument correctly, essentially &#8220;yes.&#8221;  We would be mired in many more lawsuits over patent validity than we have today, and many of these would themselves have little merit (as is the case with most other types of lawsuits).  What is needed here is some recognition that merely conceiving an invention should not automatically confer &#8220;ownership&#8221; of that invention.  The hard work of taking that invention and making something useful (i.e. beneficial to society) out of it must be rewarded.  The threat of endless lawsuits from alleged &#8220;inventors&#8221; would be a strong deterrent to bringing new innovations to commercial fruition.</p>
<p>Contrary to your assertion, I would argue that a huge tide of lawsuits actually can harm legitimate suits, because they will they be mired in a court system that is now overwhelmed with frivolous cases.</p>
<p>Here are some concrete ideas to flesh out this point.  In all cases, assume that we lowered the bar for proof of patent invalidity, how might we remedy the deterrent to commercializing innovation?</p>
<p>How about instituting a loser-pays system for patent invalitidy suits?  If you sue and successfully prove the patent is invalid, you get damages.  If you lose, you pay damages (or at least the total cost of the suit, including both sides&#8217; legal fees).</p>
<p>Or, shift the presumption of validity such that the first company to make commercial use of an invention is presumed to have invented it (unless another inventor makes a credible claim that the idea was misappropriated from him).  Incidentally, the idea here is that merely conceiving of the invention should not be enough to deserve monopoly rights.  Conceiving of an invention AND BRINGING IT TO MARKET is what benefits society and therefore what should be rewarded.</p>
<p>Just a few thoughts.  I am sure there are other ideas out there for reform.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>By: Andras</title>
		<link>http://archive.mises.org/14798/supreme-court-prepares-to-chop-down-clear-and-convincing-standard-for-proving-patent-invalidity/comment-page-1/#comment-741562</link>
		<dc:creator>Andras</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 01 Dec 2010 20:06:12 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.mises.org/?p=14798#comment-741562</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Of course, I have a homesteading view! I am just saying it is all arbitrary! Whatever &quot;society&quot; decides that will be the law. You can have better laws or worse laws depending upon how well they align with long term objectives. Again, laws of homesteadings are subjective and individuals act accordingly. IP is not different. 
I cannot but agree with Mises.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Of course, I have a homesteading view! I am just saying it is all arbitrary! Whatever &#8220;society&#8221; decides that will be the law. You can have better laws or worse laws depending upon how well they align with long term objectives. Again, laws of homesteadings are subjective and individuals act accordingly. IP is not different.<br />
I cannot but agree with Mises.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>By: Wildberry</title>
		<link>http://archive.mises.org/14798/supreme-court-prepares-to-chop-down-clear-and-convincing-standard-for-proving-patent-invalidity/comment-page-1/#comment-741551</link>
		<dc:creator>Wildberry</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 01 Dec 2010 19:36:35 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.mises.org/?p=14798#comment-741551</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[&quot;But consider what would happen if patent applications were reviewed intelligently. Fewer patents would be awarded, companies would make fewer patent applications, there would be fewer lawsuits, and the government would have to reduce the size of the patent office and the court system.&quot;

I&#039;m with you right up to here.  I loose you on the conspiracy theory, and the conclusion that therefore, there is nothing of value or salvagable in a concept of &quot;property in IP&quot;.  That is quite a leap.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>&#8220;But consider what would happen if patent applications were reviewed intelligently. Fewer patents would be awarded, companies would make fewer patent applications, there would be fewer lawsuits, and the government would have to reduce the size of the patent office and the court system.&#8221;</p>
<p>I&#8217;m with you right up to here.  I loose you on the conspiracy theory, and the conclusion that therefore, there is nothing of value or salvagable in a concept of &#8220;property in IP&#8221;.  That is quite a leap.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>By: Wildberry</title>
		<link>http://archive.mises.org/14798/supreme-court-prepares-to-chop-down-clear-and-convincing-standard-for-proving-patent-invalidity/comment-page-1/#comment-741549</link>
		<dc:creator>Wildberry</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 01 Dec 2010 19:32:24 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.mises.org/?p=14798#comment-741549</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[despite a *lack of a* showing that a homesteading act has occurred at the outset.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>despite a *lack of a* showing that a homesteading act has occurred at the outset.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>By: Wildberry</title>
		<link>http://archive.mises.org/14798/supreme-court-prepares-to-chop-down-clear-and-convincing-standard-for-proving-patent-invalidity/comment-page-1/#comment-741545</link>
		<dc:creator>Wildberry</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 01 Dec 2010 19:23:59 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.mises.org/?p=14798#comment-741545</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Stephan, “So if there is civilized society and they want to settle disputes in a civilized way, then in some forum or legal system we would ask: who owns this resource? Who has the better claim to it?”

I agree.  Property entails rights in relation to something you own. Disputes are non-violently resolved by a methodology that produces a finding of “better title”.  

Land is one type of property, and the nature of land (can’t be copied”) has an impact on the methodologies of resolving disputes about ownership.  Chattel is handled differently, as you point out.All property rights are acquired ultimately by claiming and defending your “better title”.  Once proved, one has “good title” to it.  As you point out, there is no better title than homesteading, or being a bonafide purchaser from someone who did.  However, I would argue that homesteading alone is insufficient, since title is in fact indisputably owned despite a lack of showing that a homesteading act has occurred at the outset.

All property seems to have some attributes in common.  I like Nock’s concept (is this his?) that property has a “use value” and an “economic rent value”.  If IP was in fact “property”, it would also have these attributes.  Ownership implies a monopoly in the enjoyment of these values. 

Without going into all of the details about what attributes must be proven to acquire title to IP rights, once acquired, you enjoy the right to exclude others from using the “property value” which you legitimately own.

All property rights impact the range of freedom others have in the use of their own property.  I recently discussed this in terms of “my bat” and “your car”.  If I use my bat in ways that damage your car, you have a right to retribution for the damage I caused.  Hopefully, this right to retribution will have a deterrence effect on your calculations concerning your freedom to use your property in any way you wish.  What’s wrong with that?  It seems to have the quality of avoiding conflict.

“Now, the thing is that when someone claims ownership of a given pattern or logos or idea they are never just satisfied to say this. They want to enforce this claim against real things–other people’s bodies, property, money, and so on.”

Is there something wrong with this, in light of my understanding above?

I would argue that the dispute, which is indeed over real things, like money, is a dispute over misappropriated market value; for example an income from trade is not flowing to the person who owns the means of production, and has better title to the traded good.

This means of production is composed of several things, one of which may be a set of ideas, most of which are already in the public domain.  But these “free good” ideas are insufficient to prove that a copier has better title than the author or original producer.  

In a common-sense way, it takes more than an idea to produce something, especially something unique.  Likewise, it takes more than letters of an alphabet, which are in the public domain, to author a book. 

Don’t you agree?]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Stephan, “So if there is civilized society and they want to settle disputes in a civilized way, then in some forum or legal system we would ask: who owns this resource? Who has the better claim to it?”</p>
<p>I agree.  Property entails rights in relation to something you own. Disputes are non-violently resolved by a methodology that produces a finding of “better title”.  </p>
<p>Land is one type of property, and the nature of land (can’t be copied”) has an impact on the methodologies of resolving disputes about ownership.  Chattel is handled differently, as you point out.All property rights are acquired ultimately by claiming and defending your “better title”.  Once proved, one has “good title” to it.  As you point out, there is no better title than homesteading, or being a bonafide purchaser from someone who did.  However, I would argue that homesteading alone is insufficient, since title is in fact indisputably owned despite a lack of showing that a homesteading act has occurred at the outset.</p>
<p>All property seems to have some attributes in common.  I like Nock’s concept (is this his?) that property has a “use value” and an “economic rent value”.  If IP was in fact “property”, it would also have these attributes.  Ownership implies a monopoly in the enjoyment of these values. </p>
<p>Without going into all of the details about what attributes must be proven to acquire title to IP rights, once acquired, you enjoy the right to exclude others from using the “property value” which you legitimately own.</p>
<p>All property rights impact the range of freedom others have in the use of their own property.  I recently discussed this in terms of “my bat” and “your car”.  If I use my bat in ways that damage your car, you have a right to retribution for the damage I caused.  Hopefully, this right to retribution will have a deterrence effect on your calculations concerning your freedom to use your property in any way you wish.  What’s wrong with that?  It seems to have the quality of avoiding conflict.</p>
<p>“Now, the thing is that when someone claims ownership of a given pattern or logos or idea they are never just satisfied to say this. They want to enforce this claim against real things–other people’s bodies, property, money, and so on.”</p>
<p>Is there something wrong with this, in light of my understanding above?</p>
<p>I would argue that the dispute, which is indeed over real things, like money, is a dispute over misappropriated market value; for example an income from trade is not flowing to the person who owns the means of production, and has better title to the traded good.</p>
<p>This means of production is composed of several things, one of which may be a set of ideas, most of which are already in the public domain.  But these “free good” ideas are insufficient to prove that a copier has better title than the author or original producer.  </p>
<p>In a common-sense way, it takes more than an idea to produce something, especially something unique.  Likewise, it takes more than letters of an alphabet, which are in the public domain, to author a book. </p>
<p>Don’t you agree?</p>
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