A man who is obliged to justify his handling of a matter in the eyes of other people often resorts to a pretext. As the motive of his deviation from the most suitable way of procedure he ascribes another reason than that which actually prompted him. FULL ARTICLE by Ludwig von Mises
Source link: http://archive.mises.org/14661/rationalization-in-politics-and-life/
Rationalization in Politics and Life
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“It is quite another thing with rationalization developed for the benefit of social groups. That can thrive luxuriantly because it encounters no criticism from the members of the group and because the criticism of outsiders is dismissed as obviously biased. One of the main tasks of historical analysis is to study the various manifestations of rationalization in all fields of political ideologies.”
This goes a long way towards explaining why, in my mind, there is such a parallel between the behavior of religious fanatics, and that of anarchists. Both believe in a singular, objective truth.
One says “The Bible is the word of God”, and then proceeds to rationalize everything to that one, objective truth that they hold to be self-evident.
The other says “The State is incompatible with Liberty”, and then proceeds to rationalize everything to that one, objective truth that they hold to be self-evident.
On this single, objective point of distinction, all arguments and all people can be categorized as either “for” or “against”.
One definition of an “effective majority” might be cast as “a society who holds in common a rationale for cooperation such that this rationale is sufficiently inclusive to form a majority from its members.”
The corollary is an “ineffective minority” which would be “a society who holds in common a rationale for cooperation such that this rationale is insufficiently inclusive to form a majority from its members.”
Anarchy and religious fanaticism, as a means of forming an effective majority, produces only an ineffective minority. Always has been, always will.
“in my mind, there is such a parallel between the behavior of religious fanatics, and that of anarchists. Both believe in a singular, objective truth.”
Wildberry, are you sure that what you object to is the belief in a singular objective truth? You appear to be critical of those who believe they possess that truth, rather than whether it exists. Science has been helpfully guided by its search for that truth, while recognizing that it will only be better approximated.
On the other hand, if in fact you deny the existence of such a truth, can you state why?
Allen,
Yes, I’m sure that what I object to is the notion that a singular objective truth is sufficient to organize a society, even one comprised of only two people. Several objective “truths” strung together in a cohesive structure fares no better, in absolute terms.
Empirical science is not the same thing as social “science”.
I do not deny of the existence of objective truth, which can be shared and verified by a large number of individuals, but I think it exists in relation to subjective truth, which is a precondition for human action, which occurs only by individual, human actors. Subjective evaluations concerning the application of means of production for their suitability and probability for success in achieving a desired goal must rationally precede human action.
Another example is homicide. The fact that a human being has been killed by another human being is a matter of objective truth. Murder in the first degree, second degree, voluntary manslaughter, involuntary manslaughter, justifiable homicide, crimes of passion, and executions are all examples of homicide as a subjective truth.
I am critical of the tendency, all too common on this site, to attempt to sideline those who hold less absolute view of the primacy of objective truth, and generalize that difference to make ad hominem attacks on “opponents”. Sometimes the attacks are vicious. That is because for the attacker, the “wrongness” of the ideas and therefore the “wrongness” of the person asserting them are self-evident. Very few things in the natural world are self evident, in proportion to the totality of human experience. That experience cannot be reduced to a set of objective truths sufficient for all a society to cooperate with others. In fact, society can be defined as bounded by the other humans you choose to cooperate with, based on common goals. Anarchists cooperate with each other (i.e. they are a society) for a common goal (elimination of the State), but their own view “luxuriate” within their own social boundaries, while repelling anyone that does not “buy the entire menu” of anarchist thought.
Cooperation among humans requires subjective, mutual determination of common goals, and the how the distribution of the products of that cooperation will be distributed. Although it may be possible to construct a set of objective “truth” as a framework to explain alternative organizing principles for social cooperation, it is by definition inadequate, as evidenced by the views expressed on this site, as well as the totality of human evolution; that his the “natural state” of anarchy begins go break down with the birth of a child, since mother-child must cooperate to survive. Life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness are subjective truths.
The fact that anarchists can conjure up an “alternative universe” by departing from the Crusoe device as the primary social unit and postulating a set of objective “laws”, like “first occupancy of unclaimed tangible resources” defines “ownership rights to property” is not sufficient in relation to praxeology, history, or the nature of the human experience.
However, at this point in the discussion, I must acknowledge your sensible and respectful reply.
Thank you.
Wildberry, I concur that a singular objective truth is insufficient to organize a society, but that does not refute the idea that it is a useful guide. (In science the aim of getting closer to the truth is not in itself sufficient to succeed, but is nonetheless an aid along the way.) When you write ‘the fact that there has been a murder is a matter of objective truth’ you appear to agree that there is such a thing, which is what I thought you were denying.
Surely we agree that the search for truth is not aided by ad hominem attacks, but one can believe in the existence of a singular objective truth, while acknowledging how far we are from knowing it. Conversely, people can claim that there is no such thing as truth, while engaging in personal attacks (as though they knew it were absolutely true that everyone else was mistaken, while their attacks were absolutely justified).
When you note that it is inadequate to provide objective truth to organize the principles for social cooperation, you are objecting to presuming we possess that truth, rather than employing it as a sought ideal. (As an aside, when anarchists claim they possess objective truth, they should be challenged to state their undeniable premises, and logically deduce their conclusions.)
So again, you do not appear to be rejecting the value of having a singular objective truth as a guide, but rather the practice where one believes he has it, and his method of debate.
Finally, as we discuss whether or not there is a singular objective truth, aren’t we acknowledging that searching for the answer is advisable, rather than presupposing that no view is better than any other?
yes, I agree it is desirable. We cooperate with those whose objective and subjective judgments about “truth” align. Certainly as one actor, there are some that are better than others.
Wildberry,
you appear to be analysing the anarchocapitalist position from a normative point of view. I would like to kindly point out that that is not a necessary component of the criticism of statism. There are praxeological issues with the minarchist position: it is based on a self-contradiction.
The definition of state that anarchocapitalists tend to use is “territorial monopoly on the initiation of force”. Now, whether you consider a state legitimate or not, and whether you agree with the economic calculation argument or not, the minarchist position is incompatible with that definition.
- if you consider a monopoly to be illegitimate, then you need to abandon the minarchist position in favour of anarchocapitalism
- if you consider a monopoly to be legitimate, then there is no reason why minarchy should be more legitimate than socialism
- if you consider the economic calculation argument correct, then you need to abandon the minarchist position in favour of anarchocapitalism
- if you consider the economic calculation argument incorrect, then there is no reason why minarchy should be more efficient than socialism
- last but not least, if no organisation has a territorial monopoly on the initiation of force, then you have anarchy
Summary: the minarchist position is praxeologically indefensible. It is only possible to defend minarchism if you abandon praxeology and assume that people have very specific systematic mental deficiencies, by which they are only able to accurately interpret and satisfy other people’s needs without the initiation of force if they actually have the capability to initiate force. Now, that looks like an utopian premise to me.
Peter and Allen,
Thank you for your civil and thoughtful response.
Peter said, “You appear to be analyzing the anarchocapitalist position from a normative point of view.”
If you mean that my premise is that “There ought to be a state”, no. But at the same time, it appears that you are stating that there “ought not be a state” based on your logical constructs regarding the state, because of what you call a “self-contradiction”. You evoke praxeology and the economic calculation in defense of that position.
Let me use your logic, which is quite sound, to demonstrate. (I am not a scholar of Aristotle, but I seem to recall something about how Truth can be derived from a single, true premise, provided the logic is sound, through the process of deduction.) However, you cannot just “assume in” the truth part. Allow me to explain.
Your logic goes like this:
You define the state as possessing “territorial monopoly on the initiation of force.”
From that we might infer that “territory” means sovereign boundaries, that “monopoly” means “absolute monopoly to the exclusion of other actors” and that the exercise of that monopoly is in the “initiation” of force. We may infer you are focusing on the aspect of force initiation which applies to individuals within the “territory” of the sovereign, i.e. upon the State’s own citizens.
It is only if we accept those assumptions that we can progress logically from your premise as follows:
Since monopolies prevent free markets from engaging in economic calculation, and since economic calculation is a requirement for “free markets” as defined by Austrian economic theory, then States are antithetical to free markets.
If we assume people are rational, as is required in the application of praxeology, then one who supports both a concept of “state” and one of “free markets” must be irrational.
Put in normative terms, because a “free market” is a normative objective that you and I share (i.e. they “should be” “free” from “State intervention”), then the elimination of the state is the only conclusion consistent with that objective. To conclude otherwise is irrational.
I hope you consider this a fair representation of the Ancap position. You summarized your own logical conclusions as follows:
“Summary: the minarchist position is praxeologically indefensible. It is only possible to defend minarchism if you abandon praxeology and assume that people have very specific systematic mental deficiencies, by which they are only able to accurately interpret and satisfy other people’s needs without the initiation of force if they actually have the capability to initiate force. Now, that looks like an utopian premise to me.”
It is praxeologically indefensible because to not argue for the elimination of the state is irrational, because it is irrational to believe you can only engage in economic calculation if you also believe you have the right to initiate force, even if you agree not to use it. I presume you mean by this that one must have a right to enforce a monopoly in order to engage in a free market, which is of course absurd.
Now it would be loads of fun to take each of your deductions and show how they are false in and of themselves, but according to the rules of logic and deductive reasoning, I only have to show that your initial premise is false.
Please allow me to offer the following:
- A state has a territorial monopoly on the initiation of force.
- The United States is a State.
- The “territory” of the United States is defined by the sovereign territorial boundaries of the 50 states, and the citizens who live within that territory.
- Murder within the Unites States territory is an initiation of force, because if not done in retribution for prior aggression. (I’m presuming you know the legal distinction of murder v. homicide, and that we may assume it is accomplished by citizens)
- Citizens of the state do initiate force upon other citizens (murder).
- The State does not hold a “monopoly” on the initiation of force.
- Therefore the United States cannot be a state.
Or I could do it this way:
- The United States is a State
- A state has a territorial monopoly on the initiation of force.
- State force directed against a murderer is a form of retribution for a prior force initiated by a citizen against another citizen, on behalf of the victim.
- Retribution is not equal to initiation, and therefore the United States does not initiate force.
- Therefore the United States is not a state.
To hold otherwise in irrational and logically false.
My point is that objective truth (or assertions) are tied to subjective judgments, unless you are talking about pure (i.e. mathematical) logic. This is the essential to the concepts of both economic calculation and praxeology.
Humans act, but they must rationalize first, otherwise any act would be irrational. This rationalization need not be “true”, but merely rational within the context of the actors knowledge and understanding of the real world and the laws of means and causality.
The results of human action are objective data points. Praxeology does not require an analysis of the motive of the actor; all that is required is to acknowledge (or assume) that the act is based on the actor’s rationalizations relative to her perceptions regarding the desirability of an objective and the means to achieve it. Once the act is completed, it becomes objectively distinguishable.
The objective truth of the “act” is derived from the subjective rationalization of the “actor”. They are inseparably connected.
Therefore, praxeology acknowledges that the objective fact from which economic calculation proceeds is inseparably connected to subjective reasoning, not objective logic.
Therefore, objective reasoning alone is not sufficient to explain economic calculation, or any other act of a particular human actor.
Since society may be defined as two or more human actors cooperating in the means to achieve a mutually desired goal, objective truth is not sufficient to define how human actors proceed from any point of logical departure, such as the Crusoe device, to explain the evolution of society, or even further, to create a model for how society “should” evolve.
This is not a proof for statism. This is a rebuttal to the assertion of the Truth of anarchism.
To Allen’s point above, such exchanges are a helpful guide as we define the boundaries of cooperation between human actors, i.e. “evolve society”. One objection I’ve raised to the anarchist view, is that it distinguishes the “for/against” conclusion at such a primary level, that cooperation is foreclosed generally with “non believers”, which is almost everyone else, all things considered. However, this fact is obscured by the “society of mutual support” that has become evident here at LVMI. I object.
Thank you for your attention.
Wildberry,
you are making too many assumptions. You need to go deeper, not farther.
Let us not confuse the situation by the dubious terms, such as “sovereign”. What the definition I provided means is that if the state (whoever it actually might be) violates other people’s property, such an an action is considered legitimate.
Again, there are two options: either it is in fact not legitimate, in that case you need to conclude that anarchy is the appropriate position. Or, you assume that it is legitimate, which essentially means that the state legitimately homesteaded the land, and in that case there is no reason why minarchism should be preferable to socialism.
Yes, this rephrasing is sufficiently accurate. I am glad you consider it absurd. Now you only need to acknowledge that this assumption is a necessary component of the minarchist position.
But such an action is not considered legitimate. Holding a monopoly does not mean that violating is impossible, but that it is illegitimate. It means that force is used to prevent and/or punish people who violate the monopoly.
What you did is that you selected a subset of the actions of the state and conclude that because you do not see an initiation of force by the state, it is not present. The initiation of force in the example you mention is present, you just have not noticed it. The initiation of force would become visible if people other than the state attempted to prosecute and punish the murder perpetrated by a private citizen (e.g. vigilantism, DROs, …). The state considers itself to be the only one who can perform these actions legitimately and proceeds to initiate force against the competitors. If it did not, it would not be a monopoly and therefore not a state. If it was possible to subscribe conflict resolution and security services from other providers without the state regulating the transaction, that would be anarchy. Minarchism requires that you consider the state’s arrogant attitude towards competitors legitimate.
You miss the point. There is no “Truth of anarchism”. Anarchism follows from certain assumptions. The problem with your position is that you have not provided assumptions which lead to the conclusion that minarchism should be preferred. In fact, it looks like you are making the same assumptions as me. But you are also making additional assumptions, of which you are probably not consciously aware, leading you to a self-contradictory position.
Peter, thank you for your thoughtful response.
“Let us not confuse the situation by the dubious terms, such as “sovereign”. What the definition I provided means is that if the state (whoever it actually might be) violates other people’s property, such an action is considered legitimate.”
I am asking “who” this state you are referring to might be? I gave an example of a state which would be hard to deny qualifies as an example. You may give your own example, but if we are talking about the elimination of something called “state”, it must exist to be eliminated. It may exist, for the purposes of discussion, only as a logical construct. However, if we are going to subject this construct to further analysis, then an example is helpful.
It is also helpful to give an example of how this “legitimate” force is applied by the state, and who and why it is considered legitimate. Once you go there, we have arrived at the same dilemma. “Legitimacy” is not required for praxeology to be applied, and the method is only applicable to human actors. You cannot construct a concept of “state” without reducing it to the actions of humans, or by humans acting upon other humans. The legitimacy of their acts are measured by their own calculations.
I believe it could be demonstrated that humans, acting in cooperation to achieve commonly held goals, may choose to exercise their available means to initiate violence. Two reasonable people may have conflicting views concerning whether a given act of force is “initial” or “responsive to a prior act”. This cannot be resolved “objectively”. In any case, it can only be applied to those members of a society which have agreed on a common code of ethics, and by those who agree on both the code, and the means for retribution should that code be violated. In modern society we call these codes “laws”, and “courts” are the means of last resort designed (by “us”) to enforce those codes.
“Again, there are two options: either it is in fact not legitimate, in that case you need to conclude that anarchy is the appropriate position.”
Only if I assume the same logical constructs as you assert, can we arrive at a binary conclusion of “legitimate” or not. I have tried to demonstrate that a reasonable person could rebut the truth of your construct on logical grounds, because your initial premise is full of assumptions. I picked two; “monopoly” and “initiated force”.
“Or, you assume that it is legitimate, which essentially means that the state legitimately homesteaded the land, and in that case there is no reason why minarchism should be preferable to socialism.”
Now you are the one going too far. You have not introduced “state homesteading” into your argument. How did we get to that? I don’t hold that the state can legitimately homestead land, any more than I hold that Obama should be a stake-holder in GM, and then be a party to a public offering of the stock in his company. We can go there if you wish, but I predict we will quickly be treading on Kinsella’s territory regarding how ownership is established in tangible goods. Whole other kettle of fish.
There are reasons why minarchism should be preferable to socialism, but not for the reasons we are discussing here. Socialism controls the means of production. We are discussing the concept of “state monopoly in the initiation of force.” Let’s stick with that for the moment.
*I presume you mean by this that one must have a right to enforce a monopoly in order to engage in a free market, which is of course absurd.*
“Yes, this rephrasing is sufficiently accurate. I am glad you consider it absurd. Now you only need to acknowledge that this assumption is a necessary component of the minarchist position.”
How did you deduce that? The corollary is “You do not need to enforce a monopoly to engage in a free market,” which is not absurd, of course. We have just agreed that such a deduction is not helpful or supportable by logic. Therefore it is not a necessary component of minarchism, anarchism, or anything else. It is nonsense. Perhaps I misunderstand your point?
“But such an action is not considered legitimate. Holding a monopoly does not mean that violating is impossible, but that it is illegitimate. It means that force is used to prevent and/or punish people who violate the monopoly.”
If you are referring to the monopoly to initiate force, I’m not sure I follow. I think you are saying that retribution for a violation of natural rights belong solely to the individual whose rights have been violated. I am presuming that by this you mean that if an individual sought retribution, he would be punished by the state, because the state will enforce a monopoly on retribution. However as I pointed out, retribution is not the same as initiation. You would have to provide an example of where the state initiated violence, not punished someone for seeking retribution. I believe there are such examples, but the treatment of natural rights, their origins, etc. is a different topic, and does not follow from your initial premise.
If you are interested in reviewing a minarchist view on that topic, I saw a very interesting article recently by Kathleen Touchstone here: http://libertarianpapers.org/articles/2010/lp-2-18.pdf. She also argues why the state is necessary to provide protection and why a child murdered by her mother is not protected under anarchism.
“The initiation of force would become visible if people other than the state attempted to prosecute and punish the murder perpetrated by a private citizen (e.g. vigilantism, DROs, …).”
You commit a fallacy by saying “The state considers itself”. The state is not a human, it is comprised of humans. “It” does not rationalize before it acts. What you really mean is that the particular humans of this society have consented to vest the prosecution of crimes to the human-designed institutions where authorized humans may act “legitimately” to prosecute other humans for committing crimes against human victims. This implies that at some point, humans cooperated sufficiently to establish this institution. This is voluntary based on the principle of secession. Although you may not secede from the Union, you may secede from a particular law by participating in the formation of an effective majority to change or eliminate a law. Therefore this may be viewed as an agreement by cooperating humans to act it a particular way. To attribute a human attribute to the “state” is equivalent to attributing a human attribute to the “economy”.
“The state considers itself to be the only one who can perform these actions legitimately and proceeds to initiate force against the competitors. “
Except for the human attribution to the concept of state, this is true, but for the reasons I state above. In any case, it would not be initiation; it would be a response to a prior act.
“Minarchism requires that you consider the state’s arrogant attitude towards competitors legitimate.”
This is a value judgment, not a proof. The “state” does not have an attitude, while humans who act under the authority of the state may exhibit such an attitude. Cooperating humans have agreed that there must be a balance between the protection function of the state, and rights of the individual. They have also agreed that a system of constitutional gurantees and redress of grievance is the means by which “arrogant attitudes” which infringe upon the rights of citizens may also be enforced against such actors by the same state controlled means.
“Anarchism follows from certain assumptions.”
I agree.
“The problem with your position is that you have not provided assumptions which lead to the conclusion that minarchism should be preferred. In fact, it looks like you are making the same assumptions as me.”
I think I agree. I was not attempting to provide assumptions which conclude anything about minarchism. I was merely demonstrating that by making the same assumptions as you, I can arrive at the opposite conclusion.
“But you are also making additional assumptions, of which you are probably not consciously aware, leading you to a self-contradictory position.”
Objective, logical deduction alone is not sufficient to resolve these contradictions. As Allen pointed out, any objective premise is an approximation of something else, and by definition then, must exclude something. We are not always conscious of what we are excluding, but exclude we must.
Anarchists believe in purity, I think. That is utopian thinking, in my humble opinion.
I am enjoying our conversation.
Hi Wildberry,
this is a pleasant surprise compared to a lot of other discussions, it looks like your efforts are genuine. Nevertheless, I still maintain that you are in error.
For the purposes of our debate, this is an irrelevant question. We both agree that states exist. What we disagree upon is whether their existence is in consistence with certain assumptions.
If I was to make my definition more precise in the light of your objection, it would be “state is a group of people with a territorial monopoly on the initiation of force”. That change can hardly be said to make the minarchist position stronger.
I don’t understand.
So you are denying that states have monopoly on the initiation of force as a necessary feature? Then you would be able to do any activity that does not initiate force without the fear that state considers it its prerogative to initiate force against you. That is clearly not the case.
Why is it helpful? It’s irrelevant.
I don’t understand your point. If you reduce the concept of state into the actions of humans, then you must conclude that the existence of states causes some people (we’ll call them “agents of the state”) to violate other people’s rights. How is that an argument that disproves anarchism?
I agree, but I don’t understand what this has to do with the issue in question. It does not follow that any of those requires a territorial monopoly.
What do you mean by “objectively”?
Why are you mixing normative scale into the problem again?
Above, you maintained that only humans act. Now you say that there is a fictional group (“us”) that designed the state.
While this is correct, you have not disproved the logical constructs I presented.
I rebutted your rebuttals. Your rebuttals are a mix of misunderstandings and incorrect logic, and you are mixing normative aspects into the question.
Let’s try that again.
Do you agree that a necessary component of a state is the territorial monopoly on the initiation of force?
This is a simplification of the minarchist argument, it’s not a anarchist argument. If the state’s use of force is legitimate, it means it is consistent with the theory of property rights, i.e. state must have homesteaded its territory.
So then logically state is incompatible with a theory of property rights. If you disagree, then explain how someone can gain property rights without either homesteading or trade.
But they do not follow from the arguments you presented.
Ok, so you seem to roughly understand what I’m talking about.
Minarchism = (roughly) free markets + state
State = monopoly on the initiation of force
Free markets = absence of monopoly and initiation of force
Yes, that’s possible. Maybe if you explained in more detail why you object to my definitions?
States typically have other monopolies besides the one to initiate force. But the one to initiate force is the defining one. Without initiation of force, there are no monopolies, and without any monopolies, there is no state.
No, not necessarily. I only claim that typically, states claim a monopoly on retribution.
Yes. I would like to point out though that the phrase “enforce” means that the state is initiating force.
Yes, this aspect of the example is a different monopoly. However, any monopoly can only be defended by the initiation of force. If the state didn’t initiate force, it would not have any other monopolies (e.g. that on retribution) either.
Punishing people seeking retribution who did not initiate violence is not an initiation of violence?
I briefly read the paper. I think she is mixing normative aspects into the topic, just like you. Certainly it cannot be concluded that if you desire that a service “X” is provided, that a minarchist position is preferable to anarchist one. It would require that people do not want to pay for service “X”, but they want to vote for politicians who force them to pay for “X” and then provide “X”. Just like I said in the previous post, that requires a specific systematic mental deficiency and is incompatible with praxeology.
See above. That line of argumentation only leads further away from minarchism towards anarchism.
This is contradicted by the existence of the government’s monopoly on the initiation of force. If the explanation provided was true, government would not initiate force. Initiation of force and consent are mutually exclusive.
Again we come back to the problem that the state is, in fact, initiating force.
On the contrary. It is the only logical conclusion. There is no value judgement involved. If a group of people use force to exclude competitors from a territory they did not homestead, they are initiating force against them. If they do are not using force to exclude competitors, then they cannot be considered to be a state.
Again: if you consider this construct legitimate, then any action of the state is legitimate and socialism is an equally valid position compared to minarchism.
I believe you minsunderstand the assumptions.
I don’t understand this objection. If you have a collection of assumptions that lead to contradictions, at least one of them is wrong.
My approach is actually different. I am merely investigating whether the theories provided by minarchists are consistent. It is of course possible that given a specific normative scale, minarchism ranks higher on it than anarchism. But that does not fix the logical errors in the theories.
Likewise.
Peter, You have given me a good deal to think about.
May I suggest another article to you? It is by Frank Van Dun concerning Kinsella’s and Block’s views of “libertarian legalism”. The link is http://mises.org/journals/jls/17_3/17_3_4.pdf
My arguments are derived from reductionism, natural law, praxeology, and their relationship to the natural world order. For what it’s worth, you are furthering my education. Thank you.
I will provide a response when I’ve had a chance to digest. Please check back. I have suscribed to the rss feed to this post.
I think I actually read the van Dun paper in the past. I side with Kinsella and Block here. Although I still have issues with some points, van Dun critique attacks the claims from the wrong angle. The part about trademarks is completely wrong, the part about libel mostly wrong, the one about firing I would have to read more carefully to understand. His conclusion is unfounded, the alleged deficiencies of Kinsella’s and Block’s arguments are not actually fixed by his elaborations.
Good Morning Peter,
This is much longer than I intended, but I’m not sure it’s worth it to try to edit it down. Also, I wanted to provide some continuity in our discussion. So with your indulgence, I offer the following:
You said:
“We both agree that states exist. What we disagree upon is whether their existence is in consistence with certain assumptions.
If I was to make my definition more precise in the light of your objection, it would be “state is a group of people with a territorial monopoly on the initiation of force”. That change can hardly be said to make the minarchist position stronger.”
This “precision” merely assumes a state may be defined as being comprised of a “group of people with a territorial monopoly on the initiation of force.”
If you want to define it that way as a axiom upon which you support logic which leads to the conclusion that “anarchy equals freedom equals free markets”, then you have to define which “people”, their relationship to one another, whether it is a “monopoly” in fact, and if the force is only “initiation”. Otherwise it has no more relevance to the real world than stating “A equals B”.
Let me explain: It is very relevant to the purposes of our debate to define the “state”, because, like van Dun, I am asserting that your axiom is not sufficient to define all forms of state, and depending upon how you conceptualize it for the purposes of this debate, your premise of “initiate” is too ambiguous to have meaning sufficient to build a theory of social organization upon it. It is the relationship between the state and the “group of people” who you assert is enforcing a monopoly that is central to the argument. Otherwise, it is simply a circular logic.
If you define the state as “out there”, you are presupposing that the “state” is not associated with the people upon whom this enforcement is directed. If you presuppose that there is a relationship between the “state” and the people subject to this monopoly, then one must inquire as to the nature of that relationship. If one group of humans is acting in relationship to another, praxeology requires that we assign the attribute of rationality to the interaction. If they are not, then praxeology is useless.
If they are not acting in a relationship (at least if that relationship is only defined by the act itself, i.e. “aggressor” and “victim), then you are conceptualizing the state as Attila the Hun, and the subjects of his conquest of “the people”.
If you define the state as “in here”, you are presupposing that the “state” is associated with the people upon whom “it” acts, and the nature of that association is relevant to how each party to this relationship interprets the other’s acts (i.e. “aggression” or “retribution for a prior act”). One could argue that what you call a state is in fact an institutional service provided under contract. A contract granting exclusive rights to perform a service is not a “monopoly” if the parties are free to secede, that is, to cancel or modify the contact.
You are focused on the monopolistic aspect, which is another issue we could discuss. We could argue over whether the example you choose is actually monopolistic or not, but to assume that in without defining the relationship is to merely smuggle the assumption in, making the argument circular.
• State equals monopoly
• Monopoly does not equal freedom.
• Lack of state equals lack of monopoly
• Lack of state equals freedom.
• Lack of state equals anarchy
• Anarchy equals freedom
• Lack of Anarchy equals lack of freedom
This is logically consistent, but the original premise must be accepted as true. Even if we succeed in creating a construct where this is true, it does not preclude the corollary, because if I presuppose the following: “State does not equal monopoly” you can logically arrive at the opposite conclusion and still be logically consistent.
“So you are denying that states have monopoly on the initiation of force as a necessary feature? Then you would be able to do any activity that does not initiate force without the fear that state considers it its prerogative to initiate force against you. That is clearly not the case.”
It clearly can be the case. If you are talking about the state of the Taliban, for example, husbands are free to initiate violence against their wives if they are “offensive”. We might consider that initial aggression, but they would consider it retribution. In either case, it would not be a monopoly on the application of force. Clearly that is a state in the common usage, but thankfully it is not the “state equals USA”.
Also, recall your normative objections. Praxeology does not judge the acts, but merely takes the acts as datum. To argue against the Taliban state, you would have to show that this is wrong in relation to some ideology. An ideology is something that is held and applied by the human actor. Praxeology does not require that we know it, understand it, or subscribe to it. It only requires the assumption that the actor is rational. Right?
If you are saying that in the “state equals USA”, your case of for monopoly is weak, in my view, but certainly not every act by a government agent of a US agency is within an ABSOLUTE monopoly. Attempts to assert an absolute monopoly are subject to challenge, as is the case for U.S. v. Arizona, or states v. US over the healthcare bill.
But this line of reasoning is not really central to my point.
*You cannot construct a concept of “state” without reducing it to the actions of humans, or by humans acting upon other humans.*
“If you reduce the concept of state into the actions of humans, then you must conclude that the existence of states causes some people (we’ll call them “agents of the state”) to violate other people’s rights. How is that an argument that disproves anarchism?”
If you reduce the state to the actions of humans, you may employ praxeology to explore it. This is why the Crusoe device is sometimes used to represent a construct of society and the emergence of natural law. (I agree with Touchstone, however, that the primary social unit is mother-child, and that anarchy cannot protect the child)
You are constructing a concept of state without resort to any device that is analogous to acting humans within a natural order. If we are talking about acting humans, praxeology and not “pure logic” are the preferred tools of analysis. It was sloppy language on my part, but this is what I mean by not being to be resolved by “objective logic” like A equals B, B=C, therefore C=A.
“Why are you mixing normative scale into the problem again?”
Sorry, I’m not sure I get that. Do you mean by normative, what “should” be?
*In modern society we call these codes “laws”, and “courts” are the means of last resort designed (by “us”) to enforce those codes.*
“Above, you maintained that only humans act. Now you say that there is a fictional group (“us”) that designed the state.”
If I assume a different conceptualization of the state, what I say above may be true. It does not necessarily imply a monopoly on or initiation of force. It depends upon which acts, which laws, and what social institutions have been assigned the task of enforcement. “Appeal of last resort” and “monopoly” in this sense is way too ambiguous, at least at this level of discussion, to serve as the foundation for such a sweeping conclusion as anarchism.
In my view, natural rights of humans only exist in relation to the life of a human, i.e. before you are born (excuse the impreciseness for the moment of these terms) and after you die, you have no rights. However, institutions are designed by humans to survive over multiple human generations. The state is such an institution. Of the many entities called “States” we might point to as contemporary examples, they are not merely conceptual. They are part of the natural world, and the people who live under their influence are here too. You cannot legitimately sweep this vast array of examples and define them all as simply having a monopoly on force simply by equivocation to the term you define in this way at the outset.
The institution “we” (for example Americans) are influenced by, we didn’t create personally from whole cloth during our own lifetimes. It is an institution which has evolved over, at a minimum a couple of centuries. Humans act, from both outside the institutional boundaries of a particular state agency, and as agents within it. I think it would be hard to deny that “we” designed it, support it, maintain it, etc. Like it or not, this is part of the natural order, and is one of many elements of that order we contemplate during our economic calculation.
But it is not a natural force, like a hurricane. It is a human construct. Therefore it is subject to change. It is voluntary because we have the right to secede. Wisely, the Constitution makes this a long row to hoe, but that doesn’t change the basic fact that is an institution that was designed “of the people, by the people”.
“you have not disproved the logical constructs I presented.”
As I have tried to demonstrate, that is impossible. Your logic is sound. But your axiom is not sufficient to re-construct 250,000 years of social evolution based on pure logic. This is because an objective “truth” is always attenuated by what is excluded. Humans fill the gap with subjective calculation, rationalizations, and ideologies prior to their actions. Experience leads them to draw conclusions about the usefulness of their ideologies from their experience. Experience takes time. If we could simply deduce the way things worked by constructing an axiom, the natural order would be reduced to atoms pinging against each other, (choose your metaphor).
“I rebutted your rebuttals. Your rebuttals are a mix of misunderstandings and incorrect logic, and you are mixing normative aspects into the question.”
Rebutt back at ya’.
“Let’s try that again.
Do you agree that a necessary component of a state is the territorial monopoly on the initiation of force?”
No. I think that it is possible to define something that you might call a “state” without attributing to it either a monopoly or the right to initiate force. However, as you have asserted, it is also possible to define “state” with those attributes.
If I define a “state” as being a “coercive force of last resort” for victims of crime, that implies that a victim who is no longer alive to assert their rights, will still have them asserted such that a perpetrator does not escape justice from retribution on behalf of the victim, even if dead. This is essentially Touchstone’s argument for minarchism.
“If the state’s use of force is legitimate, it means it is consistent with the theory of property rights, i.e. state must have homesteaded its territory.”
The ownership of property is not a requirement for a concept of state. For example, it may administer property held in commons. Any other function of the state is completely independent from this notion of state ownership.
A socialist state owns the means of production. A non-socialist state does not. Socialist states are not the only variety possible, either by contemporary measures, or at any other time you may pick from the archives of history.
I don’t hold that the state can legitimately homestead land …
“explain how someone can gain property rights without either homesteading or trade.”
Attila the Hun did not acquire land or plunder by homesteading or trade. A state may acquire land through eminent domain, but the practice is often questionable, despite the requirement of “due process”. However, it is possible to invent a construction of a state that has no property rights outright, but at best a role as trustee of a commons.
*There are reasons why minarchism should be preferable to socialism…*
“But they do not follow from the arguments you presented.”
Perhaps, so let me try again. I was not arguing against socialism. I could, and would, but not on the monopoly of force argument.
• Socialist states control the means of production. This is antithetical to a free market. (see Austrian economic theory and the concept of economic calculation)
• A state without control of the means of production is not antithetical to a free market.
• Therefore a state without such control is preferable to one that does.
“Minarchism = (roughly) free markets + state
State = monopoly on the initiation of force
Free markets = absence of monopoly and initiation of force
Maybe if you explained in more detail why you object to my definitions?”
I object on two grounds:
• You are merely smuggling in the assumption that “State = right to exclusively violate the non-aggression principle”
• Your concept of state rests on no prior logical constructs. It appears out of nothing.
You make my point here:
“But the one to initiate force is the defining one.”
You define the attributes of state without defining state. Then you commit the fallacy of equivocation by applying that meaning to a praxeology of state conduct, as if the agents of state are equivalent to humans acting in a free market. State agents are not actors in the free market. They are bureaucratic actors rationalizing their acts according to the rules of the agency. They do not operate on a profit motive, and therefore do not engage in economic calculation.
So let me back you up and start with a more primary set of assertions. The question is, how many must I construct before I can arrive at a construct of state? Let me try.
• Humans Exist.
• Humans Exist in Time.
• To Exist in Time, Humans must Survive.
• Human have Needs.
• The primary Human Need is Survival.
• The period of Human Existence in Time is a Lifetime.
• Human Lifetimes begin somewhere between conception and birth, and end at death
• Humans have Identity
• Humans are Rational
• Humans Act
• Humans have Natural Rights
• The Right to Survive is a Natural Right
• The Right to Survival is the Right to Life.
• Liberty is the freedom to Act to satisfy Human Needs
• Happiness is the satisfaction of Needs
• Humans have a Natural Right to Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness.
• Ownership is the dominion and control of Natural Rights
• The Natural Rights of one Human may not be Owned by another
• An Act which infringes upon a Natural Right is an Injustice
• Justice is the Retribution for and Injustice
• Humans have a Natural Right to Justice
• The means of obtaining Justice is Tit for Tat
• Tit for Tat is the principle of cooperating with those humans which cooperate, and not cooperating with those that don’t.
• The Right to Cooperation and to Retribution are Natural Rights
• Society is two or more Humans Acting in Cooperation to meet a common Need.
• The Relationship between two Cooperating Humans is bounded by the Acts of Cooperation between them.
• Natural Rights which are Owned are Vested
• The Primary Social Unit (PSU) is Woman + Child
• The Ownership of Natural Human Rights within the PSU become Vested over the associated Lifetimes of the PSU.
• The Secondary Social Unit (SSU) is PSU + Man
• Man and Woman are both Adult Humans
• Adult Humans have fully Vested Natural Rights
• Any Adult Human has the Liberty to Act with any other Adult Human
• The Lifetime of a Society Exists for the Lifetimes of its Cooperating Humans
• An Institution is a [custom, practice,] Relationship [or behavioral pattern of importance] in the Life of a Society.
• The Lifetime of an Institution is a Human Lifetime +n.
• A Social Institution is one which Survives beyond a Human Lifetime.
• A State is a Social Institution
Now you may tell me what a State is. You may have good arguments of offer on any one of these premises, (I am still working out the details), but you can see that to say that a “State is the monopoly in the initiation of force” does not yet follow from what I’ve asserted. What I have asserted (or something like it) is the foundation upon which a conceptualization of “state” must rest.
Regards,
It looks like the core of the problem is your disagreement with the anarchocapitalist definition of state. The example you provided still fits the definition though. If men in your example of Taliban rule are allowed to initiate force against women, this needs to happen with the sanction of the state. Even though saying that men in the example are agents of state is a stretch, it is accurate to say that the men’s ability to initiate force against women is derived from the state’s monopoly. If someone tries to help the women, the men would protest to the state and the state would then proceed to initiate force against the helpers.
Therefore, I maintain that my definition is the correct one.
The definition I provided is the most accurate definition that I am aware of.
So, the definition “state is a group of people with the territorial monopoly on the initiation of force” does not define state?
The agents of the state still need to consume scarce resources and decide the portfolio of goods and services and the production and distribution methods. If they do not have the option of economic calculation, they cannot make rational decisions about this. If anything, your explanation is an argument why the state should be rejected.
What you are presenting is a vague concept of what a state should be according to your theory. You do not provide the connection between your theory and the states that actually exist. You provide no explanation as to why the state should act according to implied objectives, or why a territorial monopoly is necessary or at least leads to a better satisfaction of the needs of the people living in the territory. Remember, according to my definition, without the monopoly there is no state. You also provide no explanation with regards to the fact that there is more than one state (which alone disproves this definition).
Another problem is that the definition that I provided automatically also defines anarchy (= absence of the territorial monopoly on the initiation of force), your definition does not. Just like the vagueness of your definition of state does not allow a defence of minarchy, the reciprocal vagueness of your definition of anarchy does not allow an attack of anarchy.
If I was to summarise your argument, it would be that due to emergent features of human society, a “higher power” is necessary to counter the negative ones. That is flawed logic. The state’s agents do not have powers that other people don’t have either, nor is there any reasons why it should act in accordance with the alleged deficiencies.
One more thing, that you seem to be missing:
Due to the vagueness of the constructs I can’t be sure, but I suspect that some constructs that fit into your definition of state are anarchy according to my definition. Once you realise this, you will also realise that this also means that some of the attacks on anarchy are rendered invalid by this.
Peter,
You have been very patient and persistent in your engagement here, and I appreciate that. Thank you.
You have said some things above that I am inclined to debate, but it is becoming obvious that this exchange could go on for some time. There is a great deal of what you say, however, that I can agree with. That is the beauty of cooperation; it does not have to encompass every goal that is not shared; only those that are.
From a political action viewpoint, this is one criticism I have with the approach of anarchist’s to the prospects for cooperation for dramatic political change; it seems to be all or nothing. What I mean is that it appears that you and I have much in common concerning the assertion that the role, size and scope of government (specifically US) should be dramatically reduced. Yet we part ways, at least for now, on whether it (the “state”) should vanish entirely. From a practical point of view, anarchists appear repelled by anything that involves the “State”. In fact, you are against the concept by definition. People who are not anarchists, by your own definition, are “Statists”. (Perhaps I should allow that a minarchist may not be a Statist in your mind, but in mine it is, spelled with a little “s”) I have argued, perhaps not very effectively, that this is an equivocation.
“State”, if we are to discuss it, is an ideal construct. An ideal construct is different in some ways to material reality. Not in specific ways only, but also in vague and ambiguous ways; it is an approximation of something real. Those differences are important, and if I understand Mises’s explanation of praxeology, the purpose of the method is to learn about the natural world, not to construct a logical edifice to represent the world. That assertion that such a construct can attain the heights of an “axiom” upon which an entire theory of socialization can be erected, to put it mildly, is quite an endeavor.
To use an imperfect comparison, human evolution has been going on for something like 200,000 years, and branches from a process that is substantially older. The American Experiment is roughly 2-300 years old. Much of what we are talking about, the philosophy of law, has its roots quite a bit further back. That is a substantial period for the evolutionary process of trial and error. Given we are here, and highly socialized, not everything we have done can be an error. By your logic, it seems to me, social organization should not evolve beyond a natural state of anarchism, or something like that. If one concludes that socialism is wrong, then one must also conclude that anarchism is right, as if those were the only two choices, like choosing between Heaven and Hell.
I don’t mean this in a moral or normative sense, as you’ve indicated it appears I am, but rather that I humbly acknowledge that we are simply not finished yet. We can make improvements. I don’t believe we should start with a blank piece of paper and the rules of logic, and recreate something better out of whole cloth. An axiom upon which all humanity can build itself, free of the strife and conflict which has been a constant feature of human evolution, is nothing short of the Holy Grail. Humankind has been searching for that for some time now.
That is not to say that I don’t think that the way things are, whatever that means, are acceptable, any more than I think the bust after the boom is acceptable. By analogy, the greater the boom the greater the bust. Failure to curtail the boom requires that the bust is more painful. Any dramatic change to US politics and economics is going to be painful. But, sooner the better.
As you recall, this discussion began as the result of my comment on the Mises’s excerpt concerning rationalizations and how they “luxuriate” within a society of the like-minded. I “picked the fight” by suggesting that my observations of anarchist’s conduct reminded me of that of fundamentalist Christians.
With this last post, I do get that you hear what I’m saying; yes, my issue is the definition of “State” that Ancap’s have devised as the standard upon which to evaluate the validity of all past and future assertions about a vague, ambiguous and imprecise concept which we have named the “state”.
Making it more precise by excluding much is no better than making it vaguer by including much. This is a socio-economic restatement of the Heisenberg Principle; you can’t have it both ways.
Fundamentalism is, by nature, a point of view characterized by rigid adherence to fundamental or basic principles. That in itself is not a bad thing. For example, I believe I can adhere to the non-aggression principle unshakably. However, it is not also true that any and all concepts of “state” must also be abandoned.
That fact that an internally consistent system of logical constructs can be created is indisputable.
You are correct; by definition, your State and my state cannot co-exist. You insist that if I adhered to your “basic principle”, I would see my error. I insist that your construction limits the opportunity we have for establishing common goals as a basis for cooperation. What I cannot do is accept your premise on the one hand, and show you an error on the other.
This is precisely how fundamentalists set themselves against the rest of the world.
One more point: Fundamentalism often leads to Evangelicalism, of sorts. I came to Mises.org, as have many others, for the economics and the chance to comprehend contemporary events without having to depend on someone interpreting them for me. My studies of economics and law have given me much in that regard.
However, the atmosphere, as I get deeper into the flow of discourse here, seems to be, “Come for the Economics, stay for the Anarchism.” It reminds me of the Evangelistic trick of handing out granola bars so they can also hand you a prayer card at the same time, or, “Come for the Party, stay for the Truth”, or whatever.
I tend to put things in terms dependent hierarchies, as a way to keep things straight. For example, human needs may be approximated by Maslow’s hierarchy of needs: Physiology> Safety>Affiliation>Esteem>Self-Actualization. This is an approximation of something.
In our discussions of Praxeology, we have been discussing human action and rationality. That rationality is comprised of components. One component is human, personal needs. Another is an evaluation of causality based on our beliefs about the natural world. Kinsella divided these things into “time-dependent” and “Non-time dependent” causality. That is one way, but it is not the only way. Another, almost from the top of my head would look something like:
Freedom>Legality>Morality>Ideology>Action. Without defending this here, let it suffice to say that the scope of Action is less than the scope of Freedom (i.e. what is possible).
Whether the non-aggression principle and a “monopoly” on its violation is sufficient to argue for the elimination of any act taken by a “government agent” is, at the very least, open to debate. I cannot debate the issue if I accept the premise that it is the only conclusion that can be reached, and still have a “Libertarian” theory of “Safety>Affiliation>Esteem>Self-Actualization + Freedom>Legality>Morality>Ideology>Action”.
The simplicity, i.e. establishing NAP as the only defining principle, rules out the obvious complexity, ambiguity, vagueness, and individuality of any other. To offer another analogy, E=MC2 is simple, eloquent and explains much. However, it is also not a Theory Of Everything. We’re still waiting for that.
Let me bring this all home. I can and do accept the non-aggression principle. I can’t and don’t accept that State = monopoly to violate the NAP. I believe, though apparently not yet with sufficient skill to state it clearly, it is possible to define a state in a way that is specifically “NOT monopoly to violate the NAP”. That belief turns on a theory of revocable consent in contracts, torts, criminal, property and constitutional law, and economic theory roughly defined as the Austrian School. The intersections of your and my ideologies have much in common, I suppose.
I look forward to talking with you again.
p.s. I seem incapable of offering a non-verbose post, and must be taxing your attention. Sorry.
Wildberry,
thank you for you reply, unfortunately I don’t have time to address everything. So I’ll stick to two crucial points.
From my perspective, it is exactly the opposite. Just like atheism does not require to deny that religions exist or that they cater for genuine human needs, anarchism does not require to deny that states exist or that they cater for genuine human needs. However, atheists typically argue that religion is based on myths and/or outright fraud, and anarchists typically argue that state is based on myths and/or outright fraud. Just like if an organisation provides services like charity, psychological consultations and marriage certification does not mean that organisation is religion, if an organisation provides services like property protection and dispute resolution does not mean that organisation is state.
Due to our common libertarian values you actually seem to agree with me with regards to how humans should interact with each other, so the only thing separating you from anarchism is the belief in the supernatural.
Then provide an alternative.
If “something” does not have a territorial monopoly on the violation of NAP, it is not a state. I have no problem with that. People advocating such constructs are, from my point of view, anarchists.
Peter, the brevity of my response may surprise you, I hope.
It is not the definition of “State” you offer that I am objecting to. It is the equivocation that “State” = “All states of Government” That is the equivocation.
I am suggesting we back into a definition of Government. See my post here: http://blog.mises.org/14712/how-and-why-the-state-destroys-society/comment-page-1/#comment-739399
“If “something” does not have a territorial monopoly on the violation of NAP, it is not a state. I have no problem with that. People advocating such constructs are, from my point of view, anarchists.”
This is where you loose me. Anarchists may respond that “There is no point it talking about “something”, since this something is nothing more than the State.
I am saying take out “monopoly” and “initiation” and you arrive at something more like the idealized vision of the Founding Fathers. If you find that objectionable for some reason, let’s talk about those objections without revisiting the logical trap.
If you are an anarchist, and I can say that “state /= State”, then I am inviting a discussion of “state”. One concept that “state” embodies for me is an “enforcer of last resort”. That is /= “aggression”.
As an aside, I recall from somewhere that you are a software engineer. Axiomatic logic is vital to such an endeavor. I have a natural science background but worked for years in the semiconductor industry. I saw a program recently about a scientist who had synthesized bacteria from scratch, using human-designed DNA. He said, “DNA is the software of Life.”
The implication was that the design and manipulation of DNA patters was all that was required to “invent” Life.
To some significant degree that is true. To a very large degree, it is not. To say this is not a violation of an axiomatic truth. It is an acknowledgement that there is more to the problem of creating Life than designing software. To say that “life” means the “replication of DNA patterns” may be axiomatically valid, but it is not scientifically adequate to describe Life in a larger sense. At some level of an analysis of Life, the axiom is useless; the replication of DNA is irrelevant. The interchangeable use of “life” and “Life” is an equivocation.
Regards,
Wildberry,
I think you are stuck on a symantic misunderstanding. In the post that you link you define “government” as “The enforcer of last resort of the negative rights of protection”. I have tried to explained that it is impossible to have something like that, you didn’t seem to catch on that. However, let’s ignore that for the moment. Even if something like that would be possible, it would not be a state, unless it, of course, had a territorial monopoly on the initiation of force.
I think that there is very little now separating you from anarchocapitalism, so, I’ll try to guide you in the final steps. Let me ask you this: what are the necessary abilities that “the enforcer of last resort of the negative rights of protection” must have, in order to be able to fulfil its purpose, and other people do not have? Unless you include the “territorial monopoly on the initiation of force”, you are an anarchist, although you may not realise it. Once you realise that territorial monopoly of any sort has nothing to do with the goal you are pursuing, and remember that it is impossible to rationally act without economic calculation and competition, you become a full blown anarchocapitalist. At least, that is how it worked for me.
“Let me ask you this: what are the necessary abilities that “the enforcer of last resort of the negative rights of protection” must have, in order to be able to fulfill its purpose, and other people do not have?”
This is a very good question. Let me answer by asking you this:
What is a monopoly that can be rescinded? What is a monopoly that exists but is not exercised? What is a monopoly that does not deal with the voluntary transfer of goods? What is a monopoly when the exercise of monopoly powers is constrained by checks and balances?
This conversation has been fascinating, because it really has distilled the nature of the distinctions we are attempting to express.
“Once you realise that territorial monopoly of any sort has nothing to do with the goal you are pursuing…”
How can you insist that the definition of “State” must be logically precise, yet the definition of “monopoly” carries no such requirement? This ambiguity does indeed create semantic problems, and leads to equivocation.
Both are oxymorons.
I don’t understand. Monopoly means that the use of force is justified by some common criterion shared by the victims or their property (in this case, territory).
Peter,
“Rescinded monopoly” is not an oxymoron. Here today, gone tomorrow. Monopoly is a right. A right that is not exercised does not destroy the right.
“Monopoly means that the use of force is justified by some common criterion shared by the victims or their property (in this case, territory).
A monopoly means the right to exclude others from a specified activity. This right may be bound by territory, time, or any other means of defining the boundaries of the right, including some in combination (i.e. boundaries and time).
An owner of land has a monopoly in its possession and use. The boundaries of this right are minimally defined as the property lines. Title to that land includes a description of those boundaries in reference to other boundaries and monuments. The authority of title is the Recording Act in the relevant jurisdiction. The owner, thus established, has a right to enforce this monopoly. He may choose not to do so. It is a right that only he has as owner. He has a monopoly. How he enforces that monopoly, should he choose or be required to do so, is an issue of enforcement, not monopoly.
Sorry, forgot one “crucial” point.
“Due to our common libertarian values you actually seem to agree with me with regards to how humans should interact with each other, so the only thing separating you from anarchism is the belief in the supernatural”
To say we agree is an overstatement. We probably agree on many things. But at the margins, I don’t share the view that “all natural rights are negative rights” or that the solution to the undesirable attributes of present IP law means that ALL IP laws should be abolished.
The biggest disagreement we have is that I see these issues as being on the margin, and you (i.e. Ancaps) see them as crucial, fundamental distinctions.
Finally, I have no idea how you got to the conclusion that I must believe in the supernatural. Even if somehow that means “God”, you and I would be far apart, I suspect, on the meaning of such a concept. I can easily say, however, without any reservation, my concept has nothing to do with the “supernatural”; quite the opposite.
This has nothing to do with the question of statism versus anarchism per se.
If state was necessary in order to reach a certain goal (apart from initiation of force), it would mean that it needs to have supernatural powers in order to beat the economic calculation argument. Conversely, if the state does not have supernatural powers, it is not necessary to reach goals that do not include the initiation of force.
“If state was necessary in order to reach a certain goal (apart from initiation of force), it would mean that it needs to have supernatural powers in order to beat the economic calculation argument. Conversely, if the state does not have supernatural powers, it is not necessary to reach goals that do not include the initiation of force.”
I’m not 100% certain I understand your thinking here. If the “certain goal” is “enforcement of last resort” for the protection of the associated rights of trading partners, then why must it “beat the economic calculation”? It is precisely when the conduct of one trading partner, engaged in economic calculation with the other, violates the rights of the other that the problem of enforcement arises. Enforcement in this context is not equivalent to assuming “something” becomes one of the trading partners and initiates force on the other.
This is a good example of where the “real world” seems to offer counterexamples to your assertions concerning monopoly. Parties to a contract may engage in a number of methodologies of dispute resolution before appealing to the courts. The courts specifically do not assert a monopoly on those methods (i.e. negotiation, mediation, arbitration, judicial referee, etc.). However, within certain “constitutional” limitations, the courts do specifically mandate limitations on the exercise of violence between trading partners. This is by both legal and social convention. No “supernatural powers in order to beat the economic calculation argument” are required.
Purpose is essential to the argument. For example, the original purpose for adjudicating trespass was not to enforce the negative rights of exclusion. It was to resolve through arbitration the exact position of boundaries between two property owners. Damages were nominal (i.e. a “pence”) because the purpose was not to seek damages for harm, but to arbitrate a dispute nonviolently.
Anyway, I’ve arrived at verbosity in increments, despite my earlier representation.
I already explained this. Any activity whatsoever, including “enforcement of last resort”, requires the use of scarce resources and a decision making process that establishes a relationship between means and ends. The only way to do this rationally (assuming there exists more than one person) is economic calculation. I think that, like I have noticed in other statists too, you subconsciously object to “desecration” of the mythical role of the state by “degrading” it into entrepreneurial activity.
But enforcement is also human action. It still needs to establish the means and ends. Price system and competition (=economic calculation) is required for doing that rationally.
Let us then deconstruct the requirement “enforcement of last resort”. It can mean several things:
1) Noone else can enforce after the state has enforced. This requires a territorial monopoly on the initiation of force.
2) The state is obligated to enforce. But we have established that the state does not have supernatural powers. State cannot do anything else than other people cannot. Assuming this goal is possible, there is no reason why state’s proclamation (e.g. Constitution) should make it any more likely to fulfil the declared obligations than any other organisation.
3) The state needs to be capable of performing the enforcement. Enforcement is subject to economic calculation, so unless you see it as an entrepreneurial activity, from praxeological point of view, it is impossible to perform it rationally.
So, if you eliminate the initiation of force (point 1) and mythology (point 2), that leaves anarchocapitalism (point 3) as the only solution.
“This has nothing to do with the question of statism versus anarchism per se.”
I think it does. Once you acknowledge that positive natural rights do exist, then you must face the problem of enforcement. Enforcement implies coercion, which by definition is non-voluntary. In this regard, enforcement of positive rights is not equivalent to “initiation of force”, quite aside from a concept of “monopoly” in its exercise. We have defined this as “something”, since it does not possess the attribute “initiation of force”.
Last question; if I take a poetic license to say that the vision of this “something” articulated by the Founding Fathers is closer to my definition of “something” than your definition of State, does that make them anarchists? That would solve much.
I think the division of rights into negative and positive is an approximation and the actual problem is purely logical. That which you describe as negative rights covers 100% of all activities in a non-overlapping manner. If you therefore introduce that which you call positive rights, you end up with a self-contradictory system.
Now, again, this has nothing to do with the state. If you think that certain rules of conduct are correct and should be enforced, you can found an organisation and start promoting them. There is no reason why such an organisation should be called “state”.
My argument is that constructs like this are based on contradictory requirements and mythical interpretation of “the state”.
Peter,
I have to admit, you are a fascinating guy.
“I think the division of rights into negative and positive is an approximation and the actual problem is purely logical.
This is the issue which I referred you to Touchstone.
“That which you describe as negative rights covers 100% of all activities in a non-overlapping manner. If you therefore introduce that which you call positive rights, you end up with a self-contradictory system.”
I can grant that negative rights covers 100% of all activities, in the same way that gravity covers 100%. To introduce the concept of mass does not create a self-contradictory system. In fact gravity and mass are part of a complimentary system of natural forces. The nature of that system may be theorized by the application of pure logic, and those theories can also be verified by empirical observation and experimentation. These are not self-contradictory.
Positive rights arise from the concept enforcement. My negative rights to protection mean nothing unless they also encompass the right to exercise those rights. Protection is a positive right, because they allow me to “pierce” your negative rights to protection from my enforcement.
“Now, again, this has nothing to do with the state. If you think that certain rules of conduct are correct and should be enforced, you can found an organisation and start promoting them. There is no reason why such an organisation should be called “state”.
Now we’re getting somewhere. This conversation with you gave me cause to re-read Nock’s Our Enemy the State. In the early chapters he describes a distinction between State and Government precisely in the way you describe above. My position seems to be related to this, in that should I do as you say, I would likely simply re-discover many of the issues addressed in, say, the Declaration of Independence. In ways I am not equipped to explain, I hold a concept of Government which specifically not a State in the way that Nock, and apparently you describe.
If the binary choice is between being a Statist and an Anarchist, then I am not a Statist and therefore must be an Anarchist.
“My argument is that constructs like this are based on contradictory requirements and mythical interpretation of “the state”.
My argument is that they are not contradictory except at those places on the margin where “pure logic” encounters “subjective contradictions”. To make any system of pure logic operate, it must assume that the behavior of that to which it applies behaves in a fully predictable manner. You must agree with that. Otherwise, you would not be able to write software. Electrons move through semiconductor circuits with very predictable behavior. At the margins, however, this does not hold. We have issues like “leakage” and “cosmic rays”. In this manner of speaking, electron behavior is highly predictable, except when it is not. When it is not, we must enlarge the universe of natural phenomena to deal with it.
Sometimes the “real world” solution is an approximation of a “pure” solution. We learn to adapt to the unpredictability, while at the same time striving to eliminate it.
Gotta run. Happy Thanksgiving.
“Protection is a positive right, because they allow me to “pierce” your negative rights to protection from my enforcement.”
Sorry that should read “Retaliation is a positive right…” It is derived from my negative right to protection from invasion.
They are not two separate things, but simply different aspects of the same thing. The concept of negative and positive simply acknowledges their integral relationship.
Wildberry,
I’m sorry but I don’t see anything in your post that brings our debate further. Its just another way of phrasing your ideas about how a world should be. But it does not actually explain anything.
Peter,
“But enforcement is also human action. It still needs to establish the means and ends. Price system and competition (=economic calculation) is required for doing that rationally.”
This appears to be another point of distinction where we differ. Enforcement by definition is involuntary. The economic calculation is based on voluntary exchange. There is an argument, (Touchstone again) that asserts that enforcement cannot be provided by the free market, because the offering of coercion for a fee is not in the nature of a voluntary exchange. It is more like hiring a hit-man, since the target of enforcement is not entering the transaction voluntarily.
This is why all of the anarchist arguments about private protection agencies appear strained and forced-fit into the context of the non-aggression principle. Coercion, and the results of it, are non-free market intervention. Therefore they are not subject to economic calculation, but are the performance of a function within a set of rules, i.e. a bureaucracy.
Hope to see you back here soon. This is as deep as I’ve ever been able to probe with an Ancap advocate. It is very helpful.
I addressed this about an hour ago in a different reply to you. The problem of economic calculation is independent of the use of force. You can actually also interpret the use of force from an economic point of view: if you use force to gain something, this results not only in you gaining that something, but also the direct cost (because you need to use scarce resources to overcome the defences) as well as indirect costs (retaliation and exclusion from society) and may even experience psychological costs (guilt). The one being attacked also has a decision to make: he needs to spend resources on deterrence, defence and bring these in comparison with the value of the good that is being protected. Of course, a professional can do any of those more efficiently.
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