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Source link: http://archive.mises.org/14193/interview-with-kinsella/

Interview with Kinsella

October 9, 2010 by

This interview with Stephan Kinsella concerns Rethinking Intellectual Property.

{ 65 comments }

David C October 9, 2010 at 10:26 pm

With China, I worry that their anti-IP culture is one of the true few outlets that counter balances their loss of political freedoms. It’s a force that keeps industry cartels from running out of control as China emerges as a developing economy. If the US is successful at getting China to impose IP, it could give industry and media cartels enough of a power advantage to cause China to turn inward and go fascist, especially with patent. With copyright, it’s almost like the perfect reason for the government to monitor and intrude on peoples privacy without raising the ire of the west.

Seattle October 10, 2010 at 12:27 am

With copyright, it’s almost like the perfect reason for the government to monitor and intrude on peoples privacy without raising the ire of the west.

Which only helps to show how much of a farce most of the concern over “human rights” in China is: The west doesn’t actually care about human rights. They are only upset because China’s Plan is different from Theirs.

Sasha Radeta October 10, 2010 at 7:14 am

Chinese anti-IP stance is perfectly consistent with their anti-human-rights position, although it’s hard for you to understand this…

IP is all about exclusivity of use of one’s physical property (the right to allow/sell only personal, non-commercial use) and a collectivist mind cannot easily come to terms with such notion.

Seattle October 10, 2010 at 8:39 am

I can’t sell you water on the condition you’re only allowed to use it to water plants. Even if you sign a sheet of paper promising not to. Contracts don’t work that way.

Sasha Radeta October 10, 2010 at 5:49 pm

Seattle,

That’s a sheer nonsense. Of course that I can condition what you can do with my property. That’s the essence of property rights.

iawai October 10, 2010 at 8:21 pm

You’ve SOLD it, it’s not your property anymore. Otherwise, it’s called leasing or licensing.

If you sell me your “Awesomest Novella Ever”, and I copy it and redistribute it against your wishes, you are free not to sell me any of your things in the future. You cannot claim any right to the proceeds I’ve earned in resale, for there must have been some reason you already didn’t earn those proceeds. You cannot sue for retribution because I’ve done nothing to your person or property. You can only run to the territorial monopoly of force and ask them to limit my actions – take away my liberties – because they are the only group with enough influence to pull off such a tyrannical act. You’re socializing your property protection costs, while decrying us for being “collectivists”.

If there is any such thing as property, intellectual or otherwise – each owner must be able to protect his property, either through his own efforts, or by properly delegating that service of protection to some agent. Intellectual “property” can only be enforced by putting each person in the world under massive surveillance so that they don’t happen to make their own life better by remembering something they learned from you. If you can handle being such a tyrant, please keep supporting IP, and be prepared for the treatment that tyrants receive.

Sasha Radeta October 11, 2010 at 12:02 pm

iawai,

In case of sales of copyrighted materials – I didn’t SELL “IT.” I allowed a strictly limited use of my property in compensation for money. Property ownership always includes the right to sell services or use of your goods owned. Your funny bravado is based on completely false premise.

Jay Lakner October 10, 2010 at 10:03 am

Sasha,

As has already been explained to you, any process which does not alter the integrity or momentum of an object cannot be considered a physical “use” of that object.
“Viewing” an object is not a physical “use” of that object. The only things that are put to “use” in the process of “viewing” is the viewer’s eyes and brain.

The Kid Salami October 10, 2010 at 11:53 am

“As has already been explained to you, any process which does not alter the integrity or momentum of an object cannot be considered a physical “use” of that object.”

I guess I’ve never “used” a signpost then. ok – what exactly am I doing though when i look at one of these on the way to work? Why would anyone ever erect a signpost if it can’t be “used”? Let’s agree “use” is a bad word. What is the vocabulary to describe me looking at a signpost and deciding which way to go, or to describe someone erecting a signpost, how exactly do we describe the interaction that goes on between my eyes and the signpost?

Seattle October 10, 2010 at 12:32 pm

Looking at objects does alter their integrity, if ever so slightly. So yes, you do “use” a sign in this sense.

Jay Lakner October 10, 2010 at 12:35 pm

“Shining light” on an object alters it’s integrity, but “receiving light” does not.

Jay Lakner October 10, 2010 at 12:41 pm

Kid Salami,

Light reflects off the signpost and enters your eyes. Your eyes then send signals to your brain. Your brain then interprets this information.

The only thing altered in the process is your eyes and brain. The signpost is not altered.

Seattle October 10, 2010 at 1:36 pm

(Note: Not a physicist)

Some of the photons that bounce off the sign and enter your eyes are entangled with the particles that make up the sign. This means your brain’s interaction with the entangled photons also change the sign.

Jay Lakner October 10, 2010 at 3:39 pm

It’s true that everything is causally related to everything else.

My “breathing” is also technically a “use” of the signpost if you wish to argue such extremes. In fact my “breathing” alters the integrity and momentum of the signpost to a far greater extent than “viewing” it.

However, we are discussing property rights. To do so requires assuming a simplified world where exceptionally small violations (such as the effects of actions such as “moving”, “breathing”, “heart-beating”, “hearing”, “viewing”, etc) are considered so tiny that we assume they don’t occur.

Seattle October 10, 2010 at 4:47 pm

That’s all well and good, but I must ask, what’s the difference between interferences that matter in terms of property rights and interferences that don’t?

Matthew Swaringen October 10, 2010 at 5:22 pm

I’d say that the difference is what types of interferences result in the owner not being able to use his property. As an example, EM waves passing through objects or bouncing off them aren’t an offense, unless those EM waves are like a laser beam that’s going to destroy some part of the object in a significant way.

In my view the degree or level of offense in an anarchic system would be reliant on what is sought out and agreed upon by arbitration.

Some might see small quantities relating to the use of pesticides or other chemicals nearby them as an infringement on their property. A lawsuit might come about where arbitration would make decisions on what the damage was (if anything).

These decisions wouldn’t always be right (sometimes a “harmless” chemical would be more harmful than originally thought), but over time and with more information better decisions would be made and the incentives of the system would result in less error.

This is kind of the theory that I have at the moment anyway.

Jay Lakner October 10, 2010 at 6:04 pm

Matthew is pretty much spot on.

The fine line between “too big” and “too small” a violation is ultimately an arbitrary choice.
For example, how loud can I increase the volume of my music before it becomes a property rights violation? Any decision you make is completely arbitrary.

It’s kind of funny.
Due to scarcity, “property rights” must arise.
Due to causality “property rights” must always be violated.

Hence our unavoidable dilemma in having to make an arbitrary judgement.

The libertarian position considers all but the smallest of physical changes as unacceptable. My personal position is that any physical change greater than that which is caused by the act of communicating is unacceptable.

Sasha Radeta October 10, 2010 at 7:18 pm

If you anti-IP guys wanna talk physics or metaphysics, fine, but our issues are property rights.

- Is displaying something a market service that can be a part of enforceable contract?
- Can property owner lawfully decide which uses of his property are allowed?

The answer for both questions is YES and we all agree with these premises (with only a few extremist exceptions).

We are actually splitting when it comes to question:
- Does recording other person’s property constitutes its “use” in the context of exclusivity in property rights?
For me, the answer is a clear “yes,” because it is the only true libertarian view: In Human Action, Mises brilliantly argued that property owners should be entitled to both positive and negative externalities of their property (we’re focusing here on externalities that create economic value and are marketed as services). That is the only way property rights make any sense…

Also, I humbly call you to please stop with quantum nonsense on these discussions. When dealing with property rights, it does not matter whether property externalities consist of particles or waves – which are both invisible and intangible to a normal human being. Key issue is: externalities can be so good that people are willing to pay to property owners to produce more of them. Should some IP collectivism decide that property owner is no longer entitled to manage the consumption of these externalities, he will lose economic incentives to provide these services.

You can spit on copyright all you want, but the fact is that such “limited use” services provide incentive for mass production of these works, while general public benefits from inexpensive access to property that normally costs a lot of money (which is a primary incentive for creative people to create.

And then IP opponents will say something like:
- “IP protection and litigations cost a lot of money,” but a cynical communist will notice that this is precisely their argument about the waste of all property rights protection and police.
- “The world will flourish if poor people with good ideas get to obtain the unrestricted use of capital resources now protected by IP…” A cynical communist will notice that this is also their argument, just applied to all means of production.

Be careful, communists may accuse you of stealing their ideology.

Jay Lakner October 10, 2010 at 9:10 pm

Sasha Radeta wrote:

Is displaying something a market service that can be a part of enforceable contract?

The act of displaying?
The act moving an object to a location? Yes.

Can property owner lawfully decide which uses of his property are allowed?

If by “uses of his property” you mean any act that alters the integrity or momentum of that property, then yes.

Does recording other person’s property constitutes its “use” in the context of exclusivity in property rights?

It depends of the method of “recording”.

entitled to manage the consumption of these externalities

Consumption? What, exactly, is consumed?

You always seem to be trying to sneak in deceptive language.

In fact you come up with new words every time. Eventually you’re going to run out of synonyms for “use”, “service”, “viewing” and “listening”. You’ll have to come up with a whole new method for spreading confusion over this very simple topic.

Sasha Radeta October 11, 2010 at 12:27 pm

Jay,

You managed to say nothing in so many words… I’m impressed, but you’re still stuck with same logical flaws

- Displaying (showing) a movie is a market service for which people pay money. This service is what people expect to receive — customers don’t care about physical alteration of projector and player — because the owner is liable if he does not provide the service that he expects to deliver: which is to SHOW MOVIE!

- Watching a movie is its basic “use.” If you deny the legitimacy of such “use” – you are denying the right to make it a part of enforceable contracts (end of movie shows and all visual and audio arts). This use does not require any physical contact with the user.

You reach completely wrong conclusions because you religiously try to deny these basic truths. Your attempt to define “use” as physical contact is your pathetic last stand and it denies the right to economically exist to many art forms.

Stephan Kinsella October 11, 2010 at 3:04 pm

Jay, I don’t think it’s arbitary–it’s more along the lines as discussed by Rothbard in his pollution piece, and also re his relevant technological unit — see here:

Why Airwaves (Electromagnetic Spectra) Are (Arguably) Property:

“…[Incidentally, the reason transmission of an EM wave for information-signalling purposes is not normally trespass even though the waves pass through others' bodies is that it does not interfere with their use of their bodies; for more on this approach to "invasion" see Rothbard's classic air pollution article; by contrast, aiming high-intensity, coherent, power-carrying EM radiation--a laser beam--at someone could be aggression, since it could affect the physical integrity of their body or other property.]


… See also B.K. Marcus, “Radio Free Rothbard (discussing Rothbard’s concept of the “relevant technological unit”).”

Jay Lakner October 11, 2010 at 5:17 pm

Stephan,

Thanks for the information.
I’ll have a look through those links a bit later and give a bit more thought to the subject.

Jay Lakner October 11, 2010 at 5:40 pm

Dear Sasha Radeta,

Displaying (showing) a movie is a market service for which people pay money.

Agreed.
As I’ve explained, “Displaying” is the sum of all the physical actions necessary to give you line of sight (and listening proximity) of the movie.

This service is what people expect to receive — customers don’t care about physical alteration of projector and player — because the owner is liable if he does not provide the service that he expects to deliver: which is to SHOW MOVIE!

This is where you are falling down. Customers are paying for a result.
The customer is paying for whatever actions the provider needs to perform to achieve this result.

Watching a movie is its basic “use.” If you deny the legitimacy of such “use” – you are denying the right to make it a part of enforceable contracts (end of movie shows and all visual and audio arts).

What you are saying here is completely wrong.
You can form a contract over just about anything.
There is nothing illegitimate with person A offering $X to person B to perform whatever actions are needed to achieve result Y.

You reach completely wrong conclusions because you religiously try to deny these basic truths.

This is my very criticism of you.

Your attempt to define “use” as physical contact is your pathetic last stand

Firstly, “physical alteration”, not “physical contact”.

Secondly, it’s absolutely hilarious that you make this accusation.
Looking at the fundamentals of property rights and specifically defining each aspect of the topic was far from my “last stand” … it was, in fact, my very first step!

The very fact that you consider such a logical and principled approach to be an act of desperation speaks volumes about the way your mind works.

Peter Surda October 12, 2010 at 7:09 am

Sasha,

looks like you ran away from the previous conversation without addressing the contradictions, and now you’re back for more. I’m still curious as to what your answers are, as well as how you plan to explain your claims that phenomena matching your definition of property are not property.

Watching a movie is its basic “use.” If you deny the legitimacy of such “use” – you are denying the right to make it a part of enforceable contracts (end of movie shows and all visual and audio arts).

Again, you miss the point, which is not normative (“denying legitimacy”), but positive (lack of a coherent theory). You are interpreting one phenomenon (change of physical matter) in two different ways (goods vs. services), but hold both of the relevant from property rights theory even if their owner is different. That’s not possible, it’s a self-contradiction. One of the interpretations has to go. Moral outrage does not fix a logical fallacy.

Sasha Radeta October 10, 2010 at 6:02 pm

Jay,

As already explained to you, “displaying” art is a market service for which people pay money. Since the property owners control services provided by their property, they can restrict you from misusing their strictly limited service – or they will not provide this service.

To make things funnier, I don’t have to convince people that abolition of IP would make the market for visual arts displays completely gone – you actually argue that these artists do not perform any service that they could charge.

Jay Lakner October 10, 2010 at 6:40 pm

Dear Sasha Radeta,

You come here repeating the exact same fallacious arguments as if our previous conversation never happened. Your reasoning has been utterly refuted already.

Since I can’t be bothered retyping all the same stuff, I’m going to copy and paste (with minor modifications) some of the important points I made during our last conversation (I’ve also added a bit that I addressed to Kid Salami because it’s relevant):

“Services” provided by a person generally refers to actions that person performs which in some way benefits others. You can contract with a person to perform certain physical actions with their body which in some way results in your benefit.
For services provided by “property”, the principles are exactly the same as “services” provided by a person. You can contract with a person to take possession of their property and “use” (alter it’s integrity or momentum) it some some manner which results in your benefit.

Now actions such as “viewing” and “hearing” are actions YOU perform. They are not actions performed by other people or other people’s property.

So to say that “viewing” an artwork is a service provided by that artwork is completely nonsensical. The artwork is not being physically altered by the act of viewing it. The only thing being physically altered is the viewer (whose eyes are being bombarded by photons of light and whose brain is receiving and interpreting the information).
Similarly with music, “listening” is not a service provided by the music. The music is not being physically altered by the act of listening to it. Only the listener is being altered (his eardrums are being vibrated and the information is sent to his brain which then processes the information).

A physical performance is a service provided by the performer who needs to alter their bodily movements. But the “viewing” of this performance is not a service the performer provides.

The only way in which “viewing” and “listening” can ever be considered “services” is if the “viewer” or “listener” is the one providing this service. This is actually quite common. For example, upcoming artists often pay experts to listen to or view their performances in order to gain feedback, writers pay people to proof-read their works in progress, etc, etc.

The “service” for art shows and concerts fundamentally results from ownership of the places where they take place, not from the “art” or “music” itself. It’s very simple really. The only thing preventing you from experiencing these performances is “line of sight” (or in the case of music, being able situate yourself in a position to clearly “listen” to the performance). You are paying for an unobstructed view of the art (or to be in unimpeded hearing range of the music).

You only have exclusive usage rights for “uses” of property that result in the alteration of that property’s integrity or momentum.
For a band performing at a concert, the band members have the exclusive right to alter their body movements in the manner that produces the music. This is obvious – nobody else has the right to alter their body movements.
But it’s important here to understand that they have no exclusive rights as to who can listen to it. To discriminate over who can and cannot listen to the music requires that the performance be contained in a privately owned enclosed space, and then charge people for the right to enter that space.
The contract in this scenario revolves around:
a) the band agreeing to the performance, and,
b) access to line-of-sight (or listening range) of the performance while it takes place.
If it was an inanimate work of art, then a) would be “the owner agreeing to where the artwork is located”.
There is no agreement for “viewing rights” or “listening rights”. These are not “services”.

You said yourself, I don’t have exclusive rights over the “viewing” of my car. I can’t run around forcing people not to look at my car. But if I store my car in a privately owned building, I can regulate the “viewing” of my car by regulating access to my building.
There is NO difference between viewing rights of my car and viewing rights of a work of art.

Same deal with music. If I walk around talking out loud in public, I can’t force people NOT to listen to me. I have no exclusive rights over the “listening” to my talking. However, if I talk in a sound-proof privately owned building, I can regulate who can and cannot listen to me by restricting access to the building.
Once again, there is NO difference between the listening rights to my talking and the listening rights to a piece of music.

Sasha Radeta October 10, 2010 at 7:43 pm

Jay,

you wrote so much nonsense for nothing, since I’m not arguing that “viewing” and “listening” can ever be considered “services.”

I actually argued that “displaying” and “playing” are legitimate market services and that the entire markets for art forms are based on these services. Many authors produce their works in massive volumes solely for the purpose of “limited use” by general public – and we should be thankful to that. If you claim that playing a movie is not a valid market service – you basically claim that movie theatres would not be liable for not showing a movie, after they charge you to get in.

By the way, many services that get derived from physical property don’t require users to bother with any physical work or contact to obtain their pleasure, so I really don’t understand this nonsensical obsession with “alteration of that property’s integrity or momentum.” Reading a book and watching a movie are common “uses” of books and DVDs and only a completely biased and dishonest person would try to deny this. Based on the very fact of ownership, property owners control uses of their property by others, by allowing/selling one type of use, while restricting other types.

Jay Lakner October 10, 2010 at 8:50 pm

Sasha Radeta wrote:

I actually argued that “displaying” and “playing” are legitimate market services and that the entire markets for art forms are based on these services.

Changing the words you use does not fix the flaws in your argument.

Displaying: To agree to place an object in someone’s line of sight.
I dealt with this quite nicely in my above post.

I’m not entitled to any money for “displaying” my car in public, unless someone specifically forms a contract with me to do so.

Playing: To engange in bodily actions that result in a performance.
Again, I dealt with this nicely in my above post.

I’m not entitled to any money for “playing” anything in public (Regardless of whether I’m playing a guitar, singing, or just plain talking), unless someone specifically forms a contract with me to do so.

Many authors produce their works in massive volumes solely for the purpose of “limited use” by general public

So people are more likely to enter an industry where they are promised a monopoly?
This is hardly cutting-edge economic thinking. And here I was thinking that businesses lobby government for economic benefits because they’re concerned about the “greater good”.

If you claim that playing a movie is not a valid market service – you basically claim that movie theatres would not be liable for not showing a movie, after they charge you to get in.

I think the appropriate term here is: “Strawman”.

The act of “playing” the movie is an exclusive use of the equipment used.

But that’s not what you’re arguing. You are saying that “watching” the movie is a service provided by the physical copy of the movie. Which I have clearly shown is false.

By the way, many services that get derived from physical property don’t require users to bother with any physical work or contact to obtain their pleasure, so I really don’t understand this nonsensical obsession with “alteration of that property’s integrity or momentum.” Reading a book and watching a movie are common “uses” of books and DVDs and only a completely biased and dishonest person would try to deny this.

We’ve been over this territory before and it’s blatantly dishonest of you to completely ignore our previous discussions and pretend as though I haven’t already explained this stuff.

The act of “reading” a book often does involve physical alteration of the book – handling the book and turning the pages. But a third party, reading over the shoulder of someone else, is not altering the book. Similarly, a third party who has the book “read” to them by someone else is also not altering the book.

Similarly, “playing” a DVD is an act that alters the DVD. However, a third party “watching” the DVD is NOT altering the DVD.

Making a replica of a book or DVD may or may not alter the original depending on the method of duplication. For example, copying the contents of a DVD onto your computer by accessing the DVD does alter the DVD. But copying the contents by typing it all out “from your memory” does not alter the DVD.

The Kid Salami October 11, 2010 at 6:48 am

“Looking at objects does alter their integrity, if ever so slightly. So yes, you do “use” a sign in this sense.” “ “Shining light” on an object alters it’s integrity, but “receiving light” does not.” “Light reflects off the signpost and enters your eyes. Your eyes then send signals to your brain. Your brain then interprets this information. The only thing altered in the process is your eyes and brain. The signpost is not altered.” “Some of the photons that bounce off the sign and enter your eyes are entangled with the particles that make up the sign. This means your brain’s interaction with the entangled photons also change the sign.” “It’s true that everything is causally related to everything else. My “breathing” is also technically a “use” of the signpost if you wish to argue such extremes. In fact my “breathing” alters the integrity and momentum of the signpost to a far greater extent than “viewing” it.”

Good Lord, give me a break.

“However, we are discussing property rights. To do so requires assuming a simplified world where exceptionally small violations (such as the effects of actions such as “moving”, “breathing”, “heart-beating”, “hearing”, “viewing”, etc) are considered so tiny that we assume they don’t occur.”

Yes, thank you. What was all that gibberish for then? Matthew’s comment makes sense to me, at a glance, also. That’s not what I asked – I said:

“I guess I’ve never “used” a signpost then. ok – what exactly am I doing though when i look at one of these on the way to work? Why would anyone ever erect a signpost if it can’t be “used”? Let’s agree “use” is a bad word. What is the vocabulary to describe me looking at a signpost and deciding which way to go, or to describe someone erecting a signpost, how exactly do we describe the interaction that goes on between my eyes and the signpost?”

In normal language, I can “use” my car to get to work and I can “use” the signpost to get to work. If you say use means “alter the blah blah blah” then ok – what word/phrase do we, erm, use to cover the relationship that the car and the sign share with my task of getting to work. “Rely on”? What?

Sasha Radeta October 11, 2010 at 12:53 pm

Jay said:

“You are saying that “watching” the movie is a service provided by the physical copy of the movie”

That’s a fabrication. The “show” (as in “showing the movie”) is a service provided by movie’s owner – and “watching” a movie is the “use” of this service for which people pay money – and this use does not require physical alteration on part of the user. You tried to escape by claiming that “letting people into the theatre” is the service provided – but this only proved your ignorance: the right to contract is strictly derivable from the right of private property (that includes goods or service). If showing a movie was not described as a “service” that needs to be delivered to customers who bought tickets – movie theatre would not be liable if they failed to deliver the proper show (if they just “played it” with some crappy picture, for example).

Jay also said:
“So people are more likely to enter an industry where they are promised a monopoly?”

DUH! What did you think – that more people are likely to enter an industry with hypothetically perfect competition and zero economic profit (as you probably recall from your ECO classes). But as you probably know from Rothbard: every owner of anything unique is a monopolist (the only seller of that particular good) – but this by no means entails that he is spared from competition or that he can “set” some imaginary monopolistic prices.

PS By the way, I agree that you are not entitled any money for displaying your car in public – this has nothing to do with our topic. There could be types of “use” that you do not allow with you car and such restrictions are the essence of IP.

Matthew Swaringen October 11, 2010 at 1:55 pm

If showing a movie was not described as a “service” that needs to be delivered to customers who bought tickets – movie theatre would not be liable if they failed to deliver the proper show

The theater performs more actions than simply letting someone in the door as part of it’s service. Those actions include includes such things as employees loading the proper film (or proper file if it’s a digital device).

If they don’t carry out the proper actions (by loading the wrong film or selecting the wrong file) the requested service was not performed.

By the way, I agree that you are not entitled any money for displaying your car in public

Why should you be able to view my car without paying me if a thief is driving it around? It’s my car. It’s awesome. The fact you saw it was a great addition to your viewing experience. I want payment for this. The fact you are a 3rd party doesn’t absolve you because you’ve rejected this in your prior posts via arguing that materials used by a 3rd party for infractions are the property of the owner of the party that had his property misused.

The fact it was in public shouldn’t matter because just because there are a lot of 3rd party’s still doesn’t give you the right to look at my car without my permission. I wasn’t driving it. I didn’t choose for the car to go into public. Yet you were still illegally looking at my car against my will.

It seems to me that this is the same as someone who breaks his contract with me by converting my CD into mp3 files and then sharing them on the internet. You have said that I don’t only have the right to pursue him for his crime, but you as well in that instance. So why shouldn’t I be able to go after you for viewing my car.

Sasha Radeta October 11, 2010 at 2:55 pm

Matthew said:

If they don’t carry out the proper actions (by loading the wrong film or selecting the wrong file) the requested service was not performed.

EXACTLY! Requested service may require many inputs from property owner – but the “requested service” is the “movie show.” If this service is not delivered – customers are not served for their money and they don’t care about “proper actions” and they don’t care if “proper actions” don’t result in requested service by accident.

I don’t understand the part you wrote about a car in response to my statement that you are not entitled for compensation if you display your car in public. You are clearly incapable of making right analogies… Forcing the service onto someone (like delivering goods someone did not ask for, or playing music for someone) does not entitle you to compensation. You really must be drunk to see any connection between such case — and knowingly downloading (enjoying service) that was derived someone’s stolen CD.

Jay Lakner October 11, 2010 at 3:06 pm

Sasha Radeta,

You seem to stubbornly refuse to try and understand the arguments I’m making. Either you are incapable of understanding my arguments, or you are very dishonest.

Let’s take the service provided by a movie theatre as an example.
The service provider owns (or contractually leases):
- The theatre itself. The physical place where the movies are shown.
- The physical object holding the data of the movie.
- The device that reads the object and projects it onto the screen.

When one buys a movie ticket, one is entering an agreement whereby they pay $X in exchange for entrance to the theatre and for the service provider to physically use the projection device on the physical object containing the data of the movie.
You are paying for actions. To put it more specifically, you are paying for the service provider to perform specific alterations the integrity or momentum of their property.

All “services”, by definition, require that a physical change is occurring. Otherwise a “service” is not being supplied.

Now let’s look at the case of a book.
I am allowed to read Harry Potter.
I am allowed to type anything I want into my computer.
Absent a contract stipulating otherwise, I am therefore allowed to read Harry Potter and then type the contents of it on my computer. The duplicate would not be illegal.

Let’s say a contract to the contrary exists (even though you continually assert that this is purely about property rights and not about contracts).
Let’s say that I am prohibited from typing those exact same words into my computer by a contract. Let’s also say that the contract allows me to read the book out loud to a third party.
In this scenario, I am permitted to read the book out loud to a friend who can type everything I say into his computer. Since the book is not being altered in a manner which violates the user agreement, this duplication of the book is not illegal.

Of course the contract can be even more restrictive. It could stipulate that you may not read it out loud in the presence of anyone else.

But what is important to note, is that you can only restrict actions that don’t physically effect the book via contracts. Property rights alone cannot achieve this.

Jay Lakner October 11, 2010 at 3:32 pm

Sasha Radeta wrote:

Forcing the service onto someone (like delivering goods someone did not ask for, or playing music for someone) does not entitle you to compensation.

So now you are claiming that third parties are not affected?

So does this now mean that you agree that no trespass occurs when third parties duplicate an illegally-created replica of a book?

Sasha Radeta October 11, 2010 at 3:59 pm

Jay,

Once again, anyone sane will agree that in the process of providing a market service such as “art display” or “movie show” – the provider must emply some physical work and use of other inputs.

And once again, THIS HAS NOTHING with my argument: people pay to “see the movie” and “see the art” — or see a stripper — and this service of “show” is delivered to customers. They don’t care which physical steps the service provider takes to deliver such service and they didn’t pay for these steps (so this is not where liability rests if service is not performed). Is this a strange notion?

By the way, when I said that forcing the service onto someone (like delivering goods someone did not ask for, or playing music for someone) does not entitle you to compensation – how does that involve a third party issue?

When a third party replicates an illegal copy of someone else’s book, they knowingly handle something that is “illegal” based on your very statement. You are trying to prove that by using “illegal” input, you can produce something “legal” and legitimate. That’s a lost argument from the start, but unfortunately (or fortunately for you) you are incapable to understand this.

Matthew Swaringen October 11, 2010 at 4:28 pm

“You are trying to prove that by using “illegal” input, you can produce something “legal” and legitimate. ”

Right on, and so…. where’s that $50 for having seen that thief drive my awesome car. I’m being nice. It’s truly a work of art.

Jay Lakner October 11, 2010 at 5:01 pm

people pay to “see the movie” and “see the art” — or see a stripper — and this service of “show” is delivered to customers. They don’t care which physical steps the service provider takes to deliver such service and they didn’t pay for these steps (so this is not where liability rests if service is not performed).

You don’t pay to “view” something. “Viewing” things is free. You pay for actions that result in your view of something.
You don’t even need to know what those specific actions are to form a contract.
There is nothing wrong with the contract: I’ll give you $X if you perform actions that result in my viewing of the movie.
Only in a metaphorical sense are you paying to “view” something. In reality, you are paying for those actions that resulted in your “view” of something.

By the way, when I said that forcing the service onto someone (like delivering goods someone did not ask for, or playing music for someone) does not entitle you to compensation – how does that involve a third party issue?

I have seen countless people, including myself, try to explain to you that any party who did not make a no-copying agreement can not be legally prevented from making copies. Only the original buyer of a book can be prevented from manually re-typing a book from scratch because of limitations placed on him by the contract of purchase.
If a book gets lost, abandoned, or replicated, and a third party finds it and reads it, there are no restrictions preventing them from duplicating the book.

To be honest, we don’t even need to go to this level to refute your position, since you argue that this is about property rights and not contracts.
You first need to deal with the argument that, without a contract stipulating otherwise, the original buyer is allowed to simply re-type the book on his computer.

When a third party replicates an illegal copy of someone else’s book, they knowingly handle something that is “illegal” based on your very statement. You are trying to prove that by using “illegal” input, you can produce something “legal” and legitimate.

Stop trying to twist my words. I didn’t say the copy was illegal. I said the copy was “illegally-created”.
“Illegal copy” is a nonsensical use of words. Actions can be legal or illegal. Physical objects cannot be either. It’s like saying I’m typing on an illegal computer, or sitting in an illegal chair. Nonsense.

So how about answering the question? Is the third party committing any trespass?

The Kid Salami October 12, 2010 at 6:55 am

Jay – you say

“I have seen countless people, including myself, try to explain to you that any party who did not make a no-copying agreement can not be legally prevented from making copies. Only the original buyer of a book can be prevented from manually re-typing a book from scratch because of limitations placed on him by the contract of purchase.
If a book gets lost, abandoned, or replicated, and a third party finds it and reads it, there are no restrictions preventing them from duplicating the book.”

This categorical statement is in conflict with what you said to me here:

http://blog.mises.org/13725/venus-needs-some-austrians/comment-page-1/#comment-721443

ending with

“..It does seem possible to me that you can prevent third parties from copying, under the right circumstances.”

So I don’t know what you think now.

Peter Surda October 12, 2010 at 7:12 am

Sasha,

By the way, I agree that you are not entitled any money for displaying your car in public – this has nothing to do with our topic. There could be types of “use” that you do not allow with you car and such restrictions are the essence of IP.

On the contrary, it demonstrates the intellectual fraud you are trying to perpetrate. The examples presented to you by Jay and me match all the criteria you provide, yet you claim they have nothing to do with the debate. You can’t wiggle out of it that easily.

Jay Lakner October 12, 2010 at 5:14 pm

Kid Salami,

Sasha is trying to claim that property rights alone (ie absent any contracts) are sufficient to stop third party copying.
If you read through our earlier discussion carefully, you will see I was discussing the contractual case for IP. I said it MAY be possible and that I couldn’t really answer the question because I do not know enough about contracts. Hence why I added, “under the right circumstances”.
As my understanding of contracts develops, I am actually leaning towards it not being possible, but I can’t say that with any certainty yet. Please do not misunderstand my admission of insufficient knowledge of contracts to somehow be a contradiction in the claims I’ve made.

The Kid Salami October 13, 2010 at 7:29 am

Yes, slightly out of context yes, but only slightly – your statement to sasha was categorical no matter what you say now/afterwards.I don’t have any definitive view either – I think it is up to the market.

Say a DRO in a free market had people agree, on signing up as a member, that when you find something in a field that is “a likely candidate” (whatever than means) to have been sold only with non-copying clauses attached, you must take it in to see if the originator (again, there is potential haziness here for Surda who rather oddly thinks you can’t tell. ever, whether you copied something or not) was another member.

If not, if it was created by someone outside this DRO, you can go nuts with it. Else you hand it over. Then if this takes off you could get agreements between DROs to pool their members on this and check with each other when something is handed in for checking.

This or something like its seems reasonable to me. HOw and why this attitude makes me an “IP fascist” is a mystery I’m yet to unravel.

Jay Lakner October 14, 2010 at 1:12 am

Kid Salami,

I think all the anti-IP crowd recognise that the simulation of IP via contracts is perfectly acceptable. It’s a very tricky area however because the extent to which third parties are affected is very hazy.

In fact, this is where the main debate should be… not in this ridiculous “ownership of patterns” or “ownership of actions” or “ownership of intangible services” or any of the other nonsensical positions that most pro-IP advocates try to argue.

I’ve been waiting quite a long time for the pro-IP crowd to wise up to this fact so we can all have a proper debate on the subject. Alas, they just don’t seem to get it.

Sasha Radeta October 10, 2010 at 6:01 pm

This blog has completely insane layout… it was much better before.

Jeremiah Dyke October 10, 2010 at 6:26 am

Great interview!

Stephen Adkins October 11, 2010 at 1:12 pm

Sasha is still playing with semantics after (at least) all these weeks.

Monopoly does not mean the single seller of a good or service. Monopoly does not mean the only owner of some piece of property.

Monopoly implies government force. The producer of a good or service is a monopolist not if he is the only seller, but if he has the legal right to bar other parties from competing with him. This was the understanding of the word as used in the 16th and 17th centuries when describing the mercantilist system, and this is the understanding used on this site.

This is why the word monopoly is used to describe “IP”. It is not because the writer/artist is the sole producer of his work, but because the IP framework allows certain parties the right to ban other parties from competing.

If you don’t understand the conceptual difference, or if you pretend that there is none, the rest of what you write is a waste of time.

Matthew Swaringen October 11, 2010 at 1:26 pm

I can take some pro-IP arguments seriously, but Sasha’s are just terrible. Even if I were pro-IP I’d be saying so. This is because all of Sasha’s arguments fall back to the physical medium being “misused.” What if someone else forwards an MP3 I downloaded from iTunes to themself while on my computer. Is it now the physical server that they have misused, even though they clearly had no connection to it (only using my computer) when the deed was done?

Sasha Radeta October 11, 2010 at 3:33 pm

Matthew,

If you stop hallucinating and focus on my real arguments, maybe you’ll find them more plausible. For example, I don’t focus on “physical contact” as a prerequisite of “use” (as I described, “listening” and “watching the show” are also uses of market services). This is perfectly consistent with Mises’s definition of property and the only way to privatize both positive and negative monetary externalities (true libertarianism).

Your iTunes example is silly — a person who forwarded this MP3 may only “forward” the right that belongs to you — the right of personal, non-commercial use of iTunes service. Nothing more…

Matthew Swaringen October 11, 2010 at 4:37 pm

Ok, so lets say that my friend forwards an e-mail to his friend (without my knowledge) containing an MP3 from my iTunes library. His friend pays him $5 and me nothing for the $1 iTunes song (he really really doesn’t like iTunes, so he has no problems paying more for the song that way. Or perhaps he doesn’t know about iTunes yet. You pick).

The “service” wasn’t forwarded here. They still can’t use iTunes. I didn’t do anything at all illegal (as long as I didn’t know my friend was doing it). If my friend believes he was ok to do this (didn’t ask me but thought I wouldn’t mind, given I let people use PCs at my house all the time and never specified my own iTunes library as off limits) and made no agreement whatsoever with the iTunes service himself, and sent the file to the 3rd party that was obtained using the service (perhaps he didn’t even know iTunes was involved in me getting the file)… you want to declare that the “service” is in some way forwarded?

Now I’ll admit my current example may sound on the extreme end until you realize that many people all the time purchase services and upload data to the internet and that people download it having made no agreement with the original service provider. The only difference in these cases to mine is the “awareness” of the crime, and if you wanted to make that the sticking point I’d at least follow your reasoning. But I think you’ve cut yourself away from that argument with your prior points.

Peter Surda October 12, 2010 at 7:40 am

Sasha,

For example, I don’t focus on “physical contact” as a prerequisite of “use”

That is a normative issue. It does not fix the logical fallacies in the theory. If physical objects are owned (physical property), changes to them (services) cannot be owned by a different person. These two approaches cannot be valid at the same time. If you want to have ownership of “services”, you need to abandon ownership of physical goods. There is no way around it.

Sasha Radeta October 11, 2010 at 3:22 pm

LMAO!!!!

Some people have a strange sense of humor — or just have no shame at all.

Stephen said: “Sasha is still playing with semantics after (at least) all these weeks.”

It became clear that entire anti-IP case now rests on the notion that “art show” is not a “service”, based on some strange notion that “use of service” must be defined as “physically touching good that provides service”… You have insane discussions about whether the “use of signposts” is really a “use” because photons of lights don’t have enough property of particles (!?!?!) — and you tell me I play with semantics????

Shame on you! First of all, I mentioned “monopoly” in the context of really ignorant comment: ““So people are more likely to enter an industry where they are promised a monopoly?”

Everyone who purchased copyrighted book use knows that “monopoly” in this market is consisted of millions of market players who compete with their unique goods. That’s why I reminded you that word “monopoly” means “a single seller” and it can be used to perfectly describe the IP type of “monopoly.” As long as you own something unique, you can be a single seller (monopolist) but that by no means imply that you gained some government’s privilege. IP legislations do not “grant” any rights to anyone, they simply enumerate the list of rights that directly stem from the very fact of ownership: that uses of any property belong exclusively to its owner.

Jay Lakner October 11, 2010 at 4:13 pm

Sasha “Strawman” Radeta wrote:

It became clear that entire anti-IP case now rests on the notion that “art show” is not a “service”, based on some strange notion that “use of service” must be defined as “physically touching good that provides service”

“Touching”? This is your understanding of the arguments that have been presented to you???

Your purposeful use of vague language and sheer dishonesty is so transparent that I’m amazed that you continue to persist arguing.

“Use of” or “services provided by” an object requires alteration of the integrity or momentum of that object.

When you pay to see an art show, you are paying for:
a) Access to a location – you are permitted to walk on the floors, breathe the air, open the doors, talk, etc.
b) That the physical art itself be located at that location – if prior to the show the art is not already present at the location, then you are paying for physical movement of the art works to that location.

You may go there to “enjoy” the art, but you are not “using” the art. You are paying for the service of “using” a location and this is conditional on the physical art being present.

You do not pay to “view” something. You pay for services that result in your “view” of something.

G8R HED October 11, 2010 at 4:29 pm

….flasher briefly opens waistcoat with Monet suspended on each side: “DISCOUNT!” ;)

Stephen Adkins October 11, 2010 at 1:32 pm

As a follow-up, Sasha, I felt that, since you love to vaguely refer to Rothbard, I’d quote him at length. This is from Man Economy and State, chapter 10, on “monopoly”. I know it’s a lot of reading, but you won’t mind since it’s Rothbard.

“Later in this chapter we shall analyze in greater detail the tangled web of fallacies involved in the various theories of “mo­nopolistic competition”; at this point we are attempting to arrive at a definition of monopoly per se. To proceed: There are three possible coherent definitions of monopoly. One is derived from its linguistic roots: monos (only) and polein (to sell), i.e., the only seller of any given good (definition 1). This is certainly a legiti­mate definition, but it is an extraordinarily broad one. It means that, whenever there is any differentiation at all among individual products, the individual producer and seller is a “monopolist.” John Jones, lawyer, is a “monopolist” over the legal services of John Jones; Tom Williams, doctor, is a “monopolist” over his own unique medical services, etc. The owner of the Empire State Building is a “monopolist” over the rental services in his building. This definition, therefore, labels all consumer distinctions be­tween individual products as establishing “monopolies.”

It must be remembered that only consumers can decide whether two commodities offered on the market are one good or two differ­ent goods. This issue cannot be settled by a physical inspection of the product. The elemental physical nature of the good may be only one of its properties; in most cases, a brand name, the “good will” of a particular company, or a more pleasant atmosphere in the store will differentiate the product from its rivals in the view of many of its customers. The products then become different goods for the consumers. No one can ever be certain in advance—least of all the economist—whether a commodity sold by A will be treated on the market as homogeneous with the same basic physi­cal good sold by B.[27][28]

Hence, there is hardly any way that definition 1 of “monopoly” can be successfully used. For this definition depends on how we choose a “homogeneous good,” and this can never be decided by an economist. What constitutes a homogeneous commodity” (i.e., an industry)—neckties, bow ties, bow ties with polka dots, etc., or bow ties made by Jones? Only consumers will decide, and they, as different consumers, will be likely to decide differently in each concrete case. Use of definition 1, therefore, will probably reduce to the barren definition of monopoly as each man’s exclu­sive ownership of his own property—and this, absurdly, would make every single person a monopolist![29]

Definition 1, then, is coherent, but highly inexpedient. Its use­fulness is very limited, and the term has acquired highly charged emotional connotations from past use of quite different defini­tions. For reasons detailed below, the term “monopoly” has sin­ister and evil connotations to most people. “Monopolist” is gen­erally a word of abuse; to apply the term “monopolist” to at least the vast majority of the population and perhaps to every man would have a confusing and even ludicrous effect.

The second definition is related to the first, but differs very significantly. It, in fact, was the original definition of monopoly and the very definition responsible for its sinister connotations in the public mind. Let us turn to its classic expression by the great seventeenth-century jurist, Lord Coke:

A monopoly is an institution or allowance by the king, by his grant, commission, or otherwise . . . to any person or persons, bodies politic or corporate, for the sole buying, selling, making, working, or using of anything, whereby any person or persons, bodies politic or cor­porate, are sought to be restrained of any freedom or liberty that they had before, or hindered in their lawful trade.[30]

In other words, by this definition, monopoly is a grant of special privilege by the State, reserving a certain area of production to one particular individual or group. Entry into the field is prohibited to others and this prohibition is enforced by the gen­darmes of the State.

This definition of monopoly goes back to the common law and acquired great political importance in England during the six­teenth and seventeenth centuries, when an historic struggle took place between libertarians and the Crown over the issue of mo­nopoly as opposed to freedom of production and enterprise. Un­der this definition of the term, it is not surprising that “monop­oly” took on connotations of sinister interest and tyranny in the public mind. The enormous restrictions on production and trade, as well as the establishment by the State of a monopoly caste of favorites, were the objects of vehement attack for several cen­turies.[31]

Sasha Radeta October 11, 2010 at 2:37 pm

Stephen,

Why not posting entire book to make it look like you got something to say…

Stephen Adkins October 11, 2010 at 3:46 pm

Why not “addressing” the point?

You routinely reference Rothbard though it’s clear you don’t know what he says. You routinely misuse ambiguous terminology like monopoly though it’s clear you don’t know what you’re saying.

I know it’s a lot to ask, but please try to read the above quote from Rothbard, explaining the proper definition of monopoly. Explain how you can justify your use of his “Definition 1″ in light of the difficulties he outlines.

Sasha Radeta October 11, 2010 at 4:10 pm

Stephen,

I addressed the whole issue just above. It is not my fault that your pal did not know that a promise of a monopoly will attract more producers than a promise of perfect competition (zero profits). Also, I explained why IP is not government-granted privilege — but just a “monopoly” in its original meaning (single sellers of unique goods)

I referenced Rothbard for two reasons:
- to remind that “monopolists” in this sense can never “set” prices and restrict output (which is obvious in case of copyright
- to also remind you that Rothbard was a great defender of copyright – although he was the greatest anarcho-capitalist who would never defend government-granted monopoly (of course, you don’t know this, since your one-minute Google search and copy+paste did not take you to this chapter).

Best regards.

Jay Lakner October 11, 2010 at 5:06 pm

Sasha Radeta wrote:

It is not my fault that your pal did not know that a promise of a monopoly will attract more producers than a promise of perfect competition (zero profits).

Someone please remind me never to use sarcasm in the presence of Sasha Radeta again.

Stephen Adkins October 12, 2010 at 11:04 am

…you still didnt read it. Rothbard identified the original definition of monopoly as being a State granted privelege, not as being the single seller of a good. I’ll admit that it makes you sound like you know what you’re talking about when you throw out statements like “As Rothbard says…” and “According to Rothbard…”, but it backfires a little when it becomes clear that you don’t know what he said.

I know Rothbard was a proponent of copyright, but that’s not even the issue here. The issue here is your persistent use of the term monopoly as defined as a single seller of a good. If you would only read a little, you would realize that your citing Rothbard as back up for this understanding is completely wrong. You would see that Rothbard spent the entire beginning of his chapter on monopoly explaining why a monopoly is usefully defined as a State granted privilege.

Andras October 11, 2010 at 4:25 pm

Sasha,
I admire your stamina!

Trolls' troll October 11, 2010 at 8:07 pm

Sasha could probably not win these arguments any clearer than he does which is kind of a contretemps because his argument does clearly have weak points that never get addressed. It’s really not that hard to see what he’s saying and the endless parsing and flem-spewing about semantics just make it look like you can only hold one idea inside your brain (yours, truly) at the expense of everything else. You guys seem otherwise smart enough but that makes me wonder.

Jay Lakner October 11, 2010 at 10:01 pm

It’s really not that hard to see what he’s saying

On the contrary, it has been very difficult working out exactly what his position is. He uses vague language which half the time doesn’t make any sense. And on several occasions he has completely changed his position and pretended as if he hasn’t.

Basically, he hold’s the position that an author retains ownership of all the physical copies and only sells “limited use” of them. It’s pretty much a rental agreement.

This is a much weaker view than contractual IP because the author cannot limit people’s actions that do not affect the property itself.

his argument does clearly have weak points that never get addressed.

The weak points have been clearly outlined to him.
- Duplicating the property in a manner that does not affect the copy (eg, by manually retyping the entire thing into your computer) cannot be prevented by property rights alone. (Only contracts can do that)
- His position cannot limit the actions of third parties that do not affect the property. (Contracts suffer from this problem also)

You guys seem otherwise smart enough but that makes me wonder.

Ok Mr super genius guy, if you believe there are other such obvious weak points that us dummies aren’t bright enough to think of, then please enlighten us.

Andras October 12, 2010 at 12:45 am

Guys,
If you think IP is controversial consider the current situation of real estate. Real estate can not be more “real” and still…there are title fights between MERS, REMIC and county clerks:
http://market-ticker.org/akcs-www?post=168845
They can not even figure out the real estate titles let alone the title enforcements. At least the titles of IP are still clear!
Shouldn’t you rather focus on reserving still existing property rights before there are none?

Stephen Adkins October 12, 2010 at 8:33 am

Andras,

Yes, and in a very real sense that’s what fighting IP is all about. Intellectual property reduces, and blurs the lines of, real, physical property. It is not a mere philosophical debate. It affects whether or not I can use my property in the real world, or whether others can keep me from using it.

Andras October 12, 2010 at 11:27 am

What prevented you from using your property before you learned about that particular “IP”? Not once but always?

Stephen Adkins October 12, 2010 at 10:34 pm

The idea is that I own physical property, but if a certain process is protected (i.e., through a patent), or if a certain creative work (a song, for instance) is deemed “owned” by some other party, I may not use my property within the bounds of the law to reproduce those protected elements. Thus, IP keeps me from being able to use my own property in the way I see fit. I have to choose between breaking the law and using my physical property in a totally non-aggressive way.

IP, in this way, is irreconcilable to physical property; the two must be mutually exclusive. If one upholds IP, he is implicitly agreeing that owners of physical property do not really have full ownership, that certain uses of that physical property are already “owned” by some other party. Thus, IP causes some party to own a certain element of all physical property in society; in other words, IP infringes upon real property.

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