Perhaps the most interesting experience I had, while earning my degree in Mathematics, was studying for the Topology Preliminary Exam. I spent three weeks–Christmas vacation–studying for it, as much as possible. Memorizing theorems and their proofs. Reviewing different types of spaces. Solving problem after problem after problem. Near the end, I would look at a stop-sign and think “Hey, a two-hole torus!” I could feel topology flow through me. I owned topology.

Of course, the other math students doing the same thing as I was, had every right to the knowledge they earned through the same process. Thus, understanding “Intellectual Homesteading” is a bane to the cause of so-called Intellectual Property, rather than a help to it!

Granted, books will help you do this–but they aren’t the be-all and end-all of absorbing ideas. Indeed, sometimes you come up with them independently from others, all on your own!

And once an idea is my own, if someone else homesteads the very same idea, that person doesn’t take away from my homesteading–indeed, that person cannot trespass on my ideas, because ideas are kept in my head. Thus, that person has as much right to the use of such an idea as I do.

I’m glad we’re making some progress.

> Subjectivity is everywhere, including in numerous
> principles in the law dealing with physical property.
You use subjectivity here to denote different issues that I am pointing out. I am talking about measurable aspects, you are talking about utility or meaning. There is nothing subjective in physical objects. Their existence determines their scope. Of course, we can discuss what object belongs to whom, and how an apple can be used. But that is a completely different issue. An apple does not extend beyond the skin, and ownership of an apple does not extend to places outside this skin. Why should then (the immaterial) book extend beyond the author’s head, and the homesteading beyond his copies? That is a completely unfounded assumption. Whereas with physical objects, their scope is determined by measurement, with immaterial it is determined by meaning or utility. So you see, we are talking about different “subjectivity”. Even if we can’t be completely sure with regards to results of measurement, we are still sure that there is only one thing to measure. But with meaning and utility, the scope can be literally anything.

Furthermore, you evaded the actual issue. The condition remains subjective. My condition (alteration and/or making unavailable) doesn’t.

> Homesteading and some rulemaking are sufficient
> for physical property, they are sufficient for
> intellectual property as well.
Of course, this misses that it is the scope of homesteading that we disagree about.

> Once you recognize homesteading for IP its just
> a matter of rulemaking.
Yet already you are making a rule where you assert that the homesteading of immaterial extends beyond one’s head. That’s the equivalent of claiming that ownership of an apple extends to objects in its proximity, or to objects that taste sweet when eaten.

> Just like with real estate and the rulemaking
> surrounding homesteading and exclusion there.
With physical objects, you homestead the actual objects based on their measurable properties (which are objective), rather than utility (which is subjective). That invalidates your real estate example. With immaterial objects, you again have a choice between two approaches, but regrettably for you, both are subjective: meaning and utility.

> There are documentation requirements for IP.
> This is analogous to homesteading and getting
> one’s homestead recognized.
Yet, before we even come to this stage, we need to agree that homesteading ideas extends beyond one’s head.

> Your analogy is only relevant if you are talking
> about a new kind of apple that was created by
> me.
What is “new kind of apple”? Is this again you trying to determine the limit where dissimilarities are relevant?

> If you took the apple and produced it
> commercially your theory has worse problems
> than the boundary problem.
What do you mean “took the apple”? If I take an apple without your permission, that would be theft.

> Your claim that you are entitled to copy my apple
> without my consent represents a unilateral,
> collectivist claim on another’s labor/property.
What are you talking about? If I copy an apple, I created an externality. Unless you covered such an occasion by contracts, your ownership does not extend to it. Exactly the same way as externalities are handled with regards to material goods.

> And most importantly your unilateral appropriation
> of my apple design would throw out the pricing
> mechanism (per Silas Barta) for creating new
> apple designs and varieties, especially those that
> were costly or time-consuming.
Yet, for some strange reason, none of the IP proponents are bothered by the same effect being achieved by externalities or substitutes. For some strange reason, you keep asserting that there is a difference between an illegitimate copy and an externality, between an original and a substitute, without explaining anything. I keep explaining that there is no such difference, and you just shrug it off.

> The need for a little rulemaking, like we have with
> real property exclusion, is a lot better than
> throwing out the pricing mechanism and installing
> IP collectivism.
Your argument fails on externalities, substitutes, etc.

> What’s important with homesteading is not only
> that the land is identified, but that you are
> identified as the owner (the one mixing their labor
> with the land) and that this is acknowledged.
This is only at the second stage of the theory. In the first, it needs to be determined what a homesteading would mean. You have to define it first, which you haven’t because your conditions are insufficient.

Explicitly or implicitly, you provide some of the following conditions for homesteading:
- causality (you admitted insufficient)
- similarity (you admitted subjective)
- utility (you denied as a condition)
- meaning (you have not mentioned this but I added it for completeness’ sake)

I think that you are mentally stuck with this approach to defining property. As I have demonstrated however, this approach does not deliver a usable definition. This is the core issue that you need to solve before the rest of your arguments even are relevant. You need either to make your conditions sufficient, or abandon this approach. I did the latter: I abandoned this approach and favour a different one, that is based sufficient conditions and measurable boundaries.

Why are such laws justified? What is the basis of these laws? Why should I not injure anyone?

Because each person owns themself (otherwise there is some state of slavery) and you would be infringing on their rights, etc. Our hypothetical only dealt with doing away with exclusion in real estate.

Oh!!! So rights, specifically property rights, originate from the need for commercialisation? Quite interesting and revealing (as I said, of the state of your mind).

No, that’s just one of the main reasons for exclusion. There are many others. But it’s pretty funny it was one of the first things you started focusing on prattling on about your factory and such.

Frankly, that’s where this discussion should start because your basic concept of rights itself is nothing more than a grab bag of notions based on “convenience”. Yours is not a “natural rights” position and hence, any argument between you and a person starting from the concepts of “natural rights” is bound to end in this situation.

Nonsense. My position is more strongly rooted in natural rights than yours.

So, please do tell me where man’s rights originate from and then let us take the case up using reason.

Man’s rights begin with self-ownership and the corresponding right to one’s labor (Note: Not a particular value on that labor, the right to sell or form a contract for it.) and branches out from there through homesteading.

You: Property is derived from causality.
Me: What about externalities?
You: Ok, you need the additional condition of similarity.
Me: Similarity is subjective.
You: Ok, but original and copy are causally related.

So you see? You’re moving in circles. You admit yourself that both conditions are insufficient. Absent the condition that is sufficient, you are left without a definition of property and your theory falls apart.

That’s a mischaracterization:

pil: IP is derived from homesteading.

PS: What about externalities?

pil: Basically, same as with physical property. The IP owner just decides how they’re going to sell/license their good.

PS: Similarity is subjective.

pil: Subjectivity is everywhere, including in numerous principles in the law dealing with physical property. So to claim subjectivity is an obstacle means we discard physical property too. To throw out the pricing mechanism for IP for basically collectivist claims on the grounds of “subjectivity” would be pretty unwise.

Homesteading and some rulemaking are sufficient for physical property, they are sufficient for intellectual property as well.

There is no mystery, merely subjectivity. Actually, the whole sentence is a bit confusing. I claim indeed that an original and copy are different, not that it is difficult to tell them apart. Sometimes it might be difficutl to say which is which, nevertheless there are still two of them.

There is plenty of subjectivity in the law dealing with physical property. Once you recognize homesteading for IP its just a matter of rulemaking. Just like with real estate and the rulemaking surrounding homesteading and exclusion there.

As I am attempting to explain, so far IP proponents have failed to demonstrate the “already” part. I fail to see this description as anything else than a metaphor, there is no empirical evidence for this ever happening. Furthermore, as I pointed out again several times, this brings up the question of boundaries, which again has not been answered by any of the IP proponents.

There are documentation requirements for IP. This is analogous to homesteading and getting one’s homestead recognized.

Boundaries – how much exclusion to allow – would be addressed with rulemaking.

While it is true that this example is valid within your theory, it is also valid within mine. Taking apples alters the tree and makes the apples unavailable to anyone else. However, making a copy of an apple does not alter either the idea of apple nor the existing “original” apples, nor does it make the existing “original” apples unavailable to anyone. Furthermore, unlike your theory, my theory does not have the boundary problem.

Your analogy is only relevant if you are talking about a new kind of apple that was created by me. If you took the apple and produced it commercially your theory has worse problems than the boundary problem. Your claim that you are entitled to copy my apple without my consent represents a unilateral, collectivist claim on another’s labor/property. And most importantly your unilateral appropriation of my apple design would throw out the pricing mechanism (per Silas Barda) for creating new apple designs and varieties, especially those that were costly or time-consuming.

The need for a little rulemaking, like we have with real property exclusion, is a lot better than throwing out the pricing mechanism and installing IP collectivism.

I am not sure I understand this. Apart from the feature of “looks”, land has the feature of location. Precisely because “looks” are subjective, they are not a suitable determinant of boundaries.

Correct me if I’m wrong, but the courts do not recognise land ownership based on what it looks like, rather where it is located.

What’s important with homesteading is not only that the land is identified, but that you are identified as the owner (the one mixing their labor with the land) and that this is acknowledged. The acknowledgement through documentation is what is important, just like with IP homesteading.

All subjective. All dependent on human interpretation. All are “meanings” that humans derive from the work. Not one of these things is an objective characteristic of their work.

Subjectivity is everywhere, including in contracts for labor and physical property. That doesn’t keep us from distinguishing it. Same with other concepts involving natural law, like force and fraud. We deal with distinguishing “subjective” similarities all the time. (By using “objective” or observable criteria, phenomena, or characteristics.)

No, no, no. Stop trying to evade the point.
I stated that the book and the movie were objectively completely different. To demonstrate their similarity, you continually brought up causality. I then demonstrated that causality doesn’t prove anything.

You picked a bad example to use, because the book and movie are causally related by definition.

In any case homesteading basically is and relies on causation. See Locke.

Now you introduce this new word, “adaptation”, whose meaning is so broad that I’m sure you’re going to try to twist its definition around to suit your needs.

I don’t need to twist anything. An adaptation is the process of “adapting” a story from one medium to another. Same main story. Same main characters. Same main plot. A movie adapted from a book is by definition both similar and causally related.

By my definition of adaptation, my “complete opposite” movie IS an adaptation of the movie it’s based on. But you’re going to deny that and say that I’m using the word “adaptation” wrong.

You are using it wrong. An adaptation follows the same basic plot. Doing things completely different could either be a completely different work or possibly a parody, depending on how it was done.

Now you’re changing your tune. I guess you realised that equating similarity with causality is indeed a logical error. Unfortunately, instead of just admitting it and moving on, you’ve desperately tried to cover up your error by introducing this “adaptation” word.

Not at all. I just pointed out that adaptations are both similar and causally related, which they are.

Please stop being intellectually dishonest. We were discussing an example where the acts are causally related, but similarity was in dispute.

Watch the spurious “dishonest” accusations. Up until now I’ve ignored your caustic, insulting, and condescending tone and ad hominems. If you’re going to start claiming I’m dishonest then I may decide to stop responding to your comments.

You tried to demonstrate that they must be similar because they are causally related. I demonstrated the flaw in this thinking and now you’re trying to cover up your mistake.

Didn’t make a mistake. Adaptations are both similar and causally related. I confirmed that other examples you gave were disimilar.

In the grand scheme of things this is a meaningless series of forum posts which will probably never be read again. So you made a mistake, who cares? Can you at least try to be intellectually honest and move on. I don’t want to waste my time arguing with someone who is more interested in their own self-image than the content of the discussion.

The mistake is yours. See above.

“Observable phenomena” is a subset of “characteristics”. ie all observable phenomena are characteristics but not all characteristics are observable phenomena. This is because there can be both objective characteristics and subjective characteristics. So no, they are not true synonyms.

I didn’t say they were “true synonyms”. Meanings don’t have to overlap completely for words to be synonyms.

It would be intellectually dishonest to pretend I mean something different than the meaning I intend.

I didn’t. And you now know my intended meaning. And you’ve been warned about the “dishonesty” nonsense.

let me first explain the moving in circles. Our debate goes like this:

You: Property is derived from causality.
Me: What about externalities?
You: Ok, you need the additional condition of similarity.
Me: Similarity is subjective.
You: Ok, but original and copy are causally related.

So you see? You’re moving in circles. You admit yourself that both conditions are insufficient. Absent the condition that is sufficient, you are left without a definition of property and your theory falls apart.

> You claim it is some great mystery telling an
> original IP creation from a copy.
There is no mystery, merely subjectivity. Actually, the whole sentence is a bit confusing. I claim indeed that an original and copy are different, not that it is difficult to tell them apart. Sometimes it might be difficutl to say which is which, nevertheless there are still two of them.

> Yet much of our physical property rights are
> based on written contracts – and copies of
> contracts.
This does not invalidate my argument. For this to work it is sufficient that both parties involved agree on the meaning to a sufficient degree. An arbiter only has to ascertain whether there is an overlap between what the parties involved mean. That overlap is the contract. If there is no overlap or an insufficient one, there is a mistake or fraud. None of this requries that anything objective, it wholly depends on the meaning that the involved parties derive from the communication. It does not depend on a third party opinion. Even the arbiter does not need to share the meaning.

> What’s different with intellectual property is you
> want to equate a duplicate of already
> homesteaded IP with the original. But it has
> already been homesteaded.
As I am attempting to explain, so far IP proponents have failed to demonstrate the “already” part. I fail to see this description as anything else than a metaphor, there is no empirical evidence for this ever happening. Furthermore, as I pointed out again several times, this brings up the question of boundaries, which again has not been answered by any of the IP proponents.

> It is like you coming into my apple orchard and
> picking the apples and claiming “look, I did the
> picking, these are mine”. That is incorrect
> because my homesteading claim is superior to
> yours.
While it is true that this example is valid within your theory, it is also valid within mine. Taking apples alters the tree and makes the apples unavailable to anyone else. However, making a copy of an apple does not alter either the idea of apple nor the existing “original” apples, nor does it make the existing “original” apples unavailable to anyone. Furthermore, unlike your theory, my theory does not have the boundary problem.

> First of all, some physical property can and does
> need to be distinguised, that’s why we have
> deeds, etc. – a lot of land looks just like the land
> next to it.
I am not sure I understand this. Apart from the feature of “looks”, land has the feature of location. Precisely because “looks” are subjective, they are not a suitable determinant of boundaries.

> Next, with homesteading part of the process is to
> make sure your homesteading is recognized and
> easy to establish in court if that becomes
> necessary. Same with IP homesteading.
Correct me if I’m wrong, but the courts do not recognise land ownership based on what it looks like, rather where it is located.

We are moving in circles. We’re back to the causality argument, which you yourself admit is an insufficient condition for homesteading.

Not sure what context you are referring to. The only thing necessary for physical homesteading is enclosure, which is definitely “caused” by the homesteader. The process for IP homesteading is similar. This is a long thread, cite it or paraphrase the exchange please. If there is an inconsistency I’ll be happy to address it.

I am not sure I understand. If a “copy” is made according to a contract, then it is the contract that defines the scope of copy, or, which attributes are relevant and which not. This still does not imply that the result is an “objective copy”.

No, I wasn’t referring to a contract transaction.

I was referring to contracts as patterns. You claim it is some great mystery telling an original IP creation from a copy. Yet much of our physical property rights are based on written contracts – and copies of contracts. We have to recgonize different “patterns” for recording and transacting with physical property, so it is no great hardship to do so with intellectual property.

Indeed. You yourself admit that there is a distinction between them by calling one of them “original” and one of them “copy”. Now, without using the causality argument, we are stuck with the “similarity”, which as shown before and above, is also subjective.

Homesteading IS causality. With both physical property and intellectual property. With physical property you enclose or whatever and go down to the courthouse (or land office, etc.) and get your homesteading recognized. With intellectual property you put it down in writing and go get a copyright, patent, trademark, etc.

What’s different with intellectual property is you want to equate a duplicate of already homesteaded IP with the original. But it has already been homesteaded. It is like you coming into my apple orchard and picking the apples and claiming “look, I did the picking, these are mine”. That is incorrect because my homesteading claim is superior to yours.

With physical goods, there is no “original” and “copy”. There is always just one. There is no way to distinguish one physical object from the same physical object.

Couple problems with this. First of all, some physical property can and does need to be distinguised, that’s why we have deeds, etc. – a lot of land looks just like the land next to it. Next, with homesteading part of the process is to make sure your homesteading is recognized and easy to establish in court if that becomes necessary. Same with IP homesteading.

> Because those are based partly on principles of
> self-ownership and homesteading.
We are moving in circles. We’re back to the causality argument, which you yourself admit is an insufficient condition for homesteading.

> You know what “copies” are from contracts and
> titles for physical property.
I am not sure I understand. If a “copy” is made according to a contract, then it is the contract that defines the scope of copy, or, which attributes are relevant and which not. This still does not imply that the result is an “objective copy”.

> There is an original, and then there is a copy.
Indeed. You yourself admit that there is a distinction between them by calling one of them “original” and one of them “copy”. Now, without using the causality argument, we are stuck with the “similarity”, which as shown before and above, is also subjective.

> If you can’t understand the “abstract” concept of
> originals and copies there I guess there goes
> physical property too…
With physical goods, there is no “original” and “copy”. There is always just one. There is no way to distinguish one physical object from the same physical object.

I still fail to see the connection. Some activities are harder to perform than others, that is correct. But this does not serve as an explanation for anything in natural law, Austrian economics or libertarianism. In fact, it’s a utilitarian approach.

Because those are based partly on principles of self-ownership and homesteading.

You begin with a faulty assumption already. There is no such thing as an “exact copy”. It’s just an abstraction, or a metaphor that we use when we deem the distinctions irrelevant.

Not at all. You know what “copies” are from contracts and titles for physical property. There is an original, and then there is a copy. If you can’t understand the “abstract” concept of originals and copies there I guess there goes physical property too…

On the contrary, it is you who insists on squeezing natural rights in some place where there are none.

Wrong. Homesteading (and self-ownership) is one of the foundations of natural rights, and the same person that documented and perhaps originated the concept believed homesteading applied to intellectual property as well.

> If you believe in natural law, Austrian economics,
> and libertarianism, it does.
I still fail to see the connection. Some activities are harder to perform than others, that is correct. But this does not serve as an explanation for anything in natural law, Austrian economics or libertarianism. In fact, it’s a utilitarian approach.

> Basically, we start with exact copies of protected
> works being infringing and work from there.
You begin with a faulty assumption already. There is no such thing as an “exact copy”. It’s just an abstraction, or a metaphor that we use when we deem the distinctions irrelevant.

> So if you want to abandon natural rights the
> minute a difficult distinction comes up perhaps
> you are in the wrong field.
On the contrary, it is you who insists on squeezing natural rights in some place where there are none.

> Unfortunately I can’t address the rest of your
> points until later, just wanted to chime in when I
> could.
I don’t have as much time myself as I would like to argue, so a slower pace is welcomed.

Actually, it doesn’t. Whether it is valid or not, my theory is unaffected.

Wrong. If you believe in natural law, Austrian economics, and libertarianism, it does. Homesteading is part of the foundation of natural law and the others.

It is merely a matter of extent. They always share some commonalities and some distinctions. Yet you claim that sometimes the commonalities take precedence (“property”), and sometimes the distinctions (“externalities”) without explaining how you draw such conclusions.

Basically, we start with exact copies of protected works being infringing and work from there. Legal rules have developed to sort these out. Just because distinctions are difficult to make doesn’t mean they shouldn’t be made. Note we make legal rules to make difficult distinctions involving natural law rights all the time. Physical property homesteading, contracts, fraud, etc. So if you want to abandon natural rights the minute a difficult distinction comes up perhaps you are in the wrong field.

Unfortunately I can’t address the rest of your points until later, just wanted to chime in when I could.

I will be addressing the other posters too if they are still following.

Thanks for revealing the kind of mind it takes to form a position such as yours.

” And watch you don’t injure anyone, because there are still laws against negligence, battery, etc. ”

Why are such laws justified? What is the basis of these laws? Why should I not injure anyone?

” It would be difficult and it would dramatically effect your ability to commercialize your property, but it would not be “impossible”.

That said, isn’t it great that current real estate exclusion lets you more effectively commercialize your property? No one unilaterally decides that they will commercialize your property, or unilaterally uses your property in a way that interferes with your commercialization. ”

Oh!!! So rights, specifically property rights, originate from the need for commercialisation? Quite interesting and revealing (as I said, of the state of your mind).

Frankly, that’s where this discussion should start because your basic concept of rights itself is nothing more than a grab bag of notions based on “convenience”. Yours is not a “natural rights” position and hence, any argument between you and a person starting from the concepts of “natural rights” is bound to end in this situation.

So, please do tell me where man’s rights originate from and then let us take the case up using reason.

All subjective. All dependent on human interpretation. All are “meanings” that humans derive from the work. Not one of these things is an objective characteristic of their work.

“With adaptations by definition they are similar, and causally related.”

No, no, no. Stop trying to evade the point.
I stated that the book and the movie were objectively completely different. To demonstrate their similarity, you continually brought up causality. I then demonstrated that causality doesn’t prove anything.

Now you introduce this new word, “adaptation”, whose meaning is so broad that I’m sure you’re going to try to twist its definition around to suit your needs.

By my definition of adaptation, my “complete opposite” movie IS an adaptation of the movie it’s based on. But you’re going to deny that and say that I’m using the word “adaptation” wrong.

So please, you need to specifically define “adaptation” before using that word again.

“In some cases they are different and in some cases they are not. We were talking about an adaptation, which by definition is both similar and causally related.”

Now you’re changing your tune. I guess you realised that equating similarity with causality is indeed a logical error. Unfortunately, instead of just admitting it and moving on, you’ve desperately tried to cover up your error by introducing this “adaptation” word.

“The example we were discussing was one where the acts by definition were both similar and causally related.”

Please stop being intellectually dishonest. We were discussing an example where the acts are causally related, but similarity was in dispute.

I specifically stated:
“The two are very different. However, humans assign the same meaning to the book as they do to the movie. So an individual might come to the conclusion that they are the same story. But in reality they are not.”

You countered by saying:
“Wrong. The movie is based on the book. There would be no movie in that form if the book hadn’t been created.”

You tried to demonstrate that they must be similar because they are causally related. I demonstrated the flaw in this thinking and now you’re trying to cover up your mistake.

In the grand scheme of things this is a meaningless series of forum posts which will probably never be read again. So you made a mistake, who cares? Can you at least try to be intellectually honest and move on. I don’t want to waste my time arguing with someone who is more interested in their own self-image than the content of the discussion.

“”Characteristics” is a synonym for “observable phenomena”. So yes, it does mean characteristically. Especially if we are talking about science or law.”

“Observable phenomena” is a subset of “characteristics”. ie all observable phenomena are characteristics but not all characteristics are observable phenomena. This is because there can be both objective characteristics and subjective characteristics. So no, they are not true synonyms.

But this is irrelevant at this point.

We are not trying to decipher a text here. We are trying to convey meaning to one another.
I have explained to you what I mean when I say “objectively”.
You should now understand my intended meaning of the word “objectively”.
It would be intellectually dishonest to pretend I mean something different than the meaning I intend.

> In some cases they are different and in some cases
> they are not. We were talking about an adaptation,
> which by definition is both similar and causally
> related.
Yet you fail to define either causality or similarity. You admit that some externalities do not lead to a property claim. So you admit that causality is an insufficient condition for defining property. Then you claim that in some cases, similarity does not lead to a property claim either. So you admit again that similarity is not a sufficient condition for defining property.

These two conditions eliminated, your theory is left without a definition of property.

> I’m sure you would like to assume it is irrelevant,
> since your model depends on that assumption.
Actually, it doesn’t. Whether it is valid or not, my theory is unaffected.

> They are different.
It is merely a matter of extent. They always share some commonalities and some distinctions. Yet you claim that sometimes the commonalities take precedence (“property”), and sometimes the distinctions (“externalities”) without explaining how you draw such conclusions.

> Or you could water down the archetypes even
> further and say that all art is about sex and/or
> death.
Exactly. It’s a matter of where you draw the line.

> But note how you undermine your own argument
> here.
I don’t. I never said that the aspects are never present, only that they sometimes aren’t. Elementary logic error on your side. The refutation of a claim “A always leads to B” is not “A never leads to B”, rather “A sometimes does not lead to B”.

> If people can’t objectively tell IP apart then why do
> they bother copying protected material?
Because the similarities are more useful to them than the distinctions. This is a subjective evaluation. There is no need for anything objective in this.

> As far as boundaries are concerned mentioning
> the archetypes actually harms your case.
I am afraid it harms yours and not mine.

> How do we set these boundaries? The same way
> we set boundaries for other property violations
> that involve subjectivity, like fraud and related
> offenses.
Regrettably for you, fraud requires an underlying contract. You can’t defraud a third party. Which is precisely what I’ve been arguing about.

> Wrong, the property can be identified.
No, it cannot. You merely assert this, without explaining how to actually do that.

> Externalities are simply handled like they are with
> physical property, with the property owner just
> deciding on a product and price.
Exactly. And because the goods covered by IP are just a form of externality, the owner is free to decide what strategy and contractual relationships to pursue in order to maximise his personal gain off it. There is no need for IP anywhere.

> This coming from the person working with terms
> defined to support their model.
This is coming from a person that is trying to base his assumptions on observation rather than theory-utilitarianism.

> Land is only truly rivalrous in small parcels.
So you are saying that it is rivalrous in small scope but not in large? I am afraid you are using the “utility” to define rivalry. That is an invalid approach. Utility is subjective.

> We need homesteading and exclusion to optimally
> commercialize…
So I am right. “Optimally commercialize”. You’re using an utilitarian approach. That invalidates your other part of the theory that tries a natural rights approach. You can’t mix them, you need to prove the independently.

> … and make a market in the asset. Unavailability
> for commercialization IS present when one
> cannot exclude in IP, just as in real estate.
This has nothing to do with property rights. The ability to market something depends on entrepreneurship and not exclusivity.

> Your model is flawed because it involves defining
> terms to enable the taking of an asset from
> another without an agreement on price or indeed
> any agreement at all.
Your theory is flawed because you assume there is an “asset” where there is none. There is no asset, only utility and that is subjective.

> And the ease of the taking isn’t an excuse or
> justification, as illustrated by numerous examples.
Yet again you are assuming the utilitarian approach. I don’t mind it per se, but you can’t arbitrarily switch between those two approaches (natural rights vs. utilitarian).

> Without a bilateral transaction there is no pricing
> mechanism in effect.
For the purposes of this debate, I’ll assume this is correct.

> Therefore you have the same pricing problems
> that occur in socialism. (per Mises/Silas Barta)
Silas’ argument has been refuted. I wrote a five-point refutation. Suffice to say that the ability to exclude has nothing to do with the calculation argument. If it was, it would refute all trade altogether, since noone can exclude third parties from all externalities of any good whatsoever.

> There is an “unavailibility” for commercial use.
Utility argument, metaphorical “unavailability”.

> Bad reviews are already accepted externalities,
> as long as they aren’t intentionally dishonest or
> misleading.
Accepted by whom? What is different if they are dishonest or misleading? Why is any of this relevant?

> Substitutes are accepted as either externalities or
> competition, not a factor.
Why is this relevant? It is only relevant because otherwise your theory is a fail.

Not at all. Even in your example, can the squatters pland their organic croops or whatever on precisely the same spot on which I have a factory?

Sure, when it’s finished there should be space on the roof, walls, sunlit open spaces inside, etc. (Containers, window boxes, trellises, etc.) We’ll take a look at your plans, since you can’t exclude us from coming in and taking a peek.(Oops, we might take a look at very valuable R&D too and commercialize it ourselves or sell it to someone.)

Instead of addressing this, you go off to the open spaces. What if the “open” spaces are not truly “open” but are uncovered parking lots for my trucks (which will routinely squash the squatters crops, organic or otherwise)? The 2 uses are then SIMULTANEOUSLY impossible.

We’ll rotate containers from the roof or from nearby squats into open parking spaces when they’re on the road. And watch you don’t injure anyone, because there are still laws against negligence, battery, etc. there just isn’t exclusion from real estate. It would be difficult and it would dramatically effect your ability to commercialize your property, but it would not be “impossible”.

That said, isn’t it great that current real estate exclusion lets you more effectively commercialize your property? No one unilaterally decides that they will commercialize your property, or unilaterally uses your property in a way that interferes with your commercialization. Notice that it isn’t “claiming a right to market share”, because someone can buy or homestead their own real estate and compete.

Crowding out does not reduce FREEDOM OF ACTION. It does reduce the compensation the original “creator” gets, but not the creator’s freedom. Is this that difficult to comprehend?

Wrong. It reduces the creators’ freedom to commercialize their property. Just like doing away with real estate exclusion would reduce the owners’ ability to commercialize their property.

And it is a unilateral taking of someone else’s asset. Since there is no agreed upon transaction and no price, there is no price signaling and mispricing similar to that resulting from socialism occurs.(Mises/Silas Barta) Taking someone else’s asset without their consent certainly restricts their freedom. And no, offering items for sale does not mean one should accept them being stolen. (See above: Ease of computer fraud or shoplifting does not justify either property violation.)

Do you consider the “meaning” that an artist/author conveys with their work to be a form of “property”?

See the response to Peter Surda, above. Reducing everything to archetypes and claiming “it’s all the same” doesn’t help your case. It isn’t the meaning. Authors have different styles, atmospheres, characterization, etc. Human action tells us consumers can tell the difference between authors because some are more popular than others. In fact archetypes hurt your case since an author only has to make sure a work isn’t a blatant copy of another’s to avoid infringement claims.

You continue to commit the same error. You seem to somehow believe that causality is the same as similarity.

With adaptations by definition they are similar, and causally related. That is a fact. The error is yours.

If I choose a movie at random and then try to produce a second movie which is the exact opposite of the chosen movie, are the two movies similar?

No.

Similarity and causality are completely different. One does not at all imply the other. How you can even dispute this is beyond me.

In some cases they are different and in some cases they are not. We were talking about an adaptation, which by definition is both similar and causally related.

It’s like saying, the act of stealing and the act of sitting in prison are similar because one would not happen without the other.

That wasn’t the example we were discussing. The example we were discussing was one where the acts by definition were both similar and causally related.

“Objectively” does not mean “characteristically”. It has never meant “characteristically”. “Objectively” means to have actual existence.

“Characteristics” is a synonym for “observable phenomena”. So yes, it does mean characteristically. Especially if we are talking about science or law.

It should be clear from the context of our discussion that I have been using definition 2. Maybe you should reread everything again, with a correct definition of “objectively” in mind?

No thanks, I clarified my meaning. My points still stand.