<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
		>
<channel>
	<title>Comments on: Hoppe in One Lesson, Illustrated in Welfare Economics</title>
	<atom:link href="http://archive.mises.org/11406/hoppe-in-one-lesson-illustrated-in-welfare-economics/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://archive.mises.org/11406/hoppe-in-one-lesson-illustrated-in-welfare-economics/</link>
	<description>Proceeding Ever More Boldly Against Evil</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Sun, 19 May 2013 19:58:55 +0000</lastBuildDate>
	<sy:updatePeriod>hourly</sy:updatePeriod>
	<sy:updateFrequency>1</sy:updateFrequency>
	<generator>http://wordpress.org/?v=3.5.1</generator>
	<item>
		<title>By: Interested</title>
		<link>http://archive.mises.org/11406/hoppe-in-one-lesson-illustrated-in-welfare-economics/comment-page-1/#comment-649241</link>
		<dc:creator>Interested</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 10 Jan 2010 02:13:31 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.mises.org/archives/011406.asp#comment-649241</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[I stopped reading after the word &quot;schoolboy&quot;. ]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I stopped reading after the word &#8220;schoolboy&#8221;. </p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: newson</title>
		<link>http://archive.mises.org/11406/hoppe-in-one-lesson-illustrated-in-welfare-economics/comment-page-1/#comment-649190</link>
		<dc:creator>newson</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 09 Jan 2010 18:53:56 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.mises.org/archives/011406.asp#comment-649190</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[e.v.:  see footnotes]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>e.v.:  see footnotes</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: EfforusValiturus</title>
		<link>http://archive.mises.org/11406/hoppe-in-one-lesson-illustrated-in-welfare-economics/comment-page-1/#comment-649126</link>
		<dc:creator>EfforusValiturus</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 09 Jan 2010 13:44:54 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.mises.org/archives/011406.asp#comment-649126</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Please list prerequisite reading. ]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Please list prerequisite reading. </p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: Del Lindley</title>
		<link>http://archive.mises.org/11406/hoppe-in-one-lesson-illustrated-in-welfare-economics/comment-page-1/#comment-649052</link>
		<dc:creator>Del Lindley</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 09 Jan 2010 09:01:14 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.mises.org/archives/011406.asp#comment-649052</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The lack of Pareto optimality obtained through government intervention appears to me to be a special case of a general sub-optimal principle involving the exchange of shared property.  

Take the example of company X that is to be acquired by company Y, where company X is governed by proportionate equity ownership. Let&#039;s assume that company X is owned by shareholders A (with 51% ownership) and B (with 49% ownership).  Furthermore let A value his shares at $9/share and B value his shares at $11/share. If company Y offers $10/share for company X then this is sufficient to establish a voluntary transaction between these companies. While both companies (by weighted average) may be said to benefit, it is clear that this exchange is sub-optimal from the perspective of shareholder B.

Individual-based Pareto optimality is therefore not guaranteed for the free market exchange of co-owned property. Government, in theory, represents the greatest example of co-owned property within a nation.
]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The lack of Pareto optimality obtained through government intervention appears to me to be a special case of a general sub-optimal principle involving the exchange of shared property.  </p>
<p>Take the example of company X that is to be acquired by company Y, where company X is governed by proportionate equity ownership. Let&#8217;s assume that company X is owned by shareholders A (with 51% ownership) and B (with 49% ownership).  Furthermore let A value his shares at $9/share and B value his shares at $11/share. If company Y offers $10/share for company X then this is sufficient to establish a voluntary transaction between these companies. While both companies (by weighted average) may be said to benefit, it is clear that this exchange is sub-optimal from the perspective of shareholder B.</p>
<p>Individual-based Pareto optimality is therefore not guaranteed for the free market exchange of co-owned property. Government, in theory, represents the greatest example of co-owned property within a nation.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
</channel>
</rss>

<!-- Performance optimized by W3 Total Cache. Learn more: http://www.w3-edge.com/wordpress-plugins/

Page Caching using apc
Database Caching 2/11 queries in 0.008 seconds using memcached
Object Caching 332/337 objects using apc

 Served from: archive.mises.org @ 2013-05-20 04:13:15 by W3 Total Cache -->