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	<title>Comments on: Intellectual Property and the Structure of Human Action</title>
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	<link>http://archive.mises.org/11383/intellectual-property-and-the-structure-of-human-action/</link>
	<description>Proceeding Ever More Boldly Against Evil</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Tue, 21 May 2013 04:23:48 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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		<title>By: Russell Madden&#8217;s &#8220;The Death Throes of Pro-IP Libertarianism&#8221;</title>
		<link>http://archive.mises.org/11383/intellectual-property-and-the-structure-of-human-action/comment-page-2/#comment-706211</link>
		<dc:creator>Russell Madden&#8217;s &#8220;The Death Throes of Pro-IP Libertarianism&#8221;</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 29 Jul 2010 16:20:23 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.mises.org/archives/011383.asp#comment-706211</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[[...] The market also enables the production of products that are scarce goods — with ever-increasing efficiency — and, crucially, makesscarce goods more abundant. The market is always trying to overcome and reduce the scarcity that is inherent in physical resources. The human actors on the market use infinitely reproducible, nonscarce knowledge and information to guide their use of scarce resources in ever-more efficient ways, so as to reduce the real scarcity that does exist in the physical world of useful goods. (See &#8220;Intellectual Property and the Structure of Human Action.&#8221;) [...]]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] The market also enables the production of products that are scarce goods — with ever-increasing efficiency — and, crucially, makesscarce goods more abundant. The market is always trying to overcome and reduce the scarcity that is inherent in physical resources. The human actors on the market use infinitely reproducible, nonscarce knowledge and information to guide their use of scarce resources in ever-more efficient ways, so as to reduce the real scarcity that does exist in the physical world of useful goods. (See &#8220;Intellectual Property and the Structure of Human Action.&#8221;) [...]</p>
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		<title>By: Bala</title>
		<link>http://archive.mises.org/11383/intellectual-property-and-the-structure-of-human-action/comment-page-2/#comment-648708</link>
		<dc:creator>Bala</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 08 Jan 2010 13:06:09 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.mises.org/archives/011383.asp#comment-648708</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Russ,

&quot;   Distaste for the implications of the dichotomy do not prove it false.   &quot;

Now you&#039;re being a wee bit unfair. This was not the basis of my argument. My approach has been to show that since, given what &quot;is&quot; and &quot;ought&quot; are, it is indeed possible to derive &quot;ought&quot; from &quot;is&quot; and that the dichotomy does not exist. That they belong to different categories is a red herring.

To my previous arguments, let me add one more. We agreed that an &quot;ought&quot; is a value statement. Only a living being can see &quot;value&quot; in an existent. A living being cannot stay alive if it does not judge the &quot;value&quot; of different existents it encounters. By its very nature, a living being needs to use other existents in the service of its life. This life is the source of &quot;value&quot;, which in turn can exist only as long as life does. A non-living or dead thing has no values. Thus, a &quot;value statement&quot; presupposes a living being that either lives (because it has no choice in the matter) or chooses to live (that&#039;s the human way).

Hence, the &quot;choice to live&quot; is built into the &quot;ought&quot; statement. It is erroneous to bring up the point that such an assumption is not necessarily valid (in support of the &quot;is-ought&quot; dichotomy) is erroneous.

Hence, the &quot;is-ought&quot; dichotomy is patently false.

I was just mentioning the fact that it makes a rational morality impossible to indicate that it serves as ideal ammunition for those who wish to peddle alternate schemes of morality.

If you still think it is valid, it would be good if you could either present arguments to support your position or show why I am wrong.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Russ,</p>
<p>&#8221;   Distaste for the implications of the dichotomy do not prove it false.   &#8221;</p>
<p>Now you&#8217;re being a wee bit unfair. This was not the basis of my argument. My approach has been to show that since, given what &#8220;is&#8221; and &#8220;ought&#8221; are, it is indeed possible to derive &#8220;ought&#8221; from &#8220;is&#8221; and that the dichotomy does not exist. That they belong to different categories is a red herring.</p>
<p>To my previous arguments, let me add one more. We agreed that an &#8220;ought&#8221; is a value statement. Only a living being can see &#8220;value&#8221; in an existent. A living being cannot stay alive if it does not judge the &#8220;value&#8221; of different existents it encounters. By its very nature, a living being needs to use other existents in the service of its life. This life is the source of &#8220;value&#8221;, which in turn can exist only as long as life does. A non-living or dead thing has no values. Thus, a &#8220;value statement&#8221; presupposes a living being that either lives (because it has no choice in the matter) or chooses to live (that&#8217;s the human way).</p>
<p>Hence, the &#8220;choice to live&#8221; is built into the &#8220;ought&#8221; statement. It is erroneous to bring up the point that such an assumption is not necessarily valid (in support of the &#8220;is-ought&#8221; dichotomy) is erroneous.</p>
<p>Hence, the &#8220;is-ought&#8221; dichotomy is patently false.</p>
<p>I was just mentioning the fact that it makes a rational morality impossible to indicate that it serves as ideal ammunition for those who wish to peddle alternate schemes of morality.</p>
<p>If you still think it is valid, it would be good if you could either present arguments to support your position or show why I am wrong.</p>
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		<title>By: Russ</title>
		<link>http://archive.mises.org/11383/intellectual-property-and-the-structure-of-human-action/comment-page-2/#comment-648532</link>
		<dc:creator>Russ</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 08 Jan 2010 05:24:48 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.mises.org/archives/011383.asp#comment-648532</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Bala wrote:

&quot;Frankly, the bigger problem with accepting the &quot;is-ought&quot; dichotomy as a real one is to make it impossible for man to have a rational morality/ethics.&quot;

This is true.  The is/ought dichotomy does make it impossible to derive ethics from reason and facts alone.  And yet I believe that the dichotomy is a real one.  Distaste for the implications of the dichotomy do not prove it false.

Kerem Tibuk wrote:

&quot;In order for a debate there needs to be at least two persons that are alive which necessarily values life above everything else. &quot;

&quot;The fact that humans still exist proves &quot;ought&quot; is derived from &quot;is&quot;.&quot;

Nonsense standing upon the shoulders of nonsense upon stilts.  The above sentences are complete non sequiturs.

&quot;I have answered variations of this question so many times I cant keep count. The reason you are asking this question is that you can not wrap your head around the concept of homesteading.&quot;

Yes or no?  Can one own a number?  You seem to be saying yes.  I find that absurd.

&quot;I suggest you read the post agains and after you read it, you would understand that it is not my intellectual dishonesty but your intellectual inadequacy to not to ask &quot;what the hell does granting mean and who the hell grants what?&quot;.&quot;

The verb &quot;grant&quot; has several shades of meanings.  Among those meanings is &quot;to be willing to concede&quot; or &quot;to assume to be true&quot;.  English is a bitch of a language, isn&#039;t it?]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Bala wrote:</p>
<p>&#8220;Frankly, the bigger problem with accepting the &#8220;is-ought&#8221; dichotomy as a real one is to make it impossible for man to have a rational morality/ethics.&#8221;</p>
<p>This is true.  The is/ought dichotomy does make it impossible to derive ethics from reason and facts alone.  And yet I believe that the dichotomy is a real one.  Distaste for the implications of the dichotomy do not prove it false.</p>
<p>Kerem Tibuk wrote:</p>
<p>&#8220;In order for a debate there needs to be at least two persons that are alive which necessarily values life above everything else. &#8221;</p>
<p>&#8220;The fact that humans still exist proves &#8220;ought&#8221; is derived from &#8220;is&#8221;.&#8221;</p>
<p>Nonsense standing upon the shoulders of nonsense upon stilts.  The above sentences are complete non sequiturs.</p>
<p>&#8220;I have answered variations of this question so many times I cant keep count. The reason you are asking this question is that you can not wrap your head around the concept of homesteading.&#8221;</p>
<p>Yes or no?  Can one own a number?  You seem to be saying yes.  I find that absurd.</p>
<p>&#8220;I suggest you read the post agains and after you read it, you would understand that it is not my intellectual dishonesty but your intellectual inadequacy to not to ask &#8220;what the hell does granting mean and who the hell grants what?&#8221;.&#8221;</p>
<p>The verb &#8220;grant&#8221; has several shades of meanings.  Among those meanings is &#8220;to be willing to concede&#8221; or &#8220;to assume to be true&#8221;.  English is a bitch of a language, isn&#8217;t it?</p>
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		<title>By: Kerem Tibuk</title>
		<link>http://archive.mises.org/11383/intellectual-property-and-the-structure-of-human-action/comment-page-2/#comment-648446</link>
		<dc:creator>Kerem Tibuk</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 07 Jan 2010 20:42:42 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.mises.org/archives/011383.asp#comment-648446</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Russ,

&quot;&quot;Yes you can [derive an &quot;ought&quot; from an &quot;is&quot;].&quot;

Well, I&#039;m not going to get into this argument other than to say that your contention is highly debatable.&quot;

No it is not debatable at all.  

In order for a debate there needs to be at least two persons that are alive which necessarily values life above everything else.  If one of the persons debating would like to prove that this is not true, the debate must end right there.

The fact that humans still exist proves &quot;ought&quot; is derived from &quot;is&quot;.  Some people are aware of this, some aren&#039;t.  

And don&#039;t confuse this with Hoppe&#039;s weak argumentation theory.  This is much more fundamental than an amateur Kantian can graspÃ§

&quot;Not only are you focusing on the wrong attribute, you are also assuming *a priori* that, when constructing a theory of property rights, the *only* attribute of either material or immaterial goods that is relevant to the discussion is that they are products of man.&quot;

I represent my case from ground up, and I don&#039;t pick arbitrary attributes to fir my case.  

Regarding property rights the only relevant attribute IS the man, individual.  That is why individualism is fundamental in libertarianism.  

&quot;There is no *a priori* reason why movable and non-movable goods should be treated the same. There is likewise no *a priori* reason why durable and non-durable goods should be treated the same. Only by considering these differences can we come to the conclusion that these *particular* differences are irrelevant with respect to property.&quot;

You can find many reasons, actually excuses to make distinctions.  They are all arbitrary unless they are related to &quot;human nature&quot;.  Because all property arises from the individual.  The nature of the individual as I stated at the first comment of this post.

Georgist have many excuses regarding how land can not be property and it is not different than this IP socialism in regards to arbitrariness.  

&quot;I will repeat an old argument; hopefully you won&#039;t ignore it this time. Numbers are the product of man&#039;s mind. They do not occur in nature. You cannot show me a three, for instance. So, should people be able to own particular numbers that they have come up with, that no other individual has ever written down or completely specified before?&quot;

I have answered variations of this question so many times I cant keep count.  The reason you are asking this question is that you can not wrap your head around the concept of homesteading.

Anybody can homestead any nature given resource.  If you can independently homestead the same, or rather very similar thing by all means go do it.  I wrote a poem influenced by birds, you may also be influenced by birds and write your own poem.  Just don&#039;t come to me and say you have right to my poem because you can reproduce it easily thus I can not own it in the firs place.

Can you refrain from copying someone else&#039;s product?  Can you imagine a world where people either produce IP themselves or gain consent of the producer?  Is this possible?

Yes.

In other words, can you differentiate a nature given good, a good that you yourself have produced and a good that has to be produced by some other human being?

Yes you can.  

&quot;Yes. Your dishonesty. Nowhere have I ever seen Kinsella say that society grants rights. You are completely mischaracterizing his argument. Either you are doing so due to a complete lack of understanding of his argument, or due to malice, I&#039;m not sure which.&quot;

Did you read the post that was written by Kinsella?

When Kinsella writes, 

&quot;Granting property rights in scarce resources, but not in ideas, is precisely what is needed to permit successful action as well as societal progress and prosperity.&quot;

I suggest you read the post agains and after you read it, you would understand that it is not my intellectual dishonesty but your intellectual inadequacy to not to ask &quot;what the hell does granting mean and who the hell grants what?&quot;.

]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Russ,</p>
<p>&#8220;&#8221;Yes you can [derive an "ought" from an "is"].&#8221;</p>
<p>Well, I&#8217;m not going to get into this argument other than to say that your contention is highly debatable.&#8221;</p>
<p>No it is not debatable at all.  </p>
<p>In order for a debate there needs to be at least two persons that are alive which necessarily values life above everything else.  If one of the persons debating would like to prove that this is not true, the debate must end right there.</p>
<p>The fact that humans still exist proves &#8220;ought&#8221; is derived from &#8220;is&#8221;.  Some people are aware of this, some aren&#8217;t.  </p>
<p>And don&#8217;t confuse this with Hoppe&#8217;s weak argumentation theory.  This is much more fundamental than an amateur Kantian can graspÃ§</p>
<p>&#8220;Not only are you focusing on the wrong attribute, you are also assuming *a priori* that, when constructing a theory of property rights, the *only* attribute of either material or immaterial goods that is relevant to the discussion is that they are products of man.&#8221;</p>
<p>I represent my case from ground up, and I don&#8217;t pick arbitrary attributes to fir my case.  </p>
<p>Regarding property rights the only relevant attribute IS the man, individual.  That is why individualism is fundamental in libertarianism.  </p>
<p>&#8220;There is no *a priori* reason why movable and non-movable goods should be treated the same. There is likewise no *a priori* reason why durable and non-durable goods should be treated the same. Only by considering these differences can we come to the conclusion that these *particular* differences are irrelevant with respect to property.&#8221;</p>
<p>You can find many reasons, actually excuses to make distinctions.  They are all arbitrary unless they are related to &#8220;human nature&#8221;.  Because all property arises from the individual.  The nature of the individual as I stated at the first comment of this post.</p>
<p>Georgist have many excuses regarding how land can not be property and it is not different than this IP socialism in regards to arbitrariness.  </p>
<p>&#8220;I will repeat an old argument; hopefully you won&#8217;t ignore it this time. Numbers are the product of man&#8217;s mind. They do not occur in nature. You cannot show me a three, for instance. So, should people be able to own particular numbers that they have come up with, that no other individual has ever written down or completely specified before?&#8221;</p>
<p>I have answered variations of this question so many times I cant keep count.  The reason you are asking this question is that you can not wrap your head around the concept of homesteading.</p>
<p>Anybody can homestead any nature given resource.  If you can independently homestead the same, or rather very similar thing by all means go do it.  I wrote a poem influenced by birds, you may also be influenced by birds and write your own poem.  Just don&#8217;t come to me and say you have right to my poem because you can reproduce it easily thus I can not own it in the firs place.</p>
<p>Can you refrain from copying someone else&#8217;s product?  Can you imagine a world where people either produce IP themselves or gain consent of the producer?  Is this possible?</p>
<p>Yes.</p>
<p>In other words, can you differentiate a nature given good, a good that you yourself have produced and a good that has to be produced by some other human being?</p>
<p>Yes you can.  </p>
<p>&#8220;Yes. Your dishonesty. Nowhere have I ever seen Kinsella say that society grants rights. You are completely mischaracterizing his argument. Either you are doing so due to a complete lack of understanding of his argument, or due to malice, I&#8217;m not sure which.&#8221;</p>
<p>Did you read the post that was written by Kinsella?</p>
<p>When Kinsella writes, </p>
<p>&#8220;Granting property rights in scarce resources, but not in ideas, is precisely what is needed to permit successful action as well as societal progress and prosperity.&#8221;</p>
<p>I suggest you read the post agains and after you read it, you would understand that it is not my intellectual dishonesty but your intellectual inadequacy to not to ask &#8220;what the hell does granting mean and who the hell grants what?&#8221;.</p>
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		<title>By: Bala</title>
		<link>http://archive.mises.org/11383/intellectual-property-and-the-structure-of-human-action/comment-page-2/#comment-648393</link>
		<dc:creator>Bala</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 07 Jan 2010 17:34:03 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.mises.org/archives/011383.asp#comment-648393</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Russ,

&quot;   Ah, but in order to reach your conclusion, you also have to be thinking &quot;I want to live&quot;.    &quot;

I said this too. Of course &quot;oughts&quot; exist only for someone who is contionuously choosing to live. Once death is chosen, there is only 1 &quot;ought&quot; - How best to end life.

&quot;   So you&#039;re saying that one should not make ethical judgments about the actions of others?!   &quot;

No. One does. But at the end of the day, the what one is trying to understand by figuring out the oughts is what one should be doing.

For instance, in the case of the mugger, reason tells you that what he is doing indicates that he is living out a contradiction and is hence dangerous to you. This leads you to the question &quot;What am I going to do?&quot;. This would include the &quot;now and here&quot; and the future too. Whether it is &quot;I ought to help the victim because.....&quot; or &quot;I ought to be armed because....&quot; or &quot;I ought not to hesitate to use force against the mugger because.... &quot; -  they all flow out of the fact that people like the mugger exist.

Frankly, the bigger problem with accepting the &quot;is-ought&quot; dichotomy as a real one is to make it impossible for man to have a rational morality/ethics.

Let me explain it in (what I think is) simple terms. To survive, man desperately needs to figure out his &quot;oughts&quot; because he chooses to live. He is not given with an automatic mechanism that helps him know what he &quot;ought&quot; to do in any circumstance. He has only two resources at his disposal to help him figure this out

1. His perceptual faculty that helps him form percepts of existence (that which &quot;is&quot;)

2. His conceptual faculty which uses reason to help him understand the relationship betwen different elements of existence and their relationship with him and his life

Man&#039;s ONLY means of &quot;knowing&quot; what he &quot;ought&quot; to do is &quot;reason&quot;. He uses &quot;reason&quot; to process the percepts he receives of that which &quot;is&quot; to &quot;know&quot; that which he &quot;ought&quot; to do. There is no other way open to him that fits with his nature - that of a rational animal with a volitional consciousness.

Given that man&#039;s senses give him only the &quot;is&quot;, to say that the &quot;ought&quot; cannot be derived from the &quot;is&quot; is to say that reason, man&#039;s only means of knowing, is impotent to help him &quot;know&quot; what he &quot;ought&quot; to do. Morality/Ethics being the science of &quot;oughts&quot;, this essentially means that it is not possible for man to have a rational morality/ethics.

This brings up the very important question as to &quot;Where and how else is man to derive his &quot;oughts&quot; from?&quot;. People offer a variety of answers including God, Society, Nation, etc. The common feature of all these is that they are something other than the person himself. Interesting, isn&#039;t it?

In summary, acceptance of the &quot;is-ought&quot; dichotomy places morality/ethics in the realm of the arbitrary and is hence an intellectually incorrect and dangerous thing to do.

Therefore, I am left with no option but to reject the &quot;is-ought&quot; dichotomy as not only invalid but also &quot;evil&quot;.

Stephan,

&quot;   What if Rand&#039;s do not?   &quot;

Sorry. They do. I have shown with sufficient explanation out here that the &quot;is-ought&quot; dichotomy is false. That you have not understood what Rand has said properly and are hence not able to derive it does not indicate a flaw in HER approach. A bad workman blames his tools.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Russ,</p>
<p>&#8221;   Ah, but in order to reach your conclusion, you also have to be thinking &#8220;I want to live&#8221;.    &#8221;</p>
<p>I said this too. Of course &#8220;oughts&#8221; exist only for someone who is contionuously choosing to live. Once death is chosen, there is only 1 &#8220;ought&#8221; &#8211; How best to end life.</p>
<p>&#8221;   So you&#8217;re saying that one should not make ethical judgments about the actions of others?!   &#8221;</p>
<p>No. One does. But at the end of the day, the what one is trying to understand by figuring out the oughts is what one should be doing.</p>
<p>For instance, in the case of the mugger, reason tells you that what he is doing indicates that he is living out a contradiction and is hence dangerous to you. This leads you to the question &#8220;What am I going to do?&#8221;. This would include the &#8220;now and here&#8221; and the future too. Whether it is &#8220;I ought to help the victim because&#8230;..&#8221; or &#8220;I ought to be armed because&#8230;.&#8221; or &#8220;I ought not to hesitate to use force against the mugger because&#8230;. &#8221; &#8211;  they all flow out of the fact that people like the mugger exist.</p>
<p>Frankly, the bigger problem with accepting the &#8220;is-ought&#8221; dichotomy as a real one is to make it impossible for man to have a rational morality/ethics.</p>
<p>Let me explain it in (what I think is) simple terms. To survive, man desperately needs to figure out his &#8220;oughts&#8221; because he chooses to live. He is not given with an automatic mechanism that helps him know what he &#8220;ought&#8221; to do in any circumstance. He has only two resources at his disposal to help him figure this out</p>
<p>1. His perceptual faculty that helps him form percepts of existence (that which &#8220;is&#8221;)</p>
<p>2. His conceptual faculty which uses reason to help him understand the relationship betwen different elements of existence and their relationship with him and his life</p>
<p>Man&#8217;s ONLY means of &#8220;knowing&#8221; what he &#8220;ought&#8221; to do is &#8220;reason&#8221;. He uses &#8220;reason&#8221; to process the percepts he receives of that which &#8220;is&#8221; to &#8220;know&#8221; that which he &#8220;ought&#8221; to do. There is no other way open to him that fits with his nature &#8211; that of a rational animal with a volitional consciousness.</p>
<p>Given that man&#8217;s senses give him only the &#8220;is&#8221;, to say that the &#8220;ought&#8221; cannot be derived from the &#8220;is&#8221; is to say that reason, man&#8217;s only means of knowing, is impotent to help him &#8220;know&#8221; what he &#8220;ought&#8221; to do. Morality/Ethics being the science of &#8220;oughts&#8221;, this essentially means that it is not possible for man to have a rational morality/ethics.</p>
<p>This brings up the very important question as to &#8220;Where and how else is man to derive his &#8220;oughts&#8221; from?&#8221;. People offer a variety of answers including God, Society, Nation, etc. The common feature of all these is that they are something other than the person himself. Interesting, isn&#8217;t it?</p>
<p>In summary, acceptance of the &#8220;is-ought&#8221; dichotomy places morality/ethics in the realm of the arbitrary and is hence an intellectually incorrect and dangerous thing to do.</p>
<p>Therefore, I am left with no option but to reject the &#8220;is-ought&#8221; dichotomy as not only invalid but also &#8220;evil&#8221;.</p>
<p>Stephan,</p>
<p>&#8221;   What if Rand&#8217;s do not?   &#8221;</p>
<p>Sorry. They do. I have shown with sufficient explanation out here that the &#8220;is-ought&#8221; dichotomy is false. That you have not understood what Rand has said properly and are hence not able to derive it does not indicate a flaw in HER approach. A bad workman blames his tools.</p>
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		<title>By: Russ</title>
		<link>http://archive.mises.org/11383/intellectual-property-and-the-structure-of-human-action/comment-page-2/#comment-648354</link>
		<dc:creator>Russ</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 07 Jan 2010 16:36:02 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.mises.org/archives/011383.asp#comment-648354</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Bala wrote:

&quot;Oops!!! Failure (mine) right there. I really thought I was simplifying it. :) If a very intelligent person cannot make sense of it, I must be making it complicated.&quot;

Well, it&#039;s not necessarily your fault.  Sometimes I can be dense, and need concrete examples.  I have this problem when reading Hayek, as well.  He&#039;s very abstract, and doesn&#039;t give concrete examples, and so I find it very hard to follow him sometimes.

&quot;In simpler terms, let&#039;s say that I am hungry and I come across an apple...&quot;

OK.  Let&#039;s take the facts; the &quot;is&#039;es&quot;:

1) You have not eaten for some time.

2) Continued lack of food will lead to death.

3) There is an apple nearby.

4) Eating the apple will stave off death.

&quot;Thus, I reach the conclusion that &quot;I&quot; &quot;ought&quot; to pluck/pick up the apple and consume it.&quot;

Ah, but in order to reach your conclusion, you also have to be thinking &quot;I want to live&quot;.  That is, you have to have the thought &quot;I *ought* to continue living&quot;, or &quot;I *value* continued life&quot;.  However you phrase it, this does not follow logically from any of the above *facts*.  Nor can it.  The act of valuation cannot come from knowledge of mere facts.  It must come from the human will.  The above facts alone do not dictate any particular response.  The facts and reason, *plus* the value judgment that continued life is good (which is independent of the above facts), do dictate a particular response; that you should pick up and eat the apple.

&quot;Saying that the mugger &quot;ought&quot; not to do what he is doing attributes rationality to the mugger&#039;s choice and action, something that may not be true.&quot;

So you&#039;re saying that one should not make ethical judgments about the actions of others?!

&quot;Nothing Indian about it. I am referring to the Architect of the Matrix...&quot;

D&#039;oh!  See, I told you I can be dense sometimes!]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Bala wrote:</p>
<p>&#8220;Oops!!! Failure (mine) right there. I really thought I was simplifying it. <img src='http://archive.mises.org/wp-includes/images/smilies/icon_smile.gif' alt=':)' class='wp-smiley' />  If a very intelligent person cannot make sense of it, I must be making it complicated.&#8221;</p>
<p>Well, it&#8217;s not necessarily your fault.  Sometimes I can be dense, and need concrete examples.  I have this problem when reading Hayek, as well.  He&#8217;s very abstract, and doesn&#8217;t give concrete examples, and so I find it very hard to follow him sometimes.</p>
<p>&#8220;In simpler terms, let&#8217;s say that I am hungry and I come across an apple&#8230;&#8221;</p>
<p>OK.  Let&#8217;s take the facts; the &#8220;is&#8217;es&#8221;:</p>
<p>1) You have not eaten for some time.</p>
<p>2) Continued lack of food will lead to death.</p>
<p>3) There is an apple nearby.</p>
<p>4) Eating the apple will stave off death.</p>
<p>&#8220;Thus, I reach the conclusion that &#8220;I&#8221; &#8220;ought&#8221; to pluck/pick up the apple and consume it.&#8221;</p>
<p>Ah, but in order to reach your conclusion, you also have to be thinking &#8220;I want to live&#8221;.  That is, you have to have the thought &#8220;I *ought* to continue living&#8221;, or &#8220;I *value* continued life&#8221;.  However you phrase it, this does not follow logically from any of the above *facts*.  Nor can it.  The act of valuation cannot come from knowledge of mere facts.  It must come from the human will.  The above facts alone do not dictate any particular response.  The facts and reason, *plus* the value judgment that continued life is good (which is independent of the above facts), do dictate a particular response; that you should pick up and eat the apple.</p>
<p>&#8220;Saying that the mugger &#8220;ought&#8221; not to do what he is doing attributes rationality to the mugger&#8217;s choice and action, something that may not be true.&#8221;</p>
<p>So you&#8217;re saying that one should not make ethical judgments about the actions of others?!</p>
<p>&#8220;Nothing Indian about it. I am referring to the Architect of the Matrix&#8230;&#8221;</p>
<p>D&#8217;oh!  See, I told you I can be dense sometimes!</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: Bala</title>
		<link>http://archive.mises.org/11383/intellectual-property-and-the-structure-of-human-action/comment-page-2/#comment-648334</link>
		<dc:creator>Bala</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 07 Jan 2010 14:23:49 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.mises.org/archives/011383.asp#comment-648334</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Russ,

&quot;   Huh? Architect?   &quot;

Nothing Indian about it. I am referring to the Architect of the Matrix who treats human choice as the &quot;singularity&quot; and the flaw in the system of complex mathematical equations that he uses to &quot;model&quot; life.

The renegade Smith actually says this in the final clash when Neo is lying down beaten up but trying to get up. It is part of the Smith&#039;s argument that life is pointless and the goal of life is to end.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Russ,</p>
<p>&#8221;   Huh? Architect?   &#8221;</p>
<p>Nothing Indian about it. I am referring to the Architect of the Matrix who treats human choice as the &#8220;singularity&#8221; and the flaw in the system of complex mathematical equations that he uses to &#8220;model&#8221; life.</p>
<p>The renegade Smith actually says this in the final clash when Neo is lying down beaten up but trying to get up. It is part of the Smith&#8217;s argument that life is pointless and the goal of life is to end.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: Bala</title>
		<link>http://archive.mises.org/11383/intellectual-property-and-the-structure-of-human-action/comment-page-2/#comment-648332</link>
		<dc:creator>Bala</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 07 Jan 2010 14:19:45 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.mises.org/archives/011383.asp#comment-648332</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Russ,

&quot;   Wow. I must confess that most of that made absolutely no sense to me.   &quot;

Oops!!! Failure (mine) right there. I really thought I was simplifying it. :) If a very intelligent person cannot make sense of it, I must be making it complicated.

&quot;   But how can you derive the one from the other? How can you derive that which is not from that which is?   &quot;

Reason. Causality. Non-contradiction.

In simpler terms, let&#039;s say that I am hungry and I come across an apple. The first &quot;is&quot; I recognise is that I am hungry. Reason tells me that I need food. Causality tells me that the sustained lack of food will lead to death. The second &quot;is&quot; I see is the apple. I recognise it as food based on prior experience. Reason tells me that the action of plucking/picking up the apple and consuming it will help me survive. Non-contradiction tells me that I cannot go on refusing to gather and consume that which I can recognise (rightly) as food and still stay alive. At this point, I am also reminded of my choice to stay alive.

Thus, I reach the conclusion that &quot;I&quot; &quot;ought&quot; to pluck/pick up the apple and consume it.

&quot;   Let&#039;s say that you see a man being beaten upside the head by a mugger. You say that the mugger ought not do that.   &quot;

The confusion in this statement is that you are deriving an &quot;ought&quot; on behalf of the mugger based on your premises. The correct &quot;ought&quot; for you to try to derive is &quot;What ought I to do given that there is a mugger out there who is whacking someone on the head?&quot;.

Saying that the mugger &quot;ought&quot; not to do what he is doing attributes rationality to the mugger&#039;s choice and action, something that may not be true. The statement &quot;Man is a rational animal&quot; does not mean that all men at all times act rationally.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Russ,</p>
<p>&#8221;   Wow. I must confess that most of that made absolutely no sense to me.   &#8221;</p>
<p>Oops!!! Failure (mine) right there. I really thought I was simplifying it. <img src='http://archive.mises.org/wp-includes/images/smilies/icon_smile.gif' alt=':)' class='wp-smiley' />  If a very intelligent person cannot make sense of it, I must be making it complicated.</p>
<p>&#8221;   But how can you derive the one from the other? How can you derive that which is not from that which is?   &#8221;</p>
<p>Reason. Causality. Non-contradiction.</p>
<p>In simpler terms, let&#8217;s say that I am hungry and I come across an apple. The first &#8220;is&#8221; I recognise is that I am hungry. Reason tells me that I need food. Causality tells me that the sustained lack of food will lead to death. The second &#8220;is&#8221; I see is the apple. I recognise it as food based on prior experience. Reason tells me that the action of plucking/picking up the apple and consuming it will help me survive. Non-contradiction tells me that I cannot go on refusing to gather and consume that which I can recognise (rightly) as food and still stay alive. At this point, I am also reminded of my choice to stay alive.</p>
<p>Thus, I reach the conclusion that &#8220;I&#8221; &#8220;ought&#8221; to pluck/pick up the apple and consume it.</p>
<p>&#8221;   Let&#8217;s say that you see a man being beaten upside the head by a mugger. You say that the mugger ought not do that.   &#8221;</p>
<p>The confusion in this statement is that you are deriving an &#8220;ought&#8221; on behalf of the mugger based on your premises. The correct &#8220;ought&#8221; for you to try to derive is &#8220;What ought I to do given that there is a mugger out there who is whacking someone on the head?&#8221;.</p>
<p>Saying that the mugger &#8220;ought&#8221; not to do what he is doing attributes rationality to the mugger&#8217;s choice and action, something that may not be true. The statement &#8220;Man is a rational animal&#8221; does not mean that all men at all times act rationally.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: Russ</title>
		<link>http://archive.mises.org/11383/intellectual-property-and-the-structure-of-human-action/comment-page-2/#comment-648327</link>
		<dc:creator>Russ</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 07 Jan 2010 14:05:46 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.mises.org/archives/011383.asp#comment-648327</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Bala wrote:

&quot;People who say this reminds me of the Architect

&quot; and to say that such choice is completely arbitrary and a matter of whim. &quot;

This comes straight out of the mouth of the renegade Smith.&quot;

Huh?  Architect?  Is this a reference to Howard Roark?  Or is this Indian religion (Architect=God and renegade Smith=Satan)?  I&#039;m really confused here.

Anyway, I&#039;m not saying that ethics are a matter of whim.  I think that &quot;the nature of things&quot;, as Lucretius would have put it, needs to be taken into consideration when thinking about ethics.  I just think that there is more to it than that.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Bala wrote:</p>
<p>&#8220;People who say this reminds me of the Architect</p>
<p>&#8221; and to say that such choice is completely arbitrary and a matter of whim. &#8221;</p>
<p>This comes straight out of the mouth of the renegade Smith.&#8221;</p>
<p>Huh?  Architect?  Is this a reference to Howard Roark?  Or is this Indian religion (Architect=God and renegade Smith=Satan)?  I&#8217;m really confused here.</p>
<p>Anyway, I&#8217;m not saying that ethics are a matter of whim.  I think that &#8220;the nature of things&#8221;, as Lucretius would have put it, needs to be taken into consideration when thinking about ethics.  I just think that there is more to it than that.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: Russ</title>
		<link>http://archive.mises.org/11383/intellectual-property-and-the-structure-of-human-action/comment-page-2/#comment-648324</link>
		<dc:creator>Russ</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 07 Jan 2010 13:49:18 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.mises.org/archives/011383.asp#comment-648324</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Bala,

Wow.   I must confess that most of that made absolutely no sense to me.

&quot;&quot;Value&quot; presupposes value of &quot;something&quot;. That something necessarily has to be that which &quot;is&quot;.&quot;

This is not true.  Let&#039;s say that you see a man being beaten upside the head by a mugger.  You say that the mugger ought not do that.  You are then *not* choosing something that &quot;is&quot;.  You are wishing that something which is the case were not the case.  You are saying that an alternate reality, which is not, would be better than the true reality, which is.

But how can you derive the one from the other?  How can you derive that which is not from that which is?

If you read G.E. Moore, he has other examples of the naturalistic fallacy besides the case that violates the is/ought dichotomy.  Let&#039;s say that you are a socialist, for the sake of argument.  You want to come up with a theory of justice that fits socialist goals.  So you derive a theory of justice from the idea of fairness.  But, fairness and justice are not the same thing.  They are distinct concepts with different meanings.  The word &quot;justice&quot; does not mean the same thing as &quot;fairness&quot;, and there is no real connection between them.  Trying to derive justice from fairness would also be a case of the naturalistic fallacy.

A mathematical analogy, if that helps, is orthogonal vectors.  Take the 3D Euclidean vector space.  Try to derive the unit z vector from the unit x and unit y vectors.  You can&#039;t.  If you could, then they wouldn&#039;t be orthogonal vectors.  &quot;Is&quot; and &quot;ought&quot; are similar, in a sense.  They are orthogonal concepts.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Bala,</p>
<p>Wow.   I must confess that most of that made absolutely no sense to me.</p>
<p>&#8220;&#8221;Value&#8221; presupposes value of &#8220;something&#8221;. That something necessarily has to be that which &#8220;is&#8221;.&#8221;</p>
<p>This is not true.  Let&#8217;s say that you see a man being beaten upside the head by a mugger.  You say that the mugger ought not do that.  You are then *not* choosing something that &#8220;is&#8221;.  You are wishing that something which is the case were not the case.  You are saying that an alternate reality, which is not, would be better than the true reality, which is.</p>
<p>But how can you derive the one from the other?  How can you derive that which is not from that which is?</p>
<p>If you read G.E. Moore, he has other examples of the naturalistic fallacy besides the case that violates the is/ought dichotomy.  Let&#8217;s say that you are a socialist, for the sake of argument.  You want to come up with a theory of justice that fits socialist goals.  So you derive a theory of justice from the idea of fairness.  But, fairness and justice are not the same thing.  They are distinct concepts with different meanings.  The word &#8220;justice&#8221; does not mean the same thing as &#8220;fairness&#8221;, and there is no real connection between them.  Trying to derive justice from fairness would also be a case of the naturalistic fallacy.</p>
<p>A mathematical analogy, if that helps, is orthogonal vectors.  Take the 3D Euclidean vector space.  Try to derive the unit z vector from the unit x and unit y vectors.  You can&#8217;t.  If you could, then they wouldn&#8217;t be orthogonal vectors.  &#8220;Is&#8221; and &#8220;ought&#8221; are similar, in a sense.  They are orthogonal concepts.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: Bala</title>
		<link>http://archive.mises.org/11383/intellectual-property-and-the-structure-of-human-action/comment-page-2/#comment-648321</link>
		<dc:creator>Bala</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 07 Jan 2010 13:47:15 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.mises.org/archives/011383.asp#comment-648321</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Russ,

Just adding to what I had said.

&quot;   In fact, the attempt to drive a wedge between &quot;is&quot; and &quot;ought&quot; statements amounts to a dismissal of the simple fact that living beings, by their very nature, choose&quot;

People who say this reminds me of the Architect

&quot;   and to say that such choice is completely arbitrary and a matter of whim.   &quot;

This comes straight out of the mouth of the renegade Smith.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Russ,</p>
<p>Just adding to what I had said.</p>
<p>&#8221;   In fact, the attempt to drive a wedge between &#8220;is&#8221; and &#8220;ought&#8221; statements amounts to a dismissal of the simple fact that living beings, by their very nature, choose&#8221;</p>
<p>People who say this reminds me of the Architect</p>
<p>&#8221;   and to say that such choice is completely arbitrary and a matter of whim.   &#8221;</p>
<p>This comes straight out of the mouth of the renegade Smith.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: Bala</title>
		<link>http://archive.mises.org/11383/intellectual-property-and-the-structure-of-human-action/comment-page-2/#comment-648305</link>
		<dc:creator>Bala</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 07 Jan 2010 13:05:22 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.mises.org/archives/011383.asp#comment-648305</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Russ,

&quot;   Because they are categorically different things.   &quot;

My point is simply that an &quot;ought&quot; statement, by its very nature, is a &quot;value statement&quot; (I agree with you on that). &quot;Value&quot; presupposes value of &quot;something&quot;. That something necessarily has to be that which &quot;is&quot;. &quot;Value&quot; is a judgement. Man can only judge that which he is conscious of. To be conscious is to recognise the fact that something &quot;exists&quot;. In fact, it is the recognition of the &quot;existence&quot; that forms &quot;consciousness&quot;.

The &quot;ought&quot; statement is fundamentally a comparative judgement of what &quot;is&quot; to something else that it &quot;could be&quot;. What &quot;could be&quot; is in itself something derived from what &quot;is&quot; (not necessarily that particular &quot;is&quot;) by the living being exercising its powers of consciousness. It is an identification of a possible alternative arrangement of that which exists.

Out here, we need to remind ourselves that only a living being is capable of being &quot;conscious&quot; (by the very meaning and definition of the word).

Therefore, once what &quot;is&quot; and what &quot;could be&quot; are identified, the living being that is &quot;conscious&quot; of both evaluates the consequences of the two arrangements for the effects they each have on its own survival. The &quot;ought&quot; statement is only the outcome of this process of evaluation.

To say that there is a &quot;dichotomy&quot; between &quot;is&quot; and &quot;ought&quot; statements and that the latter cannot be derived from the former is to deny the very facts and the processes of consciousness and action, i.e of life itself since those two indeed constitute the difference between plain existence and life.

In fact, the attempt to drive a wedge between &quot;is&quot; and &quot;ought&quot; statements amounts to a dismissal of the simple fact that living beings, by their very nature, choose and to say that such choice is completely arbitrary and a matter of whim. Frankly, for a living being, the choice is actually one between &quot;existence&quot; and &quot;non-existence&quot;. Given that, the fact that living beings indeed choose and given their particular method of choosing, i.e., by first becoming aware of that which exists, I am left with no option but to dismiss the &quot;is-ought&quot; dichotomy as false and the product of an evasion of reality.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Russ,</p>
<p>&#8221;   Because they are categorically different things.   &#8221;</p>
<p>My point is simply that an &#8220;ought&#8221; statement, by its very nature, is a &#8220;value statement&#8221; (I agree with you on that). &#8220;Value&#8221; presupposes value of &#8220;something&#8221;. That something necessarily has to be that which &#8220;is&#8221;. &#8220;Value&#8221; is a judgement. Man can only judge that which he is conscious of. To be conscious is to recognise the fact that something &#8220;exists&#8221;. In fact, it is the recognition of the &#8220;existence&#8221; that forms &#8220;consciousness&#8221;.</p>
<p>The &#8220;ought&#8221; statement is fundamentally a comparative judgement of what &#8220;is&#8221; to something else that it &#8220;could be&#8221;. What &#8220;could be&#8221; is in itself something derived from what &#8220;is&#8221; (not necessarily that particular &#8220;is&#8221;) by the living being exercising its powers of consciousness. It is an identification of a possible alternative arrangement of that which exists.</p>
<p>Out here, we need to remind ourselves that only a living being is capable of being &#8220;conscious&#8221; (by the very meaning and definition of the word).</p>
<p>Therefore, once what &#8220;is&#8221; and what &#8220;could be&#8221; are identified, the living being that is &#8220;conscious&#8221; of both evaluates the consequences of the two arrangements for the effects they each have on its own survival. The &#8220;ought&#8221; statement is only the outcome of this process of evaluation.</p>
<p>To say that there is a &#8220;dichotomy&#8221; between &#8220;is&#8221; and &#8220;ought&#8221; statements and that the latter cannot be derived from the former is to deny the very facts and the processes of consciousness and action, i.e of life itself since those two indeed constitute the difference between plain existence and life.</p>
<p>In fact, the attempt to drive a wedge between &#8220;is&#8221; and &#8220;ought&#8221; statements amounts to a dismissal of the simple fact that living beings, by their very nature, choose and to say that such choice is completely arbitrary and a matter of whim. Frankly, for a living being, the choice is actually one between &#8220;existence&#8221; and &#8220;non-existence&#8221;. Given that, the fact that living beings indeed choose and given their particular method of choosing, i.e., by first becoming aware of that which exists, I am left with no option but to dismiss the &#8220;is-ought&#8221; dichotomy as false and the product of an evasion of reality.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>By: Silas Barta</title>
		<link>http://archive.mises.org/11383/intellectual-property-and-the-structure-of-human-action/comment-page-2/#comment-648297</link>
		<dc:creator>Silas Barta</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 07 Jan 2010 12:28:41 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.mises.org/archives/011383.asp#comment-648297</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[@Stephan_Kinsella:

&lt;blockquote&gt;As I noted here, what&#039;s wrong with appealing to the [value] of ... prosperity...?&lt;/blockquote&gt;

Because only unprincipled terrorist utilitarians care about prosperity, I thought?]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>@Stephan_Kinsella:</p>
<blockquote><p>As I noted here, what&#8217;s wrong with appealing to the [value] of &#8230; prosperity&#8230;?</p></blockquote>
<p>Because only unprincipled terrorist utilitarians care about prosperity, I thought?</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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	<item>
		<title>By: Russ</title>
		<link>http://archive.mises.org/11383/intellectual-property-and-the-structure-of-human-action/comment-page-2/#comment-648204</link>
		<dc:creator>Russ</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 07 Jan 2010 07:31:03 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.mises.org/archives/011383.asp#comment-648204</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Stephan Kinsella wrote:
&quot; &quot;He tries to derive his theories from basic moral premises that everybody agrees with.&quot;

This is not true. Argumentation Ethics, which I agree with, appeals to moral premises that anyone engaged in normative justification necessarily, does agree with by virtue of participating in the norm-laden activity of justificatory argumentation. These are not arbitrary nor subjective; they derive from the nature of argumentation itself.&quot;

Firstly, sorry I misrepresented your position.  I saw something else you wrote here that led me to believe that you were trying to do what I said.  My bad.  

Secondly....  Wow.  Argumentation Ethics is even worse than what I thought you were doing.  I won&#039;t get into this whole debate here.  I think Callahan and Murphy sufficiently demolished AE years ago on anti-state.com.  Suffice it to say that, regarding IP, if the government didn&#039;t try to justify their pro-IP enforcement, but simply did it without justification, there&#039;s nothing AE could say against it.  

&quot;Second, even if I were doing this--so what? As I noted here, what&#039;s wrong with appealing to the values of peace, prosperity, and justice? So what if &quot;not everybody agrees that certain things are *always* wrong&quot; or &quot;his whole argument falls flat for such people.&quot; So what? There will always be criminals and outlaws, people who don&#039;t share our views of justice. Our arguments will &quot;always fall flat for them&quot;. So what? I have decided to join the civilized human race. So have you. Among this community of people we can reason and appeal to shared grundnorms. For outlaws, we have to regard them as mere technical problems, dangerous things like wild animals or hurricanes. So what?&quot;

So what?!  If you blow off 99 &amp; 44/100ths% of the human race as criminals, simply because they don&#039;t agree that your moral absolutes are absolute, then you render your philosophy a completely irrelevant piece of mental masturbation.  That&#039;s what.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Stephan Kinsella wrote:<br />
&#8221; &#8220;He tries to derive his theories from basic moral premises that everybody agrees with.&#8221;</p>
<p>This is not true. Argumentation Ethics, which I agree with, appeals to moral premises that anyone engaged in normative justification necessarily, does agree with by virtue of participating in the norm-laden activity of justificatory argumentation. These are not arbitrary nor subjective; they derive from the nature of argumentation itself.&#8221;</p>
<p>Firstly, sorry I misrepresented your position.  I saw something else you wrote here that led me to believe that you were trying to do what I said.  My bad.  </p>
<p>Secondly&#8230;.  Wow.  Argumentation Ethics is even worse than what I thought you were doing.  I won&#8217;t get into this whole debate here.  I think Callahan and Murphy sufficiently demolished AE years ago on anti-state.com.  Suffice it to say that, regarding IP, if the government didn&#8217;t try to justify their pro-IP enforcement, but simply did it without justification, there&#8217;s nothing AE could say against it.  </p>
<p>&#8220;Second, even if I were doing this&#8211;so what? As I noted here, what&#8217;s wrong with appealing to the values of peace, prosperity, and justice? So what if &#8220;not everybody agrees that certain things are *always* wrong&#8221; or &#8220;his whole argument falls flat for such people.&#8221; So what? There will always be criminals and outlaws, people who don&#8217;t share our views of justice. Our arguments will &#8220;always fall flat for them&#8221;. So what? I have decided to join the civilized human race. So have you. Among this community of people we can reason and appeal to shared grundnorms. For outlaws, we have to regard them as mere technical problems, dangerous things like wild animals or hurricanes. So what?&#8221;</p>
<p>So what?!  If you blow off 99 &#038; 44/100ths% of the human race as criminals, simply because they don&#8217;t agree that your moral absolutes are absolute, then you render your philosophy a completely irrelevant piece of mental masturbation.  That&#8217;s what.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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	<item>
		<title>By: Russ</title>
		<link>http://archive.mises.org/11383/intellectual-property-and-the-structure-of-human-action/comment-page-2/#comment-648200</link>
		<dc:creator>Russ</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 07 Jan 2010 07:16:37 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.mises.org/archives/011383.asp#comment-648200</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Bala wrote:

&quot;Russ,

&quot; You can&#039;t derive an &quot;ought&quot; from an &quot;is&quot; &quot;

Why?&quot;

Because they are categorically different things.  It would be like trying to derive a mathematical theorem from a kumquat.  An &quot;is&quot;, a statement of fact, is a statement of the way things are.  An &quot;ought&quot;, a value statement, is a statement of a particular person&#039;s view of the way things ought to be.  The very fact that an opinion about the way things ought to be does not necessarily match the way things are, is an indication of the fundamental disconnect between them.  
]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Bala wrote:</p>
<p>&#8220;Russ,</p>
<p>&#8221; You can&#8217;t derive an &#8220;ought&#8221; from an &#8220;is&#8221; &#8221;</p>
<p>Why?&#8221;</p>
<p>Because they are categorically different things.  It would be like trying to derive a mathematical theorem from a kumquat.  An &#8220;is&#8221;, a statement of fact, is a statement of the way things are.  An &#8220;ought&#8221;, a value statement, is a statement of a particular person&#8217;s view of the way things ought to be.  The very fact that an opinion about the way things ought to be does not necessarily match the way things are, is an indication of the fundamental disconnect between them.  </p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: Russ</title>
		<link>http://archive.mises.org/11383/intellectual-property-and-the-structure-of-human-action/comment-page-2/#comment-648196</link>
		<dc:creator>Russ</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 07 Jan 2010 07:01:50 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.mises.org/archives/011383.asp#comment-648196</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Kerem Tibuk wrote:

&quot;Yes you can [derive an &quot;ought&quot; from an &quot;is&quot;].&quot;

Well, I&#039;m not going to get into this argument other than to say that your contention is highly debatable.

&quot;Of course material and immaterial have different natures. But they are all products of man, which has a unique nature and the property theory is based on mans nature.&quot;

Material goods are not always a product of man.  If I find a lump of gold, that was not produced by me, nor by any man.  Picking it up is not the same as producing it.  So, why should it be considered property?  Because it is a *scarce* good.  The only workable way we have come up with of deciding who gets to control scarce goods is property.  It is the attribute of scarcity, not the attribute of being produced by a human, that is important when considering property rights.

Not only are you focusing on the wrong attribute, you are also assuming *a priori* that, when constructing a theory of property rights, the *only* attribute of either material or immaterial goods that is relevant to the discussion is that they are products of man.  

&quot;Should movable and unmoveble goods be treated differently regarding property rights? Or durable and nondurable goods?&quot;

There is no *a priori* reason why movable and non-movable goods should be treated the same.  There is likewise no *a priori* reason why durable and non-durable goods should be treated the same.  Only by considering these differences can we come to the conclusion that these *particular* differences are irrelevant with respect to property.

When one does this with man-made vs. naturally occurring, such as with a lump of gold, one also discovers that this distinction is irrelevant when considering property.

&quot;Kinsella wants to socialize privately produced property thus he is a socialist.&quot;

You are simply assuming that anything privately produced is property; if it is not, then SK isn&#039;t socializing it.  

I will repeat an old argument; hopefully you won&#039;t ignore it this time.  Numbers are the product of man&#039;s mind.  They do not occur in nature.  You cannot show me a three, for instance.  So, should people be able to own particular numbers that they have come up with, that no other individual has ever written down or completely specified before?

&quot;He cant even make distinction between production and reproduction because the individual is meaningless. Only the society that may or may not &quot;grant&quot; certain rights. There is no need for discussion there. Only the issue of honesty or dishonesty.&quot;

Yes.  Your dishonesty.  Nowhere have I ever seen Kinsella say that society grants rights.  You are completely mischaracterizing his argument.  Either you are doing so due to a complete lack of understanding of his argument, or due to malice, I&#039;m not sure which.
]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Kerem Tibuk wrote:</p>
<p>&#8220;Yes you can [derive an "ought" from an "is"].&#8221;</p>
<p>Well, I&#8217;m not going to get into this argument other than to say that your contention is highly debatable.</p>
<p>&#8220;Of course material and immaterial have different natures. But they are all products of man, which has a unique nature and the property theory is based on mans nature.&#8221;</p>
<p>Material goods are not always a product of man.  If I find a lump of gold, that was not produced by me, nor by any man.  Picking it up is not the same as producing it.  So, why should it be considered property?  Because it is a *scarce* good.  The only workable way we have come up with of deciding who gets to control scarce goods is property.  It is the attribute of scarcity, not the attribute of being produced by a human, that is important when considering property rights.</p>
<p>Not only are you focusing on the wrong attribute, you are also assuming *a priori* that, when constructing a theory of property rights, the *only* attribute of either material or immaterial goods that is relevant to the discussion is that they are products of man.  </p>
<p>&#8220;Should movable and unmoveble goods be treated differently regarding property rights? Or durable and nondurable goods?&#8221;</p>
<p>There is no *a priori* reason why movable and non-movable goods should be treated the same.  There is likewise no *a priori* reason why durable and non-durable goods should be treated the same.  Only by considering these differences can we come to the conclusion that these *particular* differences are irrelevant with respect to property.</p>
<p>When one does this with man-made vs. naturally occurring, such as with a lump of gold, one also discovers that this distinction is irrelevant when considering property.</p>
<p>&#8220;Kinsella wants to socialize privately produced property thus he is a socialist.&#8221;</p>
<p>You are simply assuming that anything privately produced is property; if it is not, then SK isn&#8217;t socializing it.  </p>
<p>I will repeat an old argument; hopefully you won&#8217;t ignore it this time.  Numbers are the product of man&#8217;s mind.  They do not occur in nature.  You cannot show me a three, for instance.  So, should people be able to own particular numbers that they have come up with, that no other individual has ever written down or completely specified before?</p>
<p>&#8220;He cant even make distinction between production and reproduction because the individual is meaningless. Only the society that may or may not &#8220;grant&#8221; certain rights. There is no need for discussion there. Only the issue of honesty or dishonesty.&#8221;</p>
<p>Yes.  Your dishonesty.  Nowhere have I ever seen Kinsella say that society grants rights.  You are completely mischaracterizing his argument.  Either you are doing so due to a complete lack of understanding of his argument, or due to malice, I&#8217;m not sure which.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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	<item>
		<title>By: Stephan Kinsella</title>
		<link>http://archive.mises.org/11383/intellectual-property-and-the-structure-of-human-action/comment-page-2/#comment-648192</link>
		<dc:creator>Stephan Kinsella</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 07 Jan 2010 06:53:12 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.mises.org/archives/011383.asp#comment-648192</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Russ: 

&lt;blockquote&gt;

Nah. SK has a point. You can&#039;t derive an &quot;ought&quot; from an &quot;is&quot;, so from a strict point of view, all natural rights or natural law based theories are suspect. (Of course, that includes Rothbard&#039;s theories...)

But SK&#039;s alternative isn&#039;t any better. He tries to derive his theories from basic moral premises that everybody agrees with. The only problem is that not everybody agrees that certain things are *always* wrong. For instance, they might agree that theft is wrong in general, but believe that taxation is necessary, and so either a justified form of theft or not theft at all. So his whole argument falls flat for such people.

In short, he bases his argument on moral absolutes. The only problem is, most people don&#039;t really believe in moral absolutes. Then the argument devolves into him calling these people unprincipled cads, and them calling him an unrealistic dogmatist.

&lt;/blockquote&gt;

Russ, &quot;He tries to derive his theories from basic moral premises that everybody agrees with.&quot;

This is not true. Argumentation Ethics, which I agree with, appeals to moral premises that anyone engaged in normative justification &lt;i&gt;necessarily, does&lt;/i&gt; agree with by virtue of participating in the norm-laden activity of justificatory argumentation. These are not arbitrary nor subjective; they derive from the nature of argumentation itself.

Second, even if I were doing this--so what? As I noted &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.stephankinsella.com/2009/12/01/wombatrons-why-i-am-a-left-libertarian/&quot;&gt;here&lt;/a&gt;, what&#039;s wrong with appealing to the values of peace, prosperity, and justice? So what if &quot;not everybody agrees that certain things are *always* wrong&quot; or &quot;his whole argument falls flat for such people.&quot; So what? There will always be criminals and outlaws, people who don&#039;t share our views of justice. Our arguments will &quot;always fall flat for them&quot;. So what?  I have decided to join the civilized human race. So have you. Among this community of people we can reason and appeal to shared grundnorms. For outlaws, we have to regard them as mere technical problems, dangerous things like wild animals or hurricanes. So what?]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Russ: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Nah. SK has a point. You can&#8217;t derive an &#8220;ought&#8221; from an &#8220;is&#8221;, so from a strict point of view, all natural rights or natural law based theories are suspect. (Of course, that includes Rothbard&#8217;s theories&#8230;)</p>
<p>But SK&#8217;s alternative isn&#8217;t any better. He tries to derive his theories from basic moral premises that everybody agrees with. The only problem is that not everybody agrees that certain things are *always* wrong. For instance, they might agree that theft is wrong in general, but believe that taxation is necessary, and so either a justified form of theft or not theft at all. So his whole argument falls flat for such people.</p>
<p>In short, he bases his argument on moral absolutes. The only problem is, most people don&#8217;t really believe in moral absolutes. Then the argument devolves into him calling these people unprincipled cads, and them calling him an unrealistic dogmatist.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Russ, &#8220;He tries to derive his theories from basic moral premises that everybody agrees with.&#8221;</p>
<p>This is not true. Argumentation Ethics, which I agree with, appeals to moral premises that anyone engaged in normative justification <i>necessarily, does</i> agree with by virtue of participating in the norm-laden activity of justificatory argumentation. These are not arbitrary nor subjective; they derive from the nature of argumentation itself.</p>
<p>Second, even if I were doing this&#8211;so what? As I noted <a href="http://www.stephankinsella.com/2009/12/01/wombatrons-why-i-am-a-left-libertarian/">here</a>, what&#8217;s wrong with appealing to the values of peace, prosperity, and justice? So what if &#8220;not everybody agrees that certain things are *always* wrong&#8221; or &#8220;his whole argument falls flat for such people.&#8221; So what? There will always be criminals and outlaws, people who don&#8217;t share our views of justice. Our arguments will &#8220;always fall flat for them&#8221;. So what?  I have decided to join the civilized human race. So have you. Among this community of people we can reason and appeal to shared grundnorms. For outlaws, we have to regard them as mere technical problems, dangerous things like wild animals or hurricanes. So what?</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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	<item>
		<title>By: Peter Surda</title>
		<link>http://archive.mises.org/11383/intellectual-property-and-the-structure-of-human-action/comment-page-2/#comment-648187</link>
		<dc:creator>Peter Surda</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 07 Jan 2010 06:41:24 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.mises.org/archives/011383.asp#comment-648187</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[@Kerem Tibuk:
&gt; I don&#039;t have natural law theory of IP, just a
&gt; complete theory of property.
You don&#039;t have a theory, just a vague narrative that you repeat like a mantra.

&gt; The difference regarding the nature of the
&gt; product is important in some senses but not
&gt; important regarding rights.
Long time ago I presented you a theory which exactly demonstrated that IP and property are disjunct sets.

Repeating the same nonsense and invoking the morality card does not close the gaps in your logic. Instead it makes you into a preacher.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>@Kerem Tibuk:<br />
> I don&#8217;t have natural law theory of IP, just a<br />
> complete theory of property.<br />
You don&#8217;t have a theory, just a vague narrative that you repeat like a mantra.</p>
<p>> The difference regarding the nature of the<br />
> product is important in some senses but not<br />
> important regarding rights.<br />
Long time ago I presented you a theory which exactly demonstrated that IP and property are disjunct sets.</p>
<p>Repeating the same nonsense and invoking the morality card does not close the gaps in your logic. Instead it makes you into a preacher.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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	<item>
		<title>By: Bala</title>
		<link>http://archive.mises.org/11383/intellectual-property-and-the-structure-of-human-action/comment-page-2/#comment-648186</link>
		<dc:creator>Bala</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 07 Jan 2010 06:39:27 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.mises.org/archives/011383.asp#comment-648186</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Russ,

&quot;   You can&#039;t derive an &quot;ought&quot; from an &quot;is&quot;    &quot;

Why?]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Russ,</p>
<p>&#8221;   You can&#8217;t derive an &#8220;ought&#8221; from an &#8220;is&#8221;    &#8221;</p>
<p>Why?</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: Kerem Tibuk</title>
		<link>http://archive.mises.org/11383/intellectual-property-and-the-structure-of-human-action/comment-page-2/#comment-648184</link>
		<dc:creator>Kerem Tibuk</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 07 Jan 2010 06:24:21 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.mises.org/archives/011383.asp#comment-648184</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Russ,

&quot;You can&#039;t derive an &quot;ought&quot; from an &quot;is&quot;, so from a strict point of view, all natural rights or natural law based theories are suspect. (Of course, that includes Rothbard&#039;s theories...)&quot;

Yes you can. 

&quot;On another note; your &quot;natural law&quot; theory of IP completely ignores the difference in *nature* between material property and intellectual property. &quot;

I don&#039;t have natural law theory of IP, just a complete theory of property.  Of course material and immaterial have different natures.  But they are all products of man, which has a unique nature and the property theory is based on mans nature.

The difference regarding the nature of the product is important in some senses but not important regarding rights.  Otherwise you can also categorize material goods, which have different natures and give them different rights.

Should movable and unmoveble goods be treated differently regarding property rights?  Or durable and nondurable goods?

Kinsella wants to socialize privately produced property thus he is a socialist.  He cant even make distinction between production and reproduction because the individual is meaningless.  Only the society that may or may not &quot;grant&quot; certain rights.  There is no need for discussion there.  Only the issue of honesty or dishonesty]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Russ,</p>
<p>&#8220;You can&#8217;t derive an &#8220;ought&#8221; from an &#8220;is&#8221;, so from a strict point of view, all natural rights or natural law based theories are suspect. (Of course, that includes Rothbard&#8217;s theories&#8230;)&#8221;</p>
<p>Yes you can. </p>
<p>&#8220;On another note; your &#8220;natural law&#8221; theory of IP completely ignores the difference in *nature* between material property and intellectual property. &#8221;</p>
<p>I don&#8217;t have natural law theory of IP, just a complete theory of property.  Of course material and immaterial have different natures.  But they are all products of man, which has a unique nature and the property theory is based on mans nature.</p>
<p>The difference regarding the nature of the product is important in some senses but not important regarding rights.  Otherwise you can also categorize material goods, which have different natures and give them different rights.</p>
<p>Should movable and unmoveble goods be treated differently regarding property rights?  Or durable and nondurable goods?</p>
<p>Kinsella wants to socialize privately produced property thus he is a socialist.  He cant even make distinction between production and reproduction because the individual is meaningless.  Only the society that may or may not &#8220;grant&#8221; certain rights.  There is no need for discussion there.  Only the issue of honesty or dishonesty</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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