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Source link: http://archive.mises.org/10652/tyler-cowen-on-the-implications-of-autism/

Tyler Cowen on the Implications of Autism

September 14, 2009 by

In the course of his discussion of autism, Cowen makes a contribution that readers of The Mises Review will find of great value. He has given us a penetrating and subtle criticism of the use of behavioral economics to support government intervention in the economy. FULL ARTICLE

{ 18 comments }

Mushindo September 14, 2009 at 10:37 am

Interesting perspective. the reference to Robert Nozick’s “experience machine” reminds me of Scott Adams’s prediction in his book ‘the dilbert future’. Wherein he confidently predicted that the future won’t be like Star Trek. Because if it was, hardly anyone would ever leave the holodeck.

As regards the ‘irrationality’ of human decisions, who is anybody to question the rationality of anybody else’s value judgments? Whether they are informed by the neocortex or the amygdala, or any combination of the two, is irrelevant. Its rational from the decision-maker’s perspective, given the information he has at hand.

Ben Ranson September 14, 2009 at 11:20 am

The “autism” that Mr. Gordon discusses in this review appears to have little or no relationship to the standard definition of “autism” found in the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV. I seriously doubt that “Charles Darwin, Gregor Mendel, Thomas Edison, Nikola Tesla, Albert Einstein, Isaac Newton, Samuel Johnson, Vincent van Gogh, Thomas Jefferson, Bertrand Russell, Jonathan Swift, Alan Turing, Paul Dirac, Glenn Gould, Steven Spielberg, and Bill Gates” meet the following criteria:

A. A total of six (or more) items from (1), (2), and (3), with at least two from (1), and one each from (2) and (3)

(1) qualitative impairment in social interaction, as manifested by at least two of the following:

(a) marked impairment in the use of multiple nonverbal behaviors such as eye-to-eye gaze, facial expression, body postures, and gestures to regulate social interaction
(b) failure to develop peer relationships appropriate to developmental level
(c) a lack of spontaneous seeking to share enjoyment, interests, or achievements with other people (e.g., by a lack of showing, bringing, or pointing out objects of interest)
(d) lack of social or emotional reciprocity

(2) qualitative impairments in communication as manifested by at least one of the following:

(a) delay in, or total lack of, the development of spoken language (not accompanied by an attempt to compensate through alternative modes of communication such as gesture or mime)
(b) in individuals with adequate speech, marked impairment in the ability to initiate or sustain a conversation with others
(c) stereotyped and repetitive use of language or idiosyncratic language
(d) lack of varied, spontaneous make-believe play or social imitative play appropriate to developmental level

(3) restricted repetitive and stereotyped patterns of behavior, interests and activities, as manifested by at least two of the following:

(a) encompassing preoccupation with one or more stereotyped and restricted patterns of interest that is abnormal either in intensity or focus
(b) apparently inflexible adherence to specific, nonfunctional routines or rituals
(c) stereotyped and repetitive motor mannerisms (e.g., hand or finger flapping or twisting, or complex whole-body movements)
(d) persistent preoccupation with parts of objects

B. Delays or abnormal functioning in at least one of the following areas, with onset prior to age 3 years: (1) social interaction, (2) language as used in social communication, or (3) symbolic or imaginative play

C. The disturbance is not better accounted for by Rett’s Disorder or Childhood Disintegrative Disorder.

Mel September 14, 2009 at 11:25 am

It seems to me that the arguments (on all sides) are deficient in that they presume static and exclusive distinctions. “True preferences” don’t pre-exist in some Platonic world of forms but are discovered or created by a learning process (such as trial and error or surfing the net). The authentic/real world doesn’t just overlap the imaginary world but seems to be incestuously mixed with it. An objective world is a hypothetical end-result of on-going often-highly-subjective testing or learning and is dependent on imaginative, if not outright imaginary, elements. Our predilection for dividing things into opposites seems to short-change the consideration that 3 categories would work better: objective, subjective, and intersubjective, all conceived dynamically.

Fallon September 14, 2009 at 12:08 pm

My following comment is by no means an attempt to disparage any real suffering. I also apologize beforehand for my lack of empirical or deductive rigor.

Cowen is taking adantage and contributing to the latest fad in psych- autism. Autism is eclipsing the many incarnations of Attention Deficit, which eclipsed general learning disorders, which eclipsed a dyslexia epidemic, which defeated repressed memory hysteria, which pushed aside manic depression, personality disorder, general depression, schizophrenia, psychotic breaks, eating and image problems and, well, last but not least, incurable unlikability.

What would Dr. Szasz say about all this diagnosis inflation? How did humanity ever make it out of the jungle without these discoveries? Maybe someone from Lilly or Pfizer or Merck can set me straight.

The psych industry tries to identify cultural and historical great figures with a new diagnosis in order to manufacture cultural acceptance. How many of you have seen the posters hanging in public schools advertising Lincoln’s depression? Or Einstein’s? Although I do find Lincoln’s believable; albeit, it would leave the question of whether he felt depressed before he decided to mass slaughter Southerners or after.

I am reminded of a parallel fad in college academia where the professors ‘discover’ the previously unknown homosexuality of a great writer. ‘Hemingway was gay after all!’

But Big Pharma knows that billions of dollars are at stake and exploit the temptations of fad.

Cowen shows his elitist stripes by romanticizing Asperger’s- like many successful and smart people have done. It is a way of establishing status without seeming arrogant. ‘See! I have a problem that is not a problem because by having this problem it means I am smarter than you’.

Is Cowen weighing the idea of labelling himself with Asperger’s so that he too may join the ranks of “Charles Darwin, Gregor Mendel, Thomas Edison, Nikola Tesla, Albert Einstein, Isaac Newton, Samuel Johnson, Vincent van Gogh, Thomas Jefferson, Bertrand Russell, Jonathan Swift, Alan Turing, Paul Dirac, Glenn Gould, Steven Spielberg, and Bill Gates”?

Maybe Cowen has discovered the backdoor to genius.

filc September 14, 2009 at 1:05 pm

Fallon, I enjoyed your comment. The entire basis for most modern disorders is that of objectivity and an attempt to classify disorders based on observed behavioral traits.

This works fine when a disorder is more easily identified like Down Syndrome. This is not fine however when the disorder is extremely vague and hard to classify, like ADD/ADHD.

Calling someone disabled for being ADD/ADHD is like calling a red-headed retarded for having red hair. The pediatritians and academic collectivists have put their heads together and arbitrarily decided what behavioral traits are good and what are bad. If you sit outside of that conformity you must be mentally disabled. As if somehow these men know how every individual person SHOULD act. Heaven forbid we have diversity. :)

Rather then let the free market determine what skills are desirable and what behavioral traits are in demand we let a group collectivists with power from the state fabricate new disorders on a yearly basis.

I’m going to write an essay about next year.

Mike D. September 14, 2009 at 1:08 pm

Ben
You might find Tyler’s article more understandable if you use the definition for Asperger’s instead of autism.
The DSM IV criteria for Asperger’s Syndrome are:

(I) Qualitative impairment in social interaction, as manifested by at least two of the following:
(A) marked impairments in the use of multiple nonverbal behaviors such as eye-to-eye gaze, facial expression, body posture, and gestures to regulate social interaction
(B) failure to develop peer relationships appropriate to developmental level
(C) a lack of spontaneous seeking to share enjoyment, interest or achievements with other people, (e.g.. by a lack of showing, bringing, or pointing out objects of interest to other people)
(D) lack of social or emotional reciprocity
(II) Restricted repetitive & stereotyped patterns of behavior, interests and activities, as manifested by at least one of the following:
(A) encompassing preoccupation with one or more stereotyped and restricted patterns of interest that is abnormal either in intensity or focus
(B) apparently inflexible adherence to specific, nonfunctional routines or rituals
(C) stereotyped and repetitive motor mannerisms (e.g. hand or finger flapping or twisting, or complex whole-body movements)
(D) persistent preoccupation with parts of objects

(III) The disturbance causes clinically significant impairments in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning.

(IV) There is no clinically significant general delay in language (E.G. single words used by age 2 years, communicative phrases used by age 3 years)

(V) There is no clinically significant delay in cognitive development or in the development of age-appropriate self help skills, adaptive behavior (other than in social interaction) and curiosity about the environment in childhood.

(VI) Criteria are not met for another specific Pervasive Developmental Disorder or Schizophrenia.”
This ties in with the latest fad to classify very smart kids with ADHD as having Asperger’s. The implications are the same – if a kid has symptoms of ADHD, treat him/(or her) with medication for ADHD, whether they have ADHD or not. If they have symptoms of Asperger’s, treat them for Asperger’s. This is just a lazy way of prescribing a treatment without ascertaining the underlying cause.

Caveman September 14, 2009 at 4:59 pm

Cowen shows his elitist stripes by romanticizing Asperger’s- like many successful and smart people have done. It is a way of establishing status without seeming arrogant. ‘See! I have a problem that is not a problem because by having this problem it means I am smarter than you’.

Fallon, your point is well taken. I’ve encountered a number of smart people in the last 5-6 years who use (undiagnosed) Asperger’s as a convenient excuse for anti-social behavior. Though more discrete, their explanations usually take the form “I’m not an arrogant, self-absorbed, unfeeling jerk. I have the genius disease!”

Sean September 14, 2009 at 5:43 pm

It is perhaps relevant to note that the term ‘autism’ originated as a descriptive term indicating inward-directed thought, or thought separated from standard ‘public’ reality. In this sense many things are autistic, such as dreams, daydreams, hallucinations. Eugen Bleuler coined the term to describe schizophrenia (a term he also coined). He was the head of the Burghölzli psychiatric clinic in Zurich, with young C. G. Jung under him. There are theories linking this kind of “autistic” thinking is the source of creative thinking. In a sense this is self-evident since an act of creativity can’t come from something we learn. All external influences have already been created. The creation must come from outside the domain of public symbols. This idea is most pronounced in Jung (see for instance, “Two Kinds of Thinking” in the book Symbols of Transformation), but can be found in others such as developmental psychologist Piaget. I think Mr. Gordon is right to point out that Cowen is focusing on just this characteristic of the autistic diagnosis, that is, its “inwardness” or “separateness” from public symbols and norms, but as he says, this is not particular to autism. I am personally familiar with numerous children diagnosed as autistic/Asperger’s. Although it is true that their conceptual systems are different and novel, this in itself does not make any particular novel perception/belief valuable. One child I know will frequently claim that he is in trouble, needs to be in “time-out”, and erupts in emotional turmoil, even when no adult has criticized him in the least (although it is quite possible he is interpreting some subtle non-verbal cues). The other night I had a “creative classification” upon waking up perceiving that I was physically merged with my bed, and hence, unable to move. This was decidedly unpleasant, although mildly creative. I would not be surprised if the Obama “health”care bill had a provision to force me onto anti-psychotic medication for this experiential indiscretion on the part of my psyche. But, hey, that will help the economy by giving someone a job, right? And if I quote Bastiat they can say that I am insane–after all I just said that I had become one with my mattress.

Sean September 14, 2009 at 5:45 pm

It is perhaps relevant to note that the term ‘autism’ originated as a descriptive term indicating inward-directed thought, or thought separated from standard ‘public’ reality. In this sense many things are autistic, such as dreams, daydreams, hallucinations. Eugen Bleuler coined the term to describe schizophrenia (a term he also coined). He was the head of the Burghölzli psychiatric clinic in Zurich, with young C. G. Jung under him. There are theories linking this kind of “autistic” thinking is the source of creative thinking. In a sense this is self-evident since an act of creativity can’t come from something we learn. All external influences have already been created. The creation must come from outside the domain of public symbols. This idea is most pronounced in Jung (see for instance, “Two Kinds of Thinking” in the book Symbols of Transformation), but can be found in others such as developmental psychologist Piaget. I think Mr. Gordon is right to point out that Cowen is focusing on just this characteristic of the autistic diagnosis, that is, its “inwardness” or “separateness” from public symbols and norms, but as he says, this is not particular to autism. I am personally familiar with numerous children diagnosed as autistic/Asperger’s. Although it is true that their conceptual systems are different and novel, this in itself does not make any particular novel perception/belief valuable. One child I know will frequently claim that he is in trouble, needs to be in “time-out”, and erupts in emotional turmoil, even when no adult has criticized him in the least (although it is quite possible he is interpreting some subtle non-verbal cues). The other night I had a “creative classification” upon waking up perceiving that I was physically merged with my bed, and hence, unable to move. This was decidedly unpleasant, although mildly creative. I would not be surprised if the Obama “health”care bill had a provision to force me onto anti-psychotic medication for this experiential indiscretion on the part of my psyche. But, hey, that will help the economy by giving someone a job, right? And if I quote Bastiat they can say that I am insane–after all I just said that I had become one with my mattress.

Ken September 14, 2009 at 9:39 pm

I rather like the idiosyncratic choice angle. I wish I could remember who it was — it may have been Claes Fornell, but I’m not sure — who said something along the lines that human freedom may lie in unexplained variance.

USA Today September 15, 2009 at 10:52 am

Cavemen,

As if society was not “self” absorbed nor unfeeling about the damage it does to individuals when it forcefully extorts wealth and obedience from individuals.

You can keep your anti-social accusations when we live in a libertarian society.

Until then, I will conclude that a lot of those deemed anti-social are just reacting and defending themselves against a predatory society.

A sheep defending intself would look “anti-social” in the middle of a wolf-pack !

USA Today September 15, 2009 at 11:01 am

Sean,

Keep those things for yourself and never tell anyone about it if you want to remain free and safe.

Disclosure of those experiences will result in loss of freedom and safety.

Once you are even suspected of mental illness, you cease to be a human being and you are deemed a defunct animal and you loose all human rights.

The right to freedom, life and pursuit of happiness is gone.

Never tell anyone. Coercive psychiatry has got the be the most cruel thing ever invented by man.

It’s like middle-age spanish inquisition and witch-hunt.

Sean September 15, 2009 at 5:06 pm

First, I apologize to other readers for posting my other comment twice.

USA Today,

Thanks for the advice. I am in total agreement on coercive psychiatry. Most psychiatry is coercive, and always has been. I did not intend to make light of this horrible fact. If there is anything that deserves to be called a mental (and social) illness, it is government. Its main symptoms (or synonyms?) would be sociopathy, megalomania, and sadism. Government exists in a region of the universe called Cloud-Cuckoo Land, in a large, rotating, spherical building called the Death Star. Self-righteous vampires run it. They are occasionally shocked to discover that people get angry at them for their murderous, parasitic, and delusional behaviors.

Alexander S. Peak September 15, 2009 at 5:15 pm

Interesting. I’ve considered before the possibility (and I think probability) that those with Aspergers may tend to have a greater number of libertarians percentagewise amongst them than those with much less autistic tendencies on the autism spectrum. The two people I know personally who have been diagnosed with Aspergers are both, in fact, libertarians, and there is another libertarian I know besides these two that I am absolutely convinced also has the syndrome. I must admit that I’ve wondered from time to time whether I, too, may have the condition. (Two friends are convinced I do, but I am far less convinced.) And I’d heard the rumour before that Jefferson likely also had Aspergers.

I do not think this is one of Mr. Gordon’s better pieces. Regarding the Nozick Machine, I would first question, how can we be sure that one would not prefer it to reality. I would then ask, why does a person’s subjective preference prove anything about objective reality? Even if few have the subjective preference to spend more time within the machine than without, or more radically, to spend all time within the machine, does this prove that the person’s subjective preference is based on some objectively rational position or fact? Of course not. Mr. Gordon wishes to say that it is objectively true that “value cannot be reduced to subjective experience” (whatever this mean), yet bases this on something entirely subjective: human preference.

Yet, some humans prefer to act aggressively, which is of course irrational. Moreover, humans base decisions on all sorts of crazy, pointless, stupidly irrelevent conditions, most of the time without even being mildly aware of the influence these conditions are having on the decision-making. Merely holding for a couple second a warm cup of coffee or a cold glass of soda can have an impact on one’s decisions many minutes later. And history is chuck full of evils perpetrated against people, against the native Americans, against the Jews, etc. None of these can be considered the least bit rational by any rational man, yet these actions take place, which shows that people have preference for taking these actions.

So even if most people choose to never plug in to the Nozick Machine, this doesn’t make their preference necessarily rational and certainly doesn’t make it somehow objectively rational, founded on some true or accurate understanding of value. It just means they subjectively believe that the experiences found in the Nozick Machine are somehow less real or less important.

This isn’t to say I necessarily disagree with Gordon or Nozick on the matter, only that this thought experiment doesn’t prove or even show anything.

(DISCLAIMER: Although I confidently declare the actions of others to be irrational, this is not meant to imply support for the sort of “libertarian paternalism” that Gordon correctly argues against. Only those irrational actions that constitute aggression should be restrained, not all irrational actions.)

Dear Caveman,

Those with Aspergers are not anti-social, or even unfeeling. They simply are less able to express their feelings, and have difficulty in social situations. Being socially-awkward or even unsocial is very different from being anti-social.

Sincerely yours,
Alex Peak

newson September 15, 2009 at 6:40 pm

to usa today:
you should watch “the changeling”, directed by clint eastwood. the happy union of psychiatry and the lapd.

David Gordon September 15, 2009 at 9:30 pm

Alexander Peak raises two excellent objections to my discussion of Nozick’s experience machine, but I think they are both mistaken. They are best addressed in the opposite order from the one he gives. He inquires, why does one’s subjective preference to enter the machine or not show anything about what it is objectively rational to do? This question rests on a misunderstanding of the point of the experience machine. Some people claim that all we in fact care about as ends is how certain experiences feel from the inside. When, e.g., I say that I like ice cream, what I mean is that I like certain sensations, those that I typically get from eating ice cream. Is this claim, i.e., that all we value as ends is experiences from the inside, always true? This question is not about what we ought rationally to prefer, but what we do in fact prefer. If we don’t choose to enter the machine, then, Nozick says, the claim is false.

This brings us to Mr. Peak’s first objection. What if we say we wouldn’t enter the machine, but we are mistaken about this? I take this to mean, what if, were one actually presented with the machine, one chose to enter it, despite one’s opinion now that one wouldn’t enter the machine. Here Mr. Peak has misunderstood Nozick’s claim. He is not formulating a hypothesis about what we would choose in a very unlikely to arise situation. He has devised a thought experiment to help us grasp what preferences we have in the actual world, where experience machines do not exist. The relevant question for his purpose is what we now say about entering the machine, not what we would say if there actually were such a machine.

Alexander S. Peak September 16, 2009 at 1:29 am

Mr. Gordon,

I’ll comment first on my first objection, because I believe that I was unclear as to exactly what I was objecting. My point wasn’t so much that one would change her or his mind upon encountering the experience machine, although this is certainly possible. Rather, my objection is that Nozick appears to simply assume people would prefer to reject it. Without seeing some polling on the matter, I see no reason to assume the opposite could not be true, viz that perhaps most people would prefer to spend most or all of their time within the experience machine.

The only reason I can think why anyone would want to spend any time outside of the experience machine is the friendships they have made in our world. If I have a large number of friends, or even very few friends but friends who are nevertheless close, I may value the time I spend with them and consider any replicas of them created within the experience machine too fictional or fabricated. (For example, how can I know that friend X would react in the real world in the same way her replica does within the experience machine?) But this problem might be solved if multiple minds could be plugged into the same experience machine simultaneously (a la The Matrix). If I and a woman I love can both experience the same fabricated reality (with no war, disease, violence, or government) within Nozick’s machine and interact with one another there, I have grave doubts I would ever leave. And if I did, it would likely be for short stints, e.g., for the purpose of finding old friends and encouraging them to plug into the experience machine so as to enjoy a vacasion with my loved-one and I.

Perhaps I am rare in this regard. But perhaps not. Either way, I fear it is a mistake to assume either that I am indeed rare in this regard or that most would share in my response to such technology. I am not convinced that we know enough about human nature to make a decent guess as to which response would be more popular, which in some ways lead me to your other point, or my second objection.

Admittedly, in providing this response thus, I have make clear, using myself as the subject, the very point I believe you are attempting to stress regarding values. I have said that I value my experiences with those I know and made clear that I do not think the experiences I would have within the experience machine would be “the same” unless the actual persons whose friendships and love I value are actually present with me, rather than mere replicas thereof as created by the machine. This is because I cannot help but to see individuals as unique, and have already cultivated various friendships and love with certain unique individuals. (A couple dreams (1, 2) I had last year provided similar philosophical insight.) So, perhaps this alone proves your point.

Still, I cannot help but to think that one who has no friends would have no attachment to this world whatsoever, and would almost universally choose the world of the experience machine. Further, I suspect that one who cultivates a friendship with replica Y in the experience machive would have more attachment to the replica than to the actual person Y upon whom the replica was based (should our subject ever discover that his experience-machine buddy was designed after a real person). I dount we could convince our subject that replica Y (or Y’s memories) is somehow “unreal” simply because Y is unable to unplug herself from the machine. Rather, the subject would, I suspect, see replica Y as being just as real as himself, but simply unable to commit an action that he himself has no desire to commit. And certainly he would have no emotional attachment to the actual Y since the actual Y would have no memory of interaction with the subject, and is thus in a very real sense a different person altogether.

(I should note that I do not mean to assume that all experiences within the experience machine would need to be social, or that the experience “people” would have to be realistic. One could just as easily have preference for the unrealistic. Although I’m afraid I’m running off on a tangent here.)

Now, perhaps I’m wrong about this. Perhaps very few would find friendships made within the machine at all valuable or “real.” Obviously, I’ve done none of my own polling, and it’s quite possible that I am filtering all of this through my own hierarchy of preferences, thereby reaching a biased conclusion. I hope this is not the case, but I cannot shake the feeling that it possibly is.

In any event, I’ll certainly admit that it is false to say that all people perceive themselves as valuing, “as ends…experiences from the inside.” But I likewise have to reject the perspective that no one does. What seems most probable is that some perceive themselves to value experiences in this way, and others do not. But perception of valuation is all one can garner by considering this thought experiment. It does not seem that anyone can determine whether one truly only values experiences from the inside or not, since knowledge intermingles with our subjective biases on the subject. Although I perceive my love for my friends as having some importance to me external from my purely internal experiences, this is still nevertheless simply a perception I have, an internal bias that informs my decision-making. Thus, I must stand behind my former conclusion that “this thought experiment doesn’t prove or even show anything.”

Sincerely yours,
Alex Peak

P.S. It dawned on me that an alternative thought experiment could be developed here. Let us say that you have many friends and, although not a perfect life, a life that you enjoy to the average degree. Let’s say then you encounter someone who explains that your whole life has been within a machine, and this person tells you that all of your friends are “unreal.” You have the ability to exit this fictional reality and enter the real reality if you wish. Would you? Or would you prefer to continue interacting with your friends who, to you, are perfectly real and with whom you share emotional attachments? I have to suspect that most would have a hard time writing off their “unreal” friends for the supposedly “more real” reality, although once again I admit this may just be my biased hierarchy of preferences blinding me to how other humans would react.

Alexander S. Peak September 16, 2009 at 1:52 am

P.P.S. I do not wish to imply that I do not see anything as objective, as I do believe natural law is objective and that its precepts are binding upon all persons.

Nor even do I wish to imply that Mr. Gordon is necessarily wrong in his belief that “value cannot be reduced to subjective experience.” Merely my point is to argue in favour of a scepticism that any thought experiment (or even polling) can stand as proof one way or the other on this matter. I do believe that all valuations that can ever be made are necessarily made subjectively, but I do not believe that it is against this view that Mr. Gordon is arguing.

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