In the present system, the more unrestricted the banks are, the more money they can generate “out of thin air,” and the more damage they can inflict upon the wealth-generation process. FULL ARTICLE by Frank Shostak
Source link: http://archive.mises.org/11679/does-it-make-sense-to-resurrect-the-glass-steagall-act/
Does It Make Sense to Resurrect the Glass-Steagall Act?
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So it is quite likely that in a free-market economy the threat of bankruptcy will bring to a minimum the practice of fractional-reserve banking.
Which means that in order to increase it’s reserves, banks would have to pay higher interest rates, to attract savers.
But today, not only to banks pay NO interests (0.25% interest is a complete joke) but they charge fees for everything and even for nothing.
The reason they can do this is they know that you cannot put your money under the mattress, inflation is so high that banks don’t have to pay you interests, you can’t go elsewhere.
Plus, all the government laws that forbids you to pay in cash more than $10,000 etc. Or that forbids you to get paid in cash when you work for an employer.
The government forces you to use paperwork and that requires to use bank services.
Basically, the government is making it impossible for joe average to save money.
I agree: if banks are to be allowed direct access to the Fed and easy credit, their ability to provide loans must be curtailed. But, does this regulation do that?
Why not simply raise the reserve requirement?
This is not my understanding of the “repeal” of Glass-Steagall. The portion of that act that allowed commercial banks to affiliate with bank holding companies that underwrite and trade in securities. The provisions that forbid commercial banks from themselves underwriting and trading in securities remain in effect. The only underwriting they can do, as before, involves the safest securities, including GSE ones. Thus the banks’ activities vis-a-vis mortgage-backed securities could have gone on regardless of what was done with Glass-Steagall.
Moreover, commercial banks can acquire securities because they believe they are good investments to hold, not for the purpose of trading. The “repeal” of Glass-Steagall did not transform commercial banks into investment banks.
Sorry, an incomplete sentence in the above: “The portion of that act that allowed commercial banks to affiliate with bank holding companies that underwrite and trade in securities” should end with the words “was repealed.”
I get questioned all the time about “free-market” banking prior to 1913 and the larger “boom-bust cycles” that occurred before The Fed was instituted when I argue the “free-market” banking issue. How can we explain this to Central Banking proponents in simple terms so that they’ll SEE the logic of free-market banking?
addendum:
I get a lot of comments about The Fed having DECREASED the severity of “boom-busts” since it’s inception, but when I bring up 2008/2009 or the 95% value decrease of the dollar, it’s dismissed.
Dr. Woods,
My only real complaint with Meltdown is that it made no mention of Glass-Steagall. Given that the mainstream economists in large measure point their finger in the direction of Glass-Steagall’s repeal as being the culprit responsible for the financial crisis – regardless of the merits of the charge – I am convinced that failing to mention the regulation or its repeal was an oversight that requires correction. This notion was reinforced by the reactions of three individuals to whom I lent the book which, distilled, expressed incredulity in Meltdown’s entire thesis based on the absence of any such commentary at all.
I meant to ask you about it when I was fortunate enough to meet you in Seattle last year, but at the last minute I was, apparently, sideswiped by your rock stardom. I notice you’ve been addressing Glass-Steagall in much of your recent commentary, so I’m pretty sure I’m just fulfilling a role as an echo chamber here because it seems like you’ve encountered this complaint before. I just think that Meltdown doesn’t fully succeed at persuading an individual beholden to the conventional view because they expect to see in a truly persuasive text an accounting of their favorite scapegoat.
Don’t think for a second, of course, that I’m beholden to that point of view. Not at all. But to be truly effective, I think Meltdown would have benefited from, at the least, shining a brief spotlight on the arguments of the mainstream towards the repeal view and a rebuttal.
Robert (if I may), I agree with you completely. I have a book coming out in January 2011 whose discussion of the crisis includes analysis of these arguments. In the meantime, if you’d like some citations, write to me.
All of the attacks on fractional reserve banking that appear on these pages fail to mention a beneficial effect: compulsory savings and investment. The fiduciary media goes to investors first, not consumers. Would there be more savings and investing or less if there was no fractional reserve banking?
David, if we agreed with Keynes that printing up money and lending it out is “just as genuine as any other savings,” we might be able to consider this alleged benefit. It is because fiduciary media does not constitute or represent real savings that the problem arises.
@David Roemer
Investment and saving are two different things. Saving is the forgoing of consumption. Investment is a category of consumption. The purpose of fractional reserve banking is to facilitate investment without the need for saving.
Putting aside why you think compulsion is good in the first place, why do you believe fractional reserve imposes compulsory savings?
Of course, nary a word from the pols that they might have screwed up by giving investment banks access to deposits while leaving intact federal deposit insurance…
Regarding Meltdown and Glass-Steagall:
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac bought mortgages from commercial banks, securitized them, and sold securities to investment banks, correct? How would Glass-Steagall have prevented this?
Daniel: I don’t think it would have. I don’t think Robert thinks so, either. I think his point is that I should at least have addressed the claim.
The meltdown went well beyond the banking industry and has it’s roots in the insurance industry. It was the mortgage insurance policies that allowed underwriters to approve those sub-prime loans. It was the insurance companies that did not have the reserves that got the ball rolling.
Insurance companies like AIG were basically selling a naked put at a strike price that they thought would never be reached. And when prices fell well below that strike price, they could not cover and the bank holding the insurance policy was left out in the cold.
The market system is not without faults. There are abuses in market actions as well. For example, I know of firms that don’t pay bonus. Instead they leak insider information to allow their employees to trade on them for additional income. And if you believe Goldman Sachs was smarter than the rest with their timing in the markets prior to the meltdown, then you are not living in the real world.
Anyway, the whole mess goes beyond the Fed, banks, insurance, markets and the government. The problem is that we can address some of the problems, but not all of them.
Proprietary trading had absolutely nothing to do with the current financial crisis. Very few banks practice proprietary trading and the few who do earn a very trivial amount of their total revenue from it. Hell, even Volcker is aware of this. Secondly, the only “systematic” risk was the one created by the state when it decided to use financial regulation to outsource much power to credit ratings agencies who had every incentive to give mortgage-backed securities an AAA or AA rating. A bank or any fund is regulated(both de jure and de facto) on how much reserves that they have backed up for every given financial instrument that they are holding.
greg,
There’s absolutely nothing wrong with a credit default swap theoretically. The problem arises when many financial institutions are holding mbs’s. Besides, it was regulators that told financial institutions to have a certain amount of CDS to offset the risk in mortgage backed-securities. CDS also could have predicted the stability of what they insured better than the give credit rating agencies’ assessments.
Besides, why don’t we really repeal Glass-Steagall and get rid of deposit insurance?
Brian Rutledge>”free-market” banking prior to 1913 and the larger “boom-bust cycles” that occurred before The Fed
There was NEVER free mkt banking in the US, merely different extents and mixes of govt intervention. The alleged free banking era included state regs. See Rothbard’s free, online, _History of Money & Banking in the US_ (ignore his intermittent, tedious, Marxist, concern with influences among businessmen) and Richard Timberlake’s (technical) study of the ideas justifying intervention, _Monetary Policy in the United States: An Intellectual and Institutional History_. Rothbard identifies bank bailouts in the colonial era. These two books make monkeys out of mainstream voices.
I don’t recall whether the socialist boom-and-bust cycle was bigger pre-Fed but the intervention was smaller.
Personally, any control that Glass-Steagall may give to the banking system I see as possibly a negative thing. The charade that is our banking system has been loosing it’s credibility with people this past year, and any such band-aid measure might be a way of diverting attention from the root problem, and give people a false sense of security. If we look at the time that Glass-Steagall was in force, we had plenty of boom-bust cycles. Won’t this just be like putting another patch on a weak tire? Sure, the place where the patch is will less likely burst, but what about the rest of the tire?
those interested in a counterpoint may care to read:
http://mises.org/journals/qjae/pdf/qjae1_1_1.pdf
regardless whether glass steagall was effective or not, i think the shostak/rothbard point is correct. the system is a rort, and controlling it reaffirms that belief with the public.
Glass-Steagall wasn’t repealed.
My understanding is that even left-wing economists who opposed Gramm-Leach-Bliley don’t blame it for the crash. Many righties view the CRA similarly.
Robert Brager: When you are writing a book, you surely can not see all things that commes to mater later. I am sure, that GSA is just one of more pieces, and weight of every piece deppends on everyones wisdom and amount of propaganda he absorbed. If Dr Woods commes with Meltdown 2.0 addressing everything raised until today, tomorrows news would make it nonsense for anyone wanting to stay in dream…
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